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Zusammenfassung
In den neunziger Jahren ist vom Begriff 'Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsiden-
tität' im sicherheitspolitischem Diskurs fleißig gebrauch gemacht worden. Vorstellungen
darüber wie das Verhältnis zwischen der NATO und der EU zu gestallten sei und welche
Rolle der jeweiligen Organisation zukommen soll, führt jedoch zu einer Dissens hinsichtlich
der Frage was sich hinter dem Kürzel ESVI (bzw. ESDI) verbirgt.
Die Attraktion diesen Begriff als Ausgangspunkt für die Studie zu benutzen liegt darin, dass
er mehrere konzeptionelle Veränderungen des Begriffs Sicherheit beinhaltet, die sich in der
akademischen Welt kurz nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer durchsetzten. In dem diese Studie
der Frage nach geht in wie weit sich eine ESVI in der NATO und der EU herausgebildet hat
und woraus diese bestehet, lassen sich Schlussfolgerungen darüber ziehen wie Sicherheit
gedacht und produziert wird. Dabei werden insbesondere zwei Aspekte ins Auge gefasst.
Erstens geht es darum in wie weit sich tatsächlich ein Verständnis von Sicherheit durchge-
setzt hat, das militärische, kriminelle und ökonomische Bedrohungen nicht getrennt, sondern
als Teile eines Ganzen behandelt werden. Häufiger Hinweise auf einen umfassenden Sicher-
heitsbegriff zu trotz, belegt die Studie, dass unterschiedliche politische Instrumente weiterhin
von getrennten Entscheidungsprozessen gelenkt werden. Ein Ereignis wird demnach zerlegt,
und unterschiedliche Bedrohungsaspekte von verschiedenen Sparten in mehreren
Entscheidungsprozessen gesondert behandelt.
Zweitens, stellt sich die Frage ob Sicherheit in Europa als unteilbar gesehen wird. Tritt Eu-
ropa in ein 'post-Westfälisches' oder 'post-national-staatliches' Sicherheitszeitalter ein? Die
Momentaufnahme des aktuellen Standes zeugt von einer schwach entwickelten ESVI die
nicht im Widerspruch zu Nationalen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungs- Identitäten steht, son-
dern diese ergänzt. Obwohl Nationalen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungs- Identitäten weiterhin
eindeutig dominieren, wird eine langsame und bescheidene Weiterentwicklung der ESVI in
der EU prognostiziert. Die NATO hingegen, wird bemüht sein, ihre ESVI zu erhalten.
Neben Souveränitätsansprüchen der Mitgliedstaaten hindern vor allem die geografisch un-
terschiedlich ausgelegten Sicherheitsinteressen der Mitgliedstaaten die Weiterentwicklung der
ESVI (was gleichzeitig auch den Mangel einer ESVI widerspiegelt). Dies kommt besonders im
militärischen Kontext zum Vorschein, wo sich die ESVI auf das Euro-atlantische Gebiet
beschränkt. Demnach müssen Mitgliedstaaten mit globalen Sicherheitsinteressen diese außer-
halb der Organisationen wahrnehmen, im Rahmen der UN wenn möglich oder im Alleingang
(vorzugsweise in einer 'coallition of the willing') wenn nötig. Sowohl im Inland als auch im
Ausland wird dadurch die Vorstellung genährt, dass der betroffene Staat alleine für die Si-
cherheit verantwortlich ist, und verantwortlich zu machen ist. Damit wird der ESVI ent-
gegengewirkt.
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11 Introduction
GENESIS AND 'ABUSE' OF THE TERM ESDI
Although the term 'European Security and Defence Identity' (ESDI) did not appear in official
documents until 1991,1 the notion of an ESDI cannot be thought of as originating in the revo-
lutionary events of 1989/90. It does not even represent a new line of thought. The end of the
East-West Conflict simply gave new impetus to old ideas that can be traced back to the initiative
of the European Defence Community, Winston Churchill, Count Richard N. Coudenhove-
Kalergi, Victor Hugo, Emanuel Kant, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre or even further back, although
under different labels.2
From a political perspective, the term ESDI proved useful and was frequently employed in the
discourse on the future European Security architecture throughout the 1990s. The expression
has a positive ring, without being, nor needing to be, clearly defined. As a vague term it left a
broad space open for interpretations, could reconcile various opinions and be applied in interna-
tional politics to suggest a more extensive consensus among participating governments then their
actual positions reflected. In addition, it could calm negative reactions. Thus, diverse representa-
tives of governments and international organisations used the expression ESDI for various rea-
sons and with different stresses, without anyone delivering a precise clarification of what they
really meant by an ESDI. In the beginning, the term ESDI was used to circumscribe the proc-
esses within the WEU, the EU and/or Alliance in which the Europeans sought to take a greater
share of responsibility for their security.3 At that time, member states of the EU, WEU and
NATO had either vague or differing ideas about how this could be accomplished. Since an in-
creasing European role in security policies implied growing European autonomy, this develop-
ment was seen as an opportunity at the same time as it raised some concern. The risk of a trans-
atlantic drift apart was apparent. In an attempt to prevent a transatlantic split and to tie the on-
going European development to the Alliance, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 'hijacked' the
term ESDI at its 1996 Berlin summit. With the formula 'ESDI within the Alliance' the phrase
mutated into a technical term that bore the Alliance's imprint.4 Of course, this nomenclatural
manoeuvre did not dissolve differences among the member states, nor did it prevent the militari-
sation of the Union. The result was simply that the term ESDI has been applied ever since to
describe an internal NATO development, and that an additional term was introduced for the
development within the EU - the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
This development is also reflected in the literature. Before 1996, the term ESDI was used to
recapitulate the bi- and multilateral institutional build-up in and between NATO, WEU and
EU; and after 1996 more specifically to describe the strengthening of the European pillar within
                                                          
1 The first official document that utilised the term was the WEU Council of Ministers, Presidency's conclusions: WEU's role and place in the
new European security architecture, Paris, 22.02.1991, article 9.
2 An informing collection of earlier concepts of a European unification is provided by Foerster, Rolf (ed.), Die Idee Europa 1300-1946: Quellen
zur Geschichte der politischen Einigung, Munich 1963. See also chapter 2 in McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union: A concise
Introduction, Basingstoke 1999. An informing history of Europe as an idea is presented by Heikki, Mikkeli, Europe as an Idea and an Identity,
London 1998.
3 The three organisations' own utilisation of the term has varied. The Alliance, for instance, began by referring to the process within the EU when
speaking of the "development of a European Identity in the domain of security". See NAC, Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance. London, 06.07.1990, article 3. Shortly after the expression "The European security identity and defence role" was used to address the
"construction of a European pillar within the Alliance". See for instance NAC, Communiquée. Brussels, 18.12.1990, article 5. After this, the
ESDI was used to describe the parallel process within all three organisations. See NAC, Final Communiqué, Copenhagen, 07.06.1991, article 1-
3; See also NAC, Declaration on Peace and Co-operation, Rome, 08.11.1991, article 6-8. NAC, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Rome,
08.11.1991, article 36.
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the Alliance.5 This technical use of the term leaves what I consider the most interesting aspects
insufficiently addressed. The expression has much more to offer. The literature does not question
to what extent the current cooperation actually results in, or reflects, an ESDI. The ESDI has
been presented and spoken of as a social fact, without anyone scrutinising if what the term is
used for, namely to describe the ongoing European integration in the field of security, does jus-
tice to the expression's constituent words. The use of the term has not been disputed. As we all
know, a label does not necessarily have to match the contents. Developing a shared European
identity in security matters proposes the creation of a pan-European security community, and
therefore a new way of conceiving security. In contrast to the traditional concept of national
security, an ESDI suggests that security is understood and thought of as pan-European security.6
This study investigates to what extent such a change in 'thinking about security' has taken place
in Europe. The central question is therefore:
- 'To what extent does an ESDI presently exist, and what is its nature?'
THE APPEAL OF THE TERM ESDI
The attraction of using the term ESDI as a starting point for this analysis is explained by the
fact that it typifies the academic alterations in the conceptualisation of security that seemed to
gain momentum shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, when the term was introduced.7 I am
not suggesting that these changes originated in the fall of the wall and the rapid disintegration of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Rather, these events provided a shock that, in combina-
tion with the intensified European integration processes, accelerated the discussion of a new se-
curity concept. The question is to what extent policy makers share this new way of thinking se-
curity, and what their altered security concepts look like. Is an ESDI reflected in political reality?
The term ESDI embraces several conceptual alterations. To begin with, the inclusion of the
words 'security' and 'defence' in the phrase suggests an understanding of security that stretches
beyond the military context. This reflects the modification of the European security agenda that
followed the end of the East-West conflict. Before 1990, all policies were more or less subordi-
nated to this bipolar confrontation. The block antagonism and the threat of mutual annihilation
determined the limits of the political room for manoeuvre. All other issues were thus inferior and
set in relation to military power balancing, which was seen as the only way to guarantee each
state's own and the whole world's survival. Security was therefore mainly thought of in terms of
military security, and security studies conceived as strategic studies.8 The opposite or antonym of
security was war, and the word peace used as a synonym for security. Following the collapse of
the bipolar order, the military dimension lost its monopolistic position as determinant of secu-
                                                                                                                                                       
4 The Alliance applied this formula for the first time in the document NAC Ministerial Meeting, Final Communiqué, Berlin, 03.06.1996, article
2 and 7.
5 See for instance: Marauhn, Thilo, Building a European security and defence identity: The evolving relationship between the Western European
Union and the European Union, Bochum. 1996; Bailes, Alyson, 'NATO's European Pillar: The European Security and Defence Identity', in
Defense Analysis, vol. 15, no. 3, 1999; Defence-Eighth Report ordered by the House of Commons April 2000. Posted 29.08.2000; Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies, International Security Review.1997, p. 1-18; See also Yost, David, 'France and West European Defence
Identity', in Survival, Nr. 4, Juli/August 1991, p. 327-351; Fröhlich, Stefan, 'Der Ausbau der europäischen Verteidigungsidentität zwischen
WEU und NATO', in Zei Discussion Paper. nr. C19, 1998; Varwick, Johannes, Sicherheit und Integration in Europa. Zur Renaissance der
Westeuropäischen Union. Opladen. 1998; Larrabee, Stephen (RAND), The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American
interests, prepared statement for a hearing before the Committee On Foreign Relations, Subcommittee On European Affairs United States
Senate, Washington, D.C. March 9, 2000.
6 The terms 'European' and 'pan-European' are utilised as synonyms throughout the study.
7 For an excellent overview of the conceptual transformation see McSweeney, Bill, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International
Relations, Cambridge 1999. See also Tarry, Sarah, 'Deepening and Widening: An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s', in Journal of
military and strategic studies, Fall 1999; For different historical conceptions of security see Rotschild, Emma, 'What is security?', Daedalus, vol
124, number 3, 1995. See also Kolodziej, Edward, 'Renaissance in Security Studies?', in International Studies Quartely, vol 36, no. 4. December
1992. pp. 421-38.
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rity. Ever since, many professional theorists and policy makers have made allowance for a secu-
rity concept that stretches beyond the military context.9 Peace remains antipodal to war, but it is
only a subset of the area covered by the term security and its counterpart insecurity.10 Previously,
non-military factors were only considered to the extent that they influenced the military dimen-
sion. With a widened concept, security becomes conceivable outside of the military context.
Security cannot only be threatened by non-military factors, now it can also be produced through
non-military responses. Thus, the term ESDI suggests a change in the view of what constitutes
security, and with what instruments it can be produced. The subsequent investigation of the
ESDI will therefore cover military as well as non-military contexts.
Furthermore, the word 'European' suggests a break with the traditional realist and neorealist
security concept that focuses on the state and states' security. Accordingly, security is no longer
an issue limited to the relations between judicially equal sovereign states. The state has lost its
exclusive role as menacer, target and security guarantor. It has become quite clear that threats to
the security of states as well as of other units are not necessarily posed solely by other states. Al
Qaida's attack on the World Trade Centre has made the increasing role of non-governmental
actors apparent. However, even before September 11th, it was quite clear that the vast majority of
wars are intrastate and not interstate conflicts.11 Thus, not even military threats are necessarily
posed by states to states. In addition, security is no longer only a question of the security of
states. Probably the most prominent example of this modification is the transition from 'nuclear
security to human security' advocated by the United Nations Development Program in 1994.12
With a security concept that extends to non-military contexts, the roles of other than state actors
become even more significant. Additionally, increasing internationalisation,13 intensified regional
cooperation, and the emergence of multi-level governance also transform states' capacity to pro-
duce security. Their ability to guarantee security unilaterally decreases, as state borders become
more pervious and interdependencies augment. Security relevant decisions are taken above, be-
low and beside the national level. Security policies are therefore no longer exclusively determined
by and between nation-states. This study does not neglect the central role of states. However, it
rather focuses on the European level and scrutinises the way in which European organisations are
involved in the definition of threats and the production of security in different contexts.
The word 'identity', finally, is appealing because it necessitates a discussion of how threats and
security are perceived. The term has been widely applied in security studies since the beginning
of the 1990s. The coupling of identity and security studies gained acceptance in this particular
time because it offered a perspective to deal with the new intellectual challenges.14 This resulted
from the attempt to explain and understand the changing security order. Many scholars found
traditional rationalist and positivist or objectivist approaches inadequate to explain and under-
                                                                                                                                                       
8 Some still took this position during the 1990s, see Walt, Stephen, 'The Renaissance of Security studies', in International Studies Quarterly, vol.
35, no. 2. June 1991. pp. 211-239, here p. 212; Greenwood, Ted, Godson, Roy and Shultz, Richard (ed), Security Studies in the 1990s, New
York 1993, here p. 2.
9 Earlier demands for a widened security conception posed by people like Richard Ullman and Barry Buzan gained broad acceptance at this time.
See Ullman, Richard, ' Redifining Security', in International Security, vol. 8, no. 1, Summer 1983; Buzan, Barry, 'The Case for a Comprehensive
Definition of Security and the Institutional Consequences of Accepting It', in Copenhagen Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Workingpa-
per 4/1990.
10 Earlier attempts to extend the focus beyond the peace-war dichotomy can be seen in Johan Galtung's introduction of the term 'structural
violence' in the mid 1970s. See Meyers, Reinhard, 'Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen, in Bundes-
zentrale für politische Bildung (ed.), Grundwissen politik, Bonn 1997, pp. 313-434, here pp. 280-282.
11 See Tickner, Ann, 'Re-visioning Security', in Booth, Ken and Smith, Steve (ed.), International Relations Theory Today, Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995, pp. 175-97. See also Ayoob, Mohammed, 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective', in Krause, Keith and
Williams, Michael (ed.), Critical Security Studies, Minneapolis 1997, pp. 121-146.
12 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford, 1995, in particular chapter 2, pp. 22-40.
13 I consciously avoid the term globalisation which suggests a universal participation at the web of interrelations that is being weaved with varying
mesh size around the world.
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stand the revolutionary changes of 1989/90.15 The theoretical development can be illustrated
with the help of a structure-agent argument. Surely, objections to theories that operate with ra-
tional (state) actors or agents led by the pursuit of power within a fixed structure have grown
constantly since the late 1970s, and many alternative theories have been developed since. How-
ever, since most of these were normatively driven and demanded a more or less hypothetical
change of structure they did make the breakthrough until the end of the Cold War. With the fall
of Communism, the logic was turned around. The question was no longer how agents should
influence and ameliorate the structure of the international system. Suddenly, the structure had
changed and everyone wondered why and how this had happened. Traditional theories con-
cerned with agents' behaviour within a given invariable structure are not particularly suited to
deliver the necessary answers. The main concern of these conservative security studies was how
states with fixed interests and static images of the enemy related to each other in a world ruled by
states' struggle for relative or absolute power. Therefore, the only dynamics these theories have
room for are agents' alterations of strategies in their pursuit of fixed interests. However, the end
of the East-West conflict could not be convincingly explained by the adaptation of strategies.
Additionally, the changing political reality raised new questions that required new clarifications.
The main question became how amicabilities and animosities arise, change and dissolve. How do
interests change, and not only strategies? The amplified European integration processes added
further impetus to this discourse. What defines the international security order and how? Conse-
quently, theorists availed themselves of the work from other disciplines within social science that
dealt with dynamic change, in particular from sociology and psychology.
Obviously, the term identity must stand in the centre of an analysis of the ESDI. Before de-
termining how the term is to be understood and utilised in this study, i.e. what aspects of iden-
tity I will actually investigate, the current combination of identity and security studies needs
further clarification.
Identity studies, or if one prefers social constructivist approaches,16 seem to offer a gateway to
understand transformation. The achievement of this approach for security studies is that it ac-
commodates changes of the logic applied in international relations (IR) as well as changes of the
actors' basic interests. According to the constructivist approach, agents' interests and actions
cannot always be traced back to human nature, as was proposed by classical realists such as
Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau. Deriving self-interested power politics exhibited by
states on the international arena from a given anarchic order, which prescribes certain interests
and survival strategies to agents, as posited by structural realists and neorealists, are equally dis-
missed.17 Identities, interests and structural constraints are not considered as exclusively material
and exogenously given, but rather as something endogenous to interaction.18 This line of think-
ing allows for changes of interests, identities, enmities and friendships and of alterations in the
way of thinking about (or conceptualising) security. The methodological individualism, pro-
posed by rational choice theories that operate with given interests, does not. On the one hand,
                                                                                                                                                       
14 Identity studies do not exist as a proper discipline. I use this label to subsume diverse orientations directed against positivism including critical
theory, feminist theory, postmodernism, constructivism and critical security studies. C.f. McSweeny 1999:30.
15 See Aggestam, Lisbeth and Hyde-Price, Adrian (ed.), Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the new agenda, London 2000, p. 4.
16 Others use the terms critical, reflectivist or constructionist as synonyms for constructivist, e.g. McSweeney 1999, chapter 6.
17 Wendt, Alexander 1992, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', in International Organization vol 46, No
2, Spring 1992. pp. 391-425, here p. 395.
18 See Wendt, Alexander, 'Collective Identity formation and the international state', in American Political Science Review, vol. 88, No. 2, 1994
pp. 384-396, here p. 384.
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constructivism assumes that agents' identities and interests are shaped through interactions that
follow a logic determined by the current material structure. On the other hand, the actions of
agents influence that structure. The international order is regarded as a construct of actors led by
interests that are determined by malleable identities, which in return are influenced by the
structure. Changing identities can therefore influence the order at the same time as a changing
order may influences the identities. The way security is thought is therefore not imposed and
fixed, but variable. Agents can, if not steer, then at least influence its transformation. Combining
a survey of changes in the security environment with an examination of the development of
identities, therefore, appears promising if one is interested in explaining and understanding
change. Rather than regarding identities and structures as given, this approach focuses on the
dynamic and interplay between them, and can be expected to enhance the understanding of
transformation as well as offering explanations for it. As a result, an abundance of literature on
European Identity in general, and on the linkage between identity and security in particular, has
been published since 1990.19
This does not mean that rational choice theories can be dismissed. On the one hand, changes
in the material reality do not always alter agents' identities. On the contrary, variation and differ-
ence are antonyms of the word identical and thus of identity. Without continuity, durability and
stability, identities will dissolve and cease to exist. Agents interpret and react to environmental
changes based on their current identity. As identities are about perceptions, norms, legitimacy,
confidence, allegiance and interests, they are vital for agents' conceptualisation of security. Iden-
tities influence what and who is perceived as a threat, what is cherished and considered worth
defending, what countermeasures are regarded as morally appropriate, what precautions can be
taken, how these can be organised, and thereby how efficiently the threats can be dealt with.
Ultimately, identities are about whom we would kill, and what we would kill for.20 An agent's
identity gives him a pre-understanding and determines what parts of the environment he sees
and how he interprets them. Changes in the external environment, therefore, do not easily effect
changes in identity. Due to their existing patterns of selection and interpretation, identities tend
to become self-fulfilling prophecies. A presumed enemy's attempts at rapprochement, for in-
stance, will most likely be met with suspicion and possibly with hostility. This may well provoke
a reaction that confirms the supposed animosity. In other words, the way agents think of security
often determines how security is.
On the other hand, actions of agents do not necessarily cause structural changes either. The
structure only changes if all, or at least most, agents involved modify their behaviour. Thus, the
                                                          
19 Examples of work on European identity are: Nelson, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (ed.), The Idea of Europe: Problems of National
and Transnational Identity, New York 1992. Cerutti, Furio, 'Can there be a Supranational Identity?,' in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol 18,
1992, pp. 147-162. Smith, Anthony, 'National Identity and the idea of European unity', International Affairs, vol. 68, 1992, no. 1, pp. 55-76.
Korte, Karl-Rudolf, 'Das Dilemma des Nationalstaates in Westeuropa: Zur Identitätsproblematik der europäischen Integration', in Aus Politik
und Zeitgeschichte, no 14, 1993, pp. 21-28. Gidlund, Janerik (ed), Den nya politiska konserten: Identitet, suveränitet och demokrati i den
europeiska integrationen, Malmö 1993. Dewandre, Nicole and Lenoble, Jacques (ed.), Projekt Europa. Postnationale Identität: Grundlage für
eine europäische Demokratie?, Berlin 1994. Delgado, Mariano and Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias (ed.), Herausforderung Europa: Wege zu einer
europäischen Identität, München 1995. Lipsius, M. Rainer, 'Bildet sich eine kulturelle Identität in der Europäischen Union?', in Blätter für
Deutsche und Internationale Politik, no. 8, 1997, pp. 948-955. Pollack, Johannes , Zur politischen identitiät der Europäischen Statengemein-
schaft, Wien 1998. Jansen, Thomas (ed.), Reflections on European Identity, European Commission Forward Studies Unit, Working Paper,
Brussels 1999.
Some examples for the coupling of Identity and security studies are: Bloom, William, Personal Identity, National Identity and International
Relations, Cambridge 1990. Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Manchester 1992.
Teune, Henry, 'Multiple group loyalties and the security of political communities', in Mlinar, Zdravko 1992 (ed), Globalization and Territorial
Identities, Aldershot 1992, pp. 105-115. Neumann, Iver, 'Identity and Security', in NUPI Notat paper, No 468 1992. Wendt 1992. Buzan,
Barry, Kelstrup, Morten, Lemaitre, Pierre and Wæver, Ole, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, New York 1993.
Wæver, Ole 1995, 'Identity, integration and security: solving the sovereignty puzzle in E.U.', in Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48, No. 2,
pp. 389-431. Katzenstein, Peter (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politcs, New York 1996. Adler, Emanuel
and Michael Barnett (ed), Security Communities, Cambridge 1998. McSweeny 1999. Burges, Peter and Tunander, Ola (ed), European Security
Identities. Contested Understandings of EU and NATO, Oslo 2000.
20 Farrands, Chris. 'Society, Modernity and Social Change: Approaches to Nationalism and Identity', in Krause, Jill and Renwick, Neil. Identities
in International Relations. London. 1996, p. 2.
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rationality or reasoning and the way of thinking security are not consistently modified in a way
that would be noticeable or worth mentioning. Since humans have the ability to act rationally
within the limits of their image of the world, arguments based on a linear causality can be valid
in some confined contexts.
In fact, up to the present, constructivist approaches have largely ignored and failed to model
the specific mechanisms through which structure (e.g. political institutions) connects to agents
and influences their interests, rationality or reasoning, and behaviour, and inversely. Therefore,
the concept of identities and security identities runs the risk of being used as a 'catch-all' ex-
planans for variations, or lack thereof, in the real world. Although identity studies consider the
interplay between objective reality and the subjective interpretation of it, they do not succeed in
explaining the interplay. In constructivist approaches, changes in material reality tend to be but
mirrored by matching identity modifications. Identity studies do not succeed in illustrating and
explaining why and how alterations of identities come about and how the interaction of material
reality and identities functions. This limitation can often be observed in attempts to explain the
European integration process and the collective production of security.21 The reason for this
insufficiency is to be found in what is simultaneously the strength and the difficulty of social
constructivism - its ontology is one where agent and structure are mutually constitutive. Neither
agent nor structure is reduced to the other and made ontologically primitive.22 Based on this
premise, it is very difficult to construct a model that can map the course of change and deliver an
exact and consistent explanation for it. In constructivist approaches, the identity and interests of
agents as well as structures are at once dependent and determinant variables. (I will return to the
difficulty this poses in chapter four.) Thus, constructivism has demonstrated that the reasoning
or rationality of agents can change, but it has not succeeded in delivering an explanation for dy-
namic change, i.e. how the agents' way of 'thinking security' changes.
THIS STUDY
The aim of this study is not to address flaws in the constructivist approach, nor to make the
dynamics and the development of an ESDI comprehensible. Neither will I attempt to explain
how the ESDI is formed or how changes in identity influence the European integration process,
institution building and politics. As I will argue in chapter four, this is unachievable. My ap-
proach is inverted and my objective more modest, but attainable. Rather than entering disputes
on the dynamics behind the development of the ESDI or on what variables dominate its evolu-
tion, I will address a more basic aspect. I seek to determine to what extent European agents pres-
ently conceive security as a European question, and if they do, how is it conceived. In other
words, I will examine what kind of ESDI currently exists, and what its magnitude may be. Has
the political concept of security reached a turning point? Is security perceived and handled as
something indivisible in Europe? Are we entering a new 'post-Westphalian' or 'post-nation-state'
European security age? Is security thought of as something restricted to the military context? Do
European organisations operate with the traditional peace-war dichotomy or do they have a
broader and more comprehensive approach to security? Do intergovernmental or supranational
European organisations recognise and counteract threats outside of the military context? Is the
                                                          
21 This is for instance the case in the work of Michael Kreft who uses the expression 'cultural institutional context' instead of ESDI. See Kreft,
Michael , Die Europäische Union als Sicherheitsgemeinschaft: Die gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und die Europäische Verteidi-
gungsgemeinschaft im kulturell-institutionellen Kontext der Europäischen Integration. Osnabrück 2002.
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production of security based on a holistic approach in which military, economic, criminal and
other countermeasures are synthesised at the European level?
Consequently, I will not utilise the ESDI as an explanans for change, i.e. to explain ongoing
European integration in security matters. I start by questioning the existence of an ESDI alto-
gether. The purpose of this study is to deliver insights on the ESDI that can be used in rational
choice models to explain and understand contemporary European security policies. It may ap-
pear contradictory to apply identity studies to provide insight to be used in rational choice theo-
ries. This coupling of two quite different approaches is, nevertheless, both feasible and permissi-
ble if one assumes that identities and the way of thinking security change gradually and at a low
speed. A constructivist approach could be said to have a much longer time frame than one that
operates with rational choice. When investigating shorter periods, it may be more illuminating to
use a rational choice approach, which assumes that agents act in a stable structure and have con-
sistent identities, interests and ideas on security.
The direct way of determining the current state of the ESDI would be to turn immediately to
the agents' identity, interest, and the rationality they apply. However, this would require a
method that provides direct access to each involved agent's collective identity, or at least an ap-
proach that allows me to determine how each agent thinks of security, how he conceives security
and what rationality he applies. In addition, I would need to find a way to aggregate the different
agents' varying notions in order to draw conclusions on the state of the ESDI. The methodologi-
cal and practical problems of such an undertaking are obvious.
Therefore, I have chosen to concentrate on what might be labelled the European security
structure, i.e. the institutional framework and processes in which threats are defined and security
is produced. According to constructivism, this structure is shaped by the agents involved and
should reflect the 'common' way of thinking security. In the first part of the study, chapter two,
I provide the basis for further investigation by scrutinising the expression ESDI as such. Starting
with a clarification of the terms collective identity, security and defence, a definition of a Security
and Defence Identity is presented, and a model for the investigation of the current state of the
ESDI elaborated.
Chapter three contains an empirical examination of the current state of the ESDI in three dif-
ferent contexts according to the model developed in chapter two. The examination of each con-
text ends with an evaluation of the current state of the ESDI.
In chapter four, I turn to two secondary objectives: explanation of the current state of ESDI,
and prognostications for its future. Bearing in mind the reservations noted above, I attempt to
explain the current state of the ESDI, e.g. why security is or is not thought of in terms of Euro-
pean security. Thus, the current state of the ESDI is treated as explanandum, and not as ex-
planans. I also discuss future developments in the ESDI. Certainly, this cannot be done with the
same precision as the investigation in chapter 3, which outlines the present state of the ESDI,
and this discussion can therefore rightfully be viewed with scepticism. Nevertheless, I have cho-
sen to include these two secondary objectives not just from curiosity, though curiosity would be
an acceptable motive in itself, but because merely defining the current state of the ESDI would
not complete the investigation. What is the point in investigating the ESDI, if one does not even
try to answer why it has its current shape? And why should I leave the speculations on the future
                                                                                                                                                       
22 Checkel, Jeffrey, 'Social Construction and integration', in Arena working papers, no 14, 1998.
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development of the ESDI to others who have invested even less time than I in understanding the
current state? As will be argued in the chapter, all discussions on the dynamic development of
identities are bound to become more speculative and therefore somewhat less scientific. How-
ever, if this is necessary to answer these questions, I will gladly make that move. The fourth
chapter can thus be regarded as a bonus and a service to the reader, rather than a strictly scientific
account, and will not be referred to in the conclusions.
The conclusions, finally, recapitulate the account of the current state of the ESDI and address
some implications of its present status.
92 ESDI – definition and model of investigation.
In this chapter, I will construct a definition of the term ESDI and design a framework that al-
lows an empirical survey of it. To answer what a European security and defence identity is and
how it can be investigated, one must begin by outlining what one understands when talking
about a collective security and defence identity (SDI). Therefore, I will clarify the meaning of the
terms identity, security, and defence, and assemble them to a coherent SDI concept. I begin by
answering what and how identity is, explaining what happens when we make identifications, and
by outlining the functions and features of collective identities. In the next step, I turn towards
the question what security and defence is. By linking these two terms to the collective identity,
the expression SDI will be defined.
Having done that, a way to examine and classify the ESDI is outlined in section 2.2
'Investigating the current state of the ESDI'. I will address some of the difficulties linked to the
investigation of mass-identities, and argue that the ESDI is manifested in the articulated inter-
ests, the actions and in the institutional framework of the European intergovernmental organisa-
tions that deal with security questions. The importance of the institutional framework for the
investigation of the ESDI is emphasised, although the analysis of the polity must be comple-
mented by the categories politics and policy.
2.1 Defining the ESDI
Trying to define the ESDI as a term is a tricky matter because each individual letter of the ab-
breviation opens for legion of definitions and different understandings. I have decided to ap-
proach the expression backwards and begin by specifying my definition of an SDI. Thereafter I
will consider where a European SDI might be found, i.e. within which organised framework a
European security process may take place. Consequently, I start by defining the nature of the
shared identity that I am interested in, and then I ask who might be a part of it. Who is a mem-
ber of the ESDI is deduced from the participation at a collective security process at a European
level. Had I chosen to begin the survey by defining Europe, i.e. by determining the members of
the group to be investigated, the outcome of the examination would have varied largely depend-
ing on what countries I had classified as European. The validity of such a study is restricted to
whether or not the selected countries share an SDI. It cannot answer the question if there is some
group of European countries that share an ESDI, and to what extent they do so. This cognitive
interest definitely speaks for the approach chosen.
2.1.1 What is Identity?
It seems reasonable to begin an answer to this question by taking a glance at what dictionaries
have to say about the word.
The lexicographical meaning - identity as uniformity.1 The word identity can be traced back to
the Latin 'idem', which means 'the same' and 'id', meaning 'it'. Late Latin contains the word
'identitas', which is influenced by the Late Latin 'essentitas', meaning 'being', and 'identidem',
                                                          
1 For an overview of the changing use over the time of the word identity in the philosophical discourse, se Pollack 1998:35-44.
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'repeatedly'. Today the word is used in two main senses, both of which refer to different ways of
uniformity, of being the same.2 The first derives from the identity in mathematics, described as A
≡ A. It refers to the quality of being the same in all that constitutes the objective reality of sepa-
rate things (idem).3 Hence, strictly speaking a thing can only be identical with itself. In this sense
of selfsameness, the word identity is also used as a synonym for individuality, to describe the
distinct personality of an individual regarded as a persisting entity. The second use of identity is
to describe the quality or condition of being the same as something else (essentitas and identi-
dem). In this sense of sameness, the word identity is used to outline the set of behavioural or
personal characteristics by which an individual is recognisable as a member of a group. The
ESDI is of course to be understood in this second sense, i.e. as a collective identity formed by
members that share some specific features.
Uniformity requires differentiation, awareness and recognition. Both collective and individual
identity is linked to the awareness of being the same. The uniformity has to be recognised and
therefore made a subject. Humans, who have the gift of self-awareness, can become aware of
their own sameness, that they are the same and that they are identical with themselves, as well as
that they share some features with others. To develop this self-awareness, to enable a mind to
think of himself as himself or as a part of a group, he must become conscious of that which he is
not, the different. This requires the recognition of the other's existence. It is logically impossible
to think in the category 'uniformity' without the counterpart 'different'. Thus, the recognition of
the otherness and the conscious differentiation from it is a prerequisite for the subject (be it a
group or an individual) to make out its own identity.4 The individual or collective self-
identification is therefore always produced in a social context. The formation of identities is a
part of the socialisation-process.5
The relativity of uniformity. The use of the word identity to describe both the collective and
the self-sameness suggests that what is defined as being the same diverges. What uniformity
(identity) is significant varies with the context. In some situations, we act as individuals, in other
cases as members of a group and sometimes as members of a large-scale community. In each
situation a different identity dominates. Hence, uniformity and difference are two relative quali-
ties. Depending on the situation, the question of what is seen as different and what is perceived
as the same varies.6 Kluckhohn & Murray made this point clear by stating that to some extent all
people are the same (the species - human beings), some people are the same (groups – Europe-
                                                          
2 See The American Heritage Dictionary. Third Edition. Version 3.6a. 1994 SoftKey International Inc. Also available at:
http://www.allwords.com/; Webster's New Complete Thesaurus. New York 1995; Oxford English Dictionary Online. Available at:
http://dictionary.oed.com    
3 This 'principium identitatis', the logical principle of the identity was already presented in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. See Pollack
1998:35.
4 According to Niklas Luhman, "all identity constitutes itself through negation” [Authors translation], See Niklas Luhmann, 'Sinn als Grundbe-
griff der Soziologie', in Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie, Frankfurt am Main 1971, p. 60.
5 The great thinkers of the 17th and 18th century argued about whether the identity is a result of the self-reflection allowed by a pre-identity
(Leibniz rationales Ich) or if the identity evolves from the experience (Locke), that is if identity exists ahead of the physical functions (continental
European philosophy) or if it is the result produced through the physical functions (Anglo-Saxon philosophy; Hume). This 'hen and egg' discus-
sion is not decisive for this study and will therefore be left an open question. One can note though, that a conscience cannot evolve to a self-
awareness in isolation. In fact a conscience can probably not even arise in isolation, and therefore no self-identification can be made. Amongst
others G.W Leibniz constructed this linkage between identity and awareness. According to him the identity is a question of the subject referring
to it self as being the same over the time, of being identical with itself. This requires the recognition of something that is not the same, the
awareness of the 'other'. See G.W, Leibniz, Philisophische Schriften, edited by H. Holz, Darmstadt 1959, vol. 3/1, p. 405. (Quoted by Pollak
1998:36.)
6 Strictly speaking, one might suppose that, as argued above, an object can only be identical with itself and that different objects only can resem-
ble each other or be similar. But if the time is entered as variable into the argumentation, it will even be difficult to adhere to that contention, in
particular with regard to persons, who constantly change. Thus, the logical claim that A=A is correct, but in real life it will always be a question of
estimation if A still is A after a certain time. This judgement will depend on the observers question, that is which of A's features are considered as
relevant.
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ans, Bavarians, members of an orchestra), and no people are the same (individuals – Blair,
Delors, Mozart).7 This depends on the angle from which one looks upon a situation and with
what question one approaches it.8
Sharing a common or collective identity with others, but not with all others, is interlinked
with the act of making categorisations, following some kind of classificatory system. Objective
features can play a role in this categorisation, but the sharing of any characteristics is not enough
to evoke a group identity. That all humans, with a few pathological exceptions, share the same
basic physiological configuration does not automatically generate a collective identity. That they
all belong to the same species and all of them are able to make identifications does not mean that
they all make the same identification and identify with each other.9 The constitution of a collec-
tive identity is based on two elements. First, the features upon which a group defines its uni-
formity must be selected. Since different groups stress different features, nature does not pre-
scribe the selection, i.e. what features are used to determine uniformity and to separate members
from non-members. In principle, a group can found its uniformity on any features and any
combinations of features, be it the colour of the eyes, clothing, weight, race, dialect, gender, de-
cent, education, the possession of a membership card or some other characteristics. The selec-
tion, i.e. the classificatory system, and the identity are therefore not naturally given, but socially
constructed.10 Secondly, those who share the features must somehow understand themselves as
members of a group. The group must develop some kind of self-awareness in order to function
as a group.
2.1.1.1 Forming identity - internalisation of external settings
The socialisation process is the melting pot of both the individual and the collective identity.
By providing social experience, surrounding people transfer social input to and influence the
individual. One could say that they transmit collective features into the individual.11 This inter-
action and the transport of some kind of common elements are the gateway to the study of col-
lective identities.
Although Sigmund Freud concentrates on the individual identity, his model of Id (Es), Ego
(Ich) and Super-ego (Über-Ich) can be used to clarify what a collective identity is.12 Taking the
individual as a starting point, Freud states that the identification begins in the childhood. The
child's first contact with the environment will (normally) be with its parents. It will identify
them as agents satisfying its physical needs and wishes, as well as sanctioning actors. As the child
                                                          
7 See C. Kluckhohn, HA Murray, 'Personality formation: the determinants', in C Kluckhohn and HA Murray (ed.), Personality: in nature,
society and culture, New York 1948, pp. 35-48.
8 To clarify the relativity of this individual aspect of identity one might as well refer to the 'not different' instead of to the 'uniformity'. A child for
example, will normally develop his self-awareness in its contact with the family. When being alone with the mother, it will learn to perceive itself
as different from her. In terms of self-awareness their differences are emphasised. But when encountering strangers together with the mother, she
will appear as more familiar than them and thus, what is different will measured according to another scale. The mother will be placed at the
common end, and the strangers in the field of being different. Now the not-different between the child and the mother will be stressed, not as
before the different. Hence, what is perceived as different depends on the circumstances. An old saying clearly describing this states: "I against my
brother. My brother and I against our neighbour. My brother, our neighbour and I against the stranger...".
9 A collective identity including all humans would require a differentiation to non-humans, and the internalisation of a general human ideal
pattern. One must differentiate between the ability to identify with any human and the actual identification with all humans. That we can pity
and feel compassion with fellow humans that suffer is not to be mistaken for a shared identity including all humans. This feeling is based on our
ability of identifying with the other, of placing ourselves in the sufferings role, that we can imagine the feeling of hunger or pain. However, in
these cases we do not identify with all, but only with some, namely the suffering, fellow humans. In fact, there is no example of any collective
identity (value, idea or ideal) shared by all humans. The closest one gets to an expression of a collective human identity might be the world wide
recognition of human rights. However, there is an immense difference between textual declarations about shared values or ideal patterns and the
interpretation of them.
10 For a comprehensive analysis of this process, see Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The social construction of reality: a treatise in the
sociology of knowledge, London 1991.
11 For an extensive theory on this subject, see Elias, Norbert, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersu-
chungen, 2nd volume, 'Wandlungen der Gesellschaft. Entwurf einer Theorie der Zivilisation', 2nd edition, Frankfurt am Main 1976.
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experiences the parents affection and their dissatisfaction, it will advance towards self-control by
laying down prototypes of the parents in its own mind, that is by internalising their regulatory
patterns, in order to avoid sanctions, to get its needs satisfied, and to benefit from their appre-
ciation. These earliest 'parental imagos' or ideals provide the basis of the Super-ego and represent
the first steps towards a collective identity. The child reproduces certain social elements of its
environment in the own mind, thereby establishing a self-critical faculty that judges the Ego's
actions and thoughts according to the duplicated external scale. 13 The installation of the Super-
ego is a successful instance of identification with the parental agency. In it, the parental influence
is resumed.14 Thus, the individual projects external values and behavioural patterns in his Super-
ego and makes them his own. Thereby the individual acquires a new set of references and ac-
companying wishes of social origin.
Collective Identity as the 'generalised other'. Although Freud did not develop the idea of the
collective identity further (his primary interest was divergence and abnormalities rather than the
evolution of common identities) one can spin on this thread a bit longer.
When the infant reflects the parent's ideal pattern in its mind, it does not make an entire copy
of the parent's personality. This is not only impossible because of the limited physical capacity of
the brain (copying just one other brain would not leave any space left for the own mind). But,
also out of the fact that parents cannot communicate their entire personality and make it accessi-
ble to the child for copying. Only certain aspects of the parents personality are being communi-
cated and thus, exposed for imitation. The most basic reason for this is that the amount of in-
formation that can be communicated at once is limited. Thus, we always select which informa-
tion we want to transmit. The same argument is valid for the incoming information. We must
always choose which incoming signals we want to pay attention to, which ones we consciously
want to receive. That means concentrating on the essential for the situation. We always make
these selections, be it consciously or unconsciously. When we move between different groups
and contexts, we seem to be able to change our selective patterns. The mother will pay attention
to different signals, and communicate and act in different ways when interacting with her child
as a family member, with colleagues at work as a member of the team, or when being alone with
close friends.
The reason for this is that each group develops and provides an own 'imago'. The contents of
such an imago can be very precise and comprehensive, such as in the family, or extremely rudi-
mentary. When we identify with a group, we copy the setting that prescribes what part of the
personality members can communicate. That is the selection pattern of what is essential in the
                                                                                                                                                       
12 This model is explained in Sigmund Freud, Abrisse der Psychoanalyse. Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Frankfurt am Main 1993. For those who
are not familiar with the model I recommend the concise but informative description by George Boeree: Sigmund Freud. Available at:
http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/freud.html  .
13 According to Freud there are two merging motivations for the identification, the partly emulative and partly defensive. The emulative, imitat-
ing one, represented by the daughters affectionate bonds to the mother and the defensive, adaptating one, where the son internalises the fathers
attributes to neutralise the threat from the father and to have a share in the fathers exclusive relation ship to the mother (Oedipus complex).
Whether emulative or defensive the purpose of the identification is survival. What is being internalised is the being who supplies food and
warmth, who offers gratification of the primary needs. If the infant does not internalise the parental models it could be sanctioned or even
ostracised, which would be fatal. See Bloom 1990:28-29
14 As far as the Super-ego separates from the Ego and confronts it, it constitutes a third force that the Ego has to consider. "One can see that, as
different as they are, both the ID and the SUPER-EGO represent the influence from the past, the ID the inherited ones, and the SUPER-EGO
essentially the ones adopted from others, whereas the EGO is mainly formed by the own accidental and current experience." (Authors translati-
on). Sigmund Freud, Abrisse der Psychoanalyse. Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Frankfurt am Main 1993, p. 11. That the border between the
Ego, which can be made conscious, and the unconscious Super-Ego, where Freud located the identification as internalised external patterns, is
fluid was recognised by the scientist himself. He was well aware of the model character of this division, stating: "When you think of this dividing
up of the personality into ego, super-ego and id, you must not imagine sharp dividing lines such as are artificially drawn in the field of political
geography. We cannot do justice to the characteristics of the mind by means of linear contours, such as occur in a drawing or in a primitive
painting, but we need rather the areas of colour shading off into one another that are to be found in modern pictures. After we have made our
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situation when the group comes together as a group. Groups can develop specific rules for the
communication determining how and what shall be communicated as well as a set of values pre-
scribing and condemning certain behaviour. This codex or setting, which one might call the
group's common denominator, corresponds to Freud's ideal patterns and is that which is inter-
nalised by the group members.15 The codex of different groups can be more or less restrictive and
allow various forms and scopes of communication. Instead of setting or codex, George Herbert
Mead spoke of the group's 'generalised other' being internalised.16 Here, the other is understood
in opposition to the individual, not as the other being different from the group.
Individuals that share experiences within a group often reproduce the same or at least similar
ideal patterns. They produce and internalise that groups generalised other. This is the basis for
uniformity, and thus, for a common or shared identity. A group that shares a collective identity
can be defined as one in which the individuals have internalised the same ideal pattern or gener-
alised other.17 This clarifies why we must differentiate between technically defined assemblages of
people and groups or collectives with a shared identity. One can certainly consider oneself as a
member of a category defined by certain attributes without necessarily identifying with it. For
instance, all people wearing glasses would probably say that they belong to the mass of far- and
short-sighted people. However, this does not mean that a specific ideal pattern exists that those
with bad eyesight could internalise. A classification based on objectified attributes is obviously
not enough to evoke identification. Without an ideal pattern, the mere recognition of uniformity
is not enough to evoke a group identity either. Moreover, even if a group defined by special at-
tributes offers an ideal pattern, all individuals carrying these features do not necessarily have to
internalise it and identify with the group. Hence, to evoke identification, a group has to offer an
ideal pattern, allowing the members to recognise and experience their uniformity. Then, the
members have to internalise the ideal pattern and become aware of that some other individuals
have done the same. The family can serve as an example for a group in this sense.
2.1.1.2 Functions and features of internalised settings
Although humans have a predisposition to make identifications, the process is neither coinci-
dentally structured nor is the resulting contents predetermined.18 Whom we identify with and
what ideal patterns or which generalised other we internalise is not foreordained. Nevertheless,
the identification does not take place in an empty space either. As it depends on what social ex-
periences and what choices we make, the identification will always draw on existing patterns.
Irrespectively of what group setting we internalise, they all share some general features.
Identities offer perception patterns and create contexts. Identities influence the reason, the per-
ception, the interpretation and they give sense. By defining sameness and by making categorisa-
                                                                                                                                                       
separations, we must allow what we have separated to merge again. Do not judge too harshly of a first attempt at picturing a thing so elusive as
the human mind." See Sigmund Freud: An Outline of Psychoanalysis. 1940. Available at:    http://dept.english.upenn.edu/~dwadswor/freudst.html  
15 Furio Cerutti calls this the model of the group identity. Furio Cerutti, 'Identität und Politik', in International Zeitschrift für Philisophie, No.
2, 1997, pp 175-201. This is comparable to Bordieu's 'Habitus'.
16 Habermas used the term 'identity securing interpretative systems'. See Bloom 1990:47.
17 According to Freud's model, the identification is located to the Ego and the Super-ego. Just as other experiences that an individual makes, the
imagos from different groups, i.e. different generalised others, are transmitted to the individual through his conscious mind (the Ego's 'eye') and
then treated, memorised and reflected in the Ego and Super-ego. Consequently, the different internalised generalised others only form a part of
the individual's personality, of his individual identity. The individuality consists of the individuals conscious mind, his unique Ego and is Super-
ego, all of which make him identical only with himself. This is so because different experiences have been transmitted through each individual's
conscious mind, and forcefully a singular Ego and Super-ego is formed. The collective identity consists of a groups generalised other, reproduced
as a copy in each member's Super-ego.
18 See André Berten, 'Europäische Identität – Einzahl oder Mehrzahl? Überlegungen zu den Entstehungsprozessen von Identität', in Dewandre
and Lenoble 1994:55-65. Here p. 59.
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tions, the complexity of the world is reduced. A group's generalised other does not merely serve
to make a differentiation between 'us' and 'them' based on some more or less objective features.
The definition of what characteristics distinguish 'us' from 'them' also determines what features
are regarded as relevant in relation to them. Thereby, the generalised other provides the individ-
ual with a framework to identify certain situations and to interpret them. By internalising a
group's pattern or setting, the individual copies an understanding of what is judged as important
and what incoming signals he should pay attention to in a special situation and what he can ig-
nore. Thus, through the group identity the individual is sensitised for various aspects of the real-
ity. His perception is educated in the group. He is taught and learns certain information select-
ing patterns. These patterns are not necessarily limited to the groups encounter with the 'other'.
The way of thinking of the reality can also be applicable when group members meet, or when
they relate to their environment, to the reality apart from the specific 'other(s)'. Since different
groups have different settings, they emphasise different aspects of the reality and interpret it dif-
ferently. Contexts are thus created by the identity.19
Language is an example of a setting. As a child grows up the adults around it teach the lan-
guage, giving name to some things while others remain nameless. By doing this, they open up a
new dimension to the child's imaginability, at the same time as they set limits to the infants
thinking. They provide the child with an instrument to develop the ability of perception and
thinking. But, when thinking more and more in language, the child loses the ability to think of
the unspeakable. At the same time as a group's setting offers a selection pattern, it also provides
an interpretation pattern. Thus, identification is closely linked to interpretation of the course of
events and to acquire a sense out of it. Individuals with different identifications interpret and
give different sense to the same occurrence. By offering an interpretation of how reality is and
how it works, it rationalises the choice of behaviour. Consequently, each group's setting pre-
scribes an own rationality, an own way of thinking and a specific logic, which influences the way
the environment is understood, and also how the individual reacts. Hence, identity simultane-
ously enables and constrains the perception and thinking, and thereby the action.
By suggesting how reality is, and in particular, how the group's internal and external relations
are, the identity provokes the group members to interpret the reality in a specific way and to act
accordingly. Thereby the suggested reality is created. Hence, identities have a tendency to result
in self-confirming, self-fulfilling prophecies. However, identities are also influenced by the envi-
ronment and have to adapt to changes. Since there are numerous collective identities and legions
of acting groups following different reasons, the reality is influenced in many different ways. The
change provoked by one identity can affect the reality in such a way, that the circle of the self-
fulfilling prophecies of another identity is interrupted. In this case, the selection and interpreta-
tion pattern of the latter has proven inadequate and needs to be adapted if the identity is to last.
Both personal and group identities are always in a process, never an artefact. Turning the argu-
ment around, in new context, new group constellations and new identities can evolve. Therefore,
identities create and influence situations, at the same time as they are shaped and influenced by
them.
                                                          
19 Different ways of interpreting the reality can be exemplified by the different way a botanists and a football player would look upon, perceive
and judge a meadow. Whereas the first would notice the vegetable variety and see all the different species, the latter might remark the grounds
unevenness, perceive puddles as water damage and all the plants as a mass of insufficiently mowed green grass.
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Identities are context bound. Each individual is equipped with several group identities and
various perception and interpretation patterns. These group identities do not only offer different
perception patterns that the individual can choose among. Since they also provide different
sense-giving interpretation patterns, a specific group identity is likely to dominate in a certain
context. Or differently put, varying external situations can emphasise different collective identi-
ties. During neighbour quarrels, the family setting may dominate and steer the individual's be-
haviour, whereas another setting matters in the football arena. In the same way, being Scandina-
vian can matter and evoke a feeling of shared identity when Scandinavians meet in Africa, but
much less so, had they met in Norway. Thus, which identity, which 'we', dominates and which
interpretation pattern is used, is influenced by the situational context. However, events do not
necessarily have to describe a single context. On the contrary, situations do not appear as isolated
phenomena with clear borders, but as chains of events, influencing each other. They effect other
situations along what one might picture as context or thinking lines, which connect and surpass
the intertwined events. Therefore being context bound means both depending on the 'objective'
situation and on the 'subjective' interpretation of it. Or to put it differently, the 'objective' situa-
tion influences which identities are 'suitable' and dominate, at the same time as the internalised
selection patterns, the set of identities, influences the interpretation of the 'objective' situation.
The context is thus, produced both through the real events and through the individuals inter-
pretation of these.
Different identities can coexist, be compatible or compete. Since a group constitutes the own
identity by defining its uniformity and by differentiating itself from others, different group iden-
tities are likely to occur in the same context. The most obvious example may be the simultaneous
appearance of so-called pair -identities (Labour- Tory, French-German, Male-Female). The in-
terests of theses groups do not necessarily have to contradict each other. In these cases, the col-
lective identity of the group and the membership in of the collectives is not stressed. But, the
larger the discord between the groups, the more important the collective identity and the group
membership become. In fact, the competition between collectives makes it easier to distinguish
the group from other groups. From an identity perspective, conflicts between groups that com-
posed of different individuals are rather unproblematic since they can strengthen both groups'
identities.
We have all internalised different collective identities that steer our behaviour and the different
roles we play. Often we only act in one role, and apply the setting of a single collective identity.
In other contexts, several internalised collective settings can be used. In some cases, being male
and a member of the labour party can matter at the same time. For the individual, this does not
pose a problem as long as the norms that the two identities suggest are compatible. On the con-
trary, they can support each other in the demarcation vis-à-vis a third 'other'. Within the same
context, identities can also be organised in a compatible hierarchical order. Being English, Brit-
ish, and European can be compatible if standing in opposition to being Chinese. As long as these
different internalised settings are compatible and suggest the same kind of rationality it is both
impossible and irrelevant to determine which one dominates. It is much more interesting to
examine situations where they differ. In these cases, compromises between them have to be
found and/or one identity will dominate. The outcome of such a situation allows the observer to
distinguish what identities are involved and which one is predominant.
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Preliminary application on ESDI. Comprising the word identity, an ESDI must encompass
both uniformity and distinction.
It is uniform in the sense that its members share a common codex, a set of features, a common
interpretative pattern, influencing their perception of a certain situation. Furthermore, the ESDI
must offer a setting of shared norms and standards according to which the security is judged and
that steers the collective actions. Hence, the ESDI creates a specific context. In addition, the
term suggests that it is bound to a specific security context with a European attribute.
As all collective identities, it is also distinct. Most obvious is the external demarcation vis-à-vis
the non-European, representing its 'other'. But, there are also internal distinctions to be made.
As any collective identity is different from the members' individual identity, the ESDI is distinct
from the citizens' individuality as well as from the different national security and defence identi-
ties (NSDI). Therefore, an ESDI should be able to coexist, be compatible or compete with other,
e.g. national, security and defence identities.
2.1.2 What are security, defence, and a SDI?
The aim here is not to invent the wheel again and to add a new definition of security and de-
fence.20 Instead, I have borrowed some ideas and terms from the concept elaborated by Buzan,
Waever and de Wilde,21 without however, applying their concept altogether. Some alterations
are necessary because I intend to investigate the ESDI, and not to analyse the security of Euro-
pean states or any other entity (for which their framework for analysis was designed). In addi-
tion, their understanding of identity deviates from mine.
The concept of Waever et al. is regarded as a suitable base, firstly, because it includes a broader
approach to security than just the military dimension. The expressive inclusion of both the terms
'security' and 'defence' in the locution ESDI suggest such an understanding. Had one restricted
the meaning to the military dimension, one could have settled for terms such as ESI, EDI or
European military identity. For this reason a security definition that goes beyond the military
dimension should be applied. Secondly, the collective nature of the term European in ESDI
requires a definition that refers to a community's rather than to a single individual's security.
Thirdly, the use of a subjective rather than an objective notion of security indicates that the per-
ception of threats and security can vary with different identities. In other words, it suggests that
identities matter.
Security: referent objects, security process and security actors. Normally, security is understood
as an estate of freedom from risk or danger, from doubt, anxiety, or fear, as safety and confi-
dence.22 Just as one cannot think 'we' without the 'not we', it is logical impossible to think of
'security' without the counterpart 'insecurity' or the antonym 'threat'. Logic prescribes that any-
one who speaks of security has to refer to something that can be threatened. If a threat is not a
threat to something, it is not a threat. When speaking of threats and security these two words
must always refer to something that is threatened or secure. Waever et al. call this the referent
                                                          
20 For a brief overview of the debate between the so-called traditionalists and non-traditionalists about what an adequate definition of the term
security should include, see Tarry 1999. See also Walt 1991 or Edward Kolodziej1992.
21 See Buzan, Ole Waeverand Jaap de Wilde, Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder 1998.
22 See The American Heritage Dictionary. Third Edition. Version 3.6a. 1994 SoftKey International Inc. Also available in the internet at:
http://www.allwords.com/   . See also Webster's New Complete Thesaurus. New York 1995.
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object, be it the territorial integrity of a country, the health of group members, a principle value,
the stability of economic system, the preservation of a cultural heritage or something else.
Collective referent objects, perceived security and defined threats are not given by nature, but
intersubjectively and socially constructed. This does not mean that they are not real. But, they
have to be determined, made a subject and be spoken. Threats have to be communicated in or-
der to be perceived as threats. Moreover, we are neither aware of all dangers that surround us,
nor can we estimate their severity or rank them objectively. Since we are not omniscient, threats
and security are not objectively ascertainable, let alone quantifiable. Security and insecurity are
determined and estimated by actors based on their momentary knowledge, not on total knowl-
edge. In this respect, security and threats are always a subjective impression and always relative.
This impairs on the validity of security analyses to the extent that some threats are bound to be
falsely estimated and some overseen. We can see threats where there are none and ignore others
that actually exist. However, when analysing human behaviour and interactions it is not the ob-
jective, but the subjective (in)security that is of interest. It is the awareness or the impression of
the reality, of threats and security that guide our actions and those of others. Not the accuracy of
our impression is decisive, but our interpretation of reality itself.
According to the terminology of Waever et al., bringing up an issue and pointing it out as a
threat is a securitizing move. When the audience accepts it, if the community is convinced that
there is a threat and that precautions are taken, they speak of a securitization. Thus, the esti-
mated security, insecurity, or vulnerability is defined during the securitization. Those who
achieve in securitizing issues are called security actors. By 'speaking' security, they determine the
perception of threat and security. To this nomenclature I add the security process. The security
process is not limited to the act of defining threats, it embrace the whole chain of events from
the definition of threats and the referent object, to the action of counteracting the threat and
producing security. Hence, the security process and thereby the production of security is always
attached to at least three elements, a security actor who points out a perceived threat and achieves
to convince others that action is necessary (securitization), a referent object and the countermea-
sures taken.23
Defence: safeguarding the referent object. In the widest sense, defence can be interpreted as
safeguarding a referent object from threats. The word defence includes the organised precautions
taken in order to prevent the threat from affecting the referent object or at least to diminish its
impact. This does not necessarily require the perceived threat to be fought directly. The organi-
sation of a defence in peacetime can also be regarded as a precaution and a countermeasure
against a securitized threat. An army does not have to be engaged in combat in order to ward off
threats. The mere activity to set the military instruments up may be enough to complete a secu-
rity process within a community. In this way, the word defence is already included in the secu-
rity process and describes the act of taking countermeasures against an identified threat. The
logical consequence is that the DI is a subset of the SI. Thus, an SDI has to meet the same con-
ditions as a SI.
                                                          
23 Apart from these, there can also be functional actors, affecting the issue more or less 'en passant' without securitizing it or being a referent
object. An example could be a polluting company that produces the threat to the environment without securitizing the environmental issue nor
being the referent object. If it securitizes something, it is more likely to do so with reference to safeguarding the employment, thereby entering a
new security issue.
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What can be understood by a collective SDI and ESDI? When investigating the ESDI, one
must separate the individual from the collective identity, and consequently the individual from
the collective security. This does not only mean differentiating a single member's security from
the one of the group, but also to distinguish a group's security from the individual security of
one or several singular members. The security of the group and the individual do not have to be
incompatible, but they are different.
We can speak of a security identity (SI) or a security and defence identity (SDI) if two condi-
tions are met. First, a security process has to take place within a Community. This means that
threats have to be made an issue within a group. They have to be securitized. However, the mere
recognition of threats is not enough. The security process requires that the risk is understood to
be serious enough that countermeasures are deemed necessary and defensive actions are taken.
Without perceived threats, security will not become an issue. If threats and security are not on
the agenda, the community will remain outside of the realm of the security conceptualisation,
and remain in a situation that can be labelled a-security.24 In this case, we cannot speak of a secu-
rity and defence identity but merely of a collective identity.
Second, the group's generalised other as a whole or certain aspects of it have to be used as ref-
erent objects. Unless this is the case, an act of speaking security would not result in a common
countermeasure. When the community's communication platform is used to securitize threats
directed against other entities, the speech act will remain but a securitizing move. A completed
security process will always use a common referent object that can be interpreted as a part of the
participants' shared identity.
I choose not to define an SDI alone on the basis of the speech act and the use of a common
referent object (as Waever et al. do). Limiting the identity question to this condition would
mean that one must speak of an ESDI as soon as any constellation of European states agree on
countermeasures against threats with reference to the European Security, or some other common
referent object. According to this logic, any collective European countermeasure reflects a shared
ESDI, irrespectively of how short-lived the coalition is and how general the referent object used
is defined. This is so, because the mere identification of a common threat creates a common
referent object, be it that 'freedom' is threatened. Accordingly, any alliance, coalition of the
willing and concerted action among some European states reflects an ESDI shared by the par-
ticipating actors. This would result in a multitude of continuously changing ESDI-
constellations.
To clarify my position and to avoid the concept of an SDI in general, and of the ESDI in par-
ticular, from flowing apart completely and become meaningless, I return to the first prerequisite
of the definition, which suggests the existence of a Community within which the security process
takes place. Of course, this approach is also problematic. Properly speaking it would mean that
the ESDI is merely a security dimension of an existing European Identity. However, common
sense tells us that the security process and the ESDI might be the very place where a European
identity is formed in the first place. What the EI and the ESDI have in common is that durabil-
ity is important for both. To comprehend themselves as a community and to develop a collective
self-awareness, the members of a community have to apperceive the community as something
that is lasting, something that is uniform over time. This permanence allows them to grasp the
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collective as an entity with which they can identify. Just as in the every day life, a perceived uni-
formity only evokes identification if it is lasting. Sporadic functional relations do not. Unless the
aspect of continuity is integrated in the ESDI concept, then what is defined as the ESDI will
change contents and constellation in the same pace as the specific coalitions change. If one would
ignore the continuity and the past, then the identity would only be reflected in the constantly
changing behaviour of the present. An identity conceived in this way gives little guidance on the
reason behind the production of security, and on how security is and will be thought. Without
durability a 'generalised other' cannot take form and an existing one cannot evoke identity and
be internalised by new members. A security process among a loose ad hoc coalition cannot influ-
ence the actors' thinking and rationality in the same way as a persisting firmly institutionalised
one. If a group of states choose to cooperate and to take collective countermeasures against a
number of threats during a long period, they have an opportunity to discover and define uni-
formity and may internalise the idea of solving threats collectively.
2.2 Investigating the current state of the ESDI
When trying to grasp the ESDI or any other identity, one will always be confronted with a
general methodological problem. Basically, it is a question about choosing the starting point.
Should I begin by defining where to look for the ESDI or by determining what to look for? Do I
begin by defining who is a member and who is not and thereafter investigate what kind of ESDI
the members share, i.e. what features the group's 'generalised other' has and to what extent the
ESDI prevails? How then am I to define the membership constellation that should be investi-
gated? Or, should I start by defining a set of exclusive ESDI characteristics and investigate in
what security process the true ESDI is found, in order to define who belongs to the community?
How then am I to define these specific ESDI features? I have opted for the first solution because,
starting with an objectified definition of the European Identity appears much more problematic
due to the inconsistency of collective identities.
Inconsistency of collective identities. Defining what constitutes a collective identity, i.e. de-
termining the substance of the 'generalised other', is difficult because a collective identity is not
based on objective sameness, but on the perception of uniformity. Identification requires recog-
nition of uniformity. Since this is a conscious act, the shared identity does not necessarily have to
be founded on objective uniformity and differences. Decisive is that individual group members
perceive that they share some features with other members, and that these characteristics differ-
entiate the collective from others groups. Collective identities are not distinguished by the objec-
tive similarity of the members or some kind of 'actual' connectedness among them, but rather
their self-conscious idea of being a community. The connectedness is created and the commu-
nity works as a community if the members choose to behave as if they share a collective iden-
tity.25 To use Benedict Anderson's expression, a community exists as such as soon as it is imag-
ined.26 Thus, although the members share the idea of forming a community, their image of the
group's 'generalised other' may diverge. This is all the more probable the larger the community
is. One can picture the generalised other as a mosaic consistent of a large quantity of pieces. Due
to the large number of members and the lack of dialogue between them, varying mosaic pieces
                                                                                                                                                       
24 See Ole Waever, 'Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community', in Adler and Barnett 1998. pp. 69-118. Here
p. 81.
25 See Waever 1998:77.
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are ascribed to a mass-identity, such as a European or a national one. Surely, people will have
different images of Europe and hence the internalised European mosaics are likely to differ.
Theoretically, it would be possible, that two European individuals do not share a single internal-
ised European mosaic piece and that their image of what the community consists of can be two
completely different ones.
Moreover, the identity is also inconsistent in itself. There is not necessarily an absolute hierar-
chy among the different internalised values, principles and objectives (mosaic pieces). Therefore,
they can be incompatible and conflict in certain situations. In some contexts, a specific value A
can be given priority over another value B, whereas B is given priority over A in another situa-
tion. It can also happen that internalised principles or objectives that have harmonised well can
prove to be contradictory in a new situation.27 The inconsistency of one and the same value can
also be displayed. One example is that a community, which generally condemns violence, some-
times uses force to defend another value. Thus, the possibility to outline a tangible, consistent
image of the community's 'generalised other' is not only contested by the fact that different indi-
viduals have internalised different values. The internalised values can also be incompatible.
In addition, it can be difficult to determine the contents of the European Identity based on
what referent objects are used in a security process. How precise the common referent object, i.e.
the shared identity, is defined in a security process can differ from case to case. When states co-
operate in security matters, they are well aware of that any attempt to specify the shared uni-
formity easily can result in the clarification of differences rather than of sameness.28 In the event
of a commonly perceived threat, they may therefore choose not to specify the referent object
more than needed to launch a security process. In order to mobilise broad support for a com-
bined countermeasure referent objects tend to be formulated in general terms whilst the com-
monly perceived threat and, if applicable, the aggressor are clearly outlined. It is much easier to
form alliances against a commonly perceived threat than to define, unite around and defend a
common referent object. This approach is particularly suited for security process that focuses on
a limited context and a specific threat. Here the uniformity, the referent object, only needs to be
defined and redefined vaguely without requiring much more specification. It may be sufficient to
use general (ambiguous) terms such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or simply to
state that security is at stake. Drawing a more elaborated image of the referent object would be
politically irrational since this involves the risk of revealing differences instead of common simi-
larities and raise opposition.29 In contrast, the threat and the aggressor can be identified with
great precision. This allows the actors to concentrate on the threat and the countermeasures,
rather than to clarify what the referent object consists of. In these cases, the own equality is de-
                                                                                                                                                       
26 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, London 1991.
27 Maja Zehfuss has shown how the notion of 'Germany' or 'German' was raised both inside and outside of Germany after the end of the cold
war. As military crisis management grow to be an urgent task, the German self-image of being a non-military international actor became unten-
able. For Germany, this was difficult, because the principles of 'never again war' and 'never again dictatorship', both part of the general self-
image, proved incompatible. Zehfuss, Maja, 'Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liasion', in European Journal of international Relations,
vol. 7, no 3. p315-348.
28 This was illustrated by the attempt of the German Foreign Minister Fischer to clarify the "finalité Européenne” during Autumn 2000. His
speech started a debate throughout Europe emphasising the differences among the EU countries rather than the common. The modest result
from the Nice European Council shows how delicate these discussions are. See Joschka Fischer. 'Das Ziel ist die Europäische Föderation', Speech
from 12 May 2000 at the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2000-05-15. p.15.
29 One can draw a parallel between the determination of that which is common, of the referent object used in the security process, and the
definition of interests. Logically, the interests of nations or any other entities require a referent object, be it something that is worth protecting or
a goal that should be achieve. The interests of a collectivity can always be traced back to that nebulous something called the common. However,
due to its inconsistency this common will always remain more or less vague. Every attempt to outline and define the common, would mean to
break the spell of the unity (Entzauberung), and runs the risk of being contra productive. Thus, it is wise to learn from the function of symbols
and to avoid fixed definitions of the common. Thus, the declared interests will and must always remain at an operative level. For instance, a
country's wish to maintain its influence or play a leading role in Europe, is often presented as a national interest. This is however a struggle for a
mechanism rather than for promoting a certain contents. It does not contain a description of the program the country stands for, its generalised
other.
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fined by outlining the 'other', rather than by defining the shared setting.30 This procedure is
especially advantageous for mass-identities because defining external differences requires lesser
efforts, than to produce internal uniformity by rectifying educational moves. Determining
stereotypes of the 'other' is easier than to design and define a commonly accepted one of the own
community, i.e. of a potential common referent object.31 Nothing can bring people together as
easily as a commonly defined enemy and threat, because internal differences can be left con-
cealed.
Finally, an examination of the ESDI that takes a predetermined shared identity as a starting
point neglects the dynamic, adaptation and development of that identity. By defining the con-
stituents of the identity in advance, one only allows for that specific configuration and thus only
for a single 'true' European Identity and ESDI. An empirical study could show to what extent a
counterpart matches this specific identity in reality. Most likely, however, it would not allow any
conclusions to be drawn regarding to what extent a differently conceived European Identity and
ESDI exists.
Starting the examination of the ESDI by identifying the European security process that is to be
investigated, seems more promising. Nevertheless, the task to determine different European secu-
rity processes, i.e. to decide which ones to investigate, remains. This basic difficulty is made
much easier if the criterion durability is added to the selection procedure. Accordingly, one has
to identify enduring collective security processes with a European scope. Or better, one has to
distinguish stable constellations of European members (states) in which a single or several secu-
rity processes take place. I will therefore concentrate on intergovernmental or supranational or-
ganisations with a European attribute.
Before continuing, I want to make two clarifications. The first concerns whose identity I am
interested in. Whose common setting does a European security process reflect? Obviously, it
mirrors the one of the political elite rather than the one of the European public. The citizens are
neither directly involved at national, nor at European security processes, but only indirectly and
at the margin. Focusing on the level where the security and defence is actually managed seems
reasonable since this is where the processes that I am interested in take place. Trying to deter-
mine the citizens' notion of an ESDI, and to what extent they have internalised it, would pose
some practical research problems and not be very conclusive regarding the development of the
European security perception and management. Since the internalised images differ, polls on the
European identity and the ESDI would not allow any conclusions on the distinctiveness, the
strength or the homogeneity of the European, national or any other identities, nor on their im-
pact on different security context. Polls could merely result in the knowledge that a European
community and an ESDI are imaginable.32 Of course, it matters whether the ESDI is only exis-
tent among the political elite, or if the population is included. But, European democracies have
an inherent control mechanism limiting the political elite's freedom of action. One may presume
that the secularisation and the enlightenment have resulted in a situation where the democracy as
system has become an internal part of the collective identities of the European nation states.
                                                          
30 Furio Cerutti (1997) uses the metaphor of a wall and the mirror to describe the two different ways to define sameness.
31 "Collective identities are constructed through contact with, defence against and exclusion of the outsider." Scholte 1996:63.
32 Surveys made by the European Commission show, that people think in both national and European identities. See European Commission:
Eurobarometer. Report no. 52. April 2000. Chapter 1.3. European and national identity. p. 10-13. According to these, there are many EU
citizens who say they feel European when asked how they see themselves in the near future. Although only 4% of EU citizens view themselves as
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Building on this assumption, one can argue that the democratic system assures that the 'Politik'33
cannot deviate too much from the public's internalised ideal pattern. Institutional arrangement
within which the decisions are taken (polity), outspoken goals and justifications of actions (pol-
icy), and countermeasures (politics) reflect that which is regarded as legitimate by the majority of
people (at least those eligible to vote). If not, the citizens would vote the government out of of-
fice. Naturally, the impact and the inner dynamic that the ESDI can evolve are affected by the
broad support it can mobilise. But, it is the political elite that steers the integration process, for-
mulates visions and sets new standards, thereby influencing the population. Thus, as dependent
as the political elite is of the electorate, the forward-looking decisions are made by the power-
house and the politicians can move ahead of the electorate, although not too fast. How the
European security process is organised will always reflect the political elite's notion of the ESDI.
They cannot move ahead of themselves.34
The second clarification concerns my view on the nature of the ESDI. I regard it as a civic
context bound identity. The attraction of using a civic rather than a cultural identity as point of
departure lies in the idea that it conceives a new identity. It seems reasonable that the European
integration process was born out of national reason and the nations' will to survive, rather than
out of a newly discovered European consciousness or some kind of European community striv-
ing for and claiming own institutions and authorities. The Second World War certainly did not
reveal a commonly shared ideal pattern to the people of Europe, but underlined differences. It
was not until the clash between the east and the west became apparent that the integration proc-
ess made considerable progress. The basic difference between the institutions of the nation states
and those of the European organisations is that the European ones are bound to a limited field of
policies, defined by the nation states. Their authority and status is confided to them by the sov-
ereign nation states. Thus, European organisations cannot widen their authority by themselves to
comprise fields outside of the authority that the nation states gave them. Consequently, the po-
tential identification with the European organisations is linked to the limited policy fields in
which they are active. Therefore, it bears the characteristics of a context bound identity rather
than of a general omnipresent one, such as a cultural identity.
2.2.1 Model of analysis
CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS: POLITY, POLITICS AND POLICY
European governmental organisations are at the same time agencies, producers, and products
of the ESDI. Enduring European security process are located to and institutionalised in these
organisations. They offer the necessary stable communication platform where shared referent
objects and common threats can be defined, and the uniformity can grow. Collective counter-
measures and precautions are also set up within and/or initiated by organisations. In addition,
they make a clear differentiation between the 'we' and the 'others', thereby providing the basis
for the imaginability of an ESDI. Once the organisations and security process that are to be in-
vestigated have been defined, the question of how the ESDI is to be grasped remains.
                                                                                                                                                       
exclusively European, more than half of the EU-citizens feel somewhat European. Many Europeans also believe that there is a European cultural
identity shared by all Europeans.
33 The German word 'Politik' is used because the German language does not differenciate between polity, politics and policies.
34 Thus, a function follows form argument, claiming that the organisation of the security process is set up to influence the development of the
ESDI is only valid for the broad public. How the political elite decides to organise the security process reflects their present notion of an ESDI.
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A main difficulty when investigating any identity is that there is no direct access to it. There is
no way to observe or measure a personal identity or a 'generalised other' immediately. Thus, one
has to content oneself with investigating the symptoms and drawing conclusions from the iden-
tity's consequences. The question is how the ESDI is reflected and has effect in the tangible real-
ity?
The ESDI is manifested in the European security processes, i.e. in the articulation of prefer-
ences, wishes and interest, in the countermeasures and in the organisation of the security process.
Preferences, wishes and interest (policy) are articulated when threats and referent objects are
defined or when the participants discuss the organisation of the security process. The action can
result in direct countermeasures against a threat (politics), and in the organisation of instruments
and security processes (polity). In reverse, the organisation of security processes and instruments
can influence what threats are identified, what referent objects are used and against whom what
countermeasures are employed.
The polity is particularly important, because it reflects the durability. A change of articulated
security interests (policy) and of actions (politics) can reflect or induce a change of identity. But,
due to hidden agendas or because the positions are not fixed, they do not necessarily have to.
Thus, the production and reproduction of the ESDI, that is the declared policy and the politics,
also create a lot of 'noise'. By introducing the dimension of continuity, this can be filtered out.
The institutionalised organisation (polity) does not reflect the temporary and varying case-by-
case coalitions, but the settled, established European security relations and identity. Although
lagging behind the daily security constellations, it reflects and influences the long-term develop-
ment of how security is thought of in Europe. The development of institutional arrangements
reflects the evolution of the ESDI, because the organisations are structured and shaped in accor-
dance with the grown common setting. Or better, the distribution of the authority and the in-
stitutional organisation mirror that, which is regarded as legitimate. The structure indicates to
what extent European security is thought and produced with reference to a national or a Euro-
pean identity and reason. Nevertheless, one cannot content oneself with the investigation of the
institutional arrangements, the polity, of European security processes. There are several reasons,
why one also has to consider the policy and politics.
An investigation that focuses on but the institutional arrangements can lead to false conclu-
sions about the ESDI. It could be, that the organisational framework, within which a security
process takes place, was actually designed for another purpose. If the structure cannot be ex-
plained by the ESDI, then it is also difficult to draw conclusions concerning the ESDI from the
structure. Thus, the motives (policy) behind a security co-operation within an organisation are
important. Furthermore, the organisational structure could be a remnant from past co-operation.
One cannot draw any valid conclusions on the ESDI from a sleeping organisation's institutions.
The actual production of security (politics) is an essential part of the ESDI. Finally, the catego-
ries policy and politics also allow for classification of the ESDI and a specification of its nature
(see 2.2.2 Classification of different ESDIs). Since the ESDI is manifested in the polity, policy
and the politics of the European security process, all three categories will be investigated.
The examination of the polity (organisation/institution) of the security process will focus on
three aspects. Are threats first defined at the national level, and then adjusted at the European
level, or are they defined within a European framework? The investigation will secondly, con-
centrate on the internal decision-making structure of the organisation, and on how the formal
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authority and responsibility is distributed between the national and European level (political
dimension). Thirdly, the structure of the defence instruments that have been set up as precaution
against threats (operational dimension, e.g. the armed forces) will be scrutinized.
The politics (action/authority) will reveal to what extent European organisations produce secu-
rity, and thereby which organisation is likely to evoke identification through the ability to pro-
ject its responsibility and authority. Due to the democracy deficit of international organisations,
an output-oriented legitimacy is crucial for the public's identification with European institu-
tions.35 I will study how the organisation and the member states have been involved in the pro-
duction of security and to what extent outspoken ambitions are met and filled with substance.
The functioning of the polity and the implementation of the policy will unveil how the nation
states and the European organisations relate to each other and to common goals when it comes
to the crunch. This will show which identity and which institution dominates.
By studying the policy (program/common setting) of the security process, the declared reasons
for the necessity of a European security process will be explored. The justification of collective
defence actions will also be revealed. This will display whether the collective production of secu-
rity is justified with reference to European or national interests and rationality. Or better, it will
demonstrate what common European referent objects are used. In addition, I will scrutinize if
the national policies comply with the idea of an ESDI. Here I focus on 'non-members', i.e. those
countries that choose to remain outside the organisations as a whole, or of parts of the security
processes within them.
DETERMINING THE SECURITY CONTEXT TO BE INVESTIGATED
In order to allow an investigation of the categories policy, polity and politics the security con-
texts, i.e. the security processes, which are to be examined, must be specified. Inevitably, the
result of the examination will depend on the security contexts chosen. The definition of security
and, thus, the security context must neither be too vast nor too narrow. An extensive definition
will raise analytical problems since it will be difficult to handle. A very restricted definition
would simplify the analysis, but the result of that investigation would only be valid for the very
limited and specific security context chosen. To avoid a generalisation of the terms security and
threat, and to distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political, Waever and his
companions added some criteria's limiting their use. According to them, security is about sur-
vival. They speak of security when a securitizing actor presents an issue as an existential threat to
a specific referent object, thereby generating endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules
that would otherwise bind.36 Of course, what threats are to be defined as existential ones and
what is regarded as emergency measures remains a matter of opinion. Decisive is that they choose
to describe the securitization as something that takes an issue out of the 'normal politics', and
that they limit it to the survival of the referent object.37.
Applied on the SDI this definition would mean that threats are such occurrences directed
against the shared identity, that threaten the survival of the 'generalised other' and thus of the
community as such. Emergency measures, could be defined as such defence activities that disre-
gard the codex prescribed by the generalised other, which is to be defended. Most typically
                                                          
35 The output-oriented legitimacy can also be called efficient policy performance. See Antje Wiener, 'Forging flexibility – the British 'No' to
Schengen', Arena Working Papers, no. 1/2000.
36 Waever et al. 1998:5 and 21
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would be the use of violence to put a stop to physical violence. For the investigation of an SDI,
this definition is problematic for two reasons.
First, it suggests a 'normal' setting of norms and behavioural rules that deviates from the ones
used in the case of securitization. This implies a split of the collective identity. There is the 'nor-
mal' one, functioning as referent object, and the SDI with another frame of reference and a de-
tached set of behavioural rules that is activated in times of emergency. However, this separation
denies that the security process plays an important role in the formation of the collective iden-
tity. As a social act, the securitization does not take place outside, but inside of the collective
identity. In fact, defining threats is one of the most efficient ways to suggest sameness and to
define the 'other'. The referent object, the collective identity, can be formed and the self-image
changed during the security process.38 A separation between the SDI and the 'normal' identity is
therefore always problematic.
The second and decisive difficulty is the limitation of the concept of security to the question of
survival.39 Although this may seem to be a straightforward definition, it is rather confusing, when
applied together with the concept of identity. This may be clarified with the Argentine invasion
of the Falkland Islands. What referent object did the British use in their security process? What
was existentially threatened? What made the British military engage in the war? Although the
Falklands' belonging to the United Kingdom was at stake, this did not threaten the survival of
the United Kingdom itself nor of its 'generalised other'. Surely, passivity might have influenced
and changed the British self-image, but the survival of the shared identity was not threatened. In
the security process the Falklands represented a part of the British self-image. The defence
against a military invasion of British territory represented another part. Thus, it was not the sur-
vival of the British identity as a whole that what was at stake, and that was used as referent ob-
ject, but the preservation of certain parts of it. Therefore, the security cannot be limited to the
question of survival, and the counterpart existential threats.
It seems more adequate to picture the definition of threats and security at the right end on a
line of interests. At the left end of the scale, one could place wishes. The further towards the
security one moves (right on the line), the higher is the priority given to the concern, with the
interest of survival at the far right end.
As the figure below demonstrates, the attempt of Waever et al. to limit the concept of security
to the right end of the scale is not convincing. Drawing a vertical demarcation through the inter-
est line, leaving all matters concerned with existential threats to the right, and defining these as
security, does not seem applicable when investigating security and defence identities. When the
threat is perceived as existential, it will surely be given higher priority, but an event does not have
to endanger the survival, in order to be regarded as threat, and to get a security process started.
The line between a community's non-securitized interests and the securitized threats remains
indistinct.
                                                                                                                                                       
37 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waeverand Jaap de Wilde, Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder 1998. pp.23-.
38 A country that perceives a threat can choose to intervene outside of its own territory in order to met this threat. This action can change the
nations self-image in the sense that interventionist politics is 'something we do'. If the interventionist politics become a part of the national self-
image and identity, the ability to intervene can be securitized.
39 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waeverand Jaap de Wilde, Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder 1998. p. 21.
26
Figure 2-1. Interest line
 McSweeny's argument for a specification of the concept of security can clarify why this differ-
entiation is difficult. By arguing, that security must not be extended to include "…all possible
sources and causes of insecurity, resulting in a security policy so wide that it lacks the focus nec-
essary to direct the allocation of scarce resources to it”,40 he unintentionally addresses the core
reason, why there is no way to clearly separate security and security interests from any other in-
terests. There can never be a separate allocation process in the society for security policies, be-
cause the shortage is definite and penetrates all areas. The discussion over the current defence
budgets in Europe exemplifies that the security questions cannot be detached from the rest of the
political life. Like other conditions, security is produced and this production claims resources. In
terms of allocation, security interests compete with other interests. They are always balanced to
their significance in relation to the overall quality of life. There is no way around the 'guns versus
butter' trade-off.41 That there is no such thing as a maximising strategy in political life, but only
optimising strategies, is also valid for security. It is not possible for a collective to eliminate all
threats, even if it allocates all its resources to countermeasures. The reallocation of resources to
counteract one threat can cause deficiencies in other areas, and open up for new threats. The
countermeasures can therefore turn into a threat themselves. The state of complete absence of
threats, of a-security, cannot be achieved. What can be reached is a-security in certain relations
and regarding certain threats. Overall, however, a community must settle for reaching an accept-
able level of countermeasures and security to meet the perceived threats. Everything else is uto-
pian. When this state is reached, it has attained what we can call security. It is a state where
threats are perceived, but where the community's defence capabilities are regarded to be suffi-
cient, taking all other concurring wishes into account.
In this investigation, one can obviously not separate between the ESDI, allowing some kind of
emergency measures, and the normal 'European Identity' consisting of the setting that is to be
defend in the European security process. Nor can one isolate the security concept to the survival
of the referent object, or draw a clear separation between the security context and other con-
flicting interests. I accept the fact that security interests cannot be clearly separated from other
interests, and content myself with a less precise definition of security. Namely, that the context
of security and threats is located at the right end of the interest scale.
To make the concept of security analytically somewhat more practical, the field of security that
will be scrutinised in this study is narrowed down, by limiting the investigation to three types of
security contexts. In the image above this could be pictured as a limitation of the examination to
three horizontal layers. A prerequisite is that the threats within the security context are managed
                                                          
40 Bill McSweeney 1999:89.
41 Richard Rosencranse, 'Economics and National Security: The Evolutionary Process', in, Roy Godson, George Quester and Richard Schultz
(ed), Security Studies for the 21st Century, London 1997, pp 209-252. Here p. 210. See also Terriff, Terry et al., Security Studies Today,
Oxford 1999, p. 137-141.
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in a European security process that utilises European referent objects. If these conditions are not
met, there cannot be an ESDI within that security context. The three contexts that will be inves-
tigated are the military, economic, and criminal ones.42 Each of which will be scrutinized sepa-
rately. Furthermore, the analysis concentrates on how identified threats are dealt with. Preventive
measures are only analysed as far as they can clearly be related to a specific referent object within
the investigated security context. Most of the time this is not the case, because the motives be-
hind such measures are not mono-causal. Counteracting poverty and improving the educational
situation, for instance, may be the most efficient way to counteract criminality. However, it can-
not be explained by this motive only. Extending the investigation to preventive measures that are
not explicitly related to a defined threat runs the risk of diluting the security context to the ex-
tent that it covers all political choices and thus the whole interest line. This would make the sur-
vey unmanageable.
It is obvious that the separation of the three security contexts is somewhat artificial. Just like
the different categories of analysis (polity, politics and policy) that depend on and affect each
other, military, criminal and economic threats are also interrelated and frequently occur simulta-
neously. Accordingly, the development in one security context is not isolated from the others. As
always when an observer attempts to divide and structure an 'organic' entity into different parts,
this cannot be done with clear cuts and the analytic sections are bound to blend to some extent.
It is therefore not always obvious to what chapter a certain part of the investigation should be
assigned. Sometimes the text in a chapter can therefore contain information that might also fit
under another headline. I have opted for the following solution.
The chapter on military threats comprises direct military threats and military countermeasures,
i.e. the organisation, development of military forces and their operations, and what could be
called flanking countermeasures in crisis regions to which military forces have been deployed.
This includes financial and economic support as well as police assistance. Since the security proc-
ess within European organisation stands in the centre of the analysis, the military context will
focus on collective defence and crisis management operations. When investigating economic
threats I focus on some regulations at the macro economic level (e.g. regulations of the Common
Market, stability of the common currency, security of supply) and on the use of economic means
to protect certain interests and to export specific values (Geo-economics). Criminal threats in-
clude countermeasures against criminal activities within Europe and at the European borders.
Hence, this chapter also includes the control of illegal migration and migratory threats.
In contrast to military threats, which are met with single operations, economic and criminal
threats are directly counteracted continuously with innumerable interventions. These interven-
tions are not decided upon at the European level on a case-by-case basis. Instead legal decisions
have been taken that regulate the responsibilities and the authority between the national level
                                                          
42 For the analysis of security Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) suggest a division of the examination into five security sectors: the military, the
political, the economic, the societal and the environmental one. "In this view, the military sector is about relationships of coercion; the political
sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production and
finance: the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relations between human activity
and the planetary biosphere." (Buzan 1998:7). Obviously, when analysing for instance a nation state's security, these sectors, these different
perspectives have to be reassembled again. However, my aim is not to analyse the security of Europe, but to what extent there is a ESDI. Thus,
the approach of this study differs from the one they suggest. Environmental and societal threats (sectors), will not be investigated. Societal threats
disqualify themselves since the referent object would be the community, that is the mass-identity itself. What I am trying to do in this investiga-
tion is to detect indicators of such an identity, but one  cannot study that identity itself. It is not possible to find out to what extent the ESDI is
established and what it consists of, by starting an analysis from the threats against the same. This would put me in a catch 22 situation since it
does not offer any consistent point of departure. Trying to outline to what extent a referent object exists and what it consists of  cannot be done
by defining that it exists and by looking at threats against it. This is impossible since the threat  cannot be defined without the referent object
being specified. This would be like trying to find out if one is surrounded by a cloud, by investigating the threats against that cloud. The envi-
ronmental threats become obsolete because the referent objects of the environmental security processes' are either local, regional or global. There
is no European environmental referent object and hardly any national one.
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and the European institutions. Assuming that these regulations are respected in the European
constitutional states, the polity and politics can be examined together under one headline. This
will also prevent the text from becoming too fragmented. The structure of the investigation
could roughly be sketched as follows:
Security context/threats
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Figure 2-2. System of investigation
2.2.2 Classification of different ESDIs
The existence of several organisations and several different security processes suggests that there
are several different ESDIs, or at least that the ESDI is differently developed in different security
contexts. Just like any other identity, the strength of the(se) ESDI(s) cannot be measured on a
numeric scale. To what extent it exists cannot be answered by putting it in relation with other
SDIs. Assuming that the institutionalisation of the security process reflects the ESDI, one can
expect differently organised security processes to reflect different forms of ESDIs. Or better, the
reflected and expected security rationality varies with the form of the institutionalisation.
To categorise differently organised European security processes and different types of ESDIs, I
have modified the model of Security Communities presented by Adler and Barnett,43 who speci-
fied the one introduced by Deutsch et al..44 The main difference is that I separate between exter-
nal and internal threats. This differentiation is necessary for two reasons. First, the handling of
internal and external threats represents two different ways of producing and reproducing uni-
formity. The identification and defence against external threats is based on a common definition
of the non-conform and the 'other'. The handling of internal threats, in contrast, results in a
rectification of a Community's members. Here the common standards have to be outlined, and
not simply that which is not the same.45 In addition, there may be large differences in an organi-
sation's handling of external and internal threats. Depending on the threat and whether it is
external or internal, the European security process can be differently organised. In either case, I
differentiate between four types of security processes.
External threats. When classifying external threats, one can begin outside of the ESDI context
with Strategic Alliances. Here, different countries come together for a limited time to defend
themselves against the same threat (enemy). However, the threat has not been identified and
defined at a European level, nor are the national countermeasures co-ordinated there. Thus,
there is no European security process and no ESDI in play, only parallel national ones. The alli-
ance against Nazi-Germany can be used as an example for this category.
                                                          
43 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Adler and Barnett 1998:29-67.
44 Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burell; Robert Kann, Maurice Lee, Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, Richard van
Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princton 1957.
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Figure 2-3. ESDI – Classification External Threats
The next category is referred to as the Consensual. This is the loosest form of an ESDI. Here
threats are determined at the national level but also discussed in a European forum. If the states
identify a common threat, they will try to co-ordinate the defence against it by acting through
the common organisation and by synchronising national countermeasures. National security
processes are compared with each other at the same time as attempts are made to harmonise na-
tional positions and interest in a way that allows concerted actions. The European security proc-
ess can thus be described as an aggregation of the national ones. The ESDI then reflects the
common denominator of the National Security and Defence Identities (NSDI).
One can speak of a Semi autonomous ESDI, when there are parallel European and national se-
curity processes. In this case, the European security process has not only developed an own mo-
mentum. Countermeasures and preventive actions can also be launched at the European level
independently of, and possibly in contradiction to national interests. The ESDI can still reflect
the common denominator of the NSDIs, but it can also follow an own reason. This is so, be-
cause the semi-autonomous European security process does not consider specific national experi-
ences, allegiances, and security concerns. The European referent object can correspond to the
common national denominator, but it does not have to. Here the security of the organisation as
a whole is put in the centre and this can sometimes contradict some particular national security
interests/preferences.
In the figure above, the countries III and IV in the consensual and the semi-autonomous cate-
gory are shaded in grey. This represents their conviction that they must seek to solve their na-
tional security challenges at the European level. The state's integration in the European frame-
work is thus recognised and taken into account in the national security process. However, that
the NSDIs become more European is not to be mistaken for an evolving ESDI. As claimed ear-
lier, the ESDI is distinct from the sub-identities of its constituents, just as any group identity is
different from the members' individuality. Even if the demarcation between the ESDI and the
NSDIs becomes vague, more 'European' NSDIs do not represent an own, new quality in the
                                                                                                                                                       
45 This can be compared with the difference between prohibition (the non-conform) and commandments (the conform).
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European security politics. It represents a change of thinking at the national level and thus, of
the NSDI, but it is still a matter of a NSDI, not an ESDI.
The Autonomous ESDI, finally, is established when a European security process replaces the
national one. Security can still be 'spoken' and be an issue at the national level, but the security
process is only completed at the European level. The determination of threats and the defence
takes place at the European level and using European referent objects. Thus, the ESDI has re-
placed or assimilated the NSDI.46
Internal threats. The security process of internal threats is also classified in four different cate-
gories. Here the threats identified are posed by a state or by other actors within the Commu-
nity.47 The categories describe different ways of how the Community meets threats and rectifies
the activities of those that poses threats.
To begin with, there is the Consensual category that is the loosest form of an ESDI. Within
the community, perceived threats are not only discussed with those who distinguish the same
menace, but also with the opponent. The management of security concerns within the Commu-
nity is based on accords and regulations agreed in consensus and voluntarily implemented. Based
on confidence-building measures the security dilemma can be offset. Thus, the national security
processes are being co-ordinated at the European level, with the ambition to reduce the mutual
threat perception. The consensual ESDI therefore consists of the common denominator of the
NSDIs.
Figure 2-4. ESDI – Classification Internal Threats
A Semi autonomous ESDI is established, when the European security process can result in an
outcome that opposes to a national position. It requires parallel European and national security
processes. This form is found, when the community can come to a conclusion without consen-
sus. The community can express this by condemning a member's behaviour or by issuing a de-
                                                          
46 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnet first follow the distinction Karl Deutsch made between pluralistic (roughly corresponding to the consensual
and semi-autonomous) and amalgamated (autonomous) Security Communities. In addition, they separated the pluralistic ones into loosely
coupled (consensual) and tightly coupled (semi-autonomous).
47 Usually the non-governmental actors are subject to a state's authority. Thus, the security matter can be discussed and agreements arranged
between states. When a state collapses, this is not possible. But the way the Community interacts with the new 'authoritative' actors follows the
same pattern as described in this section. Therefore the categories can also be applied for this case.
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cree, urging a state to change the actions that are perceived as a threat. Thus, the semi autono-
mous ESDI represents an own quality, as it can opposes to the member's NSDI.
One can speak of an Autonomous ESDI, when the Community does not only criticize a
member's actions, but has the authority to enforce its decisions. When the NSDI contradicts the
ESDI, the latter is imposed on the former. Security issues can still be on the national agenda, but
the security process is only completed at the European level. Thus, threats are determined, and
the defence against them organised by the European community.
The highest level a Security Community can reach is when the mutual threats are abolished.
This situation is characterised by mutual trust, where no member thinks of the other members as
potential adversaries, and none of them prepares for the case that the other members would pose
a threat to them. In this case the relations have been desecuritized. Since threats are not an issue
in their relationship, one cannot speak of security but of a-security.48 In this case, members can
form a community, but not a security community. Thus, in terms of internal threats, there is no
security process and no ESDI. Here one can only speak of a European Identity.   
                                                          
48 See footnote 24 on page19.
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3 Empirical examination of the ESDI's current state
3.1 Military Context
Outlining the context of military security appears rather simple. This chapter covers the inter-
national organisations' management of threats posed by military forces. It focuses on military
operations against such threats led by European organisations and on the processes concerned
with the coordination of efforts against military threats within and among the organisations
themselves. The special feature of military threats is that they are immediate existential and lo-
cated at the far right end of the interest line in figure 2.1. By threatening the survival of mem-
bers, they pose the most serious menace to any collective identity. Both external and internal
military threats are therefore more serious and more significant for an organisation's shared
identity than any other threats addressed in this study. Like other existential perils, external
military threats can reinforce the affiliation within the community and evoke identification at the
same time as a military threat among a community's members questions the identity all together.
Since military threats are directly existential, they tend to polarise feelings and leave much less
room for transitional grey zones than economic and criminal threats.
SELECTING ORGANISATIONS
There are not many organisations with a European attribute and own security processes that
deal with military threats. These are NATO, the EU/WEU and the OSCE.1 Of these three, I
exclude the OSCE. The fact that it plays an important role in the inner-European security proc-
ess would speak for its inclusion into the investigation. However, given that it is assembled of
very different member-countries, one can dispute whether it can be regarded as a European or-
ganisation at all. It is difficult to see how the politicians (let alone the citizens) of Iceland and
Kyrgyzstan could understand themselves as members of a European community. Furthermore,
the OSCE fully focuses on internal threats and lacks an external dimension. Therefore, it cannot
display an image of an external 'other' that generates the feeling of connectedness and makes the
'generalised other' imaginable. The purpose of the OSCE is rather to regulate the peaceful coex-
istence among its member states and their opposing identities by agreeing on confidence- and
security building measures. Alone the fact that the confidence-building measures rate so highly
reflects how scarce the basis for a common identity is. Thus, in contrast to the EU and NATO
who have overcome the state of internal military rivalry and conflicts, and successfully created
something common, the OSCE has merely agreed on a modus vivendi among states that remain
more or less adversary. The process of shaping a shared identity has thus hardly even started
within the OSCE.
                                                          
1 The Council of Europe is excluded from this list because it barely launches any countermeasures and certainly no military operations. Thus, no
complete military security process takes place within it.
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The polity is interesting because it clearly shows the limits of how far the states are prepared to
go in terms of co-operation, to formalise a security process at the European level and to organise
the countermeasures and precautions against military threats within a European framework. The
polity is easy to detect and mirrors the degree of mutual trust, reliance, attachments, solidarity
and voluntary interdependence. It reflects to what extent military threats are defined and coun-
teracted at the European level. In this section, I will examine the organisation of the security
process in a chronological order, answering the following questions:
- How are military threats defined? How is the military intelligence produced in Europe? Are
military threats detected and determined at the European or at the national level?
- How is the political decision-making organised? Do the states transfer any responsibilities to
European institutions? Can the European organisations take decisions that contradict a
member's opinion? Can the organisation take decisions and conduct an own military policy
complementing the national ones?
- How are the military capabilities organised? What means do the organisations have to con-
duct their own operations? Is the principle of sovereignty and independence reflected in the
organisation of the military command structures and the military forces?
- To what extent does the polity reflect a unity of EU and NATO in the security process? How
do the organisations include non-members in general and the allied non-EU members, re-
spectively the non-allied EU members in particular?
3.1.1.1 Defining military threats - ESDI and intelligence co-operation
Although military threats cannot be defined and qualified objectively, decision-makers want to
make well-informed definitions and decisions. This information is provided by military intelli-
gence services. They determine the military potential of others and estimate their willingness to
use the capabilities against the referent object. In addition the services follow and assess current
events. Thus, the main task of military intelligence services is to appraise military threats. Inves-
tigating how military intelligence is produced allows for conclusions on the referent objects used.
Such a survey is also important because all political and military decisions regarding the initia-
tion and conduct of military countermeasures are based on intelligence. It is obvious that the
availability of intelligence (or the lack of it) influences what occurrences are defined as military
threats and against which developments countermeasures are launched. Just like ill informed
rules are likely to make inadequate decisions, differently informed politicians are likely to take
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different stances in a question.2 Theoretically, uniform knowledge can be achieved in two ways,
either by transferring the responsibility for the production of military intelligence to the Euro-
pean level, or by assuring that the member states share all intelligence they have produced. Of
course, none of the two reflects the actual situation. Nevertheless, some movements towards both
can be noted. The organisations have certain (although very limited) assets to produce their own
intelligence, and to some extent, the national intelligence production is coordinated within the
organisations. Moreover, the organisations have procedures and facilities that allow the member
states to share their information with each other. This section examines how the intelligence that
is used in the European security process is produced.
The production of intelligence can be divided into five steps: collection, processing of raw in-
formation, analysis, dissemination and tasking and control. Each one of these steps influences
what threats are being identified and the quality of the information the decision-makers can take
into consideration when drawing conclusions and formulating instructions.
Figure 3.1-1 The intelligence circle
COLLECTION
In terms of ESDI, the organisation of the collection is of interest because different degrees and
forms of co-operation reflect varying degrees of mutual confidence, shared interests and priori-
ties. There are two basic ways of co-operating when collecting intelligence, both of which offer
economic and professional benefits.
The first is to collaborate during the acquisition of military equipment. The closest form of
this co-operation can be seen in the Airborne Warning and Control System fleet (AWACS) of
the Alliance.3 It was not only procured through a common funding. Its operation is also financed
collectively. Moreover, all participants share all the information gathered by this common asset.
The advantage of veritable common assets is that the countries can acquire expensive equipment
and gather information, which they could not afford unilaterally. But, such an endeavour is also
confronted with all the usual difficulties of armaments co-operation. The initial problem of
common assets is that countries must find partners that have to identify the same needs. Fur-
                                                          
2 It must still be clarified to what extent divergences between EU capitals are rooted in different interpretations of available evidence, if they
reflect that different information has been taken into account, or if differences persist in spite of a common assessment of the situation. See
Becher, Klaus, 'European intelligence policy: political and military requirements', in Lenzi , Guido (ed.), Towards a European intelligence policy,
Institute for Security Studies Western European Union. Chaillot Paper, no. 34, Paris 1998, pp. 29-36, here p. 36. Some authors even argue that
better intelligence does not necessarily improve foreign policy decisions because the politicians do not always follow the advice they get. C.f. Sir
Michael Alexander, 'Does better intelligence improve foreign policy decisions?', in RUSI Journal, October 1999. p. 1-6.
3 For more information on NATO's Airborne Warning And Control System see page 53 in the section on European integrated forces.
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thermore, the countries must want to procure the same sort of equipment. Next, they must be-
lieve that the others will set similar or at least compatible priorities concerning what information
is to be collected. There is no point in participating in a satellite program if one cannot task and
control its use according to the own needs. This is why the AWACS have remained the only
example of their kind.
The second form of co-operation is to co-ordinate the collection. Since no European country
can afford to keep the entire world under intensive surveillance, they can agree on dividing re-
sponsibilities, either by specialising on different capabilities/sources or by concentrating on dif-
ferent geographical areas or observation objects. Such coordination reduces the duplication of
efforts and allows for a more efficient use of existing resources. Consequently, the participating
states concentrate on developing their expertise in more limited fields.
Obviously both forms imply an (inter)dependence that requires a basis of mutual confidence.
The larger the unison, the stronger the trust and the more alike the identified and expected needs
are, the closer can the co-operation be. The degree of co-operation indicates the level of mutual
commitment.
Actual co-operation. The EU disposes of some proper assets for collecting intelligence, how-
ever, only in the sphere of HUMINT.4 With the Commission's 126 diplomatic missions world-
wide, the EU Monitoring Mission on the Balkans consisting of more than 100 monitors and the
special representatives,5 the European Union has an own network that can be used to collect
information. However, the EU does not dispose of any specialised technical capabilities to collect
military or any other intelligence. It does, however, obtain some information from police and
military operations it leads.
With the exception of the AWACS, Allied intelligence is based entirely on national contribu-
tions.6 Since the Alliance does not dispose of any other proper intelligence gathering resources,
all additional intelligence is collected with national means under full national control. Exceptions
from this rule can only be found at lower operational levels in a mission area, where national
forces with collection capabilities can operate under a common command.
The EU and NATO have not established any other collective resources for intelligence collec-
tion, nor have any formal agreements been reached on intelligence specialisation, be it in terms
of a functional or a geographical division.7 Member states are merely ready to declare, from
which geographical areas the intelligence they may be prepared to provide to the respective or-
ganisation is likely to come from. In principle this means saying the obvious, namely that every-
one will continue to concentrate the national intelligence efforts on the own areas of interest.
Roughly speaking, the northern countries are likely to survey the north and the southern ones
the south. This cannot be classified as a co-ordinated specialisation or division of labour, aiming
at maximising the intelligence collection. Thus, in the field of intelligence collection, the organi-
sations themselves only play a minor role, and the national element clearly dominants.
                                                          
4 HUMINT, which is derived from human sources, is the oldest form of intelligence collection. It can be obtained through espionage, but the
bulk is provided by diplomatic reporting, the own field staff, or by the local population.
5 In November 2002 the EU had appointed the following special representatives: Aldo Ajello -EU Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes
Region (Joint Action, OJ L 87, 4.4.1996); Lord Ashdown - EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Joint Action
2002/211/CFSP, OJ L 70 of 13.03.2002); Alexis Brouhns - EU Special Representative in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM) (Joint Action 2001/760/CFSP, OJ L 285, 23.10.2002); Erhard Busek - EU Special Representative to Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe (Joint Action 2001/915/CFSP, OJ L 337 of 20.12.2001, p. 62); Miguel Ángel Moratinos - EU Special Envoy for the Middle East peace
process (Joint Action, OJ L 315, 4.12.1996); Francesc Vendrell - EU Special Representative in Afghanistan (Joint Action, JO L 167, 26.6.2002).
6 See 'Study on NATO enlargement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council',
Brussels 03.09.1995, article 69, in: Nato Handbook 1999, Part III, Key Policy Documents, pp. 335-369.
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PROCESSING
The co-operation in the field of processing raw information is not particularly controversial.
Whether it is processed by the organisation, or made accessible for analysis by the national units
that have collected it, does not really make a difference from an ESDI perspective. The collective
processing only matters if the single countries do not have this ability themselves. It should how-
ever be noted that the processing is not one of the striking shortfalls in the intelligence process.
With the exception of IMINT,8 most collected information is either directly accessible for ana-
lysts and does not need to be processed, such as HUMINT, or, as in the case of SIGINT,9 the
intelligence is feed into the Union and the Alliance intelligence structure in processed form.
The only institutionalised collective processing of raw information is done at the Torrejon Sat-
ellite Centre that has been integrated into the EU and in the NATO Airborne Early Warning
and Control Programme Management Organisation (NAPMO).10 Despite its name, the Satellite
Centre neither owns nor operates any satellites. Instead it purchases commercial imagery and
analyses it for the EU and individual EU governments who request it.11 Although none of them
is an exclusive SIGINT respectively IMINT resource, both produce intelligence that most mem-
ber states do not produce at the national level. Crucial is also that the organisations can order
intelligence from the two.
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Setting up collective analysis units offers many advantages and can have a severe impact on the
definition of threats and thus on the development of the ESDI. An obvious practical gain is of
quantitative character. The amount of accessible information, in particular from open sources, is
increasing to a size that cannot be fully evaluated at the national level.12 Moreover, the European
states cannot survey and analyse all military developments in detail. Producing analysis within
the organisation would also entail qualitative gains.
First, a situation would not, as traditionally, be examined through a single pair of "national
glasses”. Approaching a question from the different national pre-understandings means that the
issue is treated, scrutinised and evaluated in different manners. Hence, new ways of thinking and
various arguments would be included into the assessment. This is likely to make the critical
analysis more balanced and extensive.
Secondly, all members would have access to and participate in producing the assessments of
the organisation. The articulation of different national concerns is likely to promote the mutual
understanding. If the organisation's assessments are used when defining military threats at the
national and the European level, one may assume that the threat perceptions are more likely to
become compatible. Harmonising the knowledge is the first step in harmonising the views and
                                                                                                                                                       
7 For a comment on the multinational satellite venture, se the section on European bi- and multinational forces on p.54 .
8 Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is information from various kinds of images (photographic, radar, infra-red and other types of imaging devices)
that are taken by e.g. persons, Aircraft or satellites.
9 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercepts electronic signals of all type. It provides the ability to 'listen' to communications (when needed after
encryption), as well as to locate the source of the emission.
10 See 2001/555/CFSP, Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, OJ L 200, 25.7.2001
p.5-11.
11 By 1998, approximately 40 % of the Center's imagery came from France's SPOT 1 and 2 satellites, 20 % came from India's IRS-1C satellite,
17 % from Hélios 1 (owned and operated by France, Spain, and Italy), and 15 % from Russian imagery satellites. The Satellite Center also orders
imagery from ERS-1 and 2 (European Space Agency), Landsat 4 and 5 (USA), and Radarsat (Canada). The Satellite Center has a budget of $11
million, and has a staff of 68 persons. See Villadsen, Ole R, 'Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy', in Central Intelligence
Agency, Studies in Intelligence, no. 9, Summer 2000. Since it has been transferred from the WEU to the EU, it does not represent a new, addi-
tional European capability. The EU already availed itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have
defence implications. See TEU article 17(3).
12 See Politi, Alessandro, 'Why is European intelligence policy necessary?', in Lenzi 1998:5-13. See also Villadsen 2000.
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security interests. Thus, a collective analysis is of special interest for the prospect of a cohesive
common security policy.
Finally and most important, a European unit would conduct its analysis from the perspective
of the European organisation. This means that it would have to evaluate the situation with a
view to the security of and effects on the organisation (not the single nation-state) and formulate
its recommendations with reference to the organisation's ability to act. In addition, a European
unit could adjust its flow of work to the overall activity of the rest of the organisation. It is easier
to co-ordinate the activities of the organisations own units, than to adjust the timelines and the
contents of the national services' work to the process within the organisation.
Analysis within the EU. The EU seems to have the ambition to develop a crisis detection and
early warning function, and to support decision-makers with information that will allow them to
prevent and manage military crisis with both military and non-military means. In this sense, the
scope of the Unions intelligence circle appears to be wider than the one of the Alliance. Obvi-
ously, military intelligence and civil information must be synthesised if the Union is to co-
ordinate and use the available civil and military instruments efficiently. The institutional build-
up of the EU has therefore mainly expanded the analysis capacity. Today, a multitude of units
belonging to the Council's General Secretariat are involved in the production of situational
analysis and evaluations: the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), the Joint
Situation Centre, the EU Military Staff, the Directorate- General of external relations and the
Institute for Security Studies. (See Annex for an organisational chart of the CFSP and ESDP
institutions.) Although the necessity of having a capacity for analysis to evaluate the flood of
collected and accessible information is undisputed, the need of having five separate units can
certainly be questioned. However, the fact that most of the units are being physically co-located
will facilitate the co-operation among them and may be interpreted as the first step towards a
merger of some.13 Despite of this, the organisational charts look more impressive than the actual
capability for analysis:
• The PPEWU14 comprises 21 diplomats (one from each country, 3 to 4 from the General
Secretariat, 1 from the Commission and one expert on WEU/NATO relations). With this
composition and size, the PPWEU has no prospect of meeting the requirements of a veritable
early warning function. Instead, it is mainly concerned with formulating advice on how the
EU may react on current developments. This explains why it is often simply called the policy
unit.
• In normal times, the Joint Situation Centre15 is run with a staff of 7 drawn from the
PPEWU and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and one seconded analyst from each of the fol-
lowing countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Although the centre is meant to be the point where military intelligence and civil
information is synthesised, its seven analysts can only produce a limited amount of veritable
analysis. The other part of the staff is largely busy compiling incoming information to daily
reports and formulating press summaries.
                                                          
13 Since late may 2001 the EUMS has been working in the new, specially adapted, Cortenbergh building together with the Directorate General
for External relations VIII, the PPEWU and the civilian EU Situation Centre. Moreover, the CEUMC has his office in the building.
14 Often called the Policy Unit (PPU or PPEWU). The staff is drawn from the Council Secretariat, the member states, the Commission and
formerly an expert from the WEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam contains a declaration which functions as a steering document for the establish-
ment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.
15 There is no official document on the JSC yet.
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• The EUMS has a volume of almost 140 persons. Of these around 30 belong to the intelli-
gence division that produces security analysis based on information from the respective capi-
tals.16
• Within the Directorate- General of external relations,17 security analyses are made by the
Directorate VII- Security and defence policy. With a staff of 11, and quite a few administra-
tive tasks to fulfil, there is not much room for any broad analysis within the General Secre-
tariat either.
• The EU Institute for Security Studies,18 finally, has a complete staff of 28, with 9 analysts/
researchers. Although being politically supervised by the Political and Security Committee
(PSC), the intellectual independence of the institute is granted. Therefore, the institute's
seminar and research activities can be seen as a valuable contribution to, but not as a part of,
the Unions analysis capacity for crisis prevention and management.
Hence, the current size of the Council's apparatus for analysis cannot even match the one of a
smaller EU country. If it tried to digest all the incoming information, the apparatus would cer-
tainly drown in it. Thus, the Council's so-called analysis capacity mainly compiles information
and can only produce a limited amount of own analysis.19 Theses analyses by no means have the
global or even regional coverage required for an early warning function.
Apart from these units the Commission is also an important actor and represents a serious ca-
pacity in the sphere of military crisis prevention and management with civilian means. In par-
ticularly involved are the Commissioners for External Relations (RELEX), Development and
Humanitarian Aid, Trade and Enlargement as well as their respective cabinets and Directorates
General (DG). Although the task of the Commission in the CFSP is of executive character, the
staffs of more than 5 000 involved in external relations20 also have to analyse the situation and
the effects of different policies. Therefore, the Commission constitutes a considerable part of the
Union's overall capacity for analysis in the field of crisis prevention and management. However,
its resources are not convincing from an intelligence perspective. The Commission does neither
dispose of an early warning function (let alone one including all four CFSP DG's), nor is the
mechanism for co-ordinating the Commission's activities in the area of conflict prevention im-
pressive. This consists of the so-called Committee of Four, which is chaired by the External Re-
lation Commissioner. He is responsible for the Commission's role in the CFSP and the co-
ordination of all the Commission's external relation activities.21 In this task, he receives support
from Directorate A (CFSP Directorate) of the DG RELEX. Within this directorate a Conflict
Prevention and Crisis Management Unit is responsible for the conflict prevention analysis. With
a foreseen staff of 12, and lacking an early warning function, it will be difficult for the Commis-
sion to co-ordinate all its CFSP activities in such a way that their synergetic effects can be used
                                                          
16 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex V: European
Union Military Staff Organisation (EUMS).
17 See ECT, article 207(2). See also Göteborg European Council, Presidency report on the strengthening the Common European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP), 16.01.2001, article 21, 22, 24 and 25.
18 2001/554/CFSP, Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies, OJ L 200,
25.07.2001, p.1-4.
19 Even if the comparison is not quit adequate, it may be interesting to point out that the human body disposes of around 5 million nerve cells
functioning as sensors and processing stimuli. But about 500 billion nerve cells are specialised on analysing and evaluating the stimuli. Thus, for
each point of contact between the human and the environment, the body disposes of hundred thousand points of contacts within the own
system. See: Kneer, Gerog and Nassehi, Armin, Niklas Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme. Eine Einführung, München 1997, p. 53.
20 Of the Commission's 26 590 posts and/or man/years almost 20 % are involved in the CFSP (5 271 External Relations, 1 749 Development,
462 Trade, 632 Enlargement, 151 Humanitarian Aid. Altogether 5 271 Person Years). Source: General Budget of the European Union for the
Financial Year 2001, January 2001. p. 24.
21 See International Crisis Group Issues, EU Crisis Response Capability. Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management,
Report no. 2. 26.06.2001, p. 18.
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efficiently for conflicts prevention. In addition, the Commission is not directly involved in the
ESDP, and therefore not in the process where military threats are defined.
Thus, neither the EU nor its members will define the security threats based on assessments
produced within the Union. Just as within the Alliance this will mainly be done with reference to
information and analysis provided by national intelligence agencies.
Analysis within NATO. The Intelligence Division of the International Military Staff (IMS) is
the linchpin in the intelligence circle of the Alliance. It is responsible for estimating the strengths
and disposition of military forces that could represent a risk to NATO's security interests and for
monitoring and reporting on worldwide events of interest to the Alliance.22 However, its main
task is to co-ordinate the production and dissemination of NATO agreed intelligence. In princi-
ple, this consists of nationally produced intelligence that has been adopted by NATO.
The NATO Situation Centre monitors political, military and economic matters of interest to
NATO and its member states on a 24-hour basis. Its Communication Branch serves as the focal
point within the Alliance for the daily receipt, exchange and dissemination of political, military
and economic information. The Situation Centre assists the North Atlantic Council, the De-
fence Planning Committee and the Military Committee in fulfilling their respective functions in
the field of consultation. The NATO Situation Centre also provides facilities for the rapid ex-
pansion of consultation during periods of tension and crises. In addition it maintains and up-
dates relevant background information during such periods.23
Despite of the ambitious tasks given to these two divisions, it is hard to see how they should be
able to produce extensive intelligence analysis, given their size. The Assessments Branch and the
Current Intelligence and Warning Branch of the Intelligence Division each comprise less then
ten members, and the Watch/Staff Support Branch of the Situation Centre consists of around 20
persons.
The intelligence circle within the Alliance's Military Command Structure is designed to pro-
vide intelligence support to military operations, once a concrete target has been defined.24
NATO staffs estimate potential military threats and the expected resistance for different opera-
tive options. Thus, the intelligence co-operation within the Alliance is not geared towards elabo-
rating own definitions of threats against the Alliance, nor to offer an early warning function.
These matters are certainly discussed within the Alliance, but this is done by national representa-
tives based on information and analysis provided by national intelligence agencies, and not on
the basis of assessments produced by the Alliance. Therefore, the security process in NATO
mainly relies on national intelligence assessments.
DISSEMINATION
Sharing intelligence with others is the essence of intelligence co-operation and at the same time
the main problem. It lies in the nature of secrecy that states will not share all their intelligence
with all others. By choosing what and how much intelligence they pass on to the organisation as
a whole or to some selected partners, states reveal their allegiances and whom they trust. The
dissemination is therefore a good indicator for how close member states actually are to each
                                                          
22 Cf. Nato Handbook 1999. p. 240.
23 Cf. Nato Handbook 1999. p. 241.
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other. It indicates to what extent they support the idea of defining military threats collectively
within the organisation, i.e. the idea of defining military threats based on uniform information.
One can assume that a member state that perceives a military threat would want all other
members to perceive that occurrence as a military threat as well. At the same time, one can as-
sume that harmonised knowledge is one important factor that makes a harmonised threat per-
ception more probable. How then, can a state's unwillingness to share national intelligence
within the organisation be explained?
The first reason is distrust towards others. All intelligence collectors are concerned about the
security of their sources and their method of collecting information. If being uncovered, the
access to the information will be jeopardised. In addition, they may want to protect the infor-
mation as such. Partly, because they are afraid of so called Trojan horses, i.e. members sharing
the information with non-members who have not obtained the providers security clearance.25
Partly, because they do not want other member states to get the information. Total transparency
between, for instance, the Greek and Turkish intelligence is not quite feasible. The main obstacle
to the exchange of information is mistrust towards the Organisation and other member states.
The concern is directed against both the ability and the will of the people involved to keep the
secret.26 Even when a country has defined a military threat and tries to mobilise support for a
countermeasure, it will approach its closest allies on a bilateral level and share more information
with them than they reveal when making their case within the organisation as a whole.27 A first
'circle argument' can be seen to emerge here. States with different threat perceptions have differ-
ent security interests. They will therefore not trust each other and be reluctant to share secrets.
Consequently, states base their security perception on different intelligence, which results in
different threat perceptions, etc..28
The second motive is closely linked to the first. No country wants to jeopardise its bilateral re-
lationship to other member or non-member states, with which they exchange information. Most
significant is the relationship with the USA, which by far has the largest collection capacity. It
seems irrational to share more information with others if this could prompt Washington to re-
duce or to stop its flow of information. This is the Union's catch-22. As long as there is no
European alternative to the intelligence collected by the Americans, the Europeans will not create
an own capability, because they fear that they will get less information. Due to the dependence,
independence cannot be achieved.
The third explanation could be categorised as financial. Those carrying the expenses will be
unwilling to let others become free riders. This does not prevent countries from exchanging in-
telligence with some selected countries. They do not necessarily do this in a tit for tat manner
limited to the field of intelligence, but in a general donnant-donnant exchange.
                                                                                                                                                       
24 This does not hinder NATO staffs to start preparations and assessments before the NAC has formally taken the decision to launch an opera-
tion.
25 One reason for a member state to pass on the information to a non-member might be that they have a friendly relations although their mem-
bership in international organisations is asymmetric, the Scandinavian states could be an example of that. Another reason may be the exchange of
information. This kind of information flow does not always have to contradict the interests of other member states. The decisive factor however,
is that it cannot be controlled by those who collected the information in the first place. Moreover, the states passing the information cannot be
aware of the consequences of sharing the information, since they do not know what other intelligence the receiver disposes of. What appears as
harmless information might turn out to be a decisive piece in a larger puzzle.
26 Although states usually worry less about that third parties could acquire the information unintentionally. Sometimes it is argued that the EU,
with its culture of transparency would have difficulties handling classified information. This argument is not convincing. Firstly, just as national
intelligence agencies, a European one could be separated from the open administration. Secondly, there is no reason to suspect that those persons
who obtain the secret information could not handle it. The secrecy does pose some practical problems, but just as on the national level, these can
surely be handled. Even in Sweden with its public-principle (Offentlighetsprincipen), which makes almost all files from public administration
accessible for anybody, handling secret documents has not posed any serious problems or endangered Sweden's security.
27 This was shown during the 2003 Iraq-crisis, where the USA shared more information with the UK than with NATO as a whole.
28 This is not to say that all intelligence services always present different information. But, having different national referent objects as starting
point, they are likely to emphasise different occurrences and to scrutinise them from different perspectives.
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A fourth purpose can be to assure the own influence within the organisation. The question is
what information one should pass on and when. Intelligence is largely a fresh product. A lot of
classified information will become irrelevant if to old and/or become public later anyhow. As
shown during Operation Allied Force, information superiority was both a vital ingredient for
operational success, and used to assure US control. By withholding information from Allies or by
delaying it, the US commanders remained the best-informed decision-makers throughout the
operation.
Thus, an extensive and continuous exchange of intelligence reflects trust and tight bonds at the
same time as it promotes a harmonised perception of military threats. The exclusion of some
member states, on the other hand, mirrors the lack of confidence and solidarity.
Because of the reasons mentioned above, most military intelligence is still exchanged on a bi-
lateral level among the member states of the two organisations. That the bilateral bonds and
allegiance between member states vary is not a secret. So does the intensity of intelligence co-
operation among them. Often countries are prepared to share information with some member
states, but not with all of them and therefore not with the organisation as such. Although both
organisations acknowledge that national representatives within the different units must have
access to all the information provided to or produced by the organisation, a state can easily avoid
this principle by sharing information on a bilateral level only. Such discrimination even takes
place within the Military Command Structure during operations. It happens that national intel-
ligence is shared with officers from some selected countries only, and not with all members of a
multinational staff.29
Of course, member states feed the organisation with some intelligence and share certain infor-
mation and assessments with all member states. But, the participants at the European security
process remain unequally informed. Furthermore, the decision to harmonise the knowledge is
taken at the national level. Naturally, decisions on dissemination are taken by the nation that
produces the intelligence.
TASKING, CONTROL AND DEVELOPMENT
This final step in the intelligence circle is at the same time the one that has the largest impact
on the national sovereignty and on the member states' own security and defence policies. The
first thing that has to be underlined is that no government has given up the full and exclusive
control over national intelligence agencies. This means that the two organisations can request
intelligence from member states, but, with the exception of the Union's own field staff and the
Alliance's AWACS, they cannot task any national intelligence production. This is also valid for
the development and procurement of intelligence gathering equipment. The Union and the Alli-
ance can analyse and address shortfalls, but they cannot redress them.
Hence, the organisations are left with the control and tasking of the own, rather modest, intel-
ligence apparatus. Of course, national representatives play the most important role when deci-
sions are made on the development and use of the organisation's own resources. In both organi-
sations, guidelines that steer what topics and geographical areas should be investigated, and gen-
eral organisational and procedural decisions are adopted with the agreement of all national repre-
42
sentatives. However, the influence of the respective organisation's Secretary General must not be
underestimated. There is no single incumbent in either organisation that holds as many threads
in his hands, nor is there anyone who will be better informed of the organisation's activities than
the Secretary General. Due to his broad involvement throughout the organisation a Secretary-
General's actual influence is likely to surpass his formal authority. It will be difficult for any unit
within the organisation to ignore his requests for information.
The Secretary-General/ High Representative of the EU stands under the tasking and control of
the Council. The Council also decides on the organisation of the General Secretariat.30 However,
the Secretary-General/ High Representative can task and control the General-Secretariat and the
PPEWU. He also chairs the boards of the EU Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite
Centre. Moreover, he may chair the PSC, especially in the event of crisis.31 Thus, he is involved
in the entire spectrum of the Council's civil intelligence process. In addition, he is also involved
in the Union's military intelligence process. He can influence the PSC's tasking of the European
Union Military Committee (EUMC) and thereby indirectly the EUMS. Moreover, he can re-
quest information from the EUMS, since the EUMS is tasked to provide him with military ex-
pertise. Finally, he can influence the input into the EUMS, both indirectly via the civil input
into the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) and through his operational direction of the Satellite
Centre.
The Secretary General of NATO is responsible for directing the international staff and with it
the NATO Situation Centre. As a part of the IMS, the Intelligence Division is subordinated to
the Military Committee (MC), which advises and assists the North Atlantic Council as well as
the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), all chaired
by the Secretary General. However, the Secretary General is not directly involved in the process
where the MC provides guidance on military matters to the major NATO Commanders. This is
where the military command structure's assessment and evaluation of the intelligence provided
by the AWACS and the national units and agencies are organised.
It must be underlined that the organisations only produce a small proportion of the total intel-
ligence that is available to the Countries. Member states and their national representatives within
the organisations are therefore not likely to base their definitions of military threats on informa-
tion provided by the EU or NATO. The definition is most likely based on national intelligence
and on the information that states have exchanged on a bilateral level. Hence, military threats are
primarily defined outside of the organisations' framework by unequally informed nation states,
whose security interests stretch across different (geographical) areas. Within the Union and the
Alliance, member states merely agree on what developments all of them consider a military
threat. What occurrence the organisation recognises as military threats is hardly dependent on
the intelligence produced by collective institutions, but rather on national assessments. The or-
ganisations' intelligence will most likely merely support the views that the countries agree upon.
Consequently, the common European referent object must not be defined in advance. Given
scarce resources, national intelligence services focus on areas and events that may affect their
national security interests, thus, primarily using national referent objects. Hence, the common
European referent object can be determined in two ways. Either it is defined in consensus when
                                                                                                                                                       
29 This is an experience several members of NATO staffs have described. For instance did a German officer tell the author about how he would be
asked to leave the room, when British and American officers were to discuss intelligence, during his time in one of the SFOR HQs.
30 See TEU, article 207.
31 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex III.
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the national representatives come together in the organisation, collate their national perceptions
and recognise a military threat collectively. Or, the member states agree on its contents in ad-
vance. In this case, they could let the organisations own intelligence use those referent objects as
starting point and/or order national services to do the same. However, the latter has not come
true. The organisation's production of intelligence is not geared towards an early warning func-
tion. Once a military threat has been recognised by the organisation, the units producing intelli-
gence engage in preparing decisions on collective responses and in supporting the political and
strategic guidance of the operations.
3.1.1.1 Political dimension: decision making
The political co-operation and decision-making within both the Alliance and the CFSP of the
Union are of intergovernmental character and lack supranational elements. This witnesses of the
participating governments' unwillingness to renounce the control over a main pillar on which
states' sovereignty rests.
Nevertheless, contenting oneself with that observation does not do justice to the way security
questions are handled in Europe. The consensual security-processes deserve some more attention,
and additional differentiation.
DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE EU
The Union counteracts military threats within the framework of the second pillar. EU institu-
tions conduct the military crisis management (CM) operations and conflict prevention activities
under the authority of the Council as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Below
the decision-making procedures in the Union's different institutions are described starting from
the top. For larger clarity, it may be helpful to consult the organisational chart of the CFSP and
ESDP institutions in the Annex.
The European Council stands at the peak of the hierarchy in the EU security process. It is
composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Community member states and the
President of the Commission.32 It defines the principles of and general guidelines for the com-
mon foreign and security policy (CFSP) and decides on common strategies for its implementa-
tion.33 These political agreements are reached by consensus and common accord. This is
achieved when no party opposes to a proposition. Consensus is not to be confused with una-
nimity, which requires formal voting. Accordingly, the president of the Commission formally
participates on equal footing with all other participants.
The Council of the European Union is responsible for the implementation of CFSP in accor-
dance with the European Council decisions.34 It is made up of representatives of the govern-
ments of the member states.35 In this responsibility, the Council meets as a General Affairs
Council (GAC), composed of Foreign Affairs Ministers and when appropriate assisted by the
Defence Ministers.36 The GAC can adopt joint actions37 and common positions38, conclude
                                                          
32 See TEU, article 4 . Although it is not a community institution, it can act as Council in the community sense. See ECT, article 11(2) and
121(4), as well as TEU, article 7.
33 See TEU, article 13.
34 See TEU, article 13(3).
35 See ECT, article 203.
36 EU defence ministers have had their own meetings, for instance during the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000. How-
ever, their decisions had to be formally adopted by a subsequent meeting of the General Affairs Council. See WEU Assembly Document A/1733,
The follow-up to the Nice decisions on the ESDP and the completion of the project for European defence, Submitted on behalf of the Political
Committee by Mr Liapis, Rapporteur, 18.06.2001, article 26. These meetings where foreseen by the Helsinki European Council. Under the
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international agreements39 and appoint special representatives40. The GAC normally makes deci-
sions unanimously, but the TEU also allows for a 'constructive abstention'. According to this
mechanism, an abstention by a member does not prevent the adoption of the decision. If a
member of the council qualifies its abstention by a formal declaration, it is not obliged to apply
the decision; but must accept that the decision commits the Union as a whole. In a spirit of soli-
darity the member concerned must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the
Union's action under that decision. The constructive abstention enables the council to agree
upon a decision even if a consensus cannot be reached among all member states.41 By derogation
from the general rule of unanimity, the Council of the European Union can also act by qualified
majority in some cases.42 However, qualified majority voting does not apply to decisions having
military or defence implications.43 The Council determines the purpose and duration of any EU-
led military operations and decides on any extension and prolongation.
To give the EU the ability to conduct crisis-management operations, the Union has established
the PSC within the Council.44 The PSC is composed of national representatives of senior/ am-
bassadorial level.45 The Council may authorise the PSC to take the relevant decisions and exer-
cises political control and strategic direction of EU-led crisis management operations. Since such
decisions have military or defence implications, the PSC makes them unanimously, leaving room
only for a 'constructive abstention'.
To increase the Council's military competence, the Military Committee and the Military Staff
were founded.46 The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military
delegates. It gives military advice and makes recommendations as required by the PSC. It also
provides military direction to the EUMS. It takes decisions in consensus based on the work of
the EUMS. With a staff of around 140, the EUMS makes military situation assessment, designs
a POL/MIL framework for an operation and draws up strategic military options for the Coun-
cil.47 The EUMS has neither the capacity to exercise command responsibilities, nor to conduct
detailed operational planning. For those functions, the EU will have to rely upon national (or
NATO) commands and headquarters. I will return to this when addressing the operational di-
mension.
DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
The striking difference between the Alliance and the Union is that the former disposes of a
military command structure that can plan and lead military operations. The policy of NATO,
however, is decided upon in the civil parts of the organisation. That is if one understands policy
as the formulation of the organisation's purpose and aim, the adoption of general guidelines for
                                                                                                                                                       
Headline 'Decision-making' in Annex 1 to Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusion the following sentence can be found "Defence Ministers will
be involved in the common European security and defence policy (CESDP); when the General Affairs Council discusses matters related to the
CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters."
37 See TEU, article 13 and 14.
38 See TEU, article 13 and 15.
39 See TEU, article 24.
40 See TEU, article 18(5).
41 According to TEU, article 23 this mechanism does not apply if the member states abstaining in this way account for more than one third of
Council votes weighted in accordance with article 205(2) of the ECT.
42 See TEU, article 23(2).
43 See TEU, article 23(2).
44 See Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 10/11.12.1999, Annex 1 to Annex IV. See also Nice European Council, Presidency
report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex III-V.
45 Most of whom also represent their countries in the WEU Permanent Council. See WEU Assembly Document A/1734, Implementation of the
Nice Summit decisions in the operational area of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Submitted on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee by Mrs Bakoyianni, Rapporteur. 19.06.2001, article 14.
46 See Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 10/11.12.1999, Annex 1 to Annex IV. See also Nice European Council, Presidency
report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex III-V.
47 See WEU Assembly Document A/1733.
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preparations against potential military threats, the collective recognition of an existing military
threat and all decisions on launching operations against an identified military threat. The policy
and decision-making process of the Alliance does not deviate from the Union's general principle
of assent. However, all decisions are made by consensus and silent approval. A decision is thus
regarded as approved if no member raises an objection within a certain period of time.
Policy decisions are taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and in the senior level policy
committees, principally the DPC and the NPG. All three units meet at the level of the perma-
nent representatives of the member states, and sometimes at higher levels involving Foreign or
Defence Ministers. The NAC also meets at the level of Heads of State or Government at so-
called Summits. Subordinated specialised committees support these senior bodies. The latter
formulate policies and make recommendations upon which the principal decision-making bodies
can base their decisions. The committees consist of national officials that represent their respec-
tive country. Consequently, all member states are represented in every body that prepares or
makes policy decisions.48 However, national representatives are not the only participants at these
bodies.
The Secretary General chairs the NAC, the DPC, the NPG and a number of other bodies.49
He is also responsible for directing the International Staff (IS) that shall support the work of the
NAC and its subordinated committees. The IS consists of personnel from member countries,
either seconded by their governments or recruited directly by the organisation (as in the EU's
CFSP structure). IS staff members are not national representatives. They are independent of
national directives and perform their duties without having to consult national authorities for
their opinion.
The NATO Military Committee is subordinate to the North Atlantic Council and Defence
Planning Committee but has a special status as the senior military authority in NATO. In order
to assist and advise the NAC, the DPC and the NPG on military matters, senior military officers
serve as national Military Representatives (Milrep) to NATO and as members of the Military
Committee. The MC is the focal point in the Alliance where the military expertise meets the
political objectives. In difference to the EUMC, the Alliance's MC stands in permanent contact
to Major Commanders (SACEUR and SACLANT) providing them with guidance on military
matters. These two Major NATO Commanders are responsible to the MC for the overall con-
duct of Alliance military matters in their areas of command. The MC performs this responsibil-
ity under the authority of the Council.
The MC is supported by the IMS, which is responsible for planning, assessing and recom-
mending policy on military matters for consideration by the MC. The IMS consists of military
personnel that have been sent by their nations to take up staff appointments at NATO Head-
quarters. They perform their duties in the capacity of MC officers, not as national representa-
tives.
                                                          
48 The only exceptions to this rule are bodies that prepare policies in fields of NATO activities at which all states do not participate. France, for
instance, does not participate at the Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the Defence Review Committee and the High
Level Group. Iceland and Luxembourg do not participate at NATO Air Command and Control System Management Organisation Board of
Directors. The Central Europe Pipeline Management Organisation Board of Directors only comprises the seven participating member countries
(Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States).
49 For instance of the the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. He is also Joint Chairman (together
with the representative of Russia and the representative of the NATO country acting as Honorary President) of the NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council, as well as of the NATO-Ukraine Commission together with the Ukrainian representative, See NATO Handbook 1999: 217.
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It is obvious that no national government has renounced any competency to the Union's sec-
ond pillar or to the Alliance. As expected, collective decision on what constitutes a military threat
and what countermeasures should be applied are taken on a truly intergovernmental basis and
thus in assent. This does not mean that member states simply send national messengers with
fixed national positions to the decision-making bodies of the organisations. Both the Alliance's
and the Union's security processes start before the actual decision-making. The institutionalised
continuous consultations that precede the actual decision-making allow member states to take
the concerns and interests of other states in consideration while formulating own positions. In
addition, the organisations own representatives participate in the preparatory work and in most
decision-making bodies. The organisations can thus make their voice heard on equal terms with
national representatives. There is not a guarantee that this will result in common views and uni-
formity, but it certainly increases the chances.
A country that perceives a military threat may raise other member states' interest for the issue,
bring them and the organisation to investigate the situation and obtain support for its views.
This produces uniformity and can result in collective countermeasures against an aggressor.
It is however unlikely that a state, which has identified an external military threat, will be con-
vinced of the opposite through consultations in the organisation. Why should any state trust the
intelligence of other states more than the one produced by its own services? Given that national
assessments are not based on nationally collected intelligence only, this becomes all the more
improbable. If a state perceives a military threat it will take the necessary decisions, make prepa-
rations and launch countermeasures at the national level with or without the support of the other
member states.
Finally, although running the risk of stating the obvious, one should underline that neither
NATO nor the EU can recognise or undertake any countermeasures against military threats, if
any member state opposes.
3.1.1.2 Operational dimension: Military integration
Two aspects of the European military structure are relevant for the ESDI. First, the organisa-
tion of the defence planning reveals the balance between national self-sufficiency and optimisa-
tion of the community's overall capabilities. Second, scrutinising integration of military bi- and
multinational military forces will expose how dependent member states are of the collective
military structure and display their ability to act and produce security autonomously.
DEFENCE PLANNING
Defence planning begins with the intelligence services that estimate the military threat. As
shown, this intelligence is mainly produced at the national level. Thereafter the need for security
must be balanced against other interests and preferences and a budget for its production deter-
mined. The financial contributions to NATO and to the Union's second pillar are decided upon
collectively. As they only make out a negligible part of the overall defence expenditure, it is safe
to say that budgetary decisions are taken at the national level. These decisions do not only de-
pend on the national security assessments but also on the other specific concerns each state faces.
Variations in the development of national defence budgets can therefore be explained by varying
threat perceptions, as well as with varying societal challenges. Finally, one must elaborate what
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affordable defence capabilities are adequate to encounter the estimated menace. The budget must
be used to adapt the composition and structure of the armed forces to the perceived threat. The
cooperation during this step is the subject of this section. Member states of the two organisations
coordinate their defence planning in three different processes at the European level. In order of
intensity, these are the defence planning processes within the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the EU
and the Alliance.
The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) is designed to provide a basis
for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available for multina-
tional training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.50 NATO and each
partner state have jointly elaborated Partnership Goals. The Partnership goals contain measures
that the Partner needs to introduce to improve the interoperability, i.e. the ability of its defence
forces to operate in conjunction with Allied forces. These goals are formulated as qualitative
standards. They merely aim at enhancing the interoperability, and thereby increasing the pool of
forces that can reinforce the allied troops during an operation. They do not include any formu-
lations where the partners commit themselves to provide a certain quantity of troops that meet
the jointly defined standards. The Partnership Goals will also assist those aspiring to NATO
membership to prepare their forces for the entry into the Alliance.51 Accordingly, each Partner
decides which forces it adapts to the standards of the partnership goals and at what pace. Its de-
fence planning process will therefore remain almost completely independent. It is not influenced
by the developments in other Partner or member states. Unless striving for NATO-membership,
attempts to enhance the interoperability with Allied forces will be done where it complies with
the national requirements.
In addition to qualitative goals, the defence planning processes among member states within
the EU and NATO also involve quantitative goals. The fundamental difference is that they have
defined the totality of the military capabilities needed to meet the military threats they consider
that they should be able to handle. This represents another level of integrated defence planning.
The EU certainly benefits from the results of the PARP. But, since they have adopted the
Headline goal and identified the needs in terms of the military capability and forces to attain it
(as outlined in the Capability Catalogue) the members of the Union cannot content themselves
with a definition of qualitative goals. They must also reach an agreement on who will contribute
with what units and of what size. This was first done at the Capabilities Commitment Confer-
ence in Brussels on the 20 November 2000. The member states' commitments have been set out
in a catalogue known as the Force Catalogue. Since an analysis of this catalogue confirms that
certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms,52 the member
states will have to co-ordinate their national defence planning to a higher degree than within the
PARP. This is done on a voluntary basis. But each member state must consider the overall Euro-
pean capabilities in its defence planning, if the Headline goal to which it has agreed is to be
achieved. This is a first move towards an integrated defence planning.
The defence planning process within the Alliance follows the same principle. The fundamental
difference to the EU Headline Goal is, that NATO's defence planning is geared to meet much
                                                          
50 C.f. NAC/NACC Ministerial Meeting, Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Brussels 10/11.01.1994, article 7.
51 See Report by the Political Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace, Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century. The Enhanced
and more Operational Partnership, 15.06.1999, Appendix B. Expanded and Adapted PARP. article 2.
52 C.f. Council – General Affairs/ Defence, Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Brussels 20.11.2000, article 4. Press Release: Brussels
(20.11.2000) - Nr: 13427/2/00
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broader military tasks. They stretch from the so-called Petersberg tasks to the deterrence and
defence against any threat of aggression against any NATO member, as provided for in Articles 5
and 6 of the Washington Treaty.53 The Alliance does not just set up an intervention force con-
sisting of a fraction of the members' entire capabilities, as the EU does. Due to the Article 5
commitment, the defence planning process has a much broader scope. At least theoretically, the
defence process of the Alliance concerns the entire national forces. Although all forces of the
allied countries do not stand under the command of NATO, they form are apart of the Alli-
ance's overall capability that could be engaged in the case of collective defence. The need to co-
ordinate the national defence planning is therefore much larger within NATO than in the EU,
both in volume and intensity.
Although this description of the three processes basically is correct, it does not say anything
about actual co-ordination performed. A glance at the practice lets the differences between the
levels diminish somewhat.
The PARP is based on a voluntary mechanism without formal commitments or moral obliga-
tions. Nevertheless, some Partners have made large efforts to adapt their forces to NATO stan-
dards and reached interoperability levels that are comparable to, or even higher than, some
NATO-members'.
As for the EU, the existent military capabilities seem to have been just as important when for-
mulating the Headline goal as the considerations for what challenges the Union might face in the
future. Thus, the result of previous national defence plans weighed just as much as any changes
of the security environment. Or differently put, the Headline goal was kept at an attainable level
because all, or at least some, member states did not perceive a change of military threats that
would call for a reallocation of resources to the defence sector. Nevertheless, the EU has identi-
fied some deficits. That non-members have offered complementary contributions to the Force
Catalogue does not make up for this.54 At the time of writing, no efforts had been made to co-
ordinate the remedy of these shortfalls at the EU level. Despite of the Review Mechanism for
Military Capabilities55 the Union has not launched any EU programs or planned any collective
financing. Thus, it is up to the member states to steer their investments in order to develop the
needed capabilities, be it alone, in co-operation with others or within the framework of the de-
fence planning process of the Alliance.56
The defence planning process of the Alliance, finally, is going through a low. As the centre of
gravity shifted from Article 5 tasks to multinational crisis-management operations, the force
requirements changed and interoperability became indispensable at much lover levels than previ-
ously. Before, under the pressure of the perceived threat from the Warsaw Pact, the interoper-
ability requirements concentrated on assuring that Armies or Corps could interact. Now,
interoperability has become vital at brigade and battalion level. Consequently, NATO's defence
planning apparatus has had much to do. In order to adapt NATO to the new challenges Force
Goals have been elaborated based on the Alliance's Ministerial Guidance. However, in the late
                                                          
53 Cf. NAC, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington D.C. 24.04.1999, article 10.
54 CF. The Helsinki Force Catalogue 2000 Supplement. For the contents see WEU Assembly Document A/1734 p. 22 and 23.
55 Cf. Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Appendix to Annex
1. The Helsinki European Council spoke of a "regular review of progress made". See Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusion,
10/11.12.1999, Annex 1 to Annex IV.
56 Although the Helsinki European Council pointed out that "Member States would use existing defence planning procedures, including, as
appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP", this was to be made in addition to the regular
review of progress of the Union. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 10/11.12.1999, Annex 1 to Annex IV, Military capabilities
for Petersberg tasks. This means that the door for a collective defence planning mechanism was foreseen. However, that mechanism has not yet
been developed, let alone shown any effect.
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1990s the national replies to the Defence Planning Questionnaire showed that many member
states did no longer meet the adopted Force Goals. As a senior national representative in the
Military Committee pointed out, the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was a result of
and an answer to this divergence. The DCI had never become necessary if the Force Goals had
been met. It appears that the imperative to adapt the national forces to the recognised military
threat has diminished. One explanation is that the threat has changed and with it the urgency
and willingness to counteract it. Obviously, instabilities and wars in the vicinity do not affect the
own security in the same way as an impending invasion of the own territory. Member states do
not give the same priority to crisis-management operations and to the adaptation of their na-
tional forces to these tasks, as they previously gave to the national defence when their own sur-
vival was threatened. As the perceived military threat against a society decreases, other issues will
be given more room on the political agenda. Crisis management is only one such issue and has to
compete with other challenges that the society faces. Thus, NATO's defence planning process
reflects a shared commitment and a will to prepare against a military threat collectively. How-
ever, this is put into perspective through the praxis. The national defence policy of some states
does not comply with what they have agreed on in the Alliance. It would however be rash to
interpret this divergence among the member states as decline of the notion of a shared European
security and a move towards re-nationalisation. The member states' different geo-strategic posi-
tions and varying threat perceptions are not the only explanation for the discrepancy. It is also
obvious that some states have larger adaptations to perform than others. The costs for the adap-
tation therefore vary among the members. This becomes very clear when comparing the British
and French interventionist forces with the more stationary German defence structure.
Despite of the limited disharmony in NATO's defence planning process, the Alliance's defence
planning procedures remains much more far-reaching and is closer coordinated than the com-
mencing co-operation within the EU. It is also clear that the Union's defence planning will not
be disconnected from the one of the Alliance. This is logically impossible, as long as both organi-
sations fall back on the same forces. Actually, one of the outspoken goals of the EU review
mechanism is to achieve consistency between the pledges undertaken in the EU framework, the
NATO planning and the PARP.57 The need to ensure the compatibility of the commitments
taken on in the EU framework with the force goals accepted in the framework of NATO plan-
ning or the PARP has thus, been recognised.58 De facto however, the Defence Planning Process
of the EU will remain subordinated to the one in NATO. The reason for this is obvious. The
Alliance already has an established procedure and disposes of an efficient integrated military
structure that can conduct and requires a collective planning. In addition, it undertakes Article 5
preparations that affect the member states security directly.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATED FORCES
There are no veritable European forces composed of European (instead of national) soldiers.
Governments have not renounced their full command over national troops, nor have they aban-
doned the option to use the own forces for national purposes. The aim of this section is to scru-
tinise to what extent member states have chosen to transfer the responsibility to counteract mili-
                                                          
57 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Appendix to Annex
I. article 4 (c).
58 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, article 6 (f).
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tary threats to the organisation. Have member states organised their military assets in such a way
that they must solve tasks collectively, or do they maintain a complete national defence that can
obtain support from other member states? Do the organisations represent an additional option
where security is produced or is it the only option? Have the member states relinquished their
sovereignty and become dependent of each other to meet military threats?59 The military struc-
ture within the EU was not set up to and does not have the ability to take on the operational lead
of any military operations. Therefore, the inquiry is limited to the cooperation within NATO
and to bi- or multilateral initiatives among member states. The latter is included because such
arrangements can be seen as a step towards a shared SDI among the participating nations, and as
a step towards an ESDI. Decisive is whether the force structure reflects the notion that security
can be produced nationally or if it indicates that military threats must be counteracted collec-
tively. Examples of permanent bi-or multinational structures are of interest that:
- lessen the national autonomy (understood as the ability to use the national military assets
and capabilities independently) and/or
- offer a capability that cannot be found at the national level,
be it for territorial defence tasks or for crisis management operations. Such examples are scarce.
Since I am interested in the nation-state's sovereignty and its military autonomy, or better the
resignation of military autonomy, I begin the examination at the national level and at the high
end of dependence. It appears suitable to start with two examples where the NSDI is not at all,
or only feebly, reflected in the military structure.
• Iceland is the only country of the 23 NATU and/or EU members that has renounced na-
tional armed forces all together. For defence matters it relies on the US protection.60 This re-
flects a high degree of confidence and speaks for a shared security and defence identity with
the US, at least in the context of safekeeping Iceland's territory. Other military threats that
require crisis-management operations are expected to be managed by the US or NATO.
• Luxembourg has not even attempted to build up a force that could act autonomously. It
merely disposes of two operational reconnaissance companies. The A company stands under
the operational command of the 1st mechanised Division of Belgium and is assigned to the
Eurocorps. The D company is a part of the Allied Mobile Force Land, which is responsible
directly to SACEUR.61 Thus, Luxembourg relies on Belgium and NATO and expects to
manage military threats and to produce security through them.
The next level of integration is an extensive task sharing that creates interdependence. Such
cooperation consists of a co-ordinated specialisation of forces in combination with mutual assur-
ances of assistance with the respective specialised capabilities. Although the case of Luxembourg
could be interpreted as an extreme task sharing, it is rather a question of a one-sided dependence.
The form of co-operation where one country autonomously decides to develop a certain capabil-
                                                          
59 Axel Sauder discusses this linkage between the sovereignty of a state and the organisation of its armed forces in depth, when constructing the
paradigm integration and the one of sovereignty. See Sauder, Axel, Souveränität und Integration. Französische und deutsche Konzeptionen
europäischer Sicherheit nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges (1990- 1993), Baden-Baden 1995.
60 In July 1941 the first US - Icelandic defence agreement was signed, passing the responsibility for Iceland's defence to Washington. In October
1946 the Icelandic and US governments agreed on terminating this responsibility. The second and still valid agreement was signed in May 1951
pursuant the request of NATO military authorities.
61 According to "déclaration d'intention politique" signed by the two ministers involved 06.09.1996.
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ity and to provide it to others, who do not possess it, also belongs to this category. This one-
sided dependence of military capabilities is characteristic for the transatlantic cooperation be-
tween the US and European states. Of course, a specialisation can take place at different levels
and with different degrees, thus, having varying consequences for the interdependence of the
participating countries. A veritable interdependence is established when none of the countries
can replace the other's special competence with proper national resources and that the other's
assets are indispensable for an operation. Agreeing on establishing an interdependent military
structure must therefore not be confused with a mutual assistance where the parties ease each
other's burden. Often different countries choose to contribute with different national assets to a
multinational unit. Such a unit can only function if all participants fulfil their obligations and
contribute the assigned forces. But, this does not necessarily generate a mutual dependence
among the member states. As long as one state can replace the assets another state withholds, and
as long as the multinational unit only represents one among several options to counteract a
military threat, the production of security does not become dependent of the cooperation among
member states. There is not a single example of a specialisation that is based on an agreement
between at least two member states stating that they will develop different capabilities and that
they commit themselves to provide the capability when the other party needs it.
Creating collective assets together with others represents the next degree of integration and de-
pendence. To determine the interdependence of the member states, several distinctions must be
made. First, one must differentiate between the creation of exclusive multinational capabilities
and the duplication of existing national functions. The multinational duplication of existing
national capabilities can ease the national burden, but it does not affect the national autonomy
and is therefore the loosest form of integration. An additional capability merely represents a new
option. However, while some member states may dispose of the asset themselves, others may not.
A collective capability may therefore appear as duplication for some, while being exclusive for
others. Second, exclusive bi- or multinational capabilities can represent a surplus that facilitate
national and multinational operations, fulfil a function that is only needed when states cooperate
on the multinational level, or be indispensable for the performance and use of national forces. It
is difficult to classify the organisation's capabilities and the single bi- and multinational projects
objectively, since they affect the dependence and interdependence of the participating states dif-
ferently. Small countries rely more on the cooperation, as well as the collective capabilities and
the national resources of fellow member states than larger ones do. The USA clearly has a differ-
ent ability to counteract perceived military threats unilaterally than Luxembourg. Nevertheless,
one can present the different multinational capabilities in a more or less consistent order starting
from the top, with the most intense form of integration, and interdependence.
Although the Benelux and Germany keep the full command over their national troops, these
countries have combined their headquarters in such a way, that none of them can lead all the
own forces under a national joint command. Thus, in short term they depend on each other to
launch large-scale operations that require the complete range of national military capabilities. In
difference to the rest of the NATO and EU states, these countries rely on the multinational co-
operation in order to use their own forces:
• The Admiral Benelux is the only examples where two European countries have joined entire
branches of their armed forces and put them under a permanent combined staff. Following
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the Co-operation Agreement between the Belgian Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy62
the operational staffs were merged into the single integrated operational staff in Den Helder
(the Netherlands). The operational fleets of both countries now operate jointly both in
peacetime and in wartime under the combined command of Admiral Benelux.63 However,
any form of task specialisation of the two navies will be avoided.64
• Due to its history the German case is unique. Germany depends on NATO-staffs to lead the
entire national forces under a joint command. Until the Einsatzführungskommando was
founded on 9 July 2001, the German Federal Republic had no headquarter at all with the
ability to lead joint forces. The Einsatzführungskommando was formed out of the last purely
national Corps HQ, the IV Corps in Potsdam, and will plan and lead the international mis-
sions of the German armed forces.65 It can also function as an operational Headquarter of the
EU. With this move Germany has somewhat regained the ability to lead the national forces
under a joint command. The German ambition is to establish a HQ with the same capabili-
ties to lead international Peterberg operations as the British Permanent Joint Headquarters in
Northwood or the French Centre Operational Interarmées in Creil. However, the intention
is only to create a HQ able to lead at army level. It is not meant to develop the capability of
leading the complete national forces as the French and the British staffs can.66 Here the dif-
ference between territorial defence and crisis management tasks becomes clear. In case of the
former, all national forces will be put into action, and the German forces put under NATO
command as previously. Thus, for the territorial defence Germany still does not dispose of a
central HQ able to lead the national forces. Although the disability to lead national forces
under a joint command is a consequence of the historical development, one might interpret
sovereign Germany's commitment to that arrangement as a pledge to the collective produc-
tion of security. On the other hand, the establishment of the Einsatzführungskommando
might also be seen as a first step to regain the capacity to act autonomously.67 Thus, with this
move Berlin has achieved to combine the reinforcement of the ESDI with the strengthening
of the NSDI.
The next step on the integration ladder is the establishment of new multinational assets and
capabilities that do not exist on any national level, and which are essential for multilateral opera-
tions.
• The most obvious example of this is the integrated military structure of NATO. Member
states developed the common multinational staffs to allow them to co-ordinate the entirety of
their forces in a collective defence against a common adversary. Thus, these resources were
not needed at any national level and represent an exclusive capability. The multinational
staffs express the member states will to co-operate in defence matters. NATO headquarters
are indispensable both for the collective territorial defence and for multinational large-scale
crisis-management missions. At present, no national staff can match the Alliance's ability to
                                                          
62 Signed 28.03.1995 by the Belgian and Dutch Ministers of defence.
63 The Admiral Benelux became operational 01.01.1996. C.f. 'Naval Force update, BENELUX fleet could lead to a Euro Navy', Jane's Defence
Weekly, 06.03.1996.
64 See Admiral Benelux at    http://www.mod.fgov.be/   (10.03.2001)
65 The other German Corps all continue to be multinational.
66 C.f. 'Das Einsatzführungskommando nimmt die Aufgabe eines Gereralstabs wahr', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10.07.2001.
67 Germany is not necessarily striving to act single-handedly. But, by strengthening the own capability it strengthened both the overall European
capability and its own position in the ESDP and maybe even in the Alliance.
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plan and lead combined joint operations at the same time as they provide an adequate and
acceptable integration and representation of the contributing countries' in the staffs. The
workload that NATO headquarters have taken on during the operations on the Balkans and
the discussion about the EU's guaranteed access to the Alliance's planning capabilities mirror
NATO's unique ability. Thus, with the exception of the USA, no allied country (or non-
allied European state) disposes of the necessary national resources to launch and run a large-
scale military operation OOA. For such operations they depend on the US
The integrated military structure of NATO provides the necessary means that permit the co-
operation and increases the potential use of national forces. It allows nation-states to participate
in a security production that they could not perform unilaterally. Thanks to the integrated mili-
tary structure, national forces can also be coordinated in a way that they achieve more collectively
than the sum of what they could perform unilaterally. The Alliance is thus indispensable for
tasks that require collective military operations. Other collective assets are not necessary indis-
pensable in the same way, but they can facilitate the cooperation and increase their ability to
conduct combined operations efficiently:
• As mentioned earlier, the Alliance disposes of veritable collective military assets in the form
of AWACS (apart from staffs and administrative bodies). These are collectively owned, fi-
nanced maintained and operated. Over the period 1982-85 eighteen E-3A AWACS Aircraft
were acquired by the 13 full-members of the NAPMO.68 The 13 participating countries fi-
nance all expenditures collectively. The organisation reports directly to the NAC and takes all
decisions in consensus. Representatives of the NATO Secretary General, the Major NATO
Commanders, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force69 Commander and
other NATO bodies, can also attend meetings of the organisation, if required, but cannot
block a decision. The NATO AWACS Force Command Headquarters is co-located with Su-
preme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The budget which funds the NATO
Airborne Early Warning and Control Force is governed by a 13-nation and a 14-nation for-
mula which reflect the industrial/commercial orientation of the cost sharing arrangements for
the related procurement organisation.70
• Another example of collective military assets is found in space. The current bi- and multina-
tional satellite initiatives in Europe are however not directly linked to the EU or NATO. The
only operative system at present is the French-Italien-Spanish Hélios programme. In differ-
ence to the NAPOM, the participants do not have access to all the information gathered.
Originally, each contributing country would order and receive imagery in direct proportion
to its shares, which amount to 79, 14 respectively 7 %. The imagery they ordered was spe-
cially encrypted for exclusive national use. Thus, although collectively owned and operated
the Hélios program does not really function as a common asset. It shares many characteristics
                                                          
68 One of which crashed after an aborted takeoff on July 14, 1996, in Greece. Source: Boeing, E-3 AWACS in Service Worldwide, at
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/infoelect/e3awacs/index4.htm    
With the exception of France and Great Britain all 'old' 15 NATO members are full-members of the NAPMO. The United Kingdom attends all
Board of Directors' meetings and other NAPMO committee meetings, as required, and provides six E-3D aircraft as a "contribution in kind" to
the NATO AEW&C Force. France attends NAPMO meetings in an observer role, based on its acquisition of four national E-3F aircraft. Repre-
sentatives of NATO's three newest members, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, attend meetings of the Board of Directors as observers.
See NATO Basic Fact sheets: NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Programme. Update 27.01.2000.
69 The NAEW&C Force consists of the 18 AWACS owned by the NAPMO and the seven E-3D aircraft owned and operated by the United
Kingdom. See NATO Handbook 2001. NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). Update 17.05.2001.
70 See NATO Handbook 2001, Cost Sharing, Update 29.04.2001.
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with normal armaments co-operation where each country acquires its proper equipment and
controls its use. During 1999, however, 17 % of Hélios images were produced for all three
countries. This figure is expected to increase.71 The latest example of European space coop-
eration that includes military use is the multinational satellite venture, including the French-
Belgium Helios II72 and the German SAR-Lupe73 programs as well as an Italian military-civil
satellite project.74 Together these will increase the European ability to collect intelligence. It
must however be noted, that this venture merely aims at interconnecting three technically, fi-
nancially, timely and politically completely separate programs. The different programs do not
result from a co-ordinated European effort, and the venture is not an attempt to establish a
centre that will take on this function.
Finally, one can find the different bi- and multinational units at the lowest end of interde-
pendence.75 Many bi- and multilateral units have no military significance. They are merely sym-
bolic and express a political will to co-operate.76 Others, such as for instance the 1. German-
Netherlands Corps, Eurocorps, the Multinational Division Central or Allied Command Europe
Mobile Force Land, represent veritable units led by permanent combined staffs.77 With the ex-
ception of the HQ Staff, all national forces that are assigned to these units are double hatted and
can solve tasks both under national and bi- or multinational command. This does not affect the
national autonomy. However, they allow the smaller participating states to develop the ability to
lead larger units than they themselves have on the national level. This may be enriching. It is
however a competence that they only need when operating in the framework of the multina-
tional unit in question.
On the whole, two features are striking. First, the degree of dependence varies with the size of
the countries and their defences. The smaller they are, the smaller is their ability to counteracting
military threats and to produce security by themselves. Second, and in a way this contradicts the
former, there is no correlation between the size of a state, respectively its defence forces, and the
preparedness to integrate the military forces with others. This hinders rationalisation potentials
from being exhausted. States in general try to maintain their autonomy and maintain a complete
range of forces instead of specialising on some specific capabilities. The Benelux and Germany
are the only states that to some extent deviate from this rule. Two explanations can be given for
the widespread unwillingness for closer integration, both of which contradict the notion of an
ESDI. To begin with, member states may simply not recognise that they depend on each other's
help and that military threats must be counteracted collectively. Organising the defence as effi-
                                                          
71 Villadsen 2000.
72 At the time of writing, the Helios II satellites is a French - Belgian project (BE 2,5 % shares) which Spain is likely to join. The first of the two
Satellites, having means for optical (god weather) and infrared (at night) observation, is expected to be launched into the orbit in march 2004.
The resolution of the Helios 2 is expected to be significantly higher than the one of the two French-Italian-Spanish Helios 1 satellites, which have
been in the orbit since 1995 respectively 1999. The Helios 1b has a resolution of about 1 meter. In comparison, some American satellites can
make out the number plates of cars from a altitude of 680 km. C.f. Isnard, Jaques, 'La Belique rejoint la France dans le projet de satellite-espion
militare Helios 2', Le Monde, 12.07.2001. See also Ulfkotte, Udo, 'Durchblick verloren', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03.07.2001.
73 The SAR-lupe is an all-weather radar satellite program consisting of six satellites planned to be put into orbit in 2004. See 'France, Germany
and Italy set to make space pact', Jane's Defence Weekly, 21.06.2001.
74 Italy intends to launch four radar satellites between 2003 and 2006. See 'France and Italy sign agreement on satellite sharing', Jane's Defence
Weekly, 21.02.2001.
75 Of course, combined coalitions of the willing used in crisis-management operation such as SFOR, KFOR and other provisional peacekeeping
units, such as NORDBAT, must also be classified as multinational forces. But, these ad hoc forces are ignored at this place.
76 There are legion of declared multinational units and other military forms of co-operation. Units such as SHIRBRIG, Ukrainian-Polish
peacekeeping battalion, the Hungarian-Romanian battalion and SEEBRIG simply offer the involved governments additional options to use their
forces. These are certainly not assembled with the ambition to optimise the military efficiency. They rather manifesting bonds between countries.
In this sense they may have a symbolic value for an ESDI but  cannot be said to reflect the notion that security cannot be produced unilaterally.
77 For an overview of different permanent multinational forces see Müller-Wille, Björn 1999, 'Europeisk Säkerhets- och Försvarsidentitet
(ESDI)', Extra Orientering, no. 6/99, Swedish Armed Forces HQ, Stockholm.
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ciently as possible together with others at the price of entering interdependencies is a very diffi-
cult step to take unless it is seen as a necessity. As long as a state believes that it can produce its
own security, any cooperation involving losses of autonomy will presumably appear to weaken
rather than strengthen the state's ability to counteract military threats. Another explanation
would be that the member states simply do not have enough trust in each other. Although they
may be convinced of the necessity to cooperate, none of them wants to be at the mercy of others.
The countries are just not sure that they will receive the assistance that they themselves consider
necessary, but rather the support that others deem as adequate and are prepared to give. This
implies that they anticipate that they will not have the same threat perception as the other mem-
ber states. That does not only hinder the integration of forces but also the transfer of authority to
European organisations.
3.1.1.3 Redefining the EU-NATO relationship
The EU and NATO have an interest in establishing a permanent and effective relationship.
The most basic reason is that both organisations aim at conducting military crisis-management
operations, and that both largely depend on the same member states' national military capabili-
ties. In addition, the EU depends on collective NATO assets and capabilities to lead a larger
operation. If the Union does not have access to these collective resources, it will have to duplicate
them within the EU, or accept that it will not be able to conduct larger crisis-management op-
erations. In addition, the EU has assumed the crisis-management functions of the WEU. The
Union and the Alliance must therefore find a way to replace the relevant agreements between
WEU and NATO with new agreements between the EU and NATO and develop them further.
The two organisations must continue to redefine their relationship.78 As long as the approach of
the two organisations will be considered as mutual beneficial the linkage between them will be
extended and deepened. This can either be the case if a closer cooperation enhances the effi-
ciency of operations or that it hinders a rift between the two organisations.
An exploration of the linkage between the EU and the Alliance in the political and operational
dimensions will display to what extent their security processes are organised as separate or inter-
locked processes. Since the collective territorial defence is not on the EU agenda, these advances
are restricted (at least formally) to the area of crisis management. The two organisations seek to
widen their security process by establishing contacts directly with the other organisation and/or
with its member states. When one of the organisations allows other countries to participate in
parts of its security process, it must not necessarily restrict this inclusion to the member states of
the other organisation. Since both organisations may have an interest in forming broad coali-
tions, they can open up for all non-members. In these cases, member states of the other organi-
sation do not necessarily obtain a special status or treatment. To grasp the whole width of the
coordination of the security processes of the two organisations, one must therefore explore the
whole range of measures aimed at including the other organisation and/or its member states.
                                                          
78 C.f. WEU Assembly Document A/1720, Report on The implementation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and WEU's
future role - reply to the annual report of the Council, Submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Marshall, Chairman and Rappor-
teur, 06.12.2000, article 86.
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INCLUSION IN THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
The inclusion of non-members into the security process of the EU or NATO is restricted to
consultations. These dialogues are important for the exchange of views and can prevent misun-
derstandings and tensions among the participants. The result can thus influence the decision
shaping. However, only full members participate directly in the decision-making. Internal deci-
sions on defence planning or decisions that initiate an operation are taken by the organisation
and its members alone. This is also the case when an operation is to be conducted together with
non-members. Both organisations are thus very strict about taking their political decisions
autonomously. Non-members and other organisations can be heard and given a voice, but never
a vote or a veto.
The EU has created different frameworks for dialogue, consultation and co-operation in the
ESDP with non-EU members. These include meetings on Ministerial as well as on lower levels.79
The EU has held meetings with non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for ac-
cession to the EU (EU+15 format) on ESDP matters and its possible implications for others.80
These countries can also appoint interlocutors to the PSC as well as to the so-called points of
contact at the EUMS.81 This means that these countries have direct access to the EU bodies
where decisions are prepared and taken. The Alliance has chosen a different method and created
new institutions for political dialogue on military threats with non-members. These are located
outside of NATO's own decision-shaping process. Only one of these forums includes non-allied
EU members, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).82 EU members do not have a
special status within the EAPC.
In addition, the two organisations have direct relations with each other. The two organisations
hold regular meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the Union's Political and Secu-
rity Committee, as well as between the respective Military Committee.83 In view of his potential
role in EU-led operations, DSACEUR can also be invited to meetings of the EU Military Com-
mittee.84 NATO and EU have held joint meetings at Ambassadorial and Ministerial level,85 and
the Secretary General of NATO has briefed the EU General Affairs Council on NATO policies.
Regular contacts between the Secretaries-Generals or their Deputies, the Secretariats and Military
Staffs (based on directives from the Military Committees) will make a useful contribution to
transparency and exchange of information. In addition, most allied EU countries send the same
representatives to the EU Military Committee and to the NATO Military Committee (France
                                                          
79 On 15.05.2001. EU foreign EU Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, respectively, met with their colleagues of the non-EU European
NATO Members and candidates for accession to the EU (the "15") as well as of the non-EU European NATO Members (the "6"). See Göteborg
European Council, Presidency report on the strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 16.01.2001, article 42.
80 Within this context, a minimum of two meetings are held during each Presidency with the six non-EU European NATO members (EU 15+6
format). The six non-EU European members of NATO are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey. The nine
countries which are candidates for accession to the EU and/or NATO are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia. See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex
VI Arrangements concerning non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU. See also
Göteborg European Council, Presidency report on the strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 16.01.2001,
article 42. Such dialogues are also held at the various meetings with Russia and the Ukraine. Especially in the framework of Summits following
the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), but also in the Northern dimension with Russia and at other meetings.
81 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex VI Arrange-
ments concerning non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU. See also Göteborg
European Council, Presidency report on the strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 16.01.2001, article 43.
82 The EAPC succeeded the North Atlantic Co-operation Council. See NACC, Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Sintra
30.05.1997, article 1. Other examples of permanent institutions were non-members are included are the NATO-Russia Permanent joint Council
the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Mediterranean Co-operation Group.
83 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Annex VII. (II). See
also WEU Assembly Document A/1734, article 40. The first formal meeting between the Alliance's and the EU's military committees was held
12.07.2001.
84 In view of his potential role in EU-led operations, DSACEUR can invited to meetings of the EU Military Committee.
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has opted for a separate representative) in order to facilitate a close co-ordination.86 Furthermore,
EU/NATO ad hoc working groups have been established. At the time of writing there were four.
These deal with questions of security, capabilities, EU access to NATO assets and capabilities,
and permanent arrangements for relations between the two organisations.87 Hence, the interlink-
age of the security processes has been intensified during the last years. Obviously, the necessity to
do so has been recognised and the political will generated. However, this should not be mistaken
for a significant step towards a merger of the two security processes in the political dimension, let
alone a merger of the organisations themselves. Decisions on either organisation's activities are
still taken by the member states alone.
INCLUSION IN THE OPERATIONAL DIMENSION
The preparations for non-member's participation at NATO-led operations are elaborated in
the EAPC and PfP. Since the Alliance does not depend on, nor is likely to draw on any of the
Union's capacities for military operations, the non-allied EU-members do not obtain any formal
special status in NATO-led operations due to their membership in the Union. They are treated
as all other contributing EAPC members. It is nevertheless presumable that the crisis will be
made a subject within the EU as well. As a result, the Union may decide to utilise its civil in-
struments in order to stabilise the situation in the crisis-area. This means that all EU members
will be more involved than other non-allied countries in the overall management of a particular
crisis. However, neither the Alliance nor the Union or any other collective body carries the over-
all responsibility for the co-ordination of the military and civilian crisis-management efforts.88
Therefore, the EU and NATO will operate in parallel. Lacking a collective decision-making
body that synchronises the two organisations' activities, there is no forum in which the EU and
its members could have more influence on the military operation of the Alliance than other par-
ticipating non-members. In return, NATO and its members have no special status or influence
on the Union's civilian crisis management.
For EU-led operations one must differentiate between those conducted with, and those con-
ducted without access to the Alliance's assets. In autonomous EU operations the allied non-EU
members will formally be on an equal footing with all other non-EU contributors. They will
participate in the Committee of Contributors and may send a liaison officer to the EUMS. If
however the EU-led operation requires recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the Allies ob-
tain a special status. In this case, officers and representatives from the NATO member states will
carry out the operational planning in the Alliance's planning bodies in accordance to NATO
procedures. Consequently, the Allies have the same influence on the planning of an EU opera-
tion as they have during the preparation of proper NATO operations. The question is therefore
not if allied states participate on equal footing with EU members during the operational plan-
ning, but if the non-allied EU members participate on equal footing with NATO states during
these EU led operations. To assure that non-allied EU members are not discriminated, they can
send experts to the NATO staff that will handle the Union's request once the staff has been ap-
                                                                                                                                                       
85 The first formal joint NATO-EU Ministerial Meeting was held in Budapest, Hungary, on 30 May 2001.
86 See WEU Assembly Document A/1733, article 21.
87 These were established at the EU summit in Feira. See Feira European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 20.06.2000, Appendix 2 to Annex I.
88 The UN does not have this responsibility. In contrast to the military operations, many civilian crisis management activities do not require a
UN mandate, or better, they are not affected by a UN mandate.
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pointed.89 Of course, these experts will function as liaison officers and will not be involved to the
same extent as ordinary staff members.
In order to simplify the co-operation amongst the organisations and single contributing states,
each organisation identifies assets, capabilities and forces that the organisation itself, its member
states or other countries are prepared to make available for crisis- operations on a case by case
basis. For NATO-led operations, a pool of forces is identified within the Operational Capability
Concept for NATO-led PfP operations. Work on pre-identifying the collective assets and capa-
bilities of the Alliance that may be used for EU-led operations is carried out together by EU and
NATO experts.90 The WEU elaborated the Audit of Assets that was later transformed into the
EU Force Catalogue. These pool-lists are continuously being updated.
It should be noted that NATO was involved when the WEU and EU lists were established.
NATO's International Staff prepared a report on forces that the Allies participating in the
NATO Defence Planning Process and the WEU observers participating in PARP (=non-allied
EU members) could make available for WEU-led operations. The Alliance was also engaged in
the development of the Helsinki Headline Goal. It helped to define the Helsinki Headline
Catalogue (HHC) that outlines the assets and forces needed to meet the Helsinki Headline goal,
to compile the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC) that lists the available forces and to elaborate the
EU Exercise Programme.91 Moreover, it participated in the framework of the Headline Goal
Task Force plus.
The pools are interesting because they reflect the European countries' intentions. Almost all
members of the EU respectively NATO have announced that they may participating at an op-
eration led by either organisation. The only exceptions are the USA and Denmark. None of
them has declared themselves prepared to contribute to EU crisis-management operations.92 This
does not mean that they definitely have excluded the possibility of supporting a EU-led opera-
tion with national resources, but both clearly prefer operations to be conducted by NATO.93
The USA will most likely make sure that an operation with significant US contributions, espe-
cially if US ground forces are involved, will be conducted by NATO or as a US-led coalition of
the willing. With this stance, the two countries stand out from all other members of the Alliance,
including Turkey. They seem wary of an independent European force that could erode US
dominance and call into question NATO's primacy for collective defence and its role as the 'op-
tion of first resort' in managing future crises. The United States also wants to reserve its right to
a final say or 'first refusal'. However, such an arrangement cannot gain any support by the Union
since it would subordinate the EU activities to a NATO decision.
                                                          
89 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Appendix to Annex
VII (1).
90 Each organisation's Military Committee then validates the result.
91 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Appendix to Annex
I, article 4.
See also Göteborg European Council, Presidency report on the strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
16.01.2001, article 33.
92 Although Canada has not committed any forces to the Helsinki Force Catalogue it has declared readiness to contribute to crisis management
efforts undertaken by the Union. See Göteborg European Council, Presidency report on the strengthening the Common European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP), 16.01.2001, article 45.
93The US has even advocated the idea of making DSACEUR the commander of European forces for all operations and considers that EU/NATO
meetings should be held at 23 (the 19 members of NATO plus the four EU countries that do not belong to NATO) instead of at 15+6. See
WEU Assembly Document A/1734, article 44.
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REMAINING CHALLENGES
Although some progress has been made, severe differences remain between the organisations.
The major issue is the question of the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. In Nice the
EU suggested that it should have guaranteed permanent access to NATO's planning capabilities
without case-by-case NATO authorisation.94 Only six days later at the North Atlantic Council
meeting Turkey used its veto to refuse the European Union automatic access to NATO opera-
tional planning capabilities.95 This was repeated at the NAC meeting in Budapest in spring
2001.96The reason for this is quite obvious. Following the transfer of the WEU's crisis-
management functions to the EU, the status and influence of the associated WEU members has
decreased. Turkey is especially affected. It is the only European NATO-member that does not
remain outside of the EU voluntarily. As a contributor to EU-led operations, Turkey will be a
full member of the Committee of Contributors, established in case of an operation to monitor
the operation's progress on a day-to-day-basis. But, in difference to the constellation of WEU-led
operations it will not have a vote in the decisions taken by the Council or the PSC on the strate-
gic control and political direction of the operation. The Committee of Contributors merely pro-
vides these two bodies with opinions and recommendations. To underpin its stance, Ankara has
pointed out that this arrangement contradicts the decision taken at NATO's 1999 Washington
Summit. Article 9(d) of the Washington Summit Communiqué Article 9(d) states that NATO
attaches "...the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU Euro-
pean Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements
within the WEU”.97 In addition, NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept determines that the Alliance
will make its assets and capabilities available for operations under the political control and strate-
gic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus,
taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.98
This together with American reservations about the autonomy of the ESDP, i.e. the stance that
NATO must be the 'option of first resort', has led to a rather meagre results and a situation
where the negotiations on the EU-NATO relations are likely to continue for a long period. So
far, no information has been forthcoming about arrangements for EU/NATO relations in times
of crisis, the role of DSACEUR and the guaranteed recourse to NATO's planning capabilities.
At the time of writing, access to NATO assets and capabilities was still subject to a political deci-
sion by the NAC.99
These disputes reflect the current limits of the consolidation of the two security processes in
both the political and operational dimension. It is apparent that the will to maintain the separa-
tion of the operational part of the two organisations' security processes stems from the EU,
which insists on its own autonomy. This seems to be a wish that both allied and non-allied EU-
members share. The EU is promoting a policy where it wants to have guaranteed access to
NATO's capabilities, but without being prepared to concede full and equal involvement of Tur-
key in the decision-making concerning an operation for which it needs NATO assets. Imagine
                                                          
94 See Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000, Appendix to Annex
VII(1).
95 See WEU Assembly Document A/1734, article 58.
96 See 'Ringen um einen Kompromiss mit der Türkei. Umstrittene Mitsprache bei der EU-Sicherheitspolitik', NZZ, 31.05.2001
97 NAC, Washington Summit Communiqué. An Alliance for the 21st Century, Washington D.C., 24.04.1999, article 9(d).
98 Cf. NAC, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington D.C. 24.04.1999, article 30. How delicate this matter is shown by the contents of the
article 10 of the 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué, which addresses the assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities.
99 See WEU Assembly Document A/1734, article 43.
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such an agreement between to companies! The argument that a duplication of NATO's assets
within the Union only can be avoided if the EU's maintains its full decision-making autonomy is
not convincing, given the EU members' moderate efforts in enhancing their capabilities.100 In
contrast NATO, and foremost the USA, has shown itself anxious to incorporate the whole mili-
tary security processes into the Alliance, including the operational part of it. Even if the US fears
to lose influence if it allows a purely European pillar to develop in NATO, the concept of an
'ESDI within the Alliance' has included suggestions to set up a European chain of command,
that the European Union could activate when it sees fit.
3.1.2 Category politics – Authority
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A complete security process includes countermeasures. The efficient production of security is
vital for the identification with an organisation that has been given this task. An organisation
that fails to serve the security needs of a member state runs the risk of losing credibility in that
state, and thus its support. In this case, states will be forced to complete a security process outside
of the organisation. This undermines the notion that the security of the member states is indi-
visible. It is also likely to impair on the commitment towards the organisation and thus the
function of the organisation's security process. Consequently, the idea of an ESDI and the
chance to develop it will erode. But, if the organisation performs and achieves in producing secu-
rity, the dynamic may be turned around.
This section investigates two aspects of the organisations' function as security producing
authorities. First, it scrutinises to what extent the EU and NATO appear as security producing
authorities.
- What military operations have the two organisations conducted? Do they appear as security
producing authorities?
- Why are military threats sometimes dealt, and thus the security process located, outside of the
organisations?
- Do the two organisations satisfy the security needs of their members? Are member states
forced to counteract military threats outside of the organisations?
- Do member states voluntarily counteract military threats outside of the two organisations?
- Do the organisations utilise civilian means to produce security?
The second aspect concerns the two organisations future prospect of acting as security pro-
ducing authorities.
                                                          
100 C.f. Rainer, Hermann, 'Die Türkei fordert mehr, als ihr zusteht. Emotionen bestimmen die Diskussion um die Europäische Eingreiftruppe',
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.07.2001.
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- Does the adaptation of national military forces match the declared ambitions and new chal-
lenges?
- Do the countries make use of the synergy effects a co-operation offers and accept the result-
ing limitations in their own capacity to act?
3.1.2.1 NATO and the EU - producing security
The EU, the Alliance and their member states have tried to meet military threats by co-
ordinating military and civilian countermeasures.
PRODUCING SECURITY WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS –NATO DOMINANCE
Since the end of the cold war, European countries have been engaged in various military op-
erations around the globe. For some of the operations they have made use of the Alliance or one
of the two Unions (WEU and EU). With the exception of the EU led operation to promote
peace in Congo, the two organisations have only conducted significant military operations on
the Balkans. These operations are shown in the figure below.
Figure 3.1-2 NATO and EU/WEU operations on the Balkans
The dominance of the Alliance in the field of armed peace-operations in the crisis area is not
surprising given that its capabilities outshine those of the EU/WEU. With the exception of the
WEU's operation in the Adriatic (1992-1993) and the Italian lead Operation Alba (1997),
NATO took on the lead in the beginning of all joint military crisis management operations in
the Euro-Atlantic area.101 The only exceptions are those led by the UN and those taken over
from NATO by the EU. On the 31 of March 2003 the EU launched its first military operation
in the FYROM to follow NATO's operation 'Allied Harmony'. At the time of writing, a possible
take over of SFOR was also being discussed. It should be noted that both of these are/would be
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conducted with access to NATO assets. Military operations on the Balkans have been comple-
mented with civilian ones. The WEU has conducted police and customs missions on the Da-
nube (1993-96), in Mostar102 (1994-96) and in Albania (1997-01). The latter was taken over by
the EU in June 2001. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
started on 1 January 2003. It followed on from the UN's International Police Task Force. It
should be noted that these were not primarily operative missions, but aimed at assisting local
authorities to develop own forces. A comparison of NATO led and WEU/EU led operations in
terms of size and the number of contributing countries underlines how much larger the military
role of the Alliance has been. The table in the Annex clearly indicates that only NATO has lead
large scale combined military operations. The Alliance has also conducted all major operations at
the high end of the intensity scale on the Balkans. In terms of identification, this means that the
EU/WEU have not conducted any military operations that could demonstrate their military
authority. Only the Alliance has done so.
It would be false to explain the Unions' idleness by NATO's dominance alone, by the capabil-
ity gap between the organisations or by some kind of 'first right of refusal' privilege of the Alli-
ance. The Italian led Operation Alba (also called Sunrise) contradicts such an interpretation. The
organisation of the Multinational Protection Force, which eventually relied on the national ca-
pabilities of Italy, proved that the Unions' and their members did not lack the military capabili-
ties to conduct the operation. It rather exposed both organisations' political inability to make a
decision, become involved in a crisis and mount a military operation when the United States
(and with it the Alliance) chose not to get involved.
WHY DO MEMBER STATES COUNTERACT MILITARY THREATS OUTSIDE OF THE ORGANISATION?
There are two reasons why member states can counteract military threats outside the security
process of the organisations. Member states can be forced to do so against their own will, e.g. if
the organisation does not fulfil its task to serve the members' security needs. In other cases,
member states choose to locate the security-process outside of the organisation.
Organisations neglect security concerns of member states' – Operation ALBA. In March 1997
the Albanian Prime Minister Bashkim Fino called for international intervention to restore order
in the country. Italy and Greece, the two countries directly affected by the stream of refugees,
tried to prepare the political ground for a stabilisation force.103 However, they were not able to
mobilise the necessary support in the EU or in the WEU. Germany and Britain, in particular,
expressed their reluctance to act. They opposed the request for a Special Session of the WEU
Council that should be convened to confide the WEU authority of a military operation.104 The
British and German reluctance might be explained with fears of yet another Balkan imbroglio,
the critical phase in the IGC negotiations or the forthcoming British elections (May 1997).
Lacking American support the Alliance did not respond to the South European Allies concerns
either.105 Consequently Italy and Greece sought a UN Security Council authority for a "coalition
                                                          
102 This was the first mission conducted by the WEU on request by the EU, in accordance with the article J.4.2. of the Masstricht Treaty.
103 C.f. Kubicek, Paul, 'Albania's collapse and reconstruction', in Journal of international Affairs, Volume III - Number 1. March-May 1998.
104 Cf. Tanner, Fred, Conflict Management and European Security: The Problem of Collective Solidarity. Paper prepared for the First GCSP-
Yale (ISS) Seminar in Leukerbad, Switzerland. 21/22.08.1998.
See also Missiroli, Antonio, 'CFSP, Defence and Flexibility', in Institute for Security Studies of WEU [Now European Union Institute for
Security Studies], Chaillot Paper, no. 38, February 2000.
105 Although the inactivity of the Alliance has been explained in a more diplomatic way by the Americans. According to US Permanent Repre-
sentative on the North Atlantic Council, "...a decision will emerge, first, on whether a military operation should be launched and, second, on
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of the willing" operation. Getting it after only one day,106 they launched a co-operation outside
of any International Governmental Organisation's framework.
Thus, the member states did not make the same security assessments as the Italian and Greek
analysts. Italy and Greece did not manage to start a security process at the European level. They
did not even succeed in putting the issue on the Unions' or the Alliance's official agenda. There
was no process in which those non-willing tried to reassure and calm Italian and Greek fears.
There was no common evaluation at all and thus no attempt to formulate a common stance in
either organisation.107 Since this was the first real test to the Union's Common Security Policy,
its inability to act caused much disappointment and some harsh reactions. Carl Bildt, who at the
time was the international community's High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina,108
remarked that the events in Albania showed that any talk of a common foreign policy for Europe
was "pathetic”.109 In retrospect, having seen the successful end of the operation, it seems like all
EU and WEU states, including Great Britain, Germany and the non-aligned, regret not to have
acted through the EU/WEU.
In this case Italy and Greece were obviously forced to start a security process outside of the in-
stitutional framework of the European organisations against their own will. Thus, the organisa-
tions denied meeting their security needs. In other cases, the unwillingness to handle a military
threat in one of the organisations security processes seems to derive from the member states.
They can chose to launch operations outside of the organisations' framework.
Why are security processes outside of the organisations' framework needed? It is quite clear
that the two organisations are not able to meet all military threats in a way that satisfies the secu-
rity needs of all member states. The reason for this is that the security perceptions of different
countries vary. Different states do not feel the same responsibility and necessity to counteract
certain developments. One important difference is the varying geographical scope of security
politics. Obviously, some members can condemn and oppose distant military developments, but
without regarding them as threats that need to be counteracted decisively and with ultimate
(military) force. Other members, in contrast, can perceive the same development as a threat
against national referent objects that need to be defended vigorously. It appears that most EU
and NATO members have a rather regional perspective on military threats, whilst others take on
own responsibilities around the world. The latter foremost concerns the USA, which has a global
scope, but also smaller countries like France and the United Kingdom. In distant parts of the
world, these countries act outside of the NATO and EU structure. Occasionally they do so
within the framework of UN operations, but often operations are launched outside the setting of
any international organisation.
This has recently been demonstrated in so called 'war against terrorism' (Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan and the war against Iraq). The members of the EU and NATO did
                                                                                                                                                       
who is best positioned to take charge of that operation. When there was an intervention in Albania, 'Operation Alba', there was never a NATO
decision to refuse that mission. It was simply understood that this was not something that NATO should do, and so it was done by a European
coalition. Unfortunately it was not done by the WEU -- the WEU missed an opportunity to test its capabilities." C.f. speech by Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow, Next steps on European Security and Defence: a US view, delivered at the conference on "The Development of the Com-
mon European Security and Defence Policy: The Integration Project of the Next Decade," organised by the Institute for European Policy (Bonn
and Berlin) and the Representation of the European Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin. 17.11.1999.
106 UN Security Council resolution 1101 (28.03.1997) and 1114 (19.06.1997).
107 The EU did send a high-level mission into the area, but the recommendations of the mission were never made a subject to a decision taken by
the European Council.
108 For more information about his status see: The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement),
Annex 10.
109 C.f. 'What common foreign policy?', The Economist, 22.03.1997.
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neither use the organisations as prime forum for the security nor for leading the military opera-
tion. Although the NAC agreed to operationalise Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the wake
of the 11 September attacks against the United States,110 no NATO operations were launched.
Instead the military war on terrorism started as a US operation. Thus, when the core of the
Washington Treaty and the fundament for the collective defence was concerned, the Alliance
merely reacted with declarations and by sending five AWACS to the United States and deployed
its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean consisting of 9 ships to the Eastern Mediterranean.
During the first months of the attacks on Afghanistan US officials and the British Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair tried to mobilise support for it on a bilateral level. They jetted around the world
from capital to capital, not as NATO but as national representatives. In addition, the US turned
directly to some NATO allies for military assistance in support of the operation, not to the or-
ganisation or at least through it.111 Thus, NATO and the EU only represent two of several op-
tional platforms for a security process.
Nevertheless, with the exception of operation ALBA all military threats that directly influence
the somewhat nebulously defined Euro-Atlantic area are dealt with and managed by NATO
and/or the EU. This includes both Article 5 threats, which are always directed against at least
one member state and therefore per definition fall within the Euro-Atlantic area, and crisis man-
agement operations, which the two organisations only conduct within this area. One could argue
that Operation ALBA can be seen as a mistake and "a missed opportunity"112 that would not be
repeated by the EU today, given the development of the ESDP. If one settles for this explana-
tion, the context of the ESDI in the sphere of military threats appears to be limited to the Euro-
Atlantic area.113 Therefore, member states will have to address those military threats that are
located outside of the organisations' geographical realm elsewhere.
PRODUCING SECURITY WITH CIVIL MEANS – EU DOMINANCE
To say that the EU does not play any role in meeting military threats would not do justice to
the organisation. Even if the Union's account on military operations is not impressive (yet), it
has made considerable civil contributions to the stabilisation and reconstruction of crisis areas.
On the most general level, the EU counteracts military threats by advocating the respect for
democratic principles, human rights and the transition towards market economy in all its exter-
nal relations. It has particularly active in doing so in its vicinity, thereby supporting the stability
the region. The engagement in the enlargement process, with the three financial pre-accession
instruments PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD flanked by the Twinning programme,114 together with
                                                          
110 The day after the attack on the World Trade Centre the NAC stated that if the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it
shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. On the 2 of October 2001 the USA provided information to the
North Atlantic Council determining that the attacks had been directed from abroad. On the 4 October the NAC invoked and operationalised
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Sources: NAC, Statement, Brussels 12.09.2001; Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson.
Brussels 02.10.2001; Lord Robertson (NATO Secretary General), Statement to the Press on the North Atlantic Council Decision On Imple-
mentation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States, Brussels 04.10.2001.
111 C f .  The  dec l a r a t i on  by  the  US  De f ence  Min i s t e r  Dona ld  Rums f e ld  a s  quo t ed  a t :
http://www.bundeswehr.de/news/aktuelles/preview.php?id=422   (07.11.2001).
112 Mr. Cutileiro, José (WEU Secretary General) in his Introductory Statement at the 50th Anniversary of the Brussels Treaty, Brussels
17.03.1998.
113 Not that the two organisations ignore military developments outside of this region. Both have condemned actions and expressed their concern
about certain developments in other parts of the world. But, none of them has articulated the ambition to become a global military actor. Al-
though the organisations and their members can disapprove of distant military developments, they do not seem to perceive them as threats
against European referent objects that have to be defended with any conceivable means, including military forces.
114 The PHARE program started in 1989, intending to help Poland and Hungary to reconstruct their economies. It has however been gradually
extended, at its height comprising 13 states (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, FYROM, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). For more information see:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/index.htm    .
The Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) came into effect on the first of January 2000, aiming at
helping candidate countries to deal with the problems of the structural adjustment in their agricultural sectors and rural areas, as well as in the
implementation of the acquis communautaire concerning the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and related legislation. For more information
see:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/sapard.htm    . The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) in transport and
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the TACIS programme115 clearly surpasses the declaratory approach it uses in other regions.
However, these efforts are not triggered alone by the fear of potential or perceived threats. Other
motives stretch from the preparation of new markets for EU products to the genuine wish to
bring the countries into their proper place in a veritable European community. The Union's
activities on the Balkans, in contrast, are linked to the management and repulse of concrete
military threats in a more direct way than in other regions. I therefore focus on these.
The Union has been represented in the region with various delegations and taken on a multi-
tude of functions. The European Union Monitoring Mission (former ECMM) has been present
since July 1991 (now closely co-operating with the Alliance and the OSCE in Macedonia) and
the EU Administration in Mostar from June 1994 until June 1996. Since June 2001 the Union
also conducts the Multinational Advisory Police Element in Albania. Furthermore, the Union
has led the IV pillar (Reconstruction and Economic Development) of UNMIK in Kosovo since
June 1999 (closely co-operating with the UN and the OSCE) and established headquarters for
the European Agency for Reconstruction in Pristina in Kosovo. The Union plays an important
role in co-ordinating the EU assistance and reconstruction aid provided by its member states and
other countries. By initiating the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in June 1999, the Un-
ion took a leading role in replacing the international communities previous reactive crisis pre-
vention policy with a comprehensive long-term conflict prevention strategy. Together with the
World Bank, the European Commission is co-ordinating the economic assistance measures for
the region.
Its main contribution is of financial character. The EU is the largest provider of Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA) in the world.116 Through its various aid programmes, it has also by
far become the largest single financial donor to the western Balkans as a whole. To obtain the
figures for the total assistance from the EU area, the national contributions must be added. Alto-
gether, the EU and its member states clearly carry the lion's share of the aid and assistance bur-
den in Southeast Europe. In analogy to the military capability gap between the US and the
countries on the European continent, one could speak of an inverse donor gap in terms of finan-
cial support to the region. In Bosnia, for instance, the US provided roughly 25 % while the
Europeans paid around 50 %. For Kosovo, the U.S. pledged 14 % of the aid while the Europe-
ans contribute 73 %. In Serbia the Europeans covered 80 % verses 18 % from the US.117 This
transatlantic assistance gap cannot only be noted in the whole region, where the EU is the domi-
nant donor, but also on a global level. The US net ODA considerably smaller both in absolute
and relative terms. The US proportion ODA/GNI amounted to 0.11 % compared to the EU
total of 0.33 % in 2001.118
The development of the ESDP display the Union's wish to complement its civilian role with
the ability to lead credible and effective military operations. On paper, nothing prevents this.
Within the CFSP it has already addressed several military conflicts/threats. In total, 3 Common
                                                                                                                                                       
environment infrastructure. For more information see:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/ispa.htm    . These three financial Twinning,
the principal tool of pre-accession assistance for Institution Building, was launched in May 1998. Through the secondment of EU experts,
known as Pre-Accession Advisors, It aims to help the candidate countries in their development of modern and efficient administrations, with the
structures, human resources and management skills needed to implement the acquis communautaire to the same standards as member states. For
more information see:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/twinning/index.htm    
115 The Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States (TACIS) programme was launched by the EC in 1991 to provide grant-
financed technical assistance to 13 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It comprises the countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor-
gia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, mainly aiming at enhancing the
transition process in these countries. For more information see: Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) no. 1279/96, (expired on 31 December
1999) and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) no. 99/2000. See also:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm    
116 See European Commission: The EU and the UN - Overview, Brussels April 2001.
117 See White House, Fact Sheet U.S. and EU Assistance to Southeast Europe, Washington 14.06.2001.
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Strategies, 121 joint Actions and 139 Common Positions have been adopted within the CFSP.119
However, the member states have only been able to agree on some relative uncontroversial cases
and measures. Common positions regarding East Timor, Ruanda/Burundi and Angola, some
small-scale WEU operations, including the maritime blockade of Iraq (1990-1) and sanctions
against Yugoslavia may serve as examples.120 One explanation for the inability to make decisions
and undertake decisive countermeasures in the form of larger operations could be explained by
lacking capabilities and that the ESDP was not yet fully developed. The question is therefore
what the European countries are doing to remedy the shortfalls. Are the military capabilities
developed in such a way, that the ESDP and the strengthening of the European pillar of the
Alliance gain credibility?
3.1.2.2 Preparing for the future - matching ambitions with capabilities.
When looking at the political declarations made by the European countries during the last
years, one might draw the conclusions that they have learned a lesson from their failure to take
full responsibility for and to lead military operations in the Euro-Atlantic area. Although the
Europeans have carried their share in terms of deploying forces,121 the operations on the Balkans
have shown that they lack a number of key capabilities, i.e. equipment, which had to be provided
by the USA.
As long as the Union and NATO do not have their own procurement budgets, the required
acquisitions must be made and financed at the national level. The military deficiencies are
therefore not isolated to one of the two organisations, nor can they be remedied alone through
new creations or correction at the organisations' institutional level. Hence, the future credibility
of the EU and NATO as crisis managers depends on the development of national capabilities.
What capabilities are needed to assure the credibility? Whether or not the European forces are
credible depends on what performance one expects from them. It is thus advisable to use the
declared ambitions as a point of reference in a credibility argument. This seems all the more suit-
able, as it is difficult to foresee future challenges and the capabilities necessary to handle them.
During the last years, three assessments that define an ambition for crisis-management opera-
tions and identify capability flaws were made.
The first one was the WEU's Audit of Assets based on five illustrative mission profiles. The
most challenging of them being a 'separation of parties by force' scenario with a duration of 12
months, a deployment range of 6000 km from Brussels and a force comprising 2 divisions and
equivalent air and maritime components.
The second one was made within the EU, which could define the Helsinki Headline Goal us-
ing the insight from the Audit of Assets. Since the EU member states could not agree on any
                                                                                                                                                       
118 Source OECD, Official Development Assistance in 2001. See also OECD, A Mixed Picture of Official Development Assistance in 2001.
119 139 Common positions as of 08.10.2001, 121 Joint Actions as of 26.07.2001 and 3 Common Strategies as of 19.06.2001. Source: Academy
of European Law European University Institute, Florence: European Foreign Policy Bulletin database. Available at
http://wwwarc.iue.it/BASIS/efpb/all/rec/SF   
120 This inefficiency of the CFSP has been object of harsh internal criticism. In a confidential document from December 2000, the high Repre-
sentative Solana expressed strong criticism against the way the EU foreign policy goals are being formulated. According to this the common
strategies had failed to produce a stronger and more effective EU, since they are defined too vaguely. They are barely more than an inventory of
existing policies and activities. See Black, Ian, 'Solana slates EU foreign policy', The Guardian, 23.01.2001. See also WEU Assembly Document
A/1733, article 69-73.
121 For 1999-2000 EU member states had committed the largest number of military troops in both Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina: 65 % of the
46,000 KFOR troops were from EU member states, with total European (EU and non-EU) troop contributions at 75 % , vs. 15 % for the U.S.
60 % of the 20,000 SFOR troops are from EU member states, vs. 21 % for the U.S. EU contributions to all troops in Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina represented 63 % of the total, vs. 17 % for the U.S. According to an analyst at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, this rela-
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scenarios of their own, they adopt the existing WEU scenarios in order to move ahead.122 The
generic forces required were defined and presented in the Helsinki Headline Catalogue (also
called the Capability Catalogue) in November 2000.123
The third assessment was made within NATO. Following the DCI, the Alliance expressed its
ambition in the NATO Ministerial Guidance 2000 (adopted at the Meeting of the North At-
lantic Council in Defence Ministers Session held in Brussels on 5 December 2000).124 Based on
this, a Force Structure Review was launched that identifies what capabilities are required to meet
the new ambition in the Force Goals 2002. Although neither the Military Guidance 2000 nor
the Force Goals 2002 have been made public, there is no doubt, that the ambition of the Alli-
ance by far surpasses the one of the Union's. According to one NATO official, the Military
Guidance 2000 envisaged the ability to deploy and sustain three separate Corps-operations dur-
ing two years, supported by equivalent air and Maritime components.
Although the third one includes the US forces, all three declared ambitions have a less de-
manding military scope of action than the national ones of the USA.125 Europeans do therefore
not necessarily have to build up an overall capacity comparable in size and effectiveness to the
American one to become credible.126 Nevertheless, they must remedy the military shortfalls
identified.
Halting remedy of identified shortfalls. All three initiatives identified the same essentially
shortfalls. The major remaining gaps between the Force Requirements and the Forces committed
to the Helsinki Headline Catalogue by EU countries can serve as example:
Type of asset Force Requirements Forces Committed
Army
Light infantry Brigade 8 5
Maritime
Strategic Sealift 61 6
Air force
(including Maritime Aviation)
SEAD 60 28
AWACS 12 5
Air/Air refuelling 73 29
Electronic Intelligence 12 10
Strategic Airlift 188 166
Source: Hans-Christian Hagman Swedish MoD
Figure 3.1-3 Major discrepancy between Force Requirements and EU Forces
committed to the Helsinki Headline Catalogue.
The considerable flaws in the capability of deployment stands in harsh contrast to the declared
ambition of a rapid reaction force. Note that 162 of the 166 planes committed, are actually tac-
                                                                                                                                                       
tion was roughly maintained until 2002. Source: Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, 'The European Union and South
Eastern Europe', November 2000. Available at    http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/formyugo/kosovo/Kosovoppt.ppt  
122 Hagman, Hans-Christian, 'European Crisis Management and Defence: The search for Capabilities', in IISS, Adelphi Paper, no. 353, 2002, p.
46.
123 There are four different Helsinki catalogues. The first one is the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC), describing the force requirements.
The second one is the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC), listing the military forces and capabilities that EU states have committed to the Union.
The HFC has been complemented with the HFC supplement including the contributions from non-members. The third catalogue is the Hel-
sinki Progress Catalogue (HPC). Set up in June 2001 it aims at identifying the capability shortfalls on an annual basis by comparing the HHC
with the HFC. Finally, there is a Military Force Catalogue, listing the forces and capabilities that can be made available before the year of 2003.
For a concise summary of the HFC and the HFC 2000 supplement see Assembly of Western European Union Document A/1734 p. 22 and 23.
124 This document gives guidance on defence planning in general and force planning in particular. Following the Military Guidance 1998 this
was the first Military Guidance document based on the Strategic Concept adopted in Washington in 1999. Thus, the first one to include crisis
management as one of the fundamental tasks of the Alliance.
125 The US Joint Vision 2010 set the goal of 'full spectrum dominance'. This was further emphasised in the Joint Vision 2020. See Director for
Strategic Plans and Policy, J5; Strategy Division, Joint Vision 2020, Washington DC June 2000. See also Garamone, Jim, 'Joint Vision 2020
Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance', American Forces Press Service, Washington , 02.06.2000.
126 For a study on the estimates of the economic and political costs of such an endeavour see Seidelmann, Reimund, 'Costs, Risks and Benefits of
a Global Military Capability for the European Union' in Defence and Peace Economics, Vol 8. 1997, pp. 123-143.
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tical airlift (C-130/ C-160/ CN-235). Only the four C-17 leased by the United Kingdom are
wide-body planes capable of transporting a main battle tank and suitable for long-range strategic
airlift.127 It must also be underlined, that these flaws do not simply reflect a reluctance to con-
tribute forces to the EU, but result from veritable shortages (with the exception of light infantry
brigades).128 The required key capabilities can simply not be made available because there are not
enough of them.129
Given the lasting shortages in the European states, NATO does not seem to be much more
successful either. According to an interim report130 on the DCI, Allies have little in the way of
success to report. The report states that only 14 of the 59 action items listed in DCI are so far in
a stage of being "nearly or fully implemented", and that in non-critical areas.131 As many as 21 of
the DCI areas, most of which concern "effective engagement" and "survivability of forces", have
not advances. "Examples include capabilities against weapons of mass destruction; suppression of
enemy air defence and support jamming; combat identifications systems; and nuclear, biological
and chemical protection and detection means."132 All in all, the current spending plans of
NATO member states will only enable them to meet 35 % of DCI goals, the review states.133
What are the European Countries doing to match the declared ambition with the required capa-
bilities?
The UK plans to improve its strategic sealift service through a co-operation with a civil com-
pany, AWSR Shipping. Six Ro-Ro ships are to be built, crewed and maintained by the contrac-
tor over a 25-year period, with the first ships made available in 2004. The Netherlands is consid-
ering joining a UK Private Finance Initiative between 2006-09. If this goes ahead, the invest-
ment by the Netherlands would be   136 million, either co-finance the project or to increase the
number of ships.134 In addition, the Belgian Ministry of Defence is projecting the Bel-
gian/Luxembourg Transport Ship.135 It is however only a single LPD-type military ship with
amphibious capacity for transporting troops and floating installations, that is capable of helicop-
ter operations.136 Of the estimated   173.6 million programme, Belgium will pay 75 % of the
costs and Luxemburg 25 %.137 According to the Belgium MoD's website, the projected is
planned to be in-service in 2006. However these initiative are far from filling the 61 to 6 gap as
set out in the in the Helsinki Progress Catalogue. Concerning the Strategic Airlift, a seven-nation
program for 212 A400M transport Aircraft, comprising Belgium (7), France (50), Germany
(60)138, Italy (16), Luxembourg (1), Portugal (3), Spain (27), Turkey (10), United Kingdom
                                                          
127 This was kindly pointed out to me by Hans-Christian Hagman from the Swedish Ministry of Defence.
128 In fact, the Europeans offered more forces to the Helsinki Force Catalogue at the Capabilities Conference than they had done to NATO non-
§5 tasks (which in part correlate with NATO Rapid Reaction Forces). For example, Greece and Belgium provided a whole brigade to the Hel-
sinki Force Catalogue and only one battalion to NATO sustained operations. The Netherlands committed one brigade (EU) versus two battal-
ions (NATO) and both the Netherlands and Belgium offered considerably more ships to the Headline Goal. Great Britain, Germany and Turkey
committed more than twice the number of combat aircraft to the EU. Cf. Hagman 2002:22.
129 That the deployment of 40 000 troops to Kosovo took about five months demonstrates the lacking ability to deploy forces rapidly. C.f. IISS,
The Military Balance 2001-2002, p. 287.
130 This report was prepared by NATO military staff as part of a presentation on 26 April 2001 to partner nations.
131 "These include: resource implications for joint logistical centres; requirements for multinational logistic formations; interoperability through
standardisation; strengthening of multinational exercise programmes; concept development and experimentation; NATO policy on training,
evaluation and exercises; clearing house mechanisms for multinational formations; exercises for multinational forces to promote command and
control procedures and common doctrine; and the need for a Wide-Area Network." Hill, Luke, 'NATO initiative progress lags', in Jane's De-
fence Weekly, 30.05.2001.
132 See Hill 2001. In these 21 areas, the work either started late, more studies need to be completed before further activities can be launched or,
progress depends on procurement of resources not forthcoming.
133 Cf. 'Armies of Europe Failing to Meet Goals, Sapping NATO', New York Times, 07.06.2001.
134 Janssen, Joris, 'Dutch increase spending to support Europe'. in Jane's Defence Weekly, 25.07.2001.
135 Also called Navire de transport stratégique belgo-luxembourgeois (NTBL).
136 WEU Assembly Document A/1757, European strategic lift capabilities –reply to the annual report of the Council, 05.12.2001, point 70.
137 Toremans, Guy, 'Requirements emerge for Belgian-Luxembourg sealift ship', in Jane's Defence Weekly, 05.09.2001.
138 The original order comprised 73 Aircraft, but Germany reduced it to 60 in March 2003. See http://www.heute.t-
online.de/ZDFheute/artikel/6/0,1367,POL-0-2025734,00.html.
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(25).139 However, the A400M, carrying a payload of 32 tons, will mainly replace the elder trans-
port aircraft Transall and Hercules (carrying 16 tonnes respectively 22,6 tonnes 140), and there-
fore it remains to be seen whether the overall lift capacity will really be boosted. Moreover, the
members of the European Air Group (EAG) signed a binding agreement in February 2001 to
share each other's airlift and air refuelling assets in order to use the existing assets more effi-
ciently.141 I have already mentioned the European bi- and multinational satellite initiatives.142
These capabilities, available at the earliest in 2004, will not even approximately match the
American one. They will not increase the overall capability considerably. They will however al-
low the involved countries to verify or put the information provided by the US to a test. It may
also meet the needs of some low level EU operations.143 In the field of Suppression of Enemy Air
Defence (SEAD), AWACS and electronic intelligence the prospect of progress is small.
All things considered, the increase of the overall European crisis management capabilities will
be modest in the next years to come. Considering the development of defence expenditure, it
seems likely that the European countries will continue to concentrate their efforts on low budget
solutions, such as co-ordinating the use of existing assets. This will only result in minor im-
provements, and leave the 'expensive' capability gaps open. Despite the common goals and al-
though some of the 23 EU and NATO states increased their procurement spending, the overall
acquisition expenditure of the member states has decreased every year since 1998.144 Admittedly,
the US boost has broken the trend, but no other European state has followed and undertaken
similar dramatic changes in national defence budgets. In addition, a large part of the envisaged
investments are in fact reinvestments, since aged equipment will be replaced. Thus, only a lim-
ited amount of the already restrained procurement budgets actually results in new additional
capabilities. Therefore, the shortfalls listed in the table above will not be corrected during a fore-
seeable future. In fact, even with budgetary increases it would hardly be possible to sort out these
flaws within this period, since the procurement and production of the capabilities would require
more time. Thus, the European countries will not make the necessary investments and provide
the required capabilities to meet the ambitions they have expressed in the Helsinki Headline
Goal. The NATO Ministerial Guidance 2000 cannot be met either, because the resources of the
allied non-EU members, including the US, will not be enough to fill the capability gap left open
by the allied EU states. Provided the Force requirements are correctly estimated, neither the EU
nor the Alliance will be able to handle the most ambitious tasks they set themselves as an objec-
tive.
                                                          
139 This decision was taken by the nine participants at the Le Bourget air show in June 2001. WEU Assembly Document A/1757, point 31. At
the time of writing Germany evaluated whether or not to decrease its orders from 73 to 60 planes. See 'Weniger Militär-Airbusse für die Bunde-
swehr', Der Spiegel, no. 40, 28.09.2002.
140 Source Försvarsmakten, Flygplankort, Stockholm 1999. This book sets the range of the C-160 Transall at 4 500 km and the one of C-130
Hercules at 3600 km. Other figures are also available. The WEU Assembly document A/1757, for instance, presents the following data: C-160
Transall 16 tonnes/1 800 km, C-130 Hercules 17 tonnes/3 200-5 000 km, and for the A400M 35 tonnes/3 700 km.
141 The agreement, known as the Air Transport and Air Refuelling Exchange of Services, was signed by the EAG members: Great Britain, France,
Belgium, Italy and Spain, Germany and the Netherlands. See Janssen, Joris, 'Extended European Air Group signs to share airlifters, tankers', in
Jane's Defence Weekly, 14.02.2001.
142 See page 54.
143 The enhanced co-operation among the European countries will not change this either, be it the co-operation in European Space Agency
(ESA), the French-Italian co-operation (decided in at the French-Italian summit in Turin 29.01.2001) or the French German co-operation
(decided in Mainz on 09.06.2001).
See 'France, Germany and Italy set to make space pact'. Jane's Defence Weekly, 21.06.2001. See also 'USA: Europas hochfliegende Weltraum-
pläne mit militärischem Anstrich', Frankfurter Rundschau 10.07.2001.
144 Source: IISS, Military Balance 2000/2001, p. 41.
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3.1.3 Category policy -Program
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The category policy is concerned with what referent objects are used in the security processes
within NATO and the EU. But, how does one investigate what referent objects are used in the
organisations security processes? Since a security processes must include countermeasures, it
seems natural to begin scrutinising the referent objects used to justify the most obvious counter-
measures against military threats – the operations led by the EU and NATO. I therefore begin
by asking:
- What referent objects are used to justify operations led by the organisations?
However, military operations are not the only way of counteracting military threats. The en-
largement process is also a way to target military threats. Furthermore, the forming of NATO
and the EU, or more precisely the decision to manage military threats together with other coun-
tries within them, can also be interpreted as a way to counteract both internal and external mili-
tary threats.
- Why do states want to co-operate in the military sphere? What are the motives behind the
development of the ESDI in the Alliance and the ESDP in the Union? Why are the reorgani-
sation and the "Europeanisation" of the security structures deemed to be necessary and what
reasons/referent objects are used when justifying this?
Since the referent object and the uniformity is not always clearly outspoken, one should also
scrutinise if the different policies offer a basis for a common security process. To this end, I ask
two additional questions. The first is concerned with the relationship between the two organisa-
tions and a possible merger of their security processes.
- With whom do the member states want to co-operate? Why do the security processes of the
EU and NATO remain separated? Why do they not grow together?
The second question addresses the policy of the voluntary non-members.
- To what extent do they want to co-operate? Do national membership-policies comply with
an ESDI? Does 'ad hoc neutrality' comply with an ESDI?
3.1.3.1 The referent objects used in the military security process.
It can be expected that the EU and/or NATO justify the production of security with reference
to the defence of specific norms and values or to the organisation's own survival. The identifica-
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tion of the referent objects currently used when undertaking actions to counteract military
threats might indicate what the common setting and thus the ESDI consists of.
Crisis management operations – no self defence but defending 'universal' values. Military op-
erations out of area (OOA) could be linked to the credibility, the raison d'être and thus, the
survival of the organisations themselves. However, the organisations' own survival has only been
used as a referent object in internal debates, and in the academic discussions. It has not explicitly
been presented as such in official documents.
In general, NATO and the EU do not justify their engagement in crisis areas to the public by
outlining European referent objects, but rather by referring to a legal basis. Normally, the aim of
the action is only outspoken in the mandate under which the personal in the field acts. However,
the mandate merely outlines their authority and operative task in the crisis area, not what values
they are to protect. So far, operations have not been justified with reference to the security of the
member states or said to be defending some kind of specific EU or NATO standards. Of course,
the threat is being securitized and discussed among the member states within the organisation
before an operation is launched. But, defining and outlining some kind of specific European
referent object does not seem to be necessary in these talks. Considering that a national stance
towards a crisis is not determined and a condemnation of a possible aggressor not always made
with reference to national referent objects either, this is not so surprising. Just as single states, the
organisations can perceive an event as a crisis, define atrocities and call for action with reference
to general norms such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In concentrated form, the
logic presented to the public reads as follows: there is a crisis in our vicinity where the values we
stand for are violated.145 Thus, we have to act, and we can do so on the legal basis of this specific
UNSC resolution, memorandum of understanding or some other form of agreement with the
local authorities.146
On the whole, it is remarkable how rarely European referent objects are specifically mentioned,
even if considering the political tactfulness of avoiding definitions of the organisations shared
setting. The occasions where the organisations have expressed their concern for the crisis on the
Balkans with reference to their own security certainly are rare. Only two WEU ministerials point
out the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as a threat to European security and/or underline the
risk of spill over effects and the spreading of the crisis.147 The NAC declared its concern over the
grave consequences that a spill over of the conflict would have, in one single document.148 The
Council of the European Union has not done so even once. Considering how often the expres-
sion "European Security" is used in Ministerial documents, it is surprising that NATO and the
EU have not even presented the most general form of a European referent object –the European
security- as referent object, whereas the WEU at least achieved to do so twice.149 In no NATO or
EU ministerial have their operations been set in direct relation to, or said to aim at contributing
to, the European security. At the most the NAC presented them as a contribution to the stability
                                                          
145 NATO and the EU have condemned the violation of these standards in almost all their declarations concerned with the former Yugoslavia. See
for instance NAC Statement on Kosovo, Washington D.C. 23/24.04.1999; and Berlin European Council, Presidency Conclusions,
24/25.03.1999, Statements on Kosovo.
146 See annex for an overview over the legal basis for EU/WEU and NATO operations.
147 C.f. WEU Council of Ministers, Common Reflection on the new European security conditions, Lisbon 15.05.1995, article I.8.5 and II.3.8.;
Extraordinary Council of Ministers, European Security : a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries, Madrid 14.11.1995 article 13 and 99.
148 NAC, Final Communiqué, Athens 10.06.1993, article 1 and 2.
149 WEU Council of Ministers, Lisbon Declaration, Lisbon 15.05.1995, article 13; WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid Declaration, Madrid
14.11.1995, article 6.
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and security of the region.150 The closest one gets to an official document from the European
Council, where the humanitarian, peacekeeping and other crisis management operations are
presented as a contribution to European security is the Reflection Group's Report from Messina,
which was not drawn up by the Council itself.151 References to the overall European security and
stability are not even made in the broadest of all initiatives, the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe. In its founding document, signed in Cologne 10 June 1999, the described aim is
"...strengthening countries in South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy,
respect for human rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole re-
gion".152 If adding the explanations and declarations of national governments it becomes evident,
that the engagement of the organisations and the single countries on the Balkans, is presented to
be driven by humanitarian considerations, with the aim to end the atrocities and to promote
stability and security in the region, period. The operations are not presented as a way to promote
the own security, but only to defend and export certain values.153
Since the organisations' justifications and explanations do not contain any declarations using
specific European referent objects, one can draw the conclusion that the violation of the general
standards was quite enough to mobilise support and to launch the operations. Moreover, the
same general or 'universal' values have been used in the security processes of both organisations.
Consequently, the same uniformity has been defined in both of them. This uniformity is by no
means exclusive. With a UN mandate, the two organisations have acted with the support of a
much broader basis than their own member states. This does not preclude that the member
states share a more detailed common identity and referent object. But, there was obviously no
need to make further specifications and to define the uniformity in more detail.
Enlargement. In contrast, the Enlargement processes of both the EU and NATO have
(amongst other things) been presented as vital moves for the security and stability in Europe as a
whole. Ever since the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the Union has underlined the secu-
rity dimension of the enlargement, claiming that peace and security in Europe depend on the
success of applicant countries' reform process.154 The Alliance has stated that it will continue to
welcome new members in a position to contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.155 The
arguments of single member states follow the same lines.156 In contrast to the military operations
OOA, the enlargement process presents itself with a double purpose. It is an important step in
exporting, defending and cementing the general values mentioned above, all of which are in-
cluded in the organisations' treaties and rules. In addition, it is also presented as a way to en-
hance the organisations' and their member states' security. However, the referent objects for the
latter have not been clarified. In other words, the uniformity has not been specified. Conse-
quently, the general or 'universal' values as outlined in the official documents of the organisa-
                                                          
150 C.f. NAC, Final Communiqué, Brussels 05.12.2000, article 2.
151 European Council, Reflection Group's Report, Messina 02.06.1995, Brussels 05.12.1995, article 168.
152 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne 10.06.1999, III Objectives.
153 C.f. Blair, Tony (British Prime Minister), 'Our responsibilities do not end at the English Channel', in The Independent on Sunday,
14.02.1999. See also Rede des Verteidigungsministers Volker Rühe (1992 – 1998) anlässlich der Debatte im Deutschen Bundestag zum Einsatz
der Bundeswehr im Rahmen der militärischen Absicherung des Friedens im früheren Jugoslawien, 30.11.1995.
154 C.f. Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 21/22.06.1993, article 7; Essen European Council, Presidency Conclusion,
9/10.12.1994, Relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; Madrid European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15/16.12.1995,
III. A; Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 10/11.12.1999, article 10.
155 C.f. NAC, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Brussels 10/11.01.1994, article 1.
NAC, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Madrid 08.07.1997, article 8.
NAC, Washington Summit Communiqué. An Alliance for the 21st Century, Washington D.C. 24.04.1999, article 7.
156 C.f. Parlement Européen Groupe de travail 'Élargissement', Livre Blanc sur l'Élargissement de l'Union Européenne. Volume II. Rapport sur
les positions des États membres et des États candidats sur l'Élargissement de l'Union Européenne. Luxembourg 1999. Updates presented at:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/members/default_en.htm    
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tions remain the only declared common referent objects. They also constitute the only uniform-
ity that has been defined.
3.1.3.2 Why are military threats on the European agenda?
When scrutinising the motives behind the European coordination of national countermeasures
against military threats one must make a clear separation. On the one hand, one has the creation
of collective defence organisations at the beginning of the East-West conflict, such as NATO and
the WEU. On the other, one has the 'Europeanisation' of the Alliance and the introduction of
military elements into the EU at the end of the East-West conflict. I will return to this duality
and outline the difference between the two from an ESDI perspective later when addressing the
non-members' policies. At this point, I concentrate on the 'Europeanisation' of the last decade.
Why has it taken place? Several arguments/incitements are used to explain the need for, respec-
tively the advantages of, the development of the ESDP and the "ESDI within the Alliance".157
First, the threat perception has changed in the post-Cold War era. Military conflicts and or-
ganised ethnical cleansing came back on the European agenda. Basically, all European actors
have an interest in stopping the crisis on the Balkans, hindering it from escalating and spreading,
and preventing similar developments to evolve elsewhere. Hence, the demand for preventive
actions and crisis management capabilities accelerated. Since no country disposes of the necessary
resources alone, this challenge can only be solved multilaterally. Therefore, there is a general
consensus concerning the need for an enhanced multinational co-operation and a coherent
European security and defence policy.158
Second, the co-operation and co-ordination of national foreign and security policies are seen as
a goal in themselves. The success of NATO and the EU has proven that inclusiveness is the most
successful strategy to counteract a re-nationalisation.159 As shown above, this is one of the argu-
ments used to justify the enlargement process. Even if a-security has not been reached among all
NATO members, i.e. between Greece and Turkey, consultations and the exchange of views
among the members within the organisations, as well as with non-members, is seen as the most
efficient way to clear up misunderstandings and to prevent armed conflicts. The institutional
frameworks of the two organisations are particularly suited for this, as they guarantees a continu-
ity that allows dialogues before conflicts evolve and in harsh times when they are needed the
most. An institutionalised exchange is likely to support the confidence building, the develop-
ment of shared behavioural codices and the establishment of a common approach to security.
Those organisations that have succeeded in creating stability towards the inside have a special
responsibility to project this stability towards the outside. Thus, to prevent a re-nationalisation
the successful European security co-operation had to be further developed and deepened as well
as opened in order to assure that the Central and Eastern European Countries become solidly
integrated into the European security structures.
Third, an intensified Europeanisation is needed in order to cope with the asymmetry in the
transatlantic relationship. In the military sphere all countries have limited capabilities to conduct
crisis management operations, but the main share of shortfalls is found on the European side of
                                                          
157 The arguments presented are those used by EU- and NATO-officials, as well as by national representatives in Brussels, when answering my
questions.
158 Even if not presented in this exact way in ministereal declarations, this argument seems to be commonly excepted in the political establish-
ment. Most persons interviewed have used this argument themselves and no one has opposed to it.
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the Atlantic. Although Lord Robertson's statement that the European members of NATO spend
almost two-thirds of the United States' defence budget – while having nothing like two-thirds of
the real capability of the US,160 must be put into perspective, it gives a hint about the dispropor-
tional burden-sharing. Therefore, it is foremost up to the Europeans to increase their military
crisis management capabilities and thereby to enlarge their contribution to European security
and to take more responsibility. This is needed to ensure the credibility of NATO and the EU,
as well as to assure the US commitment in Europe. American resentments about burden sharing
can only be avoided if the United States does not always have to carry the lion's share and foot
by far the biggest bill for military operations in Europe.161 In addition Europe has to increase its
capabilities in order to remain an interesting strategic partner to Washington.162
These three general and consensual reasons indicate that the European countries have identi-
fied and perceive that they are confronted with the same external military threats. They also seem
convinced that these can only be managed collectively. Thus, they share the responsibility to
counteract them and to project stability into their vicinity. Nevertheless, more specific arguments
that reveal differences are also used. Here the opinions of allied non-EU members, foremost the
USA and Turkey, differ from the ones of the EU-members'. Whereas Washington and Turkey
have argued that the Alliance should be the focal point for the 'Europeanisation' of defence poli-
cies, the EU has decided to develop the ESDP.
Why ESDI within the Alliance? The view of allied non-EU members. The US has urged the
Europeans to increase their contribution to the responsibility they share. First and foremost by
enhancing the military European capabilities for crisis management.163 In qualitative terms, be-
cause the technical gap between European and US forces threatens the interoperability. Already
today, the American forces cannot fully utilise the capacity of their high-tech equipment when
interacting with European forces. In quantitative terms, because this might relive the US from
engaging in all European crisis. This would allow Washington to concentrate on its commit-
ments and interests elsewhere in the world.164
Of course, the US and other allied non-EU countries, especially Turkey, which cannot rely on
joining the EU in foreseeable future, want the European Allies to take on more responsibility
and to increase their capabilities within the framework of NATO. Their reasons for preferring a
strengthening of the 'European pillar' of the Alliance are obvious. As NATO-members they can
influence a process within the Alliance directly, but not the one in the EU. In addition they fear
                                                                                                                                                       
159 C.f. Cutileiro, José (WEU Secretary General), speech at the WEU Colloquium 'European Defence and Security Identity'. Madrid
06.05.1998.
160 See Lord Robertson (NATO Secretary General) in front of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam, 15.11.1999.
161 See Talbott, Strobe (Deputy secretary of State), America's Stake in a Strong Europe, Remarks at a Conference on the Future of NATO, The
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Secretary General), A European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, speech at the WEU Colloquium 'European Defence and Security
Identity'. Madrid 06.05.1998.
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Anthony (U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of state for European Affairs), The European Union: U.S. perspectives, Remarks at the indus-
trial College at fort McNair, 08.11.1999.
164 See Talbott, Strobe (Deputy secretary of State), Speech 1999a. In this speech he also said: "It's in our interest for Europe to be able to deal
effectively with challenges to European security well before they reach the threshold of triggering U.S. combat involvement." At a later occasion
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NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period, end of debate." See Talbott, Strobe (Deputy secretary of State), The state of the Alliance: an American
perspective, speech held at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 15.12.1999.
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that the ESDP might weaken the commitment to NATO and thus, the Alliance altogether. They
are therefore alarmed by all attempts to move security policy out of NATO and into the EU.165
If the EU builds up an own veritable military capacity, then the complete security process can be
conducted within the Union. In the long run, two parallel security processes may result in two
separated ESDIs. A senior official from the State Department made this fear clear by pointing
out that the US is interested in burden-sharing but not in a division of labour in the Euro-
Atlantic area because the latter might lead to a division of perception. In the worst case, the EU
could come to one result and NATO to another, or non at all if a transatlantic consensus cannot
be reached. This would make tensions inevitable. Moreover, if the EU-members would decide to
act within the framework of the Union when the result in NATO does not suit them quite as
well, the two organisations would present themselves as competitors. In the worst case the Alli-
ance could be degraded to a coalition of the willing on EU terms, and the non-EU-Allies become
second-rate members in the Alliance. This would jeopardise the bond within the Alliance, its
SDI and the US commitment in Europe altogether. To avoid this situation, the former secretary
of state, Albright, summarised the pro-NATO arguments with her 3 D's:166
No decoupling: As all countries, Washington wants to participate in the discussions about the
necessity and purpose of a CM operation, before deciding if it wants to participate in it and de-
fining who is best placed to take the lead if military action is necessary. An exclusive discussion
among the EU-members in order to finalise EU positions before discussing security in the trans-
atlantic context, would seed a potential for disagreements and conflicts into the transatlantic
link.167 In principal this is not different than the inclusiveness argument described earlier.
No duplication really means avoiding duplicating the things that have been built up in NATO
at great cost (such as military command structures and large planning staffs) and that would not
result in an increase of the needed capabilities if being copied. In the long term duplication will
not only lead to a competition between EU and NATO (can you really have two common de-
fences?).168 Duplication is also undesirable in terms of cost-efficiency. New institutions cost
money, which is not invested in more capabilities.
No discrimination is the logical consequence as well as a prerequisite of the other two D's. If
NATO's command structure remains unduplicated, CM operations under the Union's lead
would have to fall back on NATO assets and capabilities. These would however only be released
for EU-operations, if the non-EU Allies are satisfied with the detailed arrangements for their
involvement. Otherwise countries such as Turkey might block the "assured access" and thereby
jeopardise the basis for the other two D's. Turning the argument around, if the EU craves the
capacity for autonomous actions, it must duplicate NATO assets and capabilities if the access is
not assured. Frequently the no discrimination is also explained with reference to the Article 5
commitments. It cannot be that allied countries are not involved in EU operations of low inten-
sity, while having the responsibility to help the allied EU-members, should the crisis escalate to
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an Article 5 operation.169 Ankara has also pointed out that 13 of 16 probable conflict- and crisis
scenarios are located in Turkey's neighbourhood and that an intervention is likely to have con-
siderable consequences for the country, be it in form of refugees or economic effects. Therefore,
Ankara must be fully involved in the decision-making. Another worry is that the EU could be
influenced by Greek preferences and start interventions that could contradict Turkish inter-
ests.170
Developing an ESDI within the Alliance only, would mean that the Europeans had to make
larger contributions, and in consequence take more responsibility and gain influence within the
Alliance. In terms of ESDI the most important consequence of this development would be that
military threats would be managed in a single European security process. Nevertheless, the mili-
tarisation of the EU has brought the opposite about. A parallel security process has been estab-
lished. It is obvious that the pro-NATO stance comes close to a subordination of the EU to the
Alliance in security matters. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Council of the EU had a dif-
ferent point of view. Interesting is that the driving force behind the development of the ESDP
steams from the allied EU-members, already involved in the collective security process of the
Alliance.
Why ESDP within the EU? The first argument for the development of the ESDP within the
EU is that it is a natural step in the evolution of the European Union, following Schengen, the
European Monetary Union (EMU) and the CFSP. Whereas the European Union disposes of
respectable funds and much diplomacy, the CFSP lacked the third instrument normally used in
international politics to apply pressure within the military context - soldiers. To meet the exter-
nal challenges posed by armed conflicts efficiently, the EU has to be able to back up its diplo-
macy with a credible threat of military action.171 With a complete range of instruments for crisis
management, it is argued, the EU will be given a unique opportunity to prevent and deal with
crisis that goes far beyond the abilities of the Alliance. Usually this is backed up with the argu-
ment that the European Union has to shoulder the responsibilities conferred on it by its eco-
nomic weight, political role and historic destiny. In addition, the European public does not un-
derstand, nor accept, that Europe is incapable of managing crisis in our vicinity like the one on
the Balkans.172 In addition, third parties expect the EU to get involved in foreign affairs. As an
economic giant the EU can become one of the few protagonists on the international arena that
can put other actors under considerable pressure.173 Having the means to exercise influence is
accompanied with the responsibility to do so and to make use of the instruments. Since military
elements are involved in the crisis being securitized in the EU, the Union must also take these
into account in its considerations. Military and civil elements cannot be treated in isolation from
each other. Therefore, the Union must eventually also require military elements. Making the
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whole range of complementary diplomatic, economic and military crisis management instru-
ments available to the EU is thus, simultaneously used as efficiency and responsibility argu-
ment.174
Here the American logic presented above is turned around. Since the allied non-EU-members
would never agree to a subordination of NATO to the EU and let the Alliance take over the role
and function as the military arm of a self-responsible EU, the ESDP must be developed. Thus,
the second argument often used is that the EU has to develop the ESDP. Moreover, the global
scope of the USA foreign and security policy prompted the European countries to develop the
ability to act autonomously in order to be on the safe side. The Europeans cannot rely on the
Americans to take the main responsibility for the European security.175 Be it that the transatlan-
tic partners do not want to become directly involved and to intervene in every regional crisis on
the European continent, or that their troops are engaged elsewhere so that they cannot get in-
volved.176 This is actually a diplomatic way of saying that US and European interests and priori-
ties are likely to differ at times. However, that the Americans and Europeans engage to varying
degrees in a crisis operations and that they attach varying importance to specific military threats,
would not hinder the European Allies from developing and strengthening their capabilities
within the framework of the Alliance. Unless, the EU-Allies suspect that their interests may con-
tradict American ones, and that the USA (and other allied non-EU countries) might hinder them
to look after their interests in the way they desire, they could continue to develop their ability to
act without military support from Washington within NATO. This leads to the next argument.
The third and final argument is that EU countries want to develop the ESDP in order to
counterbalance Washington. The operations on the Balkans have revealed the Europeans' de-
pendence of the US and the American dominance. Washington has successfully dictated the
terms of some of the most important security policies over the past decade (NATO enlargement;
Dayton; Balkan peacekeeping; relations with Russia). What the US sees as 'leadership,' is often
seen as 'unilateralism' in Europe. This is also valid in a wider context. Some examples of US
unilateralism criticised by Europeans are: Helms-Burton, ILSA, Kyoto, landmines, UN dues,
Iraq, CTBT, IMF chief, Echelon, National Missile Defence, the International Criminal Court
and captives held in Guantanamo Bay on Cuba. The two latter in particular have feed the per-
ception in Europe that the United States expects others to submit to rules that shall not apply to
America. It seems as if Washington thinks it can have its way on all issues in a unipolar world.
This is not a new impression generated by the events in Iraq. After a first peek was reached in
Kosovo, many Europeans seem determined never again to feel quite so dominated by the US.177
Despite of all the diplomatic formulas, such as "without unnecessary duplication" and "mutual
reinforcement", it is obvious that EU-countries want to obtain the ability of acting without the
US and to make the EU an alternative to the Alliance in the area of crisis management.178 This is
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often subsumed in diplomatic formulations such as making "Europe able to shoulder more re-
sponsibilities in a fairer and more equitable transatlantic partnership".179 Due to its 'militarisa-
tion', the instrumental catalogue of the EU now corresponds to the one of a state, including the
USA. By pooling national and collective assets, the European Union does not only have the per-
spective of being able to manage crises. With its common foreign and security policy, supported
by credible military capabilities, the EU can also be put in the same power-category as the USA,
or at least approximate to it. Moreover, it can be argued that the development of the ESDP will
enhance the European integration-process and uphold its momentum, improve the coherence of
the CFSP, meet the new challenges in the European area and increase the Unions influence and
power.
3.1.3.3 Why do the security processes of NATO and EU remain separated?
It is obvious that no one is interested in letting the EU and the Alliance become direct rivals.
That situation is unlikely to become true. Both organisations and all countries involved have
been keen on linking the security processes of the two organisations.180 In fact, it would be diffi-
cult to isolate the security processes of the two organisations from each other. The same
threats/crisis in the Euro-Atlantic area are on the agenda of both organisations. In addition, the
same countries constitute the majority of participants in both organisations. The two organisa-
tions also complement each other. While the Alliance alone disposes of the necessary military
assets for leading CM operations the EU is equipped with civilian instruments.181 As both or-
ganisations draw upon the same national European forces for their respective operations, they are
obliged to coordinate their efforts. Obviously, parts of both organisations' security context seem
to overlap in the sphere of military threats.
Figure 3.1-4 Activities in the military context.
Thus, one could expect the two processes to be integrated, at least in the context of military
crisis management. Since neither the EU nor the Alliance is willing to include non-members in
their proper decision-making,182 a harmonised membership constellation appears to be a prereq-
uisite for a merger of the two organisations' processes. It is important to remember that all EU-
members have the option to become NATO-members, but all allies cannot join the EU even if
                                                          
179 See address by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at WEU Ministerial Luxembourg, 23.11.1999. . Robertson has also stated that:
"Europe needs to develop the capacity to take action where NATO as a whole is not involved, so that the Alliance is not dragged into conflicts
simply because Europe has no capacity to handle them on its own. The 'NATO or nothing' option is no longer sustainable." Lord Robertson
(NATO Secretary General) Speech 2001a.
180 As shown in the section on polity, the two organisations have even gone further and established means to involve eastern European countries
into parts of their security processes.
181 Cf. The EU Presidency and the NATO Secretary General, Joint Press Statement on the Western Balkans, Released after the first formal
NATO-EU Ministerial Meeting in Budapest, Hungary. 30.05.2001. NATO Press Release (2001)080.
182 This does not hinder them from making the organisations activities dependent of a mandate from the UN or OSCE. It only means that non-
members cannot prescribe them to do so.
NATO
EU
Article 5
Crisis
operations
(ESDP)
Crisis preven-
tion
Reconstruction
Civilian
Means
Military Means
Civilian crisis
management
79
they wish. This is not only valid for Turkey that does not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. It is also
difficult to imagine that the Union would accept a US or Canadian membership. This alone
makes an integration of NATO into the EU impossible. A merger of the two security processes is
therefore only possible if the ESDP is integrated into NATO. Therefore, the non-aligned EU-
members have a key position. If they joined NATO, the two security processes could be consoli-
dated. This would not automatically dissolve the differences between Europeans and Americans,
but it would do away with one hinder to the inclusion of the ESDP into the Alliance. At first
glance, it also appears to be possible since the formulas presented in the Alliance allow such a
merger. The ideas labelled "separable but not separate capabilities" and "the strengthening of the
European pillar within the Alliance" might not aim at such a solution, but they make it conceiv-
able that EU-states could form a core or, if one prefers, a sub-EU-SDI within the larger NATO-
SDI. But, as the examination of the polity displayed the two processes remain separated. Several
reasons hinder an integration of the ESDP into the Alliance.183
First, there is a resistance from the side of the Alliance. It is obvious that allied non-EU mem-
bers want to avoid a situation where the EU-members co-ordinate their position in advance and
act as a joint block within the Alliance. Such a development would degrade the security process
of the Alliance since it would have to succeed the one held in the EU, from which the allied non-
EU members are excluded. Furthermore, some allied EU-members also oppose to this structure.
Not only, because such a two-piece security process would be more time consuming. Since allied
EU countries are not always of the same opinion, sometimes some of them may prefer to align
with the position of the US or other non-EU allies, rather than with the majority of the EU-
members. These countries prefer the EU to be more of an institutionalised coalition of the will-
ing, an alternative to the Alliance in case the European interests differ from the American ones.
There is also resistance from the EU. Apart from the motives behind the development of the
ESDP presented in the preceding section, one can also speculate about the different ways security
is thought in the two organisations and on the two sides of the Atlantic. While NATO tends to
treat military threats as a more or less isolated military phenomenon, the Union takes a much
wider approach. One reason for this can be found in the asymmetry of the two organisations'
field of activity as presented in the figure above. The Alliance is not involved in the civilian crisis
prevention and in the reconstruction in the same way as the EU is. Given the origin of the two
organisations, this is not surprising. NATO was founded to counteract the perceived military
threat from the Soviet Union, and this in a time when the military security dimension overshad-
owed all other security interests. The EC in contrast, started as a civilian organisation aiming at
preventing military threats from occurring among the participants. Another reason for this diver-
gence can be found in the transatlantic capability gap. Since the Europeans do not have the abil-
ity to enforce their interests with military force around the globe to the same extent as the
Americans can, they have no option than to produce security with different instruments. Conse-
quently, the European understanding of how security is to be produced may diverge from the
American one. Therefore, the Europeans want to be able to launch an own security process.
The third reason returns to the asymmetric membership. As long as the non-allied EU states
remain outside of the Alliance, they will oppose to an integration of the ESDP into the Alliance
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(unless France or some other allied EU country is faster). Turning the argument around, one
may claim that their voluntary non-membership in the Alliance is a main obstacle to the merger.
Why do these countries reject the mutual defence guarantees that a membership implies? How
does the refusal to give mutual defence guarantees influence the notion of an ESDI? Can a con-
vincing distinction between crisis management and Article 5 operations be made?
3.1.3.4 Do the national membership-policies comply with an ESDI?
Member states of both organisations carry the responsibility for the variable geometry. Iceland
and Norway can, but refrain from joining the EU, and the four non-aligned EU countries Fin-
land, Sweden, Austria and Ireland can, but refrain from joining the Alliance. The two Allies'
unwillingness to join the Union has fairly little to do with military threats and defence consid-
erations. The management of military threats only constitutes a small proportion of the Union's
activities. The voluntary non-membership can therefore not be interpreted as a rejection of the
ESDP. On the contrary, Norway has declared its willingness to contribute forces to the Helsinki
Headline Goal. An examination of Norway's and Iceland's refusal to join the EU would there-
fore not be very informative regarding the ESDI. In contrast, the refusal of some EU members to
join NATO can be explained almost exclusively with security relevant considerations. Their re-
jection of Article 5 commitments seems to conflict with the idea of a shared ESDI. Therefore,
this section focuses on the non-alignment policies of these EU-members.
DOES 'AD HOC NEUTRALITY' COMPLY WITH AN ESDI?184
The non-alignment of Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland has been a source of concern for
some, be it that they are 'free riders' profiting from the security projected by the Allies or that
their stance in the defence policy hinders the evolution of the CFSP.185 The label 'non-aligned'
clearly implies maintaining a distance from others and a reservation as to the degree to which the
countries are committed to joint demarches in the field of security.186 However, through their
contributions to crisis management operations, these non-allied countries have shown that they
are reliable partners, and willing to participate in the collective production of security, even if
this includes the use of military force. This raises two questions. Are these four countries only
formally or also de facto non-allied? How does that influence the Union's ESDI compared to
NATO's?
De facto or formal non-alignment? The non-alignment of the four countries consists of two
elements. They reject formally agreed mutual defence guarantees, and they deny any foreign
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troops to be stationed on their territory. Their averseness to give mutual defence guarantees to
fellow European countries is based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that an EU membership
does not include any obligations of mutual defence assistance. Secondly, it postulates that a clear
and distinct separation can be made between crisis management and territorial defence.
The former argument can rather easily be refuted. Due to the militarisation of the EU, the
non-alignment has to be redefined all together.187 As pointed out by Risto E. J. Penttilä, the
further the EU goes in building a common foreign and security policy, the less room is there for
non-alignment and neutrality.188 The obligation of mutual assistance is just as strong within the
EU as it is within the Alliance. As the report issued by the Finnish Council of State in March
1997 noted, the membership in the EU does not provide guarantees of military security, but
entails protection based on common solidarity. The report continues to present the EU as a de
facto obligation of mutual assistance:
"The Union is founded on the concept that its own and its Member States' security are
inseparable. (...). As a member of the Union, she [Finland] cannot be impartial in a con-
flict between the Union and a third party. Besides that, membership strengthens our secu-
rity position and raises the threshold that would have to be surmounted in order to exert
pressure on us."189
The Austrian Chancellor Schüssel went even further by explaining that Austria has to assist a
fellow EU country if being attacked. According to him, the solidarity within the European fam-
ily must have priority over the Austrian neutrality.190 The formulation in the Irish White Paper
on Defence 2000 goes in the same direction, although it is not quite as clearly outspoken.
"The EU Treaties do not provide a mutual defence guarantee. It is clear, however, that
the security interests of Member States are increasingly interdependent. There is a security
impact in terms of political solidarity between Member States, reinforced by agreement
on the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common
defence."191
Thus, as Jan Oberg argues, although the non-aligned have not signed any formal mutually
binding obligations, there is something called political signals, credibility, non-binding duties
and moral obligations.192 It is most unlikely that any of the non-allied EU members participating
in the CFSP, would declare themselves as neutral and withdraw from a situation when the inter-
national security environment, they have actively been influencing through the CFSP, gets out of
control and the military situation gets to tough. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask in what way the
moral obligation within the EU is weaker than NATO's Article 5 guarantees? Formally, an Ally
is only held to assist a member attacked, by taking forthwith such action itself deems necessary.
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No ally has resigned any sovereignty to the Alliance.193 The difference between the EU and
NATO is that the Allies have written the obligation of mutual assistance down on paper and that
they have set up collective capabilities and assets to conduct the collective defence. The moral
commitment, however, is the same.
Separating crisis management from Article 5 operations is also difficult. The four countries
concerned try to make their engagement in the ESDP consistent with their non-alignment by
drawing a line between crisis management and collective defence.194 In their view, military crisis
management could be interpreted as being in accord with their own previous activism in UN
Peacekeeping operations. Thus, they all supported the Finish-Swedish initiative to include the
Petersberg tasks into the EU.195 In fact, they could all present this as their own policies.196 Ac-
cording to their logic the territorial defence would be a national responsibility, dominated by the
NSDI, whereas the responsibility for crisis management is shared with others. This separation
reflects the different referent objects used. Crisis management operations seek to defend and
enforce general universal values. Territorial defence, in contrast, is directly concerned with the
own survival. The question is if this separation is valid. Can identified military threats be classi-
fied and assigned to these two isolated categories. Can a clear distinction be made between crisis
management operations and territorial defence?
It may be difficult to draw a line between the high end of Petersberg tasks and territorial de-
fence. The simplest argument is that preparing for and conducting crisis management through
the Union can be seen as the most efficient collective defence. But, there is more to it. It is not
likely that a military attack against an EU member would come completely out of the blue. Ten-
sions would probably grow continuously, and crisis management efforts start before a military
armed assault is launched. Thus, the non-aligned are likely to be involved throughout the escala-
tion, maybe even with military troops in a crisis management operation outside of the EU-treaty
area. Where is the line between crisis management and defence to be drawn on-site? When the
EU reaction force is attacked? When attacks are being launched on EU-territory? Can such a
differentiation be made at all? What if the adversary does not separate between in- and out-of
area and between different nationalities within the EU-reaction force?
The geographical limitations of NATO and EU crisis management operations is another rea-
son indicating that there is no distinct line between the referent objects used in crisis manage-
ment and Article 5 operations. The reason why European crisis management efforts are restricted
to the Euro-Atlantic area is not that violations against the universal values are exceptionally grave
within this region. Offences in the European neighbourhood are regarded as especially serious,
because they have a much larger effect on the stability in the member states' vicinity, and thus on
their security, than more distant irreconcilable behaviour.
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Non-alignment's influence on the ESDI. Since the distinction between non-alignment and
alignment is so vague, the four countries' refusal to give defence guarantees to others does not
suggest that the security process of the European Union generates an ESDI of a inferior quality
than the one that is created in the Alliance. In the case of the EU and NATO, one can even sug-
gest the opposite.
Mutual defence guarantees do not require a more detailed or sophisticated definition of uni-
formity, on the contrary. As indicated in the classification of different ESDIs, an alliance directed
against an identified adversary can be held together simply by a collective alienation from and
definition of the 'other'. Crisis management operations that are not defending specific national
referent objects, in contrast, require a definition of the common values and norms that the coali-
tions of the willing defend. They are thus based on an identified uniformity, and if only ex-
pressed in most general terms. However, as a lasting organisation, NATO was created and has
continued to develop to something more than a convenient alliance. Throughout the lasting
cooperation, not least during its crisis-management operations, the Allies have had to define
common values and norms. This uniformity largely matches the one expressed in the Union.
Considering the double membership of many countries, it is not surprising that the Alliance and
the EU share and advocate the same basic values such as democracy, rule of law and market
economy. Nevertheless, the example of Turkey displays that the demarcation from the 'other'
(the Soviet Union) was much more important in the Alliance's definition of uniformity, than for
the Union's. While Turkey qualifies for NATO membership, it cannot join the EU, yet. A main
reason is that it does not meet the Union's standards concerning human rights and the rule of
law.197
There is no doubt that Article 5 has a symbolic value. It is an unmistakable affirmation that
each participating states regards the survival of the others to be vital for its own survival and that
the security of all Allies is indivisible in this sense. It is also true that the four countries exclude
themselves from parts of the Alliance's activities by choosing to remain non-members. But, this
does not necessarily mean that they feel a weaker security commitment vis-à-vis other EU or
even NATO countries, nor that they are less confident to receive assistance when in need. When
it comes to the crunch help does not always come from those who have expressed their solidarity
in advance. The impact, which the refusal to speak out guarantees has on the SDI, should
therefore not be overestimated. The non-aligned must not forcefully 'think' of security differ-
ently than the Allies. This is all the more probable in a time when crisis management even stands
in the centre of the Alliance's collective security production.198 Since the WP vanished, NATO
members do not believe that they will have to defend NATO's territory collectively in a foresee-
able future. This is also reflected in the NATO Ministerial Guidance 2000 that explicitly ex-
cluded a large-scale invasion against the Alliance. Consequently, Article 5 obligations lose signifi-
cance and voluntary participation in crisis management operations becomes more important,
even within the Alliance. This voluntarism correlates well with non-alignment.
It is therefore not surprising that the four non-aligned countries are eager to adapt and increase
the interoperability of forces with those of other European states. This allows them to participate
actively in the collective production of security, i.e. crisis management operations. It should be
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noted that their contribution to EU as well as NATO led crisis management operations does not
lag behind the average of NATO states'.
Hence, the formal non-alignment of the four EU members does not necessarily contradict the
notion of an ESDI. Whether non-alignment is compatible with an ESDI depends on the motives
for the chosen non-alignment. Given that the difference between non-alignment and alignment
is so indistinct, not to say negligible, the question why these countries want to remain formally
non-aligned really becomes interesting.
Why maintaining formal non-alignment? Countries will only apply for NATO membership, if
they expect this to be advantageous. Whereas national representatives may have to explain and
justify their non-membership in international organisations, the domestic need of explanation is
turned around. Here the burden of persuasion lies on those who are in favour of the Alliance.
They have to explain to the public what it is a membership would give the country, which it does
not already profit of. Hence, for a non-aligned country the question cannot be 'why not join
NATO?' but 'why join NATO?'. In what way will membership serve our security? Given that
the non-participation in NATO only excludes the non-aligned from parts of NATO's security
process, and hardly restricts their opportunities for co-operation,199 this certainly is a difficult
task.
The change of governmental policy of all four countries during the last decade, i.e. the accep-
tance of the militarisation of the EU and the approach to the Alliance, can be seen as a de facto
alignment within the Union and even as a move towards NATO-membership. Therefore, when
discussing the non-membership, it must not be seen as a permanent status. If it is of an instru-
mental character rather than ideologically based, non-alignment characterises a particular mo-
ment in time and is not necessarily an indication for the future.200 Hence, a shared SDI with the
other European states, the Alliance and the US cannot be excluded. If the nonalignment serves
the common European interests, it can very well be compatible with an ESDI. Therefore, it is
not surprising, that voices advocating a membership in the Alliance are heard in the parliament
of all countries, with the exception of Ireland.201
The core argument used to advocate a NATO membership in Finland, Sweden and Austria, is
similar to the one used during the debates when they joined the EU – the fear of marginalisation.
The Alliance's actions influence both members and non-members. The major difference is that
an insider is directly involved in the decision-making and thus, has more influence. If your
playing the game anyhow, you should be fully involved in the process where the rules are being
formulated and the major moves are planned. Moreover, the importance of the transatlantic link
is often pointed out as an essential bound that must be maintained and strengthened. Thus, an
application for NATO membership is usually motivated both with national interests and with
shared values and responsibility.
What arguments are used for sustaining the non-alignment until further notice? Both Sweden
and Finland have explained that the non-participation in military alliances is not an end in itself,
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200 Cf. Herolf 1999:139.
201 According to Daniel Keohane no Irish political party is advocating mutual military security obligations, and no debate on the issue exists
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but best serves the security, both for themselves and the world around them.202 It is an important
instrument that contributes to security and stability in Northern Europe.203 As for military
threats, their main concern seems to be the Baltic States' relation to Russia. They are both anx-
ious not to cause unnecessary irritations in Moscow. By remaining formally non-aligned they
obviously expect to avoid unnecessary tensions in the region. That a Swedish and Finish NATO-
membership would make the integration of the Baltic States into the Western organisations even
less acceptable for Moscow seems convincing. However, following this line of argument Sweden
and Finland will join the Alliance once the Baltic States have become full NATO members. Due
to public opposition, this is not likely for several years to come (se page 86). In addition, the two
Scandinavian countries have given military support to the Baltic States, helping them to build up
their proper defence. This witnesses of a remaining cleavage between Russia and its non-aligned
Scandinavian neighbours that show solidarity with the Baltic States. Moreover, both countries
expressively articulate their support for the US commitment to European security.204 They wish
to and do maintain close relations and close co-operation with the US and NATO in order to
carry out tasks within the large area which is unrelated to Article 5.205
Although the Austrian neutrality is the only one that is prescribed by law, it can also be
classified as instrumental. In the legal texts, Austria's neutrality is presented as a mean to as-
sure its independence and inviolability.206 As early as 1997, the former Austrian Defence
Minister Dr. Werner Fasslabend underlined the instrumental character of the neutrality by
stating that "...Austria's neutrality was a product of the Cold War and has lost its function
with the end of bipolar confrontation".207 Furthermore, Austria has made a clear and undi-
minished concession to European solidarity in defence and security, and even advocated the
inclusion of the WEU Article 5 into the EU.208 In the government statement from 2000,
chancellor Shüssel also made clear, that he aims at deepening Austria's relations to NATO in
order to keep the option of a later membership open.209
The Irish policy of non-alignment (although formally referred to as "military neutrality"), fi-
nally, is the only one that has not been questioned by the own political elite. The reason for this
is that the motive behind the non-alignment has not changed. Ireland's non-alignment did not
result from the second world war, as the Finnish and Austrian did, nor was it utilised to avoid an
invasion or to obtain a special position between the two blocks during the cold war, as the
Swedish one. Thanks to its geostrategic position behind the belt of European Allies and Ireland
has been well protected. The White Paper on Defence 2000 stated that "[t]he threats to the secu-
rity of the State which have required an operational response from the Defence Forces over the
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last thirty years have all been in the internal security domain."210 The Irish neutrality can best be
described as 'neutrality against the United Kingdom'. In combination with the EC/EU member-
ship, the policy of non-alignment has helped Ireland to emancipate itself from dependence of
and subordination to the United Kingdom. From this perspective, the end of the East-West
conflict has not changed the function of non-alignment, as it has in the other three states. The
Irish participation in the ESDP and EAPC support such a conclusion.
Differences between the population and the political elite. The public opinion does not seem
to match these explanations. There is still a firm opposition against NATO membership in all
four countries.211 It is difficult to say if this really results from the instrumental reflections pre-
sented above. Can, for instance, the resistance in Sweden among both the population and in the
parliament212 be explained simply by peoples' considerations for Russian reactions?
It appears more likely, that the rejection against NATO-membership is based on the myth of
being neutral, which is deeply rooted and positively associated with the national identity.213  The
resistance against the Alliance's weapons of mass destruction and the self-image of having a
unique and important ability to mediate in crisis are probably important factors. The function as
bridge builders has vanished in the unipolar world. Following the logic of the CFSP, the non-
aligned have channelled their foreign policy through the EU and thus, not taken on any special
mediating role in any crisis that has been subject to the Union. There seems to be a gap between
the self-image of the people and the actual integration pushed through by the political elite. The
notion of an ESDI and an indivisible European security seems to be much further developed in
the minds of the responsible decision-makers than among the electorate. This is why all four
countries maintain their status of pseudo non-allied countries. The political elite seems to have
realised that there is no clear dividing line between crisis management and Article 5 operations
and that defence obligations towards others states are a fact. It is therefore not surprising that
they adapt to and prepare for a collective security production. Claiming that it only is a matter of
time until the non-aligned join NATO would however be saying too much. This depends on the
development of the ESDP. Even if this becomes the political elite's goal, it will take a long time
and be difficult to convince the population of the benefits of a NATO membership or of the
introduction of an Article 5 in the EU.
DOES A PARTIAL PARTICIPATION COMPLY WITH AN ESDI?
The variable geometry is not only a question of membership. The fragmentation is also known
within the two organisations. All member states do not participate at the organisations' entire
security process. Denmark never chose to become a full member of the WEU (it is the only Al-
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lied European country with the status of an observer) and has decided not to participate in the
elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the EU having defence implica-
tions.214 Within the Alliance, France has chosen to remain outside of the integrated military
structure and several committees.215
Danish opt-out from the EU. Although Denmark does not have reservations against the ESDP
as such,216 it has put itself in a very ambiguous, not to say inconsistent, political position. Den-
mark has distanced itself from the Union's military production of security within the EU in a
much clearer and more definite way than the non-aligned states have from NATO. The non-
aligned can chose to participate at NATO led operations on a case-by-case basis, but Denmark's
defence exemption applies to all EU decisions that include the use of military units. There is no
room for exceptions. Even Norway and Turkey, who in contrast to Denmark are prepared to
contribute forces to the ESDP, have larger possibilities to participate at military activities within
the EU framework, ranging from exercises to operations.
This can appear as a clear rejection of an ESDI within the EU. Such a view is also supported
by the fact that Denmark enthusiastically participates in military crisis operations in other or-
ganisational contexts. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is contradicted by the Danish support to
the Union's role as security producer. Denmark is represented in all bodies of the ESDP struc-
ture217 and participates in all aspects of the security process that does not include the use of
military units. Furthermore, it advocates the integrated military and civilian approach to crisis
management within the EU.218 The latter appears particularly contradictory. Although the gov-
ernment will try to distinguish on a case-by-case basis between civilian and military elements,
Denmark seems to promote its own exclusion from ESDP activities. Thus, Denmark has volun-
tarily stepped of the pitch and started to cheer for the development of an ESDI within the EU
from the sideline.
An explanation for this contradictory policy may begin with the polity. The Danish exemp-
tions from EU policies emanate from the political convention that lets any major changes in
Denmark's formal relationship to the EU be decided by referendum. The Danish defence ex-
emption came about and can only be changed by a new referendum.219 Thus, a conservative and
status quo orientated electorate limits the freedom of action of the more pro-European political
elite. I am well aware of that any attempt to elaborate a logical explanation for public opinion
and the outcome of a referendum is daring. The motives and considerations that brought about
the result are legion. The fact that the referendum was not held on the defence exemption in
isolation, but as a package of all four opt-outs, makes it even more difficult to identify the rea-
son. Nevertheless, the combination of two main arguments may explain why the defence ex-
emption was made an issue in the first place.
The idea of each state's right of self-determination is well established in Denmark. Normally,
Danes in general oppose to international power politics in the sense that one state forces its own
will upon another. Consequently, they also reject the creation of an international or suprana-
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tional superpower that could take on such a role. The rejection of the militarisation of the EU
can therefore be explained with the unwillingness to contribute to the transformation of the EC
into a superpower, and the wish to limit the Union's influence on Denmark. In this situation, an
opt-out appeared as the only option. Small Denmark should not enforce its opinion upon other
EU states and block the militarisation all together. Another reason is that the public's image of
how security was produced deviated from the one of the political elite that participated directly
in the European security process and that failed to explain the changes to the electorate. Den-
mark had participated in different international organisations with separate areas of responsibility
since the Second World War. This functional compartmentalisation could be upheld as long as
security only was thought of as hard security, which lay in NATO's sphere of responsibility.
Apparently the Danish public was not convinced that a shift from hard to soft security issues
actually took place during the early 1990s. The opt-out reflects that the Danes still believed in
the possibility of separating the military from the civilian security production. In other words,
security was still thought of as military security at the time of the referendum.
As the EU has taken over WEU functions and its military role grew, Denmark's influence di-
minished. The conflict between the Danish non-participation on the one hand and its support of
the Union's increasing role as a security actor with both civilian and military means on the other,
has become clearer with time, and so has the marginalisation of Denmark. This has had a peda-
gogical effect on the public opinion, which is changing in favour of lifting the defence exemp-
tion.220 Hence, the Danish boycott of the military cooperation within the EU contradicts the
notion of an ESDI within the Union. But, this stance is beginning to fade.
The french policy of semi-alliance. The situation of France is more complex than the one of
the states mentioned above. Just as Denmark, France has partly withdrawn from the security
process in an organisation of which it is a full member, although not in the form of a boycott.
Just like the non-aligned states, France can always opt in. Although, it cannot be hindered to
participate at the Alliance's security process as non-aligned states can. What makes France's posi-
tion special is that it did not reject further integration, but chose to disintegrate from NATO's
security process. Furthermore, it became the main advocate of an alternative European security
process.
The French withdrawal can easily be interpreted as a rejection of an ESDI within the Alliance.
However, the opposite seems more plausible. Under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, France
strove for a position from which it could play an independent role that corresponded to its self-
image as a 'Grand Nation'. The partial exit from NATO became necessary because France could
not fulfil this aspiration within the Alliance. The reason for this was that the security process had
not been lifted to the level of the Alliance. The Alliance was not the main production plant for
security. While the allies prepared for Article 5 within NATO, the negotiations with the
WP–countries were held on a bilateral level, in particular between the Soviet Union and the
USA. Instead of conferring with Eastern Europe collectively in and through NATO, the allies
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found themselves in a situation where they added their military and political weight to the
American negotiators without being asked. The two super powers de facto negotiated on behalf
of all countries on their side of the iron curtain. Thus, all other states on either side were effec-
tively degraded to satellites. So was France. France's pullout can therefore be seen as a reaction
on the American dominance, its own marginalisation and the lack of ESDI within the Alliance.
Figure 3.1-5 US marginalisation of fellow Allies.
This does not mean that France has rejected the security process within the Alliance and the
American engagement in European Security as a whole, or that it devoted itself unconditionally
to the development of an ESDI outside of NATO. Why did and does France remain outside of
NATO's integrated military structure, and why has it favoured the development of the ESDP?
In the 1960s France considered both the American presence in Europe and the existence of
NATO to be necessary. Lacking confidence in Germany is one reason why France advocated the
American engagement. But, the perceived threat from the WP remained the most important
factor that influenced the French support of NATO and the American involvement. Although
the French 'défence du faible au fort' is based on the idea of becoming militarily self-sufficient,
France never refrained from its own Article 5 commitments nor did it claim that the Alliance
had become obsolete. France always considered that armed conflicts with the WP must be
fought together with the Americans in the Alliance.221 Nevertheless, France wanted to be fully
involved in the whole security process before the East-West conflict escalated to war. Obviously,
Paris could not achieve this within the Alliance, nor could it do so on its own. The attention it
was given by the USSR could not be taken for a full involvement in the security production be-
tween East and West. Although Moscow nursed what it considered a rift in the Western unity, it
still regarded the USA as the decisive partner in talks.222 Consequently, France had to promote
the development of an ESDI outside of the Alliance. It has done so in bilateral relations, within
the WEU and finally in the ESDP of the EU. This approach has been particularly attractive for
France. As one of the larger European countries, France is guaranteed severe influence in any
Western European security process at which the Americans do not participate. Acting collectively
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with other European countries would thus give French policy more weight and multiply French
power.223
From a French point of view, this is not simply a question of maximising the French influence
and to protect French security interests. The French self-image does not allow for a separation
between French and European interests. France natural role as a great power224 is not simply
founded on its past as distinguished colonial power, its status as one of the four victors of the
Second World War225 or its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. These are
just externals. The French revolution is the most important event that formed the national self-
image. It did not only cause great changes in France, but in all of Europe and throughout the
world. The French see the revolution as the birthplace of modern European thinking.226 From a
French perspective, France stands for that which is genuine European (often seen in contrast to
what is American). In this sense, France is Europe and Europe is France. The French discourse is
therefore characterised by a synonymous notion of France and Europe. Like no other country
the French project the image of the own nation on Europe, ascribe the role of a trailblazer to
France and tend to blend French and European interests.227 It can therefore be difficult to dis-
tinguish French from European referent objects. Although Paris seems to picture a European
security process as an extended French security process, it does not simply confuse national and
European positions. France sees its own role in a European context and argues in European
terms. The French policy is often seen and presented as a European policy. In other words,
France can only realise its proper NSDI in a European context.
The French are of course by no means naive. They are well aware of that other EU countries
do not necessarily share the French view. The fears of a strong Germany display the realisation of
differences among European ideas.228 This is one explanation for why France has never been
keen on renouncing sovereignty and/or its own autonomy in the European integration process.
In fact, the other allied EU-members' fidelity to and their prioritising of the transatlantic bond
may clarify the French opposition to supranational elements in the field of security and defence
policy. As long as Paris does not see a possibility to establish its own notion of an ESDI outside
of NATO, it cannot renounce its autonomy.
France's 'rapprochement' to the Alliance during the 1990s is a defeat from the French per-
spective. It became necessary because France could not win support for its own ideas among the
allied states. France had promoted a division of labour between the Alliance and the EU/WEU.
NATO was to concentrate on the Article 5 and the EU/WEU were to take responsibility for the
crisis management in the European area.229 Paris sought to prevent an extension of NATO's
tasks in order to boost the Union's political importance at the cost of the Alliance's.230 The
EU/WEU were to take over high profile crisis operations, and still be able to call for Washing-
                                                          
223 C.f. Sauder 1995a. See also Sauder. Axel, 'Alles neu macht der Mai? Die Zukunft der deutsch-französischen Sonderbeziehung', in Blätter für
deutsche und internationale Politik, No.4. 1995, p.438-449. This view was also underlined by Jaques Chirac who stated: "Il ne fait aucun doute
que la France est plus grande dans l'Europe qu'elle ne le serait sans l'Europe." Quoted by Chambraud, Cecile and Saux, Jean-Louis, 'Jaques
Chirac se porte à la tête des Européenes de la droite', in Le Monde, 1999-03-03.
224 This self-image was demonstrated by François Mitterrand after the second Golf War with his statement: "La France a tenu son rôle et son
rang". [France has regained its role and status. Authors translation]. 'Le «rang» de la France.' Le Monde, 05.03.1991.
225 Although the country did neither participate at the conferences on Jalta or in Potsdam, France was formally elevated to the equal status with
the three victorious- and occupying powers, USA, United Kingdom and USSR.
226 When French officials speak of "la mission civilisatrice" or of France's special vocation, they refer to the country's role and responsibility for
the spreading of France cultural and political heritage.
227 Cf. Schmitt, Burkard, 'NATO à la française. Dimensionen einer sicherheitspolitischen Wende', in Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale
Politik, no. 5, 1997, pp. 567-575. Here p. 569.
228 Always when Germany's strength threatened to outgrow the French one, Paris has initially taken a restrictive, not quite solidarity position, be
it in the case of the reunification, a permanent German seat in the UN security council or voting modalities within the EU.
229 In the attempt to make NATO continue to concentrate on the collective defence, France was given strong support from Norway and the other
allied countries closest to the former Soviet Union. Although their aim apparently was not to restrict the Alliance's influence, but to assure their
own security.
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ton's help if crisis management was unsuccessful and the situation escalates to an Article 5 situa-
tion. When France saw that it could not convince the other European allies of this solution, and
that NATO adapted to the new situation and took on crisis management tasks, Paris followed
the motto 'if you can't beat them, join them'. France decided to move closer to the Alliance in
order to assure and strengthen its influence at the centre of events. This does not mean that
France abandoned its own idea of an ESDI. It only 'returned' to the extent needed to avoid be-
ing placed at the sideline, and to make sure that the 'new NATO' was modelled with respect to
French preferences. Within the Alliance, Paris advocated the European element. That is the
structural strengthening of the European pillar and making the Alliance's assets and capabilities
available for EU/WEU-led operations.231 At the same time, it pushed for the merger of the
EU/WEU and the strengthening of the autonomous European capabilities.
During the 1990s, the French idea of a transatlantic relationship and its notion of an ESDI be-
came clearer than ever. France certainly regards the European security as indivisible from the
French security and that which France stands for. Instability and armed conflicts in Europe con-
cern France security and fall in the sphere of responsibility of the 'Grande Nation'. Moreover,
France wants to have the USA as a reliable big brother. A big brother that minds his own busi-
ness elsewhere as long as not called upon. Thus, France wants to build an ESDI without Ameri-
can participation and involvement, but with the American security guarantees.
The French status as semi-allied country does therefore not contradict the notion of an ESDI.
It reflects a very specific idea of an ESDI.
3.1.4 Current state of the ESDI in the military context
Security context/threats
Military Economic Criminal
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The term ESDI implies the existence of a European security process. Within such a process,
military threats against common referent objects would be identified, the referent objects them-
selves defined, and the threats counteracted. This does not only suggest a collective definition
and production of security. It also denotes that military threats against a common referent object
concern all Europeans, and thus, that the European security is indivisible.
The survey above has shown that such a collective production of security takes place. Both or-
ganisations have been involved in the projection of stability into eastern and especially south
                                                                                                                                                       
230 See Woyke, Wichard, Deutsch-französische Beziehugen seit der Wiedervereinigung. Das Tandem faßt wieder Tritt. Opladen 2000, p. 133.
231 The introduction of a European DSACEUR goes back on an initiative from the French Defence Minister Charles Millon (12.09.1996), who
suggested that the deputy should be selected by the WEU.
In the 1996 NATO Berlin Communiqué, for instance, France wanted to describe ESDI as a "permanent and visible" part of NATO. A formula-
tion that was not accepted by all delegations. See Walker, Colin-Norman, 'Security Concerns remain a priority in a changing Europe', in Euro-
pean Commission: European Dialogue: 1997 supplement: NATO and EU options. Moreover France attempted to put the Allied Forces South-
ern Europe (AFSOUTH). under a European commander with the argument that "France considers that Europe's strategic interest in the Medi-
terranean justifies the Southern command being exercised by a European". The French President Chirac concluding the Franco-Spanish summit
in Marseilles (05.11.1996). Since this initiative would have relived the USA from its only operational command in Europe (CINCSOUTH)., it
failed on American resistance and is made one argument for why France has not completed its return to the Alliance. An American Diplomat
explained the US stance with the words: "If they don't want to come in then, that's fine with us. If the French think we will give in on this,
they're crazy." Both quotes in. RUSI, International Security review 1997, p. 15.
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eastern Europe. Due to the decision-making procedures in the Union and the Alliance, it is quite
easy to classify these security processes as consensual ones. However, I would not even go that far
and prefer to call them quasi-consensual ones. The unanimous or consensual decisions on mili-
tary operations are not legally binding. Therefore, their implementation fully depends on non-
binding national contributions. Not only do all member states have to agree on a decision, they
can also disregard the decision at any time. In addition, none of the two organisations accom-
modates a full security process. Thus, the security process has not fully been lifted to the Euro-
pean level. Neither NATO nor the EU disposes of proper means for intelligence production or
own troops. Even when the member states approve of a countermeasure, the successful imple-
mentation depends on the national contributions to an ad hoc operation. What the two organi-
sations have are assets and capabilities that do not exist and are not needed at the national level.
With the exception of some few assets that complement the national resources (e.g. AWACS),
the organisations' assets consists of staffs that were created to enable member states to co-operate.
Nevertheless, the operational dimension largely remains nationally structured and organised.
Military capabilities remain national assets, although a collectively financed and organised de-
fence could offer large rationalisation and efficiency benefits.232 Not even the attempts to coordi-
nate the national defence planning have proven efficient. Member states have neither made full
use of the synergy effects cooperation offers, nor have they harmonised priorities or remedied
acknowledged flaws. The development of National forces is not being streamlined at the Euro-
pean level. With the exception of the Benelux and Germany, all member states strive for an
autonomous and self-sufficient national defence. Thus, the two organisations' capabilities have
not replaced but been added on top of the national defence. The Union and the Alliance offer an
alternative to national operations without limiting the national autonomy.
The reluctance of member states to accept a common defence or to form an obliging central
defence planning process can be explained in many ways. At this point, I want to concentrate on
arguments that are limited to the military context. It seems like all accounts derive from the fact
that that the NSDIs and the ESDI do not always match. In other words, member states do not
consider all security within the military context as indivisible.
The geographical scope of the national and the European security production can differ. Those
countries that have security interests and responsibilities beyond the Euro-Atlantic area are thus
compelled to keep own forces. There are, however, also hinders within the Euro-Atlantic area.
The variable geometry certainly obstructs such a development. As long as all EU members have
not joined the Alliance, a common European defence cannot be established, nor will the respon-
sibility for defence planning be transferred to any of the organisations. It cannot happen within
NATO, because this would de facto result in a subordination of the EU to NATO. Likewise, it
is impossible to create a common EU defence that is partially bound by NATO's Article 5. In
addition, the participants at the EU defence would have to institute their own Article 5 to guar-
antee that the common army defends all member states. Nevertheless, the most plausible expla-
nation for the upholding of national forces and the main obstacle to a European defence is a
lacking confidence in the mutual defence guarantees.
Member states cannot accept dependencies and limitations in their own capacity to act as long
as they do not trust that other member states will make the same assessments, define the same
                                                          
232 A common European defence could boost the development of an ESDI, but it can only come true, if the ESDI has developed further. This
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military threats and perceive security in the same way. The defence structure suggests that few
European countries rely on that support. NATO members prepare for Article 5 operations and
they hope to receive help when in need, but they do not trust the guarantees. A cooperation,
which exceeds the current voluntary coordination of national defence planning processes de-
scribed above, is not possible as long as member states do not have confidence in that their fellow
members consider all security as indivisible.233
Although territorial defence is the main reason for states to keep military forces in the first
place, crisis management tasks have become more important. Following the decline of the WP
and the end of the block confrontation, crisis management has also gained significance for the
shaping of the ESDI. Despite all collective preparations for Article 5 tasks, the collective defence
remains hypothetical. Crisis management operations, in contrast, are given much attention and
show that member states produce security together within the framework of the organisations.
NATO and the EU have identified military threats, taken collective decisions and led operations
to counteract these threats. Furthermore, they have defined common referent objects in the form
of norms and values (In general subsumed under the terms democracy, human rights and the
rule of law). As central as this is for the development and formation of an ESDI, it has also
caused complications.
The Turkish membership in NATO and its non-admission to the EU displays the inconsis-
tency of the Western States' interpretation of these values. Not that Turkey's NATO member-
ship would be difficult to explain. The strategic military motives that led to the country's admis-
sion during the cold war (1952) are obvious. Nevertheless, it discredits the uniformity and the
community of values. This discrepancy becomes all the more problematic as NATO conducts
crisis management operations to enforce these values outside of the own territory.
Beside the Alliance difficulties to define the values in a consistent way, both organisations are
confronted with the problem to give them universal validity. The credibility of these values as
universal norms is curtailed by the limited geographical scope within which the two organisa-
tions can enforce them. The extent to which they are enforced within the Euro-Atlantic area
raises further doubt. Not that the Serbian activities in Kosovo were acceptable, but other serious
breaches of the universal rules are overseen both within and outside of the Euro- Atlantic area. In
fact, some member states even support undemocratic regimes.234 Thus, the uniformity that is
produced during crisis management operations is rather built on the collective identification of
the aggressor and his 'otherness', than on the presumable agreement on universal inviolable val-
ues. Just as during the cold war, the definition of the common ideal pattern, i.e. of the substance
of the ESDI, seems to fall by the way side.
It appears to be particularly difficult for NATO to define and preserve that, which is common.
Not that the Alliance cannot produce security (it has proven far more capable of conducting
military operations than the Union), but it is difficult to see what the common referent object
would consist of. To the specific Turkish interpretation of the advocated universal values, one
must add the tensions within the Alliance. Turkey and Greece are the only EU or NATO mem-
bers that seriously consider a possible military confrontation with each other, and that prepare
                                                                                                                                                       
possibility is expressively mentioned in the preamble and in article 17 TEU.
233 The experiences France made during the two World Wars and during the Suez crisis, when it did not receive support from its allies, may
exemplify this.
234 The American support for Saudi Arabia is only one example.
94
for such a case. The Alliance certainly stabilises their relation, but it has not been able to dissolve
the oppositeness. This is hardly the best substratum for a collective identity to sprout and uni-
formity to take shape. Moreover, there is the transatlantic strain that initiated the creation of the
ESDP. This leaves the Alliance with its Article 5 and the fact that it has proven successful in
crisis management operations on the Balkans. Although the mutual defence commitments have
never been put to a serious test, there is no doubt that the NATO structure is fit to meet its de-
clared Article 5 and crisis management ambitions, both of which are strictly operational. While
no distinct perceptible European referent object has been generated within the Alliance, its capa-
bility to counteract military threats using military instruments is credible.
The European Union, in contrast, has elaborated a much more detailed and comprehensive
description of the fundamental values, not least due to the enlargement process. The acquis that
applicants have to accept goes much further than the short formulas used during the operations
on the Balkans. However, although the EU members' uniformity is more perceptible, the Union
will have larger problems to live up to the goals it has set itself. Although the Union's ambitions
concerning military operations lag far behind those of the Alliance, the EU wants to take on a
broader role. The Union has chosen to counteract military threats with civilian instruments, and
has thereby widened the period of time in which it counteracts military threats. In contrast to
NATO, the EU has taken on a role in crisis prevention and reconstruction. In chapter four and
five, I will return to how this influences the thinking of security within the EU and the further
development of the ESDI within the Union. At this point, it is only necessary to point out the
danger of a credibility gap from occurring. At present, the Union is only a credible reconstructor.
Lacking a veritable early warning function, it is far from adequately equipped to serve as a crisis
preventer. EU's modest military capabilities, the failure to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal and
its record of operations does not reinforce the image of the Union as military security producer
either. Finally, some member states' overt rejection of a common defence and mutual security
guarantees hamper the notion that the European security is indivisible and that all military
threats within the Euro-Atlantic area concern all Europeans.235 If one regards the military context
in isolation, the development of an ESDI within the EU does not seem to stand on solid ground.
In the West, military threats and 'military security' seem to be thought of primarily in national
terms. The notion of security as an indivisible European security does not convince in the mili-
tary context. The member states of NATO and the EU do not support the idea of transferring
the responsibility or the capability to counteract military threats with military means to the
European level. The NSDI is clearly still dominant in the context of military threats, at least as
far as military countermeasures are concerned.   
                                                          
235 That the ESDP does not imply the forming of a European army has been assured repeatedly. See for instance Helsinki European Council,
Presidency Conclusion, 10/11.12.1999, II Common European Policy on Security and Defence. In the draft from the 6 December 1999, Sweden
and Ireland suggested the sentence "Nor will it mean forming of a European Army. See also General Affairs Council, Military Capabilities
Commitment Declaration, Brussels 20.11.2000; Nice European Council, Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), 7/8 and 9.12.2000.
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3.2 Economic Context
The concept, contents and meaning of economic threats and economic security are likely to be
less obvious and clear than the notion of military threats. Economic security is not only a less
common term in political science, it is also utilised in a less distinct and conform manner than
military security. One of the main reasons for this is that the number of economic policies and
instruments by far surpass the ones applied in the military context. All these economic policies
pursue different aims, seek to protect different referent objects and are implemented by a multi-
tude of actors. Another explanation lies in the discipline's fondness of separating the security
context from a somehow defined 'normal' one. When defining the economic security context,
one must therefore consider far more variables than in the case of military security. Under these
circumstances, it is only logical that a multitude of understandings and definitions of economic
security occur. It seems adequate to begin this section with a specification of what I mean when
using these terms.1
To fit into the ESDI concept, the understanding of this study must build on the assumption
that economic variables pose a threat to a shared European setting, and that these economic
threats are managed in a security process in a European organisation (the EU as will be shown). I
assume that the members of the community can identify with their economic system, and that
its stability and functioning can be used as referent object in a security process. In addition, I
presume that economic instruments can be used to promote and advocate the collective's general
(or universal) values internationally, including the extension of the market system and free trade.
Before turning towards this thought, I want to outline and distance myself from another view
on how security and economy are linked. This approach remains in the military context and
regards economy and economic security as a sub-function of military security.2 When security is
thought of in terms of military security, economics only matter to the extent that they provide
the material and financial means for military defence.3 The economy is thus regarded as the base
for military power. In this conception, the economic development influences the military secu-
rity in two ways. First, security is threatened if the economic development affects the military
capability. Although the economic strength influences the amount of recourses that can be made
available for military use, economic growth and prosperity do not represent referent objects in
this view. This is so, because a strong economy is no guarantee for military power and perform-
ance.4 Economic security is instead concerned with the efficiency of military expenditure and the
amount of resources devoted to defence. Second, the combination of globalisation (or better,
internationalisation of markets) and the growing dependence of the military capability of com-
mercial inputs, increases the vulnerability of the state despite reduced risks of a military attack
against the country. In both cases, economic threats and security are linked to the own, and to
the potential opponent's, supply of goods for military use, not to the development of wealth as
                                                          
1 In the widest sense, economic threats (and security) can simply be described as the existence of shortage. Using this definition, economic threats
will always be present as long as we do not live in the land of Cockaigne. For an analysis of the category economic threats such a definition would
be unpractical and run the risk to be meaningless. As long as economy (understood as the management of resources) exists, there  cannot be such
a thing as an economic security. Speaking of economic security would then be a contradiction in terms.
2 For an excellent discussion on different views on economic security, see Crawford, Beverly, 'Hawks, Doves and Owls: International Economic
Interdependence and Construction of the New Security Dilemma', in Lipschutz 1995, pp. 148-185.
3 See Giacomo, Luciani, 'The Economic Content of Security', in Journal of Public Policy, Volume 8, no. 2, 1998, pp. 151-173. Here p. 153;
Cable, Vincent, 'What is international economic security?', in International Affairs, Volume 71, No. 2, 1995, pp. 305-324. Here p. 306; Terriff,
Terry et al., Security Studies Today. Oxford 1999, pp. 137-141.
4 Giacomo Luciani underlines how easy it is to point out a series of cases "…in which large, rich, powerful countries met military defeat at the
hands of smaller, poorer, worse armed opponents”. He mentions the Russian defeat against the Japanese in 1905, the American defeat in Viet-
nam, the Soviet defeat in Afganistan, and the Libyan defeat in Chad. Giacomo 1989:154.
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such.5 Consequently, economic security policies are about assuring the own, and preventing a
potential opponent's, access to goods that are essential for warfare and the defence industry. Im-
port restrictions to protect the own production and export restrictions concerning proliferation
of weapons and dual use goods are typical policies in this context. Stockpiling oil and other vital
resources is another. This chapter does not follow this line of thought. I am not interested in
examining the economic aspects of the military context. Instead, I will study the economic con-
text as such. Consequently, the referent object used is changed. Whilst territorial integrity,
autonomy and self-determination stand in the centre of the traditional military context, the eco-
nomic context uses wealth and economic growth as point of departure. Economy can therefore
not be regarded as something that is subordinated to military defence. On the contrary. Taking
the economic context as a starting point for the survey, military instruments present themselves
as means to gain economic security. This does not mean that I will not examine any of the poli-
cies that are relevant for those that regard economic security as a sub-function of military secu-
rity. Policies aiming at the supply of goods, for instance, do not become irrelevant. However, I
do not focus on the access to goods that are essential for warfare and for the defence industry,
but on the access to goods that are essential for the economic prosperity.
The referent objects in the economic context. Humankind has always struggled to meet needs
and wishes in an environment characterised by shortage. The shortage of resources and the un-
satisfied needs have driven people to interact. Not only because co-operation is a way to please
some needs directly, but also because it is a way to please them more efficiently. We have seen
that the satisfaction of needs and the interaction among people are basic ingredients of the for-
mation of a collective identity.6 This is why economics are closely linked to identification.
Acting under the restriction of shortage requires an allocation mechanism, an economic sys-
tem, that regulates which wishes are to be served by the limited resources and which are not. To
a large extent, the mechanism chosen determines the interactions within a group and a commu-
nity. By defining the rules for exchanges, property and by regulating who can make such deci-
sions, the economic system sets the framework for the community's 'way of life'.7 The prevailing
allocation mechanism for mass-communities in Europe and in the larger parts of the world is the
market system. Allowing decisions to be taken decentralised, the market system facilitates the
division of labour and has proven efficient in supporting the growth of welfare. However, this
system is not self-sustaining. Traditionally, states play a key role in establishing, maintaining,
securing and regulating the market system. By issuing national currencies and enacting national
regulations, states have provided the basis for domestic markets and established national eco-
nomic systems. Although the national markets are not closed and self-sufficient, but relatively
open systems, they have facilitated and favoured the domestic economic interactions. Thereby,
they have had a severe impact on inner state relations and, thus, on the formation of a collective
identity and the development of a self-image of the nation state as a community.
The notion of a special 'way of life' that is connected with an economic system is not the only
basis for identification. The performance of the economic system is the second variable. People
                                                          
5 Given that military capabilities increasingly depend on commercial products and innovation, falling behind in commercial competition, and
thus in the development of wealth, ultimately means falling behind in military competition as well. See Crawford 1995:152.
6 One might argue that there would be no such thing as a collective identity without the shortage of resources. However, since some needs
comprise the interaction as such, this argumentation is only valid for mass identities, since mass collectives would lose their function.
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can identify with a system of which they are part and that provides goods that allow them to
please their needs. If regarded as efficient and good,8 the economic system and the institutions
that uphold it can evoke identification. The debate about the D-Mark patriotism, with the cur-
rency as unifying symbol for the entire German economy, has shown how people can identify
with their own economic system. The affection to, and the faith in, the D-Mark were based on
the very practical function it played in Germany's post-war economic recovery and prosperity.9
In fact, the absolute and relative prosperity of an economic system can become a part of the
community's self image. If wealth and material means form part of the internalised image, eco-
nomic performance as such can be used as a referent object in a security process. The absolute
economic growth does not only reinforce the domestic consensus and political stability, it has
become part and parcel of the essential values that the community stands for. For a rich state,
belonging to the wealthy and influential states can also be an important part of the self-image.
This makes relative economic growth important, or better, that others do not outstrip the coun-
try's economic performance and threaten its position among the rich. To achieve all this, the
influence on the international stage is important. Here 'geo-economics' come into play.
'Geo-economics'.10 The idea of 'geo-economics' is basically a prolongation of Clausewitz11 ar-
gument, and understands economics as a source of power.12 Economic policies represent one set
of instruments beside military, diplomatic and other means, in a community's 'stick and carrot'
toolbox by which it can defend and assert its economic and other interests. It is therefore not
surprising that scholars of the realist line of thought commonly use the term 'geo-economics'.
Nevertheless, as the EU has shown, friendly states can co-operate, establish common markets and
conduct collective economic policies in order to support their economic prosperity.
I have chosen to investigate 'geo-economic' policies of the Union because one motive behind
the European economic integration was to increase the influence on the international stage.13
The Union is therefore likely to utilise its economic policies vis-à-vis third states to maintain the
own position among the rich(est) and to exercise power. This would allow the participating
members to play their 'proper' role on the world stage and promote the export of 'essential val-
ues'. Thus, one can expect the Union to promote universal values and/or to protect its economy
from negative external influences by using economic instruments. For the former, the referent
objects would be the same as for crisis management operations, and for the latter, the stability
and performance of its economic system.14 The criticism against the concept of conducting geo-
                                                                                                                                                       
7 In this sense, the industrial revolution was not only ground-breaking in the technological field, but just as much in the societal area. The devel-
opment of the market system, replacing the former rural community, gradually enabling mobility and providing people with the freedom of
choice significantly changed our way of life.
8 What is efficient and good depends on the preferences, and which needs are highlighted. Therefore any allocation mechanism can theoretically
be regarded as legitimate and be internalised. Within the family, for instance, the distribution of goods is normally determined by the parents and
not by some market system.
9 As Helmut Kohl expressed it, the D-Mark symbolised 50 years of peace, freedom and stability in prosperity for the west Germans and the new
democratic beginning for those in the newly formed German states. See Kohl, Helmut (German Chancellor), Regierungserklärung anläßlich der
Debatte im Deutschen Bundestag über die Konvergenzberichte zur Teilnahme an der Europäischen Währungsunion, Bonn 02.04.1998.
10 The Expression is borrowed from Luttwak, Edward, Disarming the world's economies. (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, unpublished CEO paper, 1990). Quoted by Cable 1995:308.
11 Clausewitz's most famous argument, widely quoted, is that War is a continuation of 'politik' by other means. von Clausewitz, Carl, Hinter-
lassenes Werk vom Kriege, 18th edition by Halweg, W, Bonn 1973. Quoted in Meyers, Reinhard, Grundbegriffe der Friedenswissenschaft I:
Krieg, Wandel des Kriegbildes, Gewalt, 1994.
12 The school of 'geopolitics' started with Alfred Thayer Mahan's The influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783, Boston 1890, in particular
pp. 29-87. A more modern version is presented by Samuel Huntington: "Economists are blind to the fact that economic activity is a source of
power ass well as well-being. It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power an, in a world in which military conflict between major
states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy and subordination of states.” Huntington, Samuel,
'Why international primacy matters', in International Security, Volume 17, no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. here p. 72.
13 See section 3.2.2.1 on page 124.
14 Often the motives, respectively the referent objects, can be difficult to disentangle. The introduction of the market system as allocation mecha-
nism and free trade can be promoted outside of the own system either as part of the essential values that the community stands for (like democ-
racy, rule of law etc.), or in order to assure access to resources outside of the own territory (security of supply), thereby securing the stability of the
economic system.
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economic policies makes it even more interesting to see how the EU handles the issue. I will
return to this criticism at the end of the section on geo-economics.
SELECTING ORGANISATION
The EU is the only organisation with a European attribute that has established a common
market15 and a common economic system, and the only one that embodies security processes
dealing with economic threats. Therefore, the EU presents itself as the only suitable organisation
to investigate.
Investigating economic security. Economic security processes differ from the military ones in
several ways. It is quite clear that the Community is faced with a larger number of diverse eco-
nomic threats and that these have to be counteracted with a vast number of different economic
policies, instruments and measures. These widely surpass the amount of policies utilised in the
military context. Decisions on the different policies do not result from a single forum that carries
the political overall responsibility and that takes decisions according to a standardised procedure.
Countermeasures are not co-ordinated within a single command structure, and are not con-
ducted as consistent operation that pursues a single defined aim, i.e. to counteract the military
threat. In difference to military instruments, economic instruments are not applied in emergen-
cies but as preventive measures to avoid emergencies. Safeguarding the referent object, i.e. the
stability and performance of the economic system, requires continuous and predictable state
interventions. Moreover, the stability and performance of the economic system is more difficult
to define and therefore also the threats. The stability and function of the economic system is
assessed with reference to the development of a number of indicators or secondary referent ob-
jects, such as price stability or employment levels etc.. Security is produced through different
policies, each of which pursue different aims, i.e. seek to protect a different secondary referent
object. These secondary referent objects can even conflict.16 This is one reason why it can be
difficult to objectify when a secondary referent object is threatened, and thus when the stability is
threatened. When does the level of unemployment become a security threat? In addition, and
this is more important for the security process, the non-fulfilment of, for instance, economic
growth, can be noticed and classified as a menace to the stability of the system, without necessar-
ily allowing a clear identification of the source of the threat. This makes it difficult to elaborate
and implement adequate policies, and nearly impossible to estimate the efficiency and the effect
of single countermeasures.
Since I have placed security policies at one end of the interest line, without making a clear
separation between security and other issues, I run the risk of including almost any policy into
the economic security context. To avoid this, I must specify the economic security context. A
policy must meet the following requirements to qualify as a security policy in a security context:
it must either counteract a defined threat against a secondary referent object, or, if the threat
cannot be defined, it must aim at counterbalancing the negative effects on a defined referent
                                                          
15 The introduction of the Euro might be seen as the step from a common to a single market. However, the meaning of the three terms (single,
internal and common), used in EC documents to describe the market remains disputed. Only the 'internal market' has been legally defined
(ECT, article 14). In some cases, the countries of the European Economic Area are said to be part of the single market, since they have adopted
the European Community legislation in most areas. This terminology is not used in this study. See for instance: European Commission: Trade
policy instruments. Existing instruments: Anti-dumping. How to introduce an anti-dumping complaint? Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/compl.htm    
16 One example is the disputed Philips Curve, suggesting a trade-off between employment and inflation.
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object. Consequently, a security policy must be directly involved in the production of security,
i.e. in the protection or enhancement of the secondary referent object.
To start the investigation of the Union's economic security process the policies to be investi-
gated must be selected. Outlining the full spectrum of EU policies that may fall under the head-
line economic policy of stability would go far beyond the scope of this study. I must therefore
concentrate on the most prominent and important ones. In order to assure that the investigated
policies are relevant for the security production the selection is made with a specified referent
object as point of departure. Based on the economic objectives as declared in article 2 of the EC-
Treaty17 and considering the areas in which the Union has responsibilities for the economic poli-
cies, I have divided the general referent object, i.e. the stability and performance of the economic
system, into four secondary referent objects. This chapter investigates the European economic
security processes concerned with defending the following secondary referent objects: maintain-
ing competition, economic cohesion and high level of employment, price stability and the supply
of essential goods. These secondary referent objects are not necessarily defended by a single actor
or by a single type of policy. Since it is impossible to grasp the influence of all imaginable policies
and actors, I do not claim to present a complete picture of the different economic security proc-
esses. Nevertheless, I consider the main European and national economic policies involved in
each security process. Where fitting, I will also indicate some of the threats to the secondary ref-
erent object that are not covered by these policies and point out other actors with responsibility
for the protection of the referent object.
In addition, I will examine the so-called 'geo-economics' comprising policies that display the
Union's economic power on the international arena. They include protectionist and commercial
defence measures that seek to protect the domestic production and markets, as well as policies
used to reward or punish an actor and to induce or coerce him to behave in particular ways.
Due to this partition, I speak of different economic security processes within the same organi-
sation. This does not mean that the economic context or the economic system is fragmented. All
parts and policies are interconnected. But, the production of economic security is organised in
several separate economic security processes at the European level, each of which must be inves-
tigated in detail and classified. Thus, this chapter does not only analyse two security processes, as
the previous chapter on military threats did (NATO and EU), but several processes within the
EU.
                                                          
17 In article 2 of the EC-Treaty, the community has declared to promote among other things the following economic objectives: a harmonious,
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities; a high level of employment and of social protection; sustainable and non-
inflationary growth; a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance; the raising of the standard of living and quality
of life; and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among member states. These objectives are to be achieved by establishing a common
market and an economic and monetary union supported by the implementation of common policies or activities, all conducted in accordance
with the principle of an open market economy with free competition (ECT, article 4(2)). These are all goals that correlate well to the economic
objectives of the member states' national economic policies, which they have declared in their stability or convergence programs, issued by the
Stability and Growth Pact. Thus, in a European security process either the general objectives themselves can be used as referent objects, or, as a
way to attain these, the functioning and the stability of the Common Market and the EMU.
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The aim of this section is to explore to what extent the ESDI is reflected in the EU polity and
politics by outlining and scrutinizing the Union's authorities within the field of economic secu-
rity policies. The examination aims at determining whether the institutional structure allows us
to speak of a consensual, semi-autonomous or autonomous European security process dealing
with economic threats in the areas of the EU competencies. I concentrate on how and by whom
threats are defined, decisions on countermeasures are taken and who implements them. Can
decisions that contradict national preferences be taken? What role does the EU play in the differ-
ent economic security processes? How are the responsibilities shared between the European level
and the member states?
3.2.1.1 Economic policy of stability
This section assesses the security processes of three referent objects, maintaining competition,
economic cohesion and a high level of employment, and price stability. All three represent func-
tions that are vital for the continuous operation of the market and that tend to be threatened by
market forces. The policies involved in the protection of these secondary referent objects are
therefore concerned with controlling the market and restraining market forces. I chose the
maintenance of competition because it is one of the most important secondary referent objects.
Without competition, the advantages from the liberalisation of the internal market, such as the
incentive to increase efficiency, are nullified. Economic cohesion, a high level of employment
and price stability are all directly linked to the Union's economic objectives as expressed in article
2 ECT. The first two are treated together because the EC largely uses the same policies to deal
with both.
MAINTAINING COMPETITION
Anticompetitive practices, such as the division of markets and price agreements, represent one
of the main threats against the function and stability of the single market. This is why the ECT
contains general principles on competition.18 The Council, acting by a qualified majority, has
adopted the appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to these principles.19 Although free
competition is seen as a means to enhance economic efficiency and prosperity, anti-competitive
practices can be attractive for both companies and national authorities. Therefore, the Commis-
sion has been tasked to assure that these actors do not prevent, restrict or distort the competition
                                                          
18 ECT, article 81 and 82.
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within the Common Market.20 The Commission does not only have the task of ensuring that the
EC competition rules are respected. It also has the competency to interpret the regulations on
competition, to grant exemptions when anti-competitive actions are acceptable and desirable, or
to authorise them on certain conditions. Thus, the Commission defines if an isolated case is to
be regarded as a threat and it decides suitable countermeasures.
Concerning the governmental policies, the Commission surveys state aid. A complete ban of
state aid is impossible since it is sometimes needed to correct imbalance and help in emergencies.
Therefore, article 87 ECT lists a number of exceptions from the general prohibition when state
aid is, or may be, compatible with the Common Market. New aid must be reported to and be
authorised by the Commission, and existing aid kept under constant review.21 If the Commis-
sion observes infringements, it decides a period of time, within which the State concerned shall
abolish or alter such aid.22 But, the Commission can neither penalise the State concerned, nor
allow a State to grant aid, that would normally be prohibited. The latter can only be made by the
Council, acting unanimously, under exceptional circumstances.23 Thus, concerning state aid,
anti-competitive practices are surveyed and threats determined at the European level, but no
countermeasures enforced.
As for the activities of businesses, the Commission surveys restricted agreements and concerted
practices, as well as the abuse of a dominant position and mergers that create or strengthen a
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded.
However, the Commission is not the sole guardian of competition rules for businesses. It is only
responsible to watch those activities that may affect trade between member states. If a company's
practices only affect the trade within a state, the competition authority of that country will pro-
ceed against the infringements of competition rules. In the cases of mergers, the question
whether or not the trade between member states is affected, is determined with reference to the
turnover of the company.24 If these quantified criteria are met, the companies involved have to
notify the Commission that has to authorise the merger, which it also does in most cases.25 For
the Antitrust policies, in contrast, there are no clear rules defining how much of a market a com-
pany must control to have a dominant position that it could abuse.26 This depends on the nature
of the product, substitute products and consumers' perception. In this case, the Commission
decides whether or not to engage in a case. If it finds that an infringement has occurred, it can
order its cessation, and even impose a fine or penalty.27 This means, that it also takes on a quasi
judicative role. Thus, infringements fall under the exclusive control of the Commission if the
quantitative criteria are met, or if it considers that a company abuses its dominant position on a
market. Consequently, anti-competitive practices are surveyed and counteracted on both the
national and the European level, although the Union is responsible for the 'bigger' cases.
As for the politics, the Competition Directorate-General can certainly be said to fulfil its task
as guardian of the European competition rules. Since listing the single cases and decisions would
                                                                                                                                                       
19 ECT, article 82.
20 ECT, article 85.
21 ECT, article 88 (1 and 3).
22 ECT, article 88 (2).
23 ECT, article 88 (2).
24 For the precise and rather complex definition of how big the turnover has to be, see the Council Regulation (EEC) no. 4064/89 and 1310/97
and their amendments.
25 European Parliament Fact Sheet: Abuse of a dominant position and investigation of mergers.
http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/3_3_2_en.htm    
26 Article 82 of the ECT gives some examples of such abusive practices.
27 The Commission's 1998 decision in the Volkswagen case is one example. The Commission fined Volkswagen AG   102 million for restricting
the cross-border trade in motor vehicles. Another example is the Tetrapak case from 1991, in which the company was fined ECU 75 million.
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not add value to the examination I refrain from presenting such a record.28 It can however be
noted, that the amount of cases that are examined by the Commission is constantly growing.
Consequently, the competition is guarded in three independent security processes. The Com-
mission defines threats to the competition rules stemming from governmental policies autono-
mously, but since the competition rules cannot be enforced, this autonomous European security
process remains incomplete. Anti competitive behaviour of undertakings in contrast is defined,
counteracted and penalized in parallel but separated national and European security processes.
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Figure 3.2-1.  Security process: defending competition rules
ECONOMIC COHESION AND A HIGH LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT
Article 2 ECT defines the promotion of a harmonious development of economic activities, a
high level of employment and economic and social cohesion among member states as one of its
objectives. Since there is a direct linkage between unemployment and poverty, the two issues are
closely related. Although they are presented as part of the fundamental aims of the Community's
activities, they can also be interpreted as modal targets that have to be reached in order to fulfil
the more general final target – the stability of the economic (and political) system. Or differently
put, if the unemployment and the social disparity assume large proportions, the system will lose
legitimacy and become unstable. This was recognised at local and national level, long before it
came on the EC agenda. All European states have engaged in employment policies and con-
structed national systems for redistributing financial means to increase the economic cohesion.
The EC has devoted almost 35 % of its budget for cohesion and employment policies (  34 bil-
lion in 2002). Nearly all of these means are distributed through the Structural Funds29 (  30,9
billion in 2002) and the Cohesion Fund30 (  2,8 billion in 2002).31 The Common Agriculture
Policy (CAP) can be interpreted as a policy that serves the same aim. I will return to the CAP
below.
In terms of ESDI, it is interesting to note, how and by whom the economic threat is defined.
By emphasising the economic and social cohesion, the Community has indirectly defined eco-
                                                          
28 Complete lists are available on the Commission's Competition homepage at:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html  
29 For the period 2000-2006 three objectives have been defined for the Structural Funds: Objective 1 promotes the development and structural
adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind, i.e. those whose average per capita GDP is less than 75% of the European Union
average. Two thirds of Structural Fund operations concentrate on this objective and almost 20% of the Union's total population will benefit
from the measures taken. Objective 2 contributes to the economic and social conversion of regions undergoing economic change, declining
industrial and rural areas, depressed areas dependent on fisheries and urban areas in difficulty. No more than 18% of the Union's population is
covered by this objective. Objective 3 gathers together all the measures taken reduce unemployment and to enhance employment opportunities
taken under the Title VIII of the ECT on employment and under the European Employment Strategy. Regulation (EC) no. 1260/1999.
30 The Cohesion Funds, in contrast was set up to provide a financial contribution to projects in the fields of environment and trans-European
networks in the area of transport infrastructure (ECT, article 161). It is reserved to members whose per capita GNP is less than 90% of the
Community average. At present four members are eligible to benefit from it, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal.
31 European Commission: General Budget of the European Union for the year 2002. Brussels and Luxembourg 2002. Title B2. p. 9.
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nomic and social gaps as an economic threat. As for the countermeasures, the Council defines
the tasks, priority objectives, organisation, general rules and coordination of the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund unanimously.32 From a security perspective these regulations seem to be
defined in a backward manner. The EC has not specified the referent object. It has not defined a
cohesion or employment target that has to be reached, suggesting that a drifting apart beyond a
certain limit poses an economic threat, and must be counteracted. What it has done is to define
how the Funds are to be distributed. By setting the objective criteria by which member states or
regions qualify for funding from the Funds (these are not dependent on employment levels, but
exclusively of the economic cohesion33) the Council has not defined the threat and referent ob-
ject, but a level of economic cohesion that can be regarded as secure, i.e. the point beyond which
levelling countermeasures are no longer required. This means that the Council has decided at
what degree of cohesion countermeasures become superfluous, but without setting a target that is
to be reached. The mechanism is therefore not geared towards defending a specified referent
object, to achieve a cohesion (security) goal and to lift all regions/countries to a certain level. All
that has been said is that the funding will stop if a certain level of cohesion is reached. One can
picture this as a leaking pond, in which the EC pours water with the explanation that it does not
want the surface to sink too low. It has also defined the upper water level at which the Commu-
nity will stop pouring in more water. But it has not defined under what level the water must not
sink, that is the lower water level, which represents a danger. Consequently, the gap between
regions can continue to grow, despite of the funds.
The division of responsibility between the European and the national level for the economic
and social cohesion and the regional development can explain this approach. A general principle
for Community assistance is that it may not substitute for national funds.34 Thus, the Commu-
nity does not relieve member states from any responsibility. It merely complements national
efforts. The logic behind the European funding suggests that the primary responsibility lies with
the nation state. This impression is reinforced when looking at how the member states are in-
volved in the European security process, i.e. in the decisions on European cohesion and em-
ployment policies.
The Commission is responsible for the implementation and distribution of both Funds in ac-
cordance with the objectives and restrictions defined by the Council. However, the Commission
only has a very limited ability to define threats on its own within the prescribed framework.
Only around 5 % (ca.   10 billion in 2000-2006) of the Structural Funds are earmarked for so
called Community initiatives, which the Commission can instigate. However, these are subject
to strict regulations that severely limit the Commissions freedom of action.35 The rest of the
Structural Funds and the entire Cohesion Fund are allocated to projects proposed by member
states or regions that qualify for funding by fulfilling objectified criteria. Although these projects
are discussed with, and must be approved by, the Commission before obtaining Community
funding, the Union does not initiate them.36 The role of the Commission is to estimate the effi-
                                                          
32 ECT, article 161.
33 Funding from the Structural Funds for projects that promote the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is
lagging behind can only be granted to regions where the average per capita GDP is less than 75% of the European Union average. Funding out of
the Cohesion Fund is only granted to members whose per capita GNP is less than 90% of the Community average.
34 SCAD plus: Regional Policy. General provisions on the Structural Funds. Point 13. Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60014.htm    
35 Council Regulation (EC) no. 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds. OJ L 161, 26.06.1999. p.
1-42.
36 European Commission: Regional Policy-inforegio. At the service of the regions. How does it work? Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/intro/regions7_en.htm    
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ciency and to help the applicants to elaborate the projects. Thus, the Community does not even
conduct its own process autonomously, but in close co-operation and consent with the recipi-
ents.
An examination and estimation of the importance of the EC activities compared to the na-
tional efforts cannot be provided in this study. It is however quite clear, that the allocation of
around   30 billion a year for structural measures has a considerable impact on the secondary
referent object. Concerning the effects, one should however differentiate between the goals of
economic cohesion and a high level of employment. The EC and the member states could target
a specified goal of economic cohesion directly through programs aiming at adapting and mod-
ernising the regional infrastructure and economy or by transfer payments. In contrast, it is more
difficult to promote the increase of sustainable employment. Considering the limits of public
budgets the bulk of new sustainable jobs must be created in the private sector. Therefore, it is
decided on the labour market, which can only be influenced indirectly by the governments and
the EC. Apart from the direct funding of projects through the European Social Funds (which is a
part of the Structural Funds), the governments have also agreed to co-ordinate their employment
policies at the European level. The aim is to avoid competition of economic policies at the ex-
pense of the labour force, at the same time as they can benefit from each other's experiences.
Since the member states maintain their exclusive competence in the field, the co-operation is
based on non-biding guidelines, recommendations and dialogue.37
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Figure 3.2-2.  Security process:
defending economic cohesion and high level of employment
Lacking specifications of the referent objects, i.e. the cohesion and employment goals, it is very
difficult to make assessments of the security production. Nevertheless, one can note that the
member states and the Community share some responsibilities for the cohesion and employment
levels. Due to the division of responsibility, the security process concerned could be described as
semi-autonomous. The EC can take decisions that contradict national interests, but only to the
extent that the Commission decides not to fund a project proposed by a member state. There is
no room for a fully autonomous European policy, which is conducted in parallel to the national
ones, and that the receiving member state rejects. When considering this and the involvement of
                                                          
37 SCAD plus: Employment. Current Situation and outlook. Available at:
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the member states and regions in the Community's own process, the label semi-autonomous
even appears a bit exaggerated. The limited role the EU plays in terms of employment must also
be emphasised.
PRICE STABILITY
The stability of the currency can be influenced by both internal and external economic threats.
In the same way as the responsibility for the national currencies lies with the respective national
central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been confided the responsible maintaining
the stability and, thus, the confidence in the Euro. Consequently, the Euro-countries have
transferred the responsibility for monetary policy and thus, the security process, to the European
level.
In terms of security, the purpose of the ECB is clearly defined. Its primary objective is to
maintain price stability. The state of security and the targeted goal has been defined by ECB
itself as "a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the Euro-area
of below 2%”.38 Events that may endanger this goal can therefore be defined as threats and will
be counteracted by the Bank. To implement its tasks, the ECB has been equipped with instru-
ments to handle internal threats to price stability posed by the activity of governments and
commercial banks. It can regulate the money supply by controlling the commercial banks ability
to grant credits and to create money through e.g. its open market and credit policy or its mini-
mum reserve policy.39 The ECB can make regulations and take decisions that are binding in this
area40 and it is entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure
to fulfil obligations arising from these.41
Although, the goal attainment is verifiable by everyone consulting official statistics, the ECB
independently decides on its policy and countermeasures. The Euro system exercises its tasks in
independence. According to article 108 EC-treaty, "…neither the ECB, nor a national central
bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a member state or from any other
body”. In addition, it has its own budget, independent from the one of the European Union.
The personal independence of the members of the ECB's decision-making bodies is also granted.
The governors of the national central banks are assured a minimum renewable term in office of
five years, and a non-renewable term in office of eight years for members of the executive board.
42 The process of decision-making in the Euro system takes place within the Governing Council
and the Executive board of the ECB. In both of them decisions are normally taken by simple
majority of the votes cast by the persons present, each of whom has one vote.
Thus, the ECB defines whether or not the current development poses a threat to the attain-
ment of the referent object that it has objectified with a reference value. If the development is
regarded as a threat, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) alone delineates the threat
                                                                                                                                                       
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c00002.htm    
38 ECB press release: A stability-oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB. 13.10.1998. Available at:
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr981013_1.htm    
39 Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (annexed to the TEU), article 18 and 19.
In addition the ESCB can impose sanctions in the form of fines and periodic penalties for failures to comply with obligations under its regula-
tions and decisions. See ibid, article 34.3.
40 According to article 34 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank the ECB
can make binding regulations to implement the monetary policy of the Community, the minimum reserve policy, the clearing and payment
systems and for the supervision of credit and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.
41 Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (annexed to the TEU), article 19 (1) and
34 (3). See also: Recommendation of the European Central Bank for a Council Regulation (EC) concerning the powers of the European Central
Bank to impose sanctions. Published in the ECB Compendium 1999. p. 103-106. Also OJ C 246, 6.8.1998, p.9ff.
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and chooses a policy to counteract it. Hence, the Euro system has an autonomous exclusive
authority within its sphere of responsibility. Since the ECB defines its own goals and manages all
activities from threat detection to countermeasures alone, one may speak of an entirely autono-
mous security process. This does, however, not mean that the ECB can ward off all threats to
price stability.
As for external monetary threats to price stability, the ECB can only compensate for the rise in
prices of imported goods to a limited extent by influencing the exchange rates through its foreign
exchange policy. Given that European countries only can control internal threats to price stabil-
ity directly, it is not surprising, that the ESCB above all tries to achieve its primary objective
through an internal monetary policy and avoids regulatory interventions on the foreign exchange
market.
The ECB cannot even counteract all internal threats. It cannot prevent the financial policy of
the Euro-zone governments, which may have severe impact on price stability. A government
could be tempted to stimulate the national economy by increasing the state demand, financed by
deficit spending. In this case, the state could profit from all the benefits of that policy, while
sharing costs in the form of the resulting demand driven inflation with all other Euro countries.
To prevent such behaviour, the Council may impose sanctions in the form of fines on a Euro
state with a government deficit larger than 3% of GDP.43 This decision is taken on a recom-
mendation from the Commission by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of its members
weighted in accordance with Article 205(2), excluding the votes of the representative of the
member state concerned.44 As the case of Ireland showed in 2001, the EU cannot impose any
sanctions on a government if they conduct an expansive policy, kindling the inflation as long as
they meet the deficit spending criteria.45 Neither can the EU or the ESCB (nor the national gov-
ernments) control other internal demand or supply driven inflation. Thus, the ECB shares the
responsibility for price stability with the Council and with the member states.
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Figure 3.2-3.  Security process: defending price stability of the currency
                                                                                                                                                       
42 The Institutional Framework of the European System of Central Banks. ECB Monthly Bulletin. July 1999. p. 55-63. Here p. 57-58.
43 ECT, article 104 (11); Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact. Amsterdam. 17.06.1997, article 3-5.
44 ECT, article 104 (13).
45 In this case, the Council may make recommendations to the member state concerned and decide to make these public. ECT, article 99 (4). See
also Blome, Nikolaus, 'EU-Länder stellen Irland an den Pranger', in Die Welt, 13.01.2002.
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3.2.1.2 Supply of essential goods - Security of energy supply
It is not possible to investigate the Union's role in securing the supply for every single product
separately. Therefore, I have chosen to display its responsibility for the most fundamental goods -
energy. For no other product is the dependence as large and inescapable. The Union's depend-
ence on external energy sources is constantly growing. The European Commission considers this
to be problematic and has written a Green Paper called "Towards a European Strategy for Secu-
rity of Energy Supply”, which it adopted in November 2000.46. According to the Green Paper
the share of imported energy covering Union's energy requirements will grow from the current
50% to 70% in the next 20 to 30 years, unless measures are taken. At the same time, the total
energy consumption is expected to grow with 2-4% annually, which means that the dependence
will increase in both absolute and relative terms.47 Interruptions in supply of energy products
such as oil, gas, coal, nuclear energy or renewable resources would have severe effect on the entire
economy. Although the economic activity as a whole need not come to a halt if the supply of
energy is reduced, a substitution of energy sources and a conversion to more efficient energy
consumption is an expensive and time-consuming process. One must only imagine replacing oil
with another source of energy in the transport sector. Thus, the Union's economic system will
become even more vulnerable towards erratic fluctuations in the price of imported energy prod-
ucts and towards their physical availability. This is probably why the term security has been fre-
quently used in the energy context lately. I accept that the supply of certain goods can be a secu-
rity matter; water is a well-known example. However, I am not prepared to accept that the sup-
ply of even the scarcest goods is treated as a security matter at the European level without further
ado. I must therefore not simply scrutinise the European energy policies, but also answer
whether or not they can be regarded as security policies. Security of supply can be pursued by
two complementary strategies. While the first aims at reducing the risks linked to dependencies,
the second one seeks to enhance self-sufficiency.
REDUCING THE RISKS OF DEPENDENCE
Since nobody has any illusions about the Union's ability to become self-sufficient in the energy
sector in foreseeable future, the first strategy is essential. The vulnerability of the European econ-
omy can be reduced by diversifying the external sources of supply, both in terms of products
(e.g. oil, gas) and in terms of suppliers. Strategic stockpiling of essential goods is a second
method that can cushion the impact of temporary shocks.
The EC supports the development of supply networks directed towards the Union. To this
end, the Union has set up the technical assistance INOGATE programme (Interstate Oil and
Gas Transport to Europe). The financial volume of these programs displays the modest role the
Community plays in achieving the security of supply. Since 1994, 26 INOGATE programs have
been launched. Of these, 25 projects were funded by TACIS with a total budget of   58 Million
and only one project PHARE with a budget of   300 000.48 All these infrastructure measures aim
at encouraging and facilitating private investments. The EC programs thus only complement
                                                          
46 European Commission: Green Paper. Towards a European Strategy for Security of Energy Supply. Luxemburg 2001. (COM(2000) 769 final).
47 European Commission: Green Paper. Towards a European Strategy for Security of Energy Supply. Luxemburg 2001. (COM(2000) 769 final)
p. 14.
48 The funding of INOGATE programs depends on the geographical location of the investment. Funding is foreseen from TACIS (projects
involving countries from the NIS and Mongolia), PHARE (Central and Eastern European countries) and MEDA (countries from the Mediterra-
nean). A list of all INOGATE programs can be found of the INOGATE Website at:    http://www.inogate.org/html/resource/resource1.htm    
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member states' and the private sector's efforts. Consequently, the EC does not take on the full
costs of any pipeline, harbour or the like.
Strategic stock management of energy products is another area that the EC has regulated by
law. At present, EU members are held to maintain a level of stocks equivalent to 90 days' con-
sumption for each of the three main categories of petroleum products.49 Since EC law has fixed
this level, there is no continuous ongoing security process at the European level. The EU does
not keep or finance any of its own stocks, nor is it the main body dealing with oil shortage. In
the wake of the1973/74 oil crisis, the International Energy Agency was formed. It has similar
rules concerning stockpiling and mechanisms for re-allocation among the countries of the Inter-
national Energy Agency in case of a crisis. The role of the Union concerning the stockpiling of
oil is also put into perspective by the fact that the EU states keep larger national stocks than fore-
seen by the Union.50
SELF SUFFICIENCY - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Self-sufficiency can be enhanced in several ways. The first and most obvious method is to ex-
pand the domestic production. This is not the goal of any EC policies, because the question of
what domestic energy sources are adequate is highly charged. One must only consider the na-
tional debates on nuclear power to understand how difficult it would be for the Commission or
the Council to regulate how much nuclear energy is to be produced within the Union or even to
finance the expansion of nuclear energy production. The second way is to utilise Energy more
efficient, and thereby to reduce the consumption or at least its growth. To this end, the Com-
mission has launched the SAVE (I and II) programmes.51 A third procedure is to substitute the
imported energy with domestic alternatives. This can be achieved if new and renewable energy
sources are developed. For this purpose, the ALTENER programmes were established.52 Both
programs finance educational as well as research and development activities in the respective area.
Some of these actions are fully funded by the Community, whilst others (i.e. pilot actions and
measures proposed by third parties) can obtain a maximum Community contribution of 50%,
with the rest made up from public and/or private sources. Educational as well as Research and
Development (R&D) activities are amongst, if not the, most important instrument to promote
self-sufficiency and reduce dependency. Given the total volume of these programs, it is however
also quite clear that the member states and the private sector carry the main responsibility in this
area.53
                                                          
49 Directive 68/414/EEC, as amended by Directive 98/93/EC.
50 Occasionally some countries fall below this level, but the sum of European oil stocks usually exceed the equivalent of 90 days. See for example
The European Union's Oil supply, 2000.10.04. Available at    http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/library/commen.pdf  
51 Council Decision no. 647/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2000 adopting a multiannual programme
for the promotion of energy efficiency (SAVE) (1998 to 2002). Available at:    http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27017.htm    
52 Decision no. 646/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2000 adopting a multiannual programme for the
promotion of renewable energy sources in the Community (Altener) (1998 to 2002). Availabe at:
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27016b.htm    
53 The limited role of the EU in the area of R&D is also reflected by the fact that the European Commission finances less than 5% of all publicly
funded research in Europe. Source: Commission's research web site at    http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/faq.html  
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1998-2002 Energy Framework Program Commission Proposal for 2003-2006
BudgetAim Program Budget
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Promotion of energy
efficiency
SAVE 66 21 18 18 18 75
Promotion of renewable
sources ALTENER 77 23 21 21 21 86
International promotion
of renewables and en-
ergy efficiency
COOPENER 2 5 7 5 19
Total 143 46 34 36 34 180
Source: European Commission: Intelligent Energy for Europe. Proposal of the Com-
mission for a multiannual programme for actions in the field of energy (2003-2006).
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/intelligent/index_en.html
Figure 3.2-4.  EC energy self-sufficiency funding programs (in million Euro)
Supply as security issue at the European level? Since the Union does not produce energy itself,
it is quite clear that it neither has the exclusive competency or the full responsibility for the secu-
rity of supply of energy. Just as with economic cohesion and employment, it is laborious to ob-
jectify the referent object, i.e. the level of energy supply that is secure. One explanation for this is
that neither energy nor the energy supply is a public goods. The consumers' vulnerability varies
because their price elasticity as well as their ability to adapt the consumption of energy varies. To
objectify the security of energy supply, one would therefore have to answer how much energy
must be produced and at what price it must be sold within the EC. This is not possible without
determining what amount of energy what actors should be able to afford. It is also difficult to
identify what threats the EC programmes aim at counteracting. What threats are counteracted
when the risks of dependence are reduced and when self-sufficiency is enhanced? As such, the
shortage energy and the dependence of external producers can hardly be seen as a threat. Short-
ages of private goods as well as dependencies are essential elements of a market economy. With-
out shortage of private goods no market will develop, and without dependencies the whole idea
of division of labour becomes redundant. In a situation where neither the referent object nor the
threat can be defined it is difficult to see how the EC programs can be presented as defence
measures in a European economic 'security of supply' context. To some extent, this argument is
also valid for the economic cohesion and employment policies. In the case of energy, however,
the EC does not intervene to 'correct' the outcome of the market. Instead, the EC energy policies
aim at supporting the development of the market. Apart from reducing the growth of demand
(SAVE) and enhancing the competition and the supply (alternative sources ALTNER, and sup-
pliers INOGATE), the EC has also made efforts to complete the internal market in order to
enhance the competition in the energy sector. The Commission has adopted a set of measures to
open the gas and electricity markets fully by 2005. This includes infrastructure measures within
the Union that interconnect the different European supply networks. Rather than arguing that
that energy supply would be handled as a security issue at the European level, I prefer to describe
the EC energy policies as measures that seek to develop the market where the supply of energy is
regulated. Although the energy supply is addressed at all political levels, undertakings carry the
responsibility for the energy supply to the European market.54 The EC does not produce supply
security. This role is incumbent on undertakings. EC policies do not counteract and restrain any
forces that threaten the supply of essential goods (at least not within the economic context), nor
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do they rectify or alleviate an insufficient supply. The European policies merely seek to make the
allocation of energy over the market possible by supporting the development of a competitive
European market. By doing so, the EC may reduce its dependence on specific sources. It is diffi-
cult to say whether or not this objectively decreases the vulnerability, but even if it seems to make
the supply of energy more reliable, the EC policies only increase the opportunity for undertak-
ings to import energy. The policies do not automatically increase the supply nor do they directly
counteract a reduction. The supply of EU external energy is still completely managed by under-
takings and therefore they carry the full responsibility for the 'security of supply'.
3.2.1.3 'Geo-economics'- protectionism and export of values
This section turns towards the external dimension of the economic context. It examines to
what extent the Union uses commercial and financial policies in relations with third states as
geo-economic instruments. The EC could utilise its economic toolkit to exercise power over
third parties in two different ways. First, it could protect the own economic development. This
can be done by counteracting protectionist policies of others, by protecting the domestic produc-
ers from competition, and by supporting the domestic production. Second, the Union could
defend the general (or universal) values outside of its own territory and influence others through
an economic 'carrot and stick policy'. The EC could use favourable trade agreements and devel-
opment policy as incentives, and impose sanctions as coercive measures.
'Geo-economics' are based on the idea of economic power politics. Security could therefore be
understood as self-determination and economics as one means by which it can be assured. Inter-
national relations are then implicitly understood as a competition for power and a zero sum
game. Just like physical force, economic pressure represents a way of exercising power to achieve
political ends. The more powerful the economy is, the larger is its ability to exert influence on
others and to resist efforts by others to influence it. Thus, a strong economy is not only the basis
for maintaining a strong military force. It also provides a greater range of instruments of influ-
ence.55 In this view, economic security and economic threats are seen in the context of depend-
ency and relative economic gains. Economic weakness leaves a country vulnerable to outside
forces that restrict and erode its autonomy. This may result in foreign imposition that threatens
the own sovereignty and freedom of action. Economic security policies will therefore pursue the
maintenance of relative economic strength, attempt to limit own economic dependence and
vulnerability, promote the dependence of others and elaborate ways to exercise economic influ-
ence on them.
As will be shown below, geo-economics are not easily implemented, not by single states and
not by the EU. The reason for this is that contradicting ambitions have to be handled. Depend-
encies have to be minimised in order to reduce the vulnerability. In a mercantilist fashion, trade
deficits can be interpreted as economic threats, leading to dependency, accumulation of external
debt and inward investment and ownership. Competition is not seen as a synonym for produc-
tivity, but rather as a threat to the national production, that can result in increasing dependence
and exposure. Consequently, the government will pursue a protectionist trade policy. This con-
                                                                                                                                                       
54 For more information on, and an argument around, the move of the prime responsibility for achieving security of supply from governments
(and the EC) to market participants in liberalised markets, see Report of a CEPS Working Party: Security of Energy Supply. A Question for
Policy or the Markets. Brussels 2001.
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trasts with the ambition to promote the own economy's relative strength. Since economic co-
operation has proven beneficial for the economic development, the protectionist policy can be
regarded as a threat to both the absolute and the relative economic growth.56
In addition, the efficiency of a 'geo-economic' policy can be contested. The critics do not only
concern the contradiction outlined above.57 The effectiveness of an economic 'carrot and stick'
policy to exercise power is also questioned. The impact of economic instruments will vary with
the targeted actor's dependence of the 'mastering' party. Over time, sanctions may stimulate
local production of the embargoed commodity or result in substitution of the product. Boycotts
and import restriction will encourage the targeted to find alternative markets. Moreover, eco-
nomic rewards and punishments have a reciprocal influence, with both the targeted and the ini-
tiating state suffering costs.58 Most important however, is that economic instruments have proven
ineffective to impose one's will on antagonist states. From Cuba, Iran to Burma, US sanctions
have failed to achieve the goal of changing the behaviour or the nature of target regimes.59
PROTECTIONISM AND COMMERCIAL DEFENCE MEASURES
Protectionism and commercial defence measures on the one hand, and trade liberalisation on
the other, are two sides of the same coin, although opposite ones. As for the ESDI, the following
questions are of interest:
- In what cases/areas is the EC an actor in trade conflicts?
- What instruments can it apply?
- How is the security process within the EC organised? How and by whom, are the exter-
nal threats defined and the necessity to act determined? Who decides what countermea-
sures are appropriate and whether or not they are to be applied? How is this decision
taken?
EC as an actor in commercial conflicts. With growing trade flows among them, states have
shown an interest in regulating trade. The most prominent package of such regulations was the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was succeeded by the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in 1995. The EC is a WTO member in its own right, just like the 15 EC
members and 128 other countries.60 The use of commercial defence and support measures is
regulated by WTO rules. Consequently, the EC regulations for commercial defence measures
comply with the WTO regulations. If the EC and other parties disagree on the interpretation of
WTO agreements and the use of commercial defence measures, they resolve their differences
according to the procedures of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.61 If the parties
cannot agree on a solution, the case is taken to a Dispute Settlement Body that rules or recom-
                                                                                                                                                       
55 Terriff 1999:148.
56 Bewerly Crawford (1995) calls this connection between the economic growth and dependency/vulnerability the 'New Security Dilemma'.
57 Another criticism is that this conception contradicts the logic of the market. It assumes a similarity of interests between the domestic firms and
their national governments, although the autonomy of enterprises and their ability to move capital contradicts such a view. Furthermore, the
firms are concerned with absolute rather than relative gains.
58 Kuttner, Robert, 'How 'National Security' Hurts National Competitiveness', in Harvard Business Review, Vol 69, no. 1, January –February
1991, pp 140-149; Sweeney, John P., 'The High Costs of Clinton's Trade War with the European Union', in The Heritage Foundation: Execu-
tive Memorandum, No. 584, 26.03.1999; Schavey, Aaron, 'Avoid a Trade War over U.S. Antidumping Measure', in The Heritage Foundation:
Executive Memorandum, No. 713, 26.10.2001.
59 Moreover, thinking of economics as a source of, and competition for, power is doomed to frustration, since the emerging markets are almost
certainly bound to grow faster than the established strong economies such as the US and the EU. Consequently, the rich countries share of the
world GNP and trade will shrink steadily and thereby also their relative strength. See Cable 1995:312.
60 In total the WTO had 144 members in January 2002, 15 of which are EC members and the EC itself.
61 Available at:    http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm#dispute 
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mends a solution.62 Thus, the members have institutionalised a security process within the
WTO. But, since the WTO is not a supranational organisation, it can neither issue or enforce
trade regulations nor define the duties applied. The authorities of the WTO members do this.
Hence, the members must conduct their own security process. This is not only necessary in order
to function as a party within the WTO, but also to allow them to interact with non-WTO
members on a bilateral level. Therefore, the WTO represents the main forum where the EC
seeks to defend the Community's interests, but not the only one.
The EC has competencies for supporting and shielding commercial defence measures, to react
on obstacles to trade and fair competition that are adopted or maintained by third parties, and
which cause or threaten to cause injury or otherwise adverse trade effects to Community enter-
prises. The EC acts as party in every case where Community subsidies are involved and where
exports and imports from the Community as a whole are concerned.
However, the EC is not responsible for all external commercial policy. The regulations for
services, for instance, which remain under national responsibility within the Common Market,
also remain under national authority in terms of extra EC-policies. This is the case for activities
connected with the exercise of official authority and in the area of education, social and human
health, public policy and public security.63 The individual states determine the technical re-
quirements for these services. In other words, they decide what qualifications a person must have
in order to exercise certain professions or to offer specific service (in some cases including the
nationality), and how the qualification is to be verified. In addition, the EU can decide on col-
lective defence measures within the framework of the CFSP. This possibility is, for instance,
explicitly expressed for urgent measures on the movement of capital and on payments.64
Third countries do not always treat the EC as a whole. In the vast majority of cases, member
states and industry are the direct participants to procedures carried out and countermeasures
applied by third countries.65 For example, if European firms practice 'predatory pricing' to boost
their market shares in foreign countries and to drive competitors out (industrial dumping). In
these cases the Commission can play an advisory role. But, since it is not a party in the conflict,
the Community will not engage directly in the negotiations.
The commercial defence instruments at the EC's disposal. There are several motives for im-
plementing commercial defence measures and a range of instruments to be utilised. By instating
shielding defence measures the EC can protect the domestic production from foreign competi-
tion. To balance so called 'unfair' external competition, i.e. when a foreign product is sold on the
world market at a price that is held low artificially, be it in consequence of governmental subsi-
dies or as a result of dumping on behalf of the exporters (often made possible by subsidies), the
EC can apply countervailing duties (anti-subsidies) or anti-dumping duties. However, shielding
measures are not only applied against 'unfair' competition. Drastic changes on markets can also
call for protection. If, for instance, a product is imported in greatly increased quantities and on
such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the own producers,
the EC can apply temporary safeguard measures in the form of customs duties or import quotas.
                                                          
62 Amongst WTO members, cases involving anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures as well as safeguards, can all be taken to the
Dispute Settlement Body.
63 ECT, article 45-47. This is also clarified in the article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty.
64 ECT, article 60 and 301.
65 European Commission: Trade policy instruments: Monitoring of third country commercial defence actions. (January 2001). Available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/third_c/thirdcountries.htm    
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The aim is to enable the domestic producers to survive shocks and to facilitate their adaptation
to a changing environment. In addition, some permanent technical trade barriers also restrict the
access to the market. Some of them can protect the domestic producers from external competi-
tion all together. For instance, this is the case for the services falling under the national regula-
tion. They can also consist of technical regulations, standards, testing and certification that are
supposed to guarantee the protection of the health and safety of consumers, the environment and
the product quality. Normally these rules apply for all products regardless of their origin. Other
bureaucratic or legal non-tariff barriers, such as the procedures concerning import licensing, the
valuation of goods at customs etc. can also be subsumed under the group of permanent technical
trade barriers.
Subsidies, understood as financial contributions by a government, represent supporting de-
fence measures. They aim at promoting or at least preserving domestic producers' competitive-
ness on the domestic and/or world market. From a security perspective, it can be prudent to use
subsidies, if one seeks to protect 'strategic' industries, maintain employment or promote the re-
construction of elder, respectively support infant industries, so that they can become competi-
tive.
Apart from these defensive and supportive commercial measures, the EC can also seek to
counteract the protectionism of others in order to gain access to their market. It can either do so
within the framework of the WTO, as pointed out above, or by suspending any favourable trade
concessions it has made to the country in question. The figure below displays the distribution of
competencies between different actors involved in extra European trade conflicts and what in-
struments can be used at each level.
Figure 3.2-5.  Extra-EC trade conflicts at different levels
The EC commercial security processes. The EC procedures concerning the measures 1-3 in the
figure above are much alike. These comprise measures to counteract third parties protectionism
(1), dumping (2a), and subsidies (2b), as well as safeguard measures (3). Within the EC, the
security process for these commercial countermeasures consists of three steps (see table in the
annex for details). In the first step, a case is brought forward to the Commission by the member
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states, the community industry or a community enterprise.66 Based on the information pre-
sented, the Commission decides if it will investigate the issue. If it suspects that an economic
threat is posed to EC producers, it will define this and elaborate upon countermeasures to be
proposed to the Council. In the second step, the Commission can decide to endorse provisional
duties while it continues its investigation of the case. In the third step, the Commission presents
the result of the investigation to the Council, which decides on the final countermeasures with
qualified or simple majority voting. The final quotas are then surveyed and the final duties col-
lected by the national authorities that implement all customs regulations. Throughout the proc-
ess, the Commission is expressively held to act in the interest of the Community as a whole,
including the industry, users and consumers, and to weigh the benefits of a countermeasure
against the benefits.67 Since the EC members have adopted a customs union, the Community is
responsible for all retaliatory and shielding measures that involve duties. The EC is also responsi-
ble for all quotas on goods. 68 This means that the EC member states cannot take any of these
measures against third parties unilaterally. Consequently, the security processes described above
are autonomous European ones. Although the Council can overrule the Commission's decisions,
the decision-making procedure allows for a single member's interests to be subordinated to the
majority's.
It should be noted that these retaliatory and shielding measures are not often implemented.
Between January 1995 and May 2003 the EC only dealt with 19 anti-protectionist cases, and
without making use of any direct countermeasures.69 In March 2003, 163 different anti-
dumping duties were applied by the EC, covering around 0,5% of the EC imports. Anti-
subsidies duties were applied in 17 cases during the same time.70 Safeguard measures, finally,
only applied to certain types of footwear and ceramic and porcelain tableware during the same
period.
The fourth type of countermeasures, are those that restrict access to the Common Market by
instating technical standards and essential requirements, as well as regulations and certification
procedures. These regulations exclude many products from the community market, and could be
seen as 'back door' protectionism. The EC does however not seem to exploit these measures as
retaliatory instruments in commercial conflicts. If it would, one could expect the counterparts to
put complaints against the EC forward in the WTO. However, no such complaints have been
made.71 The US and Canadian procedures against EC measures prohibiting the importation of
livestock and meat from livestock that have been treated with growth hormones, is the only case
among them that may appear as a such. Certainly domestic EC producers profit from the exclu-
sion of these products from the European market, but so do all other producers that have not
used these hormones. To present this as a commercial dispute rather than a health question is
                                                          
66 Member states can always take a case to the Commission (1-3). A legal person acting in behalf of the Community industry can do so with the
exception for safeguard measures (1-2). Individual enterprises can only bring a third parties protectionist policies to the Commissions attention
(1.)
67 This is done in all four treaties referred to in the table 4.2.X. The Injurious pricing instrument in the area of shipbuilding, as foreseen in the
Council Regulation no. 385/96 of 29 January 1996 on protection against injurious pricing of vessels, is not included here. For details se:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/vessels/adreg08a.htm    
68 ECT, article 26,37 and 133.
69 These are cases treated according to the Trade Barrier Procedure of the EC (Council Regulation N°3286/94), which came into effect on 1
January 1995. Most cases were settled on a bilateral level, or in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Only in two cases, both against the USA, has
the EC submitted a request to the WTO to implement countermeasures, one in the form of suspension of concessions, and the other in the form
of suspension of obligations against the US. For more information see: European Commission: Trade policy instruments. Trade Barriers Regula-
tion. List of cases. Available at    http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/traderegul/cases.htm    
70 A list updated weekly (in Excel format) of all anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures either in force and or under current investigation is
provided by the European Commission at:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/dbminforce.xls  
71 Of the twenty-five complaints that had been launched against the EC by June 2003, none belonged to this category. For a list and detailed
information see:    http://mkaccdb.eu.int/miti/dsu   
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therefore not convincing.72 In fact, it is difficult to see how the EC could use any of the measures
subsumed in the fourth group as a 'weapon' in trade disputes. Although having external effects,
they result from mainly inward looking EC processes that focus on the internal harmonization as
a step in forming the Common Market. It would, for instance, be very difficult for the Commis-
sion to formulate a proposal on technical harmonization directives and lay down essential re-
quirements for products that exclude certain foreign products from the Common Market with-
out also prohibiting some domestic ones. It is difficult to apply technical requirements to protect
the domestic production from foreign competition without harming some national producers.
Instead, these proposals aim at prohibiting such goods access to the market, be they domestic or
foreign, which may pose a threat to the health and safety of the user. Such proposals are more
likely to be adopted by the Council (acting by qualified majority) in co-decision with the Euro-
pean parliament.73 The mutual recognition agreements on conformity assessment signed between
the EC and Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zeeland, Switzerland and USA also contradict
arguments suggesting that the EC uses the technical requirements as protectionist instruments.74
Hence, the fourth group of measures does not really play any role as an instrument in EC-'geo-
economics'.
Subsidies constitute the fifth type of countermeasures. Subsidies can affect the international
trade, especially when given in a form that encourages over-production. Domestic products oust
imported ones off the internal market and the surplus may be dumped on world markets with
the help of export refunds (subsidies). As shown above, the EC does not only subsidise inner
European production, it also controls state aid. The CAP and the structural operations represent
the by far largest expenditures in this context, together amounting for more than 3/4 of the Un-
ion's total budget. However, as indicated in the section on Economic Cohesion and Employ-
ment, the EU does not primarily subsidise the domestic production or allow certain state aid to
enhance the domestic producers' extra European competitiveness. Most measures should rather
be interpreted as means to solve rural, regional problems to achieve an inner European cohesion.
It is more difficult to determine in what security process one should place the CAP. Agriculture
subsidies can certainly be regarded as commercial defence measure that favours European prod-
ucts. In addition, the EC only applies export subsidies to support the agricultural sector. It is,
however, no longer regarded as a particularly efficient and cost effective tool. Therefore, market
price support and export refunds are successively being replaced by direct payments to the pro-
ducers (which do not stimulate production) and by production limiting programmes.75 The
share of export refunds of the CAP expenditure is also sinking and reached a level of 12% in the
year 2000 as opposed to 25% in 1992.76 From another angle, the CAP could be interpreted as a
policy that aims at securing inland production and thereby the supply of agricultural goods.
However, given the overproduction and the fact that export subsidies are needed to sell Euro-
pean products on the world market, this does not convince. A security of supply argument would
                                                          
72 The EC has treated the issue as a measure falling under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures all
along. See    http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf  
73 ECT, article 95 and 251.
74 According to these agreements all test reports, certificates and marks of conformity issued by the conformity assessment bodies of one of the
parties of the agreement are accepted by the second, if issued in conformity with the legislation of the second party. For more information see:
European Commission: Mutual Recognition Agreements. Available at    http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international/indexb1.htm    
75 In 1989-1991 market price support and export refunds accounted for over 90% of the Agricultural budget, whereas they are estimated to be
brought down to approximately 21 % in 2006. In 1995-1997 the share was already down to 36,9%. European Commission Directorate-General
f o r  A g r i c u l t u r e :  E U  a g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  t h e  W T O .  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 .  A v a i l a b l e  a t :
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/newround/preface.pdf  
76 European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture: EU agriculture and the WTO. September 2001. Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/newround/preface.pdf  
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only be believable if the CAP aimed at assuring a particular secure (minimum) level of domestic
production. This is however neither the goal of the CAP, nor is it organised according to this
logic. Another way of regarding the CAP is to see it as a security policy that utilises the social and
geographical cohesion and a high level of employment as referent object. However, I prefer not
to interpret the CAP as a security policy at all. It is rather a burden from the past and can be
explained by the history of the European integration process. In short and somewhat simplified,
the CAP was the price that industrial Germany had to pay rural France for the continued inte-
gration process.77 In total, EC subsidies do not seem to play a significant role in external trade
conflicts. Subsidies are not utilised as supporting defence measures in any of the commercial
conflicts within the WTO in which the EC is involved. On the contrary, the Community is
reducing its export refunds and market price support and thereby its most distorting subsidies.
As mentioned earlier, the European agriculture has been protected through the exclusion from
the WTO agreements and from other economic concessions made to third parties rather than
through subsidies. EC subsidies should therefore not be seen as an instrument used in EC-'geo-
economics'.
Executive Security Process
 Level
Legislative
Security
Process (Rules)
Situation
assessment
Decision Enforcement
Classification
Security process
Applied to counter-
act threats?/ Efficacy
Figure 3.2-6.  Security process:
Defending the Union's economy against external commercial threats
The Union's commercial instruments can clearly be regarded as defence instruments in com-
mercial conflicts and in this sense as countermeasures in a security process. However, they can-
not be regarded as geo-economic power instruments that can be applied at free will. Their use is
rigorously restricted by WTO regulations. Not only would violations of these rules evoke criti-
cism and countermeasures from the affected parties. The pressure to comply with WTO rules is
also very high because an open 'commercial war' would endanger the function of the WTO alto-
                                                          
77 Given the proportion of the CAP, one can even argue that it curtails the overall economic growth, perpetuates an uneconomical production
and prevents economically sane adaptations in the agriculture sector. It could therefore even be argued that the CAP counteracts the in the
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gether. Given that all states' economies are integrated in an international web, no party would
benefit from such a development. Thus, the only commercial policy of the Union that really
deserves the label geo-economics is the one that exempts agriculture and textile products from
the WTO agreements.78
ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS AND SANCTIONS
Just as shown in the military context, the Union can be expected to utilise economic instru-
ments to export, protect and promote its general values, most generally expressed in the form of
democracy, the rule of law, human rights or, somewhat cryptically, good governance.79
The Union can utilize the economic concessions and sanctions in three different ways to influ-
ence the conduct of third states: The first way is to undertake actions in direct support of the
values. It can, however, be doubted if these activities form part of the EU 'geo-economics' under-
stood as power politics. Certainly, the Union80 finances and conducts human rights and democ-
ratisation activities, be it in the form of electoral observation and assistance, institution building
or human rights education and training.81 Thereby it promotes and makes the general values
gain acceptance in third countries. But, given the nature of these direct activities, conducted with
the approval of the local government, it is quite clear that they do not initiate policy changes. By
supporting the ongoing democratisation processes the Union does not impose its own values
against those of others. By supporting the democratisation processes and spreading the knowl-
edge on human rights, it rather satisfies a domestic demand in the beneficiary countries. This is
an important activity, especially in countries that are in a reconstruction phase, but does not
necessarily fit under the label of power struggle or subordination.
The second way is to use an incentive conditionality during the negotiations of trade and/or
development agreements.82 The objective of this incentive conditionality is to reward those
countries that show a commitment to what the EC understands as an improvement of govern-
ance with economic concessions. This selectivity is based on a positive and rewarding form of
conditionality. In this case the EC would grant preferential tariff agreements and accord devel-
opment aid83 to those countries that take, or promise to take, certain defined policy actions.84
The third way is to penalize non-conformist behaviour. The use of punitive conditionality85
implies that granted economic concessions are precluded if certain predefined conditions are not
met. If the development in a country takes a course that does not please the EU, e.g. an inter-
                                                          
78 Negotiations on agriculture are taking place within the WTO. At the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, the agriculture negotia-
tions became part of the single undertaking in which virtually all the linked negotiations are to end by 1 January 2005.
79 Together with a sustainable economic development these values form the basis for a democratic structural stability and can therefore also be
regarded as a means of crisis mitigation and conflict prevention. See for instance Göteborg European Council, European Programme for Conflict
Prevention,16.06.2001.
80 The term Union is used here, because the actions in direct support of the democratisation are not exclusively located to the first pillar. The
European parliaments own monitoring of elections may serve as an example.
81 These activities are mainly conducted within the framework of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and the European
Development Fund for ACP countries. This direct support for governance and civil society amounts to around 7 % of the total EU aid budget.
The latter according to Cox, Aidan, and Chapman, Jenny: The European Community External Cooperation Programmes: Policies, Management
and Distribution. Brussels 1999. Quoted by Santiso, Carlos, 'The Reform of EU Development Policy', in CEPS Working Document, no 182,
March 2002, p. 10
82 That the development policy shall contribute to the objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, is laid down in article 177(2) of the ECT.
83 It should be noted that humanitarian assistance is not used to put recipient governments under pressure. According to Council Regulation
(EC) no. 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, "humanitarian aid decisions must be taken impartially and solely according to
the victims' needs and interests”. Therefore, ECHO provides the humanitarian aid of the EC to all victims of crises, unconditionally, impartially
and independently of the recipient countries' political records. It does not aim at promoting value conform conduct.
84 Concessions are not necessarily rewarded on the perceived level of democracy or the fulfilment of predefined goals, but rather on the direction
of change. In other words, striving for coherence with the general values, such as the rule of law, democratisation, respect of human rights, is
rewarded.
85 The literature usually displays two sets of conditionality that might be used to impose the Union's general values: the incentive conditionality
(selectivity) and the punitive political conditionality. For an overview see: Santiso 2002; Beynon, Jonathan, Policy Implications for Aid Alloca-
tions of Recent Research on Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity, OECD Paris 2001; Youngs, Richard, 'Democracy Promotion: The case of Euro-
pean Union Strategy', CEPS Working Document, No. 167, 2001.
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ruption of democratic procedure, the Union can suspend the concessions. As punitive political
conditionality is usually activated if the violations are considered as severe, the withdrawal of a
preferential treatment is usually complemented with additional punitive restrictions in the form
of a combination of political and diplomatic, cultural, commercial or financial sanctions against
the offender.
In terms of polity, the main difference between the decision-making ('security') processes in-
volved when granting and withdrawing tariff concessions and development aid, and when
launching sanctions, lies in the distribution of responsibility between the EU and the member
states. As for tariff concessions, they fall in the exclusive competency of the EC and are prepared
and decided at the European level alone. In difference to the tariff policy, the individual EU
member states conduct a more than considerable own aid policy in parallel to the Community's.
In 2001, the ODA provided by the EC amounted to around $US 5.9 billion, while the member
states combined provided about $US 26 billion.86 This makes the EU the largest ODA provider
in Europe. The responsibility for the sanctions, finally, is also shared between the member states
and the Community. Consequently, sanctions are decided both within the first and the second
pillar and unilaterally by the member states. This section scrutinizes how the EC can and does
use these economic instruments to export its values. I begin with the incentive and rewarding
measures, and finish with the suspension of economic concessions and other punitive sanctions.
(See the annex for an overview chart)
Incentive Conditionality. The EC grants Generalised Tariff Preferences (GTP) to lesser-
developed economies on a non-reciprocal and thus non-contractual basis. Every three to four
years, the Council, acting by qualified majority,87 adapts a regulation applying a scheme of GTP,
prepared and presented by the Commission. This regulation contains the rules and procedures
for granting EC tariff preferences and sets out on what grounds these shall be withdrawn.88 The
tariff preferences are accorded to the developing countries and the least developed countries
(LCD) on the grounds of their economic performance. Whether a country belongs to the first
category depends on the classification made by the World Bank, and on the development index
calculated for the country.89 The Commission makes this calculation, estimation and classifica-
tion on a yearly basis. The definition of the LCDs, in contrast, follows the classification made by
the UN.90 Thus, the GTP is not granted to these countries as a reward for, or an incentive to
achieve, political compliance.
During the last decade the Community scheme of GTP has also contained three arrangements
in support of developing countries, one aiming at combating drug production and trafficking,
and two special incentive arrangements aiming at exporting what one might call European val-
ues.
The special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking are not granted with ref-
erence to any conditionality. Their purpose is to support the transition from cultivating drugs to
'legal' agricultural products. In this way, it is more a question meeting a criminal and social
threat at its root, than of exporting values. Beneficiaries are the Andean Community (Bolivia,
                                                          
86 Source OECD, Official Development Assistance in 2001. See also OECD, A Mixed Picture of Official Development Assistance in 2001.
87 ECT, article 133.
88 At the time of writing Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001 was valid (applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period
from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004).
89 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 3 (1). The formula of the development index is presented in Annex II of the regulation.
90 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, Introduction (5).
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Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), the member states of the Central American Common
Market (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador), Panama and Paki-
stan.91 The Commission has been tasked to monitor and evaluate the effects of the special ar-
rangements.
The other two special arrangements, finally, are the only cases where the GTP is linked to an
incentive conditionality. These concern the protection of labour rights in accordance with the
standards laid down in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions92 and the
sustainable management of tropical forests.93 In both cases, the Commission examines applica-
tions and decides if the special incentive arrangements are to be granted to the applicant.94 The
Council can stop the implementation of the Commissions' decisions in both cases.95 Both these
incentive arrangements are linked directly to the recipient's political performance in the form of
the national legislation. It cannot be determined whether or not the special incentive arrange-
ments are the main cause for the legislative adaptation. Since they only consist of partially re-
duced duties this can be doubted, but they support and encourage such a change. To what extent
they really result in compliance with the ILO Conventions and environmental goals depends on
the implementation of the national legislation. Thus, although the impact of these special incen-
tive arrangements is difficult to assess, it seems more likely that it is overestimated than underes-
timated.
The EC has not only reduced tariffs through the GTP. The Community has also concluded,
and the Commission is in process of negotiating, a number of association and partnership
agreements that, amongst other things, include tariff reductions and regulate the Union's aid
policy vis-à-vis these countries. The Council adopts these by qualified majority.96 To what extent
rewarding conditionality is used during the negotiation phase of partnership and association
agreements is difficult to say. It is however quite clear, that the Union does not use some kind of
'conditionality catalogue' containing a list of requirements concerning human rights, democracy
or good governance, that have to be met before an agreement is signed. On the contrary, several
ACP partners and some associates neither fulfil the most basic standards nor have they made
much, or any, progress towards fulfilling these standards. Given that that many non-reformers
have been allocated significant development and trade provisions, and that reformers have not
been significantly rewarded, the application of incentive access conditionality can be doubted
altogether.97
                                                          
91 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, Annex I.
92 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 14 (2) refers to ILO Conventions no. 29 and no. 105 on forced labour, no. 87 and no. 98 on
the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, no. 100 and no. 111 on non-discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation, and no. 138 and no. 182 on child labour and which effectively applies that legislation.
93 The frame of reference when granting special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment are not quite as clear. According to
Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 21 (2) these "…may be granted to a country which effectively applies national legislation
incorporating the substance of internationally acknowledged standards and guidelines concerning sustainable management of tropical forests”.
94 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 16, 18, 22 and 23
95 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 38; Council Decision (EC) no. 468/1999, article 5.
96 ECT, article 181 and 300. A complete list of EC trade agreements is provided on the European Commission's Web site at :
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/ecrtagr.pdf  . During the 1990s the EC started to negotiate Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements
with the aim to replace the co-operation agreements from 1978. With Tunisia, Israel, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority (interim) these
have been concluded and entered into force. At the time of writing, negotiations continued with Syria, had been concluded with Algeria (Dec.
2001) and Lebanon (Jan. 2002), and agreements had been signed with Egypt (June 2001) and Jordan (Nov. 1997). However, none of them had
yet entered into force. With the countries participating in the Barcelona process that have a (at least formal) prospect of EU membership, Turkey,
Cyprus and Malta, the EC envisages a Customs Union. With Turkey and Cyprus an agreements on a Customs Union that obliges the two to
adopt the Union's Common Customs Tariff is already in force. With Malta an agreement has been signed that visualizes the establishment of a
customs Union. Outside of the framework of the GDP and the Partnership and Association agreements, the EU can also grant Macro-financial
assistance and offer Rapid Reaction Aid. Since release of the Macro Financial Assistance (administrated by the Commission's DG Economic and
Financial Affairs) is not linked to the fulfilment and export of the general values, but to subject to the fulfilment of economic policy conditions, it
does not form part of the export of values. As for the Rapid Reaction Aid, the commission grants and controls Once-off or Kick-Start projects in
emergencies. Since it merely disposes of a budget around   20million/year within the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), the RRM can be
neglected in terms of geo-economics.
97 See Youngs 2001:26 and 28.
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However, it is not only the use of rewarding conditionality that can be questioned, but also the
utility of it. The example of so called 'rouge states', such as Libya and formally Iraq, demonstrate
that the attraction of trade and aid agreements with the EU is not always strong enough to con-
vince countries to adopt conform behaviour. The EU has imposed sanctions on some of these
countries. Thus, instead of using the carrot the EU swings the stick.
Punitive Conditionality and Sanctions. In contrast to sanctions, which in principle can be ap-
plied at will, punitive conditionality is always defined in advance, i.e. when concessions are con-
cluded in agreements. In this case, the EC defines the political conditions that disqualify a
country from the benefit of granted economic concessions. These could for instance include
certain criteria with respect to democracy (holding free and fair elections) and the compliance
with human rights. Since the punitive suspension and sanctions are not used separately, they are
discussed together at this point. The EU has defined political conditionality in both the GTP
and Partnership and Association Agreements.
The EC has defined what clearly unacceptable practices may result in a temporary withdrawal
from the GTP.98 The reasons listed are linked to practices such as slavery or other serious viola-
tions of the ILO Conventions, goods made by prison labour, unfair trading practices and lacking
countermeasures against criminal behaviour such as drug traffic and fraud. The Council decides
on the temporary withdrawal from the preferential arrangements with qualified majority, based
on a proposal of the Commission.99 However, other violations of human rights and democratic
governance are not listed as criteria that have to be met in order to become and/or remain a
beneficiary of the EC preferential arrangements.
As for Partnership and Association Agreements, a clause defining respect for fundamental hu-
man rights and democratic principles as 'essential elements' has been included in all such agree-
ments signed by the EC and third countries since 1992.100 This is the clearest attempt (at least
formally) to export the general values through conditionalities. The notion of 'essential elements'
has the legal status as a binding commitment and is associated with 'suspension' or 'non-
performance' clauses. If not observed, the clauses can affect the validity of the agreement and
ultimately lead to its suspension.101 Since the Council signs the agreements concerned, their sus-
pension also lies within the Council's responsibility (se the figure in the annex).102
Suspensions of economic concessions are often accompanied by sanctions. Usually, whole sets
of political and diplomatic, cultural, commercial and financial sanctions are applied.103 Political
sanctions can consist of the suspension of official visits, visa restrictions and selective travel bans.
Diplomatic sanctions can range from the reduction and scale of diplomatic representation to the
severance of all diplomatic relations. Cultural sanctions can be used to reduce cultural and sports
contacts or scientific cooperation. Commercial sanctions affect the trade relations. Normally
such trade embargoes have the largest impact on the subject. These can be complemented by
financial sanctions that include bans of movement of capital and payments or the targeted freez-
                                                          
98 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 26. This applies for the first four preferential arrangements listed above. The safeguard provi-
sions can naturally not apply on the arrangements to combat drugs. Neither are they likely to be cancelled due to unacceptable behaviour, since
that is exactly what they aim at combating.
99 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2501/2001, article 29-32.
100 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union's role in
promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in third countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels, 8 May 2001. p. 4
101 Santiso 2002:16.
102 As the Council Decision of 18 February 2002 concluding consultations with Zimbabwe under article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agree-
ment (2002/148/EC) showed, this is done with qualified majority in accordance with article 300 of the ECT.
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ing of assets in the Union. A recent example of combined EU sanctions was directed against
Zimbabwe.104 Commercial and Financial sanctions are of special interest, because they fall within
the competency of the first pillar and thus under Community jurisdiction.105 They are decided
upon with qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. However, such a decision can
only be taken if provided for in a common position or in a joint action adopted in the second
pillar.106 Thus, just like all other types of European sanctions, they depend on a unanimous
CFSP decision. The difference is that the member states cannot implement Commercial or Fi-
nancial sanctions at will.107 In addition, collective political, diplomatic and cultural sanctions
must be implemented by the member states' domestic legal provisions. This is also the case for
arms embargoes; since armaments export policy is excluded from the EC competency.108
Difficulties using Conditionality and Sanctions (Geo-economic instruments). Despite the in-
tention to start 'imposing' political values on other countries, the EU has made little use of the
instrument of conditionality and sanctions. In his study on democracy promotion, Richard
Youngs points out that neither sanctions nor the rescinding of contractual aid and trade provi-
sions have been employed systematically against simply non-democratic states during the last
decade. The EU has not targeted democratic shortfalls isolated, but applied punitive actions in
cases where several values were seriously violated, often in combination with direct physical vio-
lence. Furthermore, the conditionality applied by the EU was not matched by member states on
a bilateral level.109
The conduct of a coherent and consistent European aid, trade and sanction policy is compli-
cated by two factors. The first is the fragmented decision-making process, which characterised by
the division between national and EC competencies. The constellations of the Union's and its
members' interests can differ from country to country. The national aid and arms delivery poli-
cies of the different EU member states, for instance, do not always match. The reason for this is
that the promotion of the general values must compete with many other national and European
interests, not at least economic ones. This is the main reason why neither the EU, nor the mem-
ber states, always achieve to advocate the general values in a coherent, consistent and therefore
efficient way.110 The disagreement between France and the Commission during the Fall 2001
over the resumption of aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo is only one of many exam-
ples.111
The second factor that complicates the use of conditionality and sanctions is the uncertainty
about what measures are appropriate. Although it appears as a perfectly clear concept at first
glance, the practical use of conditionality remains problematic. There are difficulties at the con-
ceptual level in defining criteria for assessing the performance of the beneficiaries and setting up
adequate targets. This does not only concern concepts such as democratisation processes and
                                                                                                                                                       
103 Information on, and an updated list of all EU sanctions in force are provided by the Delegation of the European Commission to the United
States: European Union Sanctions Applied to non-member Countries. Available at    http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Sanctions.htm    .
104 Council Decision of 18 February 2002 concluding consultations with Zimbabwe under article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
(2002/148/EC)
105 A  l i s t  o f  f i n anc i a l  s anc t i on s  t ak en  by  th e  Eu ropean  Communi t y  i s  a v a i l ab l e  a t :
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/activities_freecapitalmovement_sanctions_en.htm    A list of embargoes is available
at    http://ue.eu.int/pesc/legislation/texten.htm    
106 ECT article 60 and 301.
107 See ECT article 60 for EC restrictions concerning unilateral measures against a third country with regard to capital movements and payments.
108 ECT, article 296.
109 Richard Youngs offers an excellent empiric overview of how the instruments discussed in this section have been used during the last decade.
See Youngs 2001:18 ff.
110 For a broader critic see Santiso 2002.
111 See Santiso 2002:33.
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good governance that do not follow a natural, orderly and linear sequence of positive and pro-
gressive political transformation.112 It can also be difficult to monitor concrete targets, such as
fiscal deficits, since the non-fulfilment must not necessarily result from poor governmental per-
formance, but can be caused by external shocks or other developments.113 The largest difficulty,
however, is the uncertainty about how the EC can influence countries to adopt a certain course
of action. This is also valid for the use of sanctions. As can be expected, there is no ready-made
solution for how to apply the available means, if one seeks to bring bad performers on to the
desired track and to project the general values in an efficient way. Each recipient's situation is
singular and must be examined separately. The withdrawal of economic concessions and the
implementation of sanctions is not necessarily always the best solution, nor is the granting of
economic incentives. Criticism has in particular been directed against the effectiveness of using
punitive aid conditionality as a means to influence a third state's policy and to promote sustain-
able reform.114 The basic conclusion is that the punitive conditionality and sanctions cannot
substitute or circumvent domestic ownership of and commitment to reform.115
Altogether, the EC does not seem to utilise the granting of tariff reductions or the threat of
withdrawing them as means to persuade actors to tolerable behaviour. That trade agreements
primarily are built on the logic of trade, and that the ambition to export/secure certain values is
given a secondary role, may explain this to some extent. However, the main reason seems to be,
that both the Commission, the Council and the member states are aware that they cannot en-
force coherent behaviour through suspensions or sanctions. What the Union can do is to support
ongoing and wished transitions towards more democracy and the respect of human rights in
third countries. Sanctions and suspensions are merely used to express disapproval and to avoid
supporting an oppressive governments economic development. They do not necessarily enhance
the acceptance of the general values in third countries, but have a disciplinary function, and may
therefore counteract the erosion of these values. This may explain why the Commission consid-
ers a positive and constructive partnership with the responsible governments to be the most effi-
cient way of achieving sustainable change and conformist behaviour,116 and why the EU favours
an approach based on partnership and co-operation, rather than sanctions and other negative
measures.
Thus, it is difficult to see how economic concessions and sanctions are used in a sense that
could be described as Geo-economics with the aim of imposing one's own values. Nevertheless,
one may say that the Union does seek to protect and export the general values to some extent by
these means. It is however difficult to distinguish a coherent security process in which this is
done. Often the ambition to export these values and the condemnation of inconsistent behaviour
seems to be subordinated to other interests. Speaking of one 'security process' would therefore be
benevolent. If however one chose to do so, it should be defined as semi-autonomous, since the
member states can apply their own conditionality and sanctions. Tariff reductions alone fall
                                                          
112 Santiso 2002:22 and 35
113 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why, 1998, p. 50.
114 A prominent conclusion is that published by the World Bank: "The lesson? A conditional loan is no guarantee that reforms will be carried
out—or last once they are.” Source: World Bank 1998:51.
115 Santiso 2002:25. However, the analytical validity of the separation between incentive and punitive conditionality can be question. From the
perspective of recipients, there is not necessarily a qualitative difference between a reward-based commitment and punitive measures. If having
established an 'entitlement mentality', those countries that were not offered a periodic upgrading in their relation to the EU perceived this as a
punishment. Thus, it can be questioned if the criticism against punitive conditionality does not also apply on incentive conditionality. C.f.
Youngs 2001:28.
116 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The European Union's role in
promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in third countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels, 8 May 2001. p. 8.
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within the Union's exclusive competency. But, as shown, it cannot be said that these are granted
and withdrawn with reference to the promotion of the general values.
Executive Security Process
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Figure 3.2-7.  Security process: Defending general values
with commercial and financial 'carrot and stick' policies.
ENLARGEMENT
The enlargement process can be seen as the most efficient way for the EU to export its values
and the Union's 'way of life'. However, even if the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria117 is a
precondition for opening accession negotiations, it cannot be argued that the Union imposes
these values on the applicant countries. Such a statement would only be valid, if these countries
did not stand for these values by themselves.
Certainly, the candidate countries carry the lion's share of the adaptation necessary for the en-
largement. The efforts demanded of the applicants to qualify for membership widely surpass
those required of the EU to qualify for the reception of new members. The EU is also an un-
evenly strong partner in the negotiations held. While it obliges the applicants to adopt the entire
acquis communautaire, they cannot oblige the Union to do much at all. Nevertheless, there is a
severe difference between the Union's relation to states that are involved in the enlargement
process and its relation to other countries. Imposing and exporting values is not the same thing
as growing as a Community. Through the enlargement, new members will obtain direct influ-
ence on and be part of the process in which the Union's values are formulated. Thus, the EU is
                                                          
117 Amongst other things, the Copenhagen criteria prescribes the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and the respect for and protection of minorities.
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not simply projecting its values into the candidate countries nor is it expanding in an invasive
manner, replacing former governments by a new one located in Brussels. The Union is embrac-
ing the countries and is prepared to receive them as equal, not as defeated, conquered or sup-
pressed, members.
Again, the Union's power in the enlargement process does not lie in its ability to influence the
applicants to perform a certain conduct, but rather in its ability to support the development to-
wards goals that the Union and the affected country agree upon. This does not mean that the
enlargement does not have a security dimension. It is however not convincing to present the
enlargement as a part of the Union's Geo-economics. In fact, it is even difficult to argue that the
enlargement is a step in an economic security process. The only economic threat that is counter-
acted through the enlargement would be the widening social and economic gap between east and
west. But, it would certainly be a challenge to formulate a firm argument explaining that the
purpose of the enlargement is to counteract that threat, to produce cohesion, and that the en-
largement is the most efficient way to do so. Thus, the enlargement process should not be ex-
plained as a question of economic European security. Certainly the military security argument
can be used to some extent, but most convincing is the simple conviction of the EU members,
that the Eastern Europeans belong to the 'family' and should join the Union.
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This section inquires to what extent the EU can be seen as an organisation set up with the
purpose of handling the security process of economic threats. Therefore, it asks the following
questions:
- What motives stand behind the economic European integration? Can the justification be
interpreted as a security process?
- Do the member states' policies comply with the idea of a common economic system and
thus with an ESDI?
I do not ask what referent objects are used in the security processes. This question becomes su-
perfluous since I deduced the concept of economic security from the function and performance
of the economic system. I did thus take the referent object as a starting point for the examina-
tion.
3.2.2.1 Why are economic threats on the European agenda?
The simple answer is that economic threats are on the European agenda because of the Com-
mon Market. Establishing and maintaining a common market per definition means that some
economic threats have to be treated centrally. This is not only so because they affect the eco-
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nomic area as a whole, but also because they require common responses. Without common rules
and countermeasures, a common market would not be a common one and not exist as such. The
creation of a common market is therefore inextricably linked to the collective management of
economic threats to the common economic system.
Nevertheless, the question why the economic integration was initiated and what motives lie
behind the creation of the Common Market are still of interest. Three main arguments have
been put forward: a strive for peace, a pursuit of economic growth and the will to regaining in-
fluence. Striking is that, that which geo-economics describe as a new security dilemma, i.e. the
connection between economic growth on the one hand and dependency and vulnerability on the
other, was regarded as a solution and not as a problem by the founding fathers of the Union.118
The fear of renewed military confrontations on the European continent was without doubt the
main reason for the initiation of the European integration process that evolved to the European
Union. That the cooperation began in the coal and steel industry, which forms the basis for the
armaments industry, is not a coincidence. Nevertheless, the general economic peace argumenta-
tion stretches far beyond controlling the production of arms.119 The idea is based on the neo-
liberal conviction that competition and the division of labour within a functioning market sys-
tem in principle is beneficial for all participants, and functions as a positive-sum game.120 Being
mutually advantageous, the economic integration is an ideal way to increase the mutual interde-
pendence. This results in a situation where it would be counterproductive to assert one's own
interests by violence, let alone with military instruments. Thus, the economic integration was
utilised as a means to overcome mutual threats in the military context.121
The member states also viewed the EC in a plain economic context and expected to gain eco-
nomic advantages from the integration.122 The creation of a common market was to induce a
stable economic development and increase welfare and prosperity in all participating states. In
addition, the economic growth can be seen as the basis for societal stability, defusing distribution
fights and offering a prospect –'things are getting better'. By supporting economic growth, the
economic integration was to secure both the economic and political stability.123
The foundation of the EC can also be interpreted as a result of a security process, in which the
former status and influence of the European countries and the self-image of Europe as the central
world organiser was used as a referent object.124 During the first phase of the economic integra-
tion, European countries were losing their key position in world politics to the USA and the
Soviet Union, both in military, political and economic terms. After the military and political
merger of the European Defence Community and the European Political Community had been
cancelled, the economic co-operation suggested itself as the only realistic way to restore or at least
to enhance the Europeans' influence. The EC was to enhance the combined economic perform-
ance of the EC states both in absolute terms and in comparison to other economic systems. By
                                                          
118 See footnote 56 on page 111.
119 The promotion of the market economy in Eastern Europe during the last decade shows how the economic system is linked to the peace and
stability argument. See also Laeken European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 14/15.12.2001, article 53.
120 In general, the opponents of the Common Market and the EMU share this conviction. However, they disagree on how welfare is most effi-
ciently produced and secured.
121 The idea that war cannot merely be made unthinkable, but materially impossible, through economic co-operation was already presented in the
Schuman Declaration in 1950.
122 This goal was clearly formulated when the plans on the European Economic and Monetary Union began to take concrete form. See the so-
called Werner-report (EC document no. 16.958/II/70-D) adopted by the Council on 22 march 1971. A German version of the Werner-report is
printed in: Jürgen Schwarz (ed.), Der Aufbau Europas. Pläne und Dokumentationen 1945-1980, Bonn 1980, pp. 429-444, here p. 431.
123 Economic growth is fundamental for the legitimacy of both the economic and political institutions. Of course, the economic growth can also
be linked to the peace argument above. Peace and prosperity are coupled in the same way as survival and well-being. Well-being cannot be
achieved without survival and survival is not worthwhile without well-being. Therefore the two go hand in hand.
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acting together on the international stage, the EC members were also to strengthen their position
in negotiations and enhance their influence.
With varying intensity, these three arguments have been presented at each 'relance Eu-
ropéenne'.125 The first relance took place in the mid 1950s. At the 1955 Messina conference the
member states described the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of na-
tional economies and the creation of a common market, as indispensable, if Europe is to preserve
the standing, which she has in the world, to restore the influence and her prestige, and to im-
prove steadily the living standard of the population.126
The second relance took place as the end of the transitional period for setting into practice the
Common Market came closer (31 December 1969). At that time, the discussion on a political as
well as an economic and monetary union was given new impetus. In The Hague, the French
President Pompidou underlined the external argument, saying that the Europe of the six must
strive for a common stance vis-à-vis the IMF, come to a common monetary policy and thereby
make their full weight to bear in international negotiations.127 The German Chancellor Brandt
expressed himself in a similar way, although not quite as explicitly: "By unifying its resources she
[the EC] shall enable Europe to stand its ground economically, in science and technically along
side with the Superpowers and thereby preserve its identity".128 Due to 'Euro sclerosis', charac-
terised by high inflation and persisting unemployment, setting in after the break up of the Bret-
ton Woods system and the first oil crisis in 1973, the project of a monetary Union was post-
poned.
The third relance started in the late 1980s. On 1 July 1990 the first of three stages towards the
EMU began. It is understandable that the peace argument was highlighted during this time of
revolutionary changes,129 although the other two motives were far from forgotten.130
Thus, the creation of the Common Market implied a transfer of security processes that deal
with some specific economic threats to the European level. There is no doubt that the member
states have gained internal military security through this move. It is also clear that their position
in international negotiations has been strengthened, even if the EC does not use its economic
instruments to project power in the way suggested by 'geo-economics'. That the Common Mar-
ket has stimulated the economic growth is also probable. The attraction the Union has for new
members reflects this. However, the member states disagree on how economic growth is most
efficiently produced, i.e. what economic threats have to be dealt with at the European level in
order to secure prosperity.
                                                                                                                                                       
124 This was underlined by the German Chancellor Adenauer, who saw the close unification of the old European states as the only chance for
Europe to regain and to preserve its old position in the concert of powers. C.f. Erklärung der deutschen Bundesregierung zum Vertrag über die
Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. 21.03.1957. In: Schwarz 1980: 337.
125 I refrain from presenting opposing positions or to enter a discussion about the validity of the arguments favouring the economic unification.
126 C.f. Schlußkommuniqué der Konferenz von Messina vom 3. Juni 1955. In. Europa-Archiev 05.07.1955. p. 7974. A non-official English
translation is available at    http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/messina.htm    . In the original Treaty of Rome and in the Amsterdam
version of the ECT the 'internal' economic goals where highlighted. In the original treaty the peace argument was more or less left out. Article 1
of the treaty, describing the promotion of closer relations between the states as one of the community's tasks, is the nearest the original treaty
comes to a peace argument. C.f. 'Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und die Europäische Atomgemeinschaft', in Europa-Archiev,
05.06.1957, pp. 9897-9923. Here p. 9901. One explanation for leaving out the peace argument in this document may be that the major threat
to peace was not considered to come from inside of the community. Military peace was determined by the block confrontation and thus treated
within NATO. Refraining from declaring 'external' economic goals could be explained by political tactfulness, given the parallel trade negotia-
tions within other forums such as the GATT.
127 C.f. 'Französische Verlautbarung über die Erklärung von Staatspräsident Georege Pompidou auf der Konferenz der Staats- und Regierung-
schefs der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Den Haag am 2. Dezember 1969', in Europa-Archiev no. 2, 1970, pp. D40-41.
Here p. D41.
128 C.f. Brandt, Willy (German Chancelor), speech at the conference of the Heads of state and Government of the member states of the European
Communities, held in the Hague, 2.12.1969, in Europa-Archiev, no. 2, 1970, pp. D36-D40, here p. D40. [Authors translation]
129 See Kohl, Helmut 1991 (German Chancellor), 'Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Maasricht', in
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, Bonn 17.11.1991, no. 142. pp 1153-1158. Here p. 1153.
130 According to Mitterrand, "the introduction of a single currency is the only means of ensuring that Europe remains a great economic and
monetary power, and it is the best means of ensuring the sustained growth of our economies”. Mitterrand, François: Programme of the French
Presidency. Speech in the European Parliament. In: Debates of the European Parliament. Luxemburg.17.01.1995, no. 4-456. Official Publica-
tions of the European Community. pp. 45-52. Quoted by Buzan 1998: 182.
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3.2.2.2 Do the national membership-policies comply with the ESDI?
It is quite clear, that the economic integration was anticipated as a continuous process from the
very beginning. Whether the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) nor the European
Economic Community (EEC) were conceived as being final steps by their creators.131 Although
the finalité Européene was not clearly outlined,132 the question of the economic and monetary
union was already a part of the discussion when the Common Market was conceived in the mid
1950s.133 Ever since, some have seen the single currency as a vital complement to the idea of a
common market, abolishing segmentation and fragmentation. The Euro is therefore not to be
understood as new or separate idea, even if it was not introduced until 1999.134 Moreover, the
linkage between the intensified economic co-operation, the fusion of interests and the harmoni-
sation of policies was also predicted from the start.135 Therefore, the reluctance of Denmark,
Great Britain and Sweden to fully join the economic integration and the Euro may seem rather
surprising. However, when taking a closer look at the arguments used in the national debate, the
linkage to the question of the collective identity will become clear.
Pro EMU arguments. It is interesting that the main pro-EMU arguments in all three countries
underline the economic effects of the Euro. They are the same ones that have already been used
to justify and explain the creation and completion of the common market.
With a common currency the transaction costs of the intra European trade will diminish and
the potential advantage of the Common Market be better exploited. Exchange rates and currency
fluctuations are eliminated at the same time as the transparency and the competitiveness in-
creases. This will create lower prices and reduce the risks in trade and investment calculations. As
the primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability,136 inflation and interest rates will
also be stabilised. All things considered, the EMU will support the economic growth.
In addition, the stability in the international monetary system would increase. Given that
nearly 80 % of the international transactions are made in US dollars, whereas the US only repre-
sents about a fifth of world exports, the present system is unbalanced. With the Euro as a third
strong currency beside the dollar and the Yen, the international monetary system will be more
balanced, and this is good for stability.137 Moreover, due to its volume the Euro will be more
resistant towards speculative attacks and have a larger potential to maintain the stability vis-à-vis
                                                          
131 When the ECSC was founded, the creation of a uniform European economic area was already conceived. "The goal when founding the
European Coal and Steel Community was the creation of a common European economic area with 160 million people, which can assert itself
among other economic powers." (Authors translation) Regierungserklärung des deutschen Bundeskanzlers Adenauer (Auszüge zur europäischen
Einigungspolitik). 29.04.1954, in Schwarz 1980:269 and 271.
132 The Schuman Declaration speaks of a first step in the federation of Europe.
In the final communiqué from Messina the member states spoke of the creation of a united Europe; See Schlußkommuniqué der Konferenz von
Messina vom 3. Juni 1955. In. Europa-Archiev 05.07.1955, p. 7974.
133 One example are the six characteristics of domestic markets that should also apply to the internal European market as outlined by the scientific
advisory board of the German federal Department of Trade and Industry (Bundes Wirtschafts Ministerium). The common currency was one of
them. C.f.
Schiffler, Gerhard, 'Vertag über die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG)', in Europa-Archiev. 05/2.06.1957, pp. 9871- 9878. Here p.
9872.
134 This approach to build Europe step by step was expressed by the foreign ministers of the EC member states in the article 8 of the so-called
Davignon report 20.07.1970. Cf. Schwarz 1980:426.
135 C.f. Schiffler 1957.
136 Cf. Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, article 2.
137 Cf. The interview with Yves-Thibault de Silguy in 'Everything You Need to Know About Europe's New Currency The Euro', in Europe
Magazine of the European Union, Special Report, 1997.
In a speech in November 1999, the Danish Foreign Affairs Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen summarised these arguments saying: "A strong single
currency for Europe will enhance the dynamics of the single market, benefit trade partners and protect Europe against international financial
crisis and speculation. It will take some time before we see the full potential of the Euro. Having a third strong global currency beside the dollar
and the yen will hopefully help in stabilising the world economy. This will benefit all economies and allow smaller states to have a say in interna-
tional monetary policy.” Cf. Niels Helveg Petersen (Danish Foreign Affairs Minister), Small states can make a difference – Denmark in Europe,
speech held in Beijing, 10.11.1999.
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other currencies.138 Finally, the fear of marginalisation and loss of influence over a development
that will have severe impact on the national economy has also been used as a pro-EMU argu-
ment. The Euro will give Europe, which is one of the world's largest trade partners and a leader
in economic terms, a voice and existence on the world scene in monetary terms.
Contra EMU arguments. The EMU opponents in all three 'No'-countries have underlined
political and more emotive issues, setting the loss of national sovereignty and the image of the
evolving 'European super state' in the centre of their argumentation.
After the Maastricht treaty was rejected in a referendum in 1992, the Danish government ne-
gotiated four opt-outs at the Edinburgh European Council 139 and could therefore win the sec-
ond referendum. Unlike Sweden and Britain, Denmark participates in the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), and has maintained a fixed exchange rate policy vis-à-vis the
Deutsche Mark and the other core currencies within the European Monetary System since
1982.140 Thus, the goal of the Danish monetary policy is to support Denmark's fixed-exchange
rate towards the Euro. Consequently, the Central Bank has little freedom to follow an independ-
ent monetary policy. It is therefore not surprising that the Danish Economic Council assessed
"…the purely economic costs and benefits for Denmark of EMU membership as being small and
uncertain".141
Although the Danish Crown is directly linked to the Euro, the adoption of the Euro was re-
jected in a referendum held on 28 September 2000 (53,1% of the votes against and 46,9% in
favour).142 Despite the overwhelming support from the political establishment, with around 80
% of the parliament and both the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen
i Danmark, LO) and the Danish Employers' Confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, DA)
in favour of a membership, the Danes were not convinced.143 It seems that the majority was per-
suaded by the Danish 'No' campaign, that disregarded the strictly economic reasoning and made
the Euro question a proxy debate about the future of the Danish nation-state. The front figures
of the No-movement, Pia Kjaersgaard of the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) and the
member of the European Parliament Jens-Peter Bonde, leader of the June Movement (Juni
Bevægelsen), were successful in appealing to the preservation and defence of the national identity
and societal system. It was not built on criticism against the expected contents or goals of the
common and harmonised European economic policies, but opposed to the centralisation as such.
The referendum was said to be about "Denmark's existence as an independent nation – not more
nor less”.144 The Euro was not described as a currency that promotes trade, but one that pro-
                                                          
138 This argument is based on the assumption that the volatility of exchange rates inherent with monetary independence may be the cause of
economic shocks rather than the means of adjusting to economic shocks. Four a concise and clear summary of the argument see: Coleman,
Andrew 1999, 'Economic Integration and Monetary Union', in Treasury Working Paper, no. 6, 1999.
139 Apart from the EMU, the opt outs concerned the Union Citizenship (lifted through the new wording of the Amsterdam treaty), cooperation
in the field of JHA, and the ESDP. See Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 11/12.12.1992, Part B, Denmark and the
Treaty on European Union, Annex 1, Section B. (This conclusion was included in the Maasticht Treaty as Protocol no. 12.)
140 In 1992 the krone became a member of the ERM, which fixed its value against a narrow band against the ECU. Since 1 January 1999 Den-
mark has participated in the ERM II agreed with the European Central Bank, with an of exchange rate fluctuation of 2.25% around a central
parity rate. (The central rate of the Danish krone is kr. 746.038 per 100 euro. The upper and lower fluctuation limits are thereby respectively kr.
762.824 per 100 euro and kr. 729.252 per 100 euro. Cf.    http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/target2point5/mpframework/index.htm    ).
141 'The EMU: Danish Exchange Rate Policy at a Crossroads', the English Summary of chapter II of Det Økonomiske Råd, Danish Economy,
Spring 2000.
142 For further information on the Danish referendum see: Miller, Vaughne, 'The Danish Referendum on Economic and Monetary Union', in
House of Commons Research Paper, no. 00/78, 29.09.2002.
143 Jørgensen, Carsten: Denmark votes no to the euro. Published 10.28.2000
144 Kjærsgaard, Pia, Grundlovstale, speech held in Aastrup Mølle, 05.06.2000.
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motes a new state.145 The result of the referendum shows, that the strategy of setting the Danish
economic system and identity in opposition to a European one, proved successful.
The starting position of Britain is quite different from the Danish. Just like Denmark, the UK
also obtained an opt-out clause from the third stage of the economic and monetary union.146
But, unlike Denmark the UK suspended its ERM membership on 16 September 1992. Ever
since, it has pursued an own and independent monetary policy with the objective to deliver price
stability instead of exchange rate stability. The official stance towards the Euro membership has
been that the economic benefits have to be clear and unambiguous. To make this assessment, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out five economic tests, which have to be met before Britain
enters.147 The Government's decision to exercise its opt out from the third stage of economic and
monetary union was made with reference to a statement to Parliament by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and an accompanying Treasury Paper in October 1997, noting that the five tests are
not met.148
When Sweden joined the EU it did not obtain any opt-out clauses. Thus, formally it has al-
ready approved to become a member of the EMU. Nevertheless, in 1997 the Swedish parlia-
ment adopted the government proposition not to join the monetary union from its start on 1
January 1999, but to assure the possibility to join, if it so chooses through the pursuit of an eco-
nomic policy that will enable the country to fulfil the convergence criteria. The government's
proposal was not explained by critical arguments against the EMU, but rather with the low sup-
port among the population at the time being.149 Just like the United Kingdom, Sweden does not
participate in the ERM II (and did not participate in its forerunner ERM). The Swedish central
bank can therefore pursue the objective of price stability through an independent monetary pol-
icy. Consequently, in both the 1998 and the 2000 Convergence Report of the EC Commission,
Sweden was assessed as neither fulfilling the criterion on exchange rate stability nor the require-
ments for the Riksbank's legal integration in the ESCB.150 These deficits cannot be explained by
insufficient economic performance. They rather result from the intended Swedish policy.
It is quite peculiar that both Britain and Sweden intend to make the entry into the third step
of the EMU dependent of a referendum. In the British case, it is strange, because the non-
membership has been explained with the five tests that were presented as objectified criteria. A
referendum would hardly clarify whether the five economic tests are met or not. The Swedish
case is much worse, since a referendum was held on the entry to the EU. Since this included the
EMU and no opt out was obtained, the Swedes have already voted on the issue once. Thus, the
fact alone that referendums will be held shows that the issue is highly-charged and emotional
rather than based on some kind of objective economic criteria. At the time of writing, the up-
coming referendums were still distant and the Euro-question not lifted to top of the political
agenda. The campaigns had therefore not been launched yet. Nevertheless, one can expect that
                                                          
145 Bonde, Jens-Peter, The Danish Referendum on entry to the Single Currency, Speech to the Fourth Congress for Democracy, held at Church
House, Westminister 14.07.2000.
146 Maastricht Treaty: Protocol on Certain Provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (Protocol 11)
147 Covering cyclical convergence, flexibility, investment, financial service, and employment and growth.
148 The feeble cyclical convergence of the British and the European economies was presented as one of the main reasons. C.f. Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Statement on Economic and Monetary Union, 27.10.1997. HM Treasury, UK Membership of the Single Currency - An Assessment
of the Five Economic Tests, October 1997.
149Regeringens proposition 1997/98:25, Om Sverige och den ekonomiska och monetära unionen.
150 Cf. Report from the Commission: Convergence report 2000 prepared in accordance with article 122(2) of the Treaty. Brussels 03.05.2000.
Both available at:    http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/index_en.htm    
Thus, Sweden is actually violating article 109 of the Amsterdam Treaty. However, such a situation was foreseen in article 122 of the ECT (ex-
article 109k), with the status of 'member states with a derogation'.
130
the Swedish and British debate will follow the Danish pattern. Opponents in both countries
already highlight the democratic deficit and the loss of self-determination.151
Assenting EU goals, but formally maintaining national self-determination. The reluctance to-
wards the participation in the third stage of the EMU reflects that it has to represent a new qual-
ity of integration. Although it remains disputed, whether or not the introduction of the Euro is a
step towards a European super state, it certainly is a step from a national towards a European
economic system in which an increasing share of the economic security is produced at the Euro-
pean level.
The Euro is important because it completes the single market. At present, the EU does not
only have responsibility for internal and external regulations of the Common Market. Through
the ECB it also provides and guarantees the common exchange medium used within that mar-
ket. In this sense, the Euro-area can be regarded a cohesive economic system.
It is important to underline that the three member states that do not participate in the third
stage of the EMU only have reservations concerning the Euro, the ECB and the single monetary
and exchange-rate policy. Thus, they remain fully involved in all other EC-activities, including
the coordination of the economic policy. They are bound by the general economic objectives
that the Union has set itself in article 2 of the EC-Treaty.152 In accordance with the Stability and
Growth Pact all three countries have also presented convergence programs and conduct an eco-
nomic policy that meets the requirements of the broad economic policy guidelines recommended
by the Commission. Hence, they comply with the fulfilment of the economic convergence crite-
ria as set out in Article 121(1) of the Amsterdam EC-Treaty153 (with the exception of the British
and Swedish exchange rate development vis-à-vis the Euro154).
Given that Denmark alone participates in the EMR II, and is the only one of the three coun-
tries that fulfils all the convergence criteria, it may seem ironical that the Danish no-campaign
could use the sovereignty and identity argument so successfully. After all, Denmark could now
be described as a complying quasi-member of the EMU, without full influence. By linking the
Danish Crown to the Euro, Denmark has technically transferred competencies to the ESCB to
the same extent as the Euro members have. Thus, it charges the ESCB with the responsibility to
handle economic threats against the currency. In terms of ESDI, the Danish decision not to join
the third stage is merely of symbolic character. The feigned separation between the Danish and
the European economic system is compensated for by the EMR II. This could be explained by
an identity gap between the political elite and the people. Nevertheless, Denmark has not won
                                                          
151 The threat of a Super state is used in the British Conservative Party's campaign to keep the pound "Five Reasons to Keep the Pound”-strategy
(   http://www.keepthepound.org.uk/about_ktp/about_index.html  ). Speaking at the Kensington & Chelsea Constituency Association in
25.05.2001, the Shadow Chancellor, Rt. Hon Michael Portillo described what he called "the Blair vision of Britain” a defeatist agenda. He saw
the "ceding more and more economic and political powers to un-elected officials in Europe” as a profound lack of confidence in Britain and
"…in our ability to govern ourselves and influence the world without ceding authority to a more closely integrated European Union”. The
Conservative Leader, William Hague, has called the British pound "the currency that for centuries has been both the symbol and reality of our
national independence”. C.f. Hague, William, Conservatives will fight tooth and nail to Keep the Pound, speech held 08.02.2001; The Deputy
Leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament, Theresa Villiers, asked: "Do we want the people we elect at a general election to run the
UK economy or do we want a one-size-fits-all euro-economic policy set in Frankfurt?" Source: 'Tories attack 'flawed' euro', BBC News,
07.01.2002. As for the Swedish opponents, their arguments were clearly expressed in the EMU debate in the Swedish Riksdag. C.f. Sveriges
Riksdag. Snabbprotokoll 1999/2000:36. 30.11.1999. 1§ Särskilt anordnad debatt om Sveriges anslutning till EMU.
152 All of which are well compatible with the national economic goals. It promotes a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of
economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of
the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among member states.
Cf. ECT ,article 2.
153 Cf. Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Finance, Updated Convergence Program for Denmark 2000; Swedish Ministry of
Finance, Updated Swedish Convergence Program 2000; HM Treasury: Delivering Economic Stability, Convergence Programme submitted in
line with the Stability and Growth Pact 2000.
154 Since Sweden and the UK have had a floating exchange rate, the exchange rate is not a monetary policy objective. In the short term the rate of
exchange is decided by international capital flows and in the long term by economic fundamentals. Hence, it is rather regarded as the outcome of
all other economic policies. The Exchange rate stability is therefore to be achieved through policies for achieving greater economic stability.
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but lost autonomy through this choice. De facto, it has not only transferred, but also externalised
the security process to the European level. Paradoxically, the Danish opt out complies very much
with the idea of an ESDI.
The Swedish and British policies, in contrast, are more consistent. Both make a clear distinc-
tion between membership in the third stage of the EMU and an autonomous monetary and
exchange rate policy. Thus, at present, for their part, they have rejected the idea of an ESDI con-
cerned with the defence of price stability. Maybe it is more correct to say that they have not yet
made their final decision.
3.2.3 Current state of the ESDI in the economic context
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Given that the EU is involved in several different security processes, it is more difficult to clas-
sify the ESDI in the economic than in the military context. In difference to the military context,
the European uniformity is not defined during the security process, but rather the threats to, or
threatening changes of the secondary referent objects. When defining the competencies of the
EC, the member states have not only determined what countermeasures the EC may utilise and
how decisions on their application shall be taken. They also resolved on the purpose of EC poli-
cies. Therefore, the secondary referent objects were defined in consensus before the European
security processes started. If the common economic system were regarded as the common refer-
ent object resulting from a security process, one would have to classify the ESDI as consensual.
However, as shown in the section on the policy, the security process conceived in this way can-
not be classified as one that primarily takes place in the economic context. It is difficult to ex-
plain the integrative steps of the past as a response to economic threats. Presenting the creation
of the common economic system as a measure aimed at protecting that very same common eco-
nomic system is even more implausible. But, if one considers that the ongoing EC interventions
are the security processes that are to be analysed in the economic context, then the ESDI is much
further developed.
The survey has showed that the Union disposes of various economic instruments that could be
used to counteract internal and external economic threats as well as to push 'general values'
through outside of the Union's territory. However, the Union does not apply all economic in-
struments at its disposal for these purposes, nor has it taken responsibility for all economic poli-
cies within the Union. The table below summarises the Union's different security processes in
the economic context.
The first column lists the different secondary referent objects and the respective EC policies in
the same systematic order as presented in section 3.2.1. Each line represents one economic pol-
icy/countermeasure. Although several completely different policies can affect the same threat and
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or aim at safeguarding the same referent object, each policy is presented as a separate security
process.155 This is so, because the division of responsibility between the European and national
level varies for different policies, and because each policy is conducted separately. Although the
utilisation of other economic instruments that affect a referent object may be taken into account
when the Union decides on a countermeasure, each policy is determined following specific as-
sessment, decision-making and implementation procedures. Since I do not classify the European
policies analysed under the headline 'Supply of essential goods' as security policies, this category
is not included in the table.156
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Figure 3.2-8.  EU economic security process.
The second column indicates the categorisation of the different security processes and describes
how the responsibility for each policy is divided between the Union and the member states. A
security process is labelled autonomous when the European security process has replaced the
national one. A horizontal division, as in the first line (competition policy dealing with the ac-
tivities of undertakings), means that the EU has been given exclusive responsibility for some
parts of the policy, while the members are in charge of others. In this case, the competencies of
the EU and the member states do not overlap. The same cases/threats are not counteracted at
both the national and the European level. I chose to call this a horizontal division, because, the
                                                          
155 Some of the policies, e.g. the monetary policy, utilise different instruments. Since they contain several measures they might also be described as
a group of policies rather than a single one. But, for the sake of simplicity and clarity I have chosen to group them and present them as one
policy. This can be permitted because a division into more policies would only extend and complicate the chart without changing my argument.
156 According to the definition of security policies on page 99.
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policy field can be divided in two separate levels, a 'lower' one where the member state is fully
responsible, and a European one, where the Union conducts an autonomous security process. A
vertical division describes the existence of parallel security processes at the European and national
level that partly overlap. The same threat can thus be met with the same type of countermea-
sure/policy at both levels. These policies are labelled semi-autonomous because the European
security process partly duplicates the national one, and because it represents a quality of its own.
At least in theory, the European policy can contradict the interests of one or several member
states. Sanctions, finally, are classified as consensual because they are decided upon within the
CFSP.
An autonomous European security process/policy does not necessarily suggest that all kinds of
threats to the secondary referent object are warded off. There is not even a guarantee that the
European policy can counteract the targeted threat efficiently.157 An autonomous security process
merely indicates that the European process has replaced the national one. As the table displays,
the autonomous security processes include those policies where parallel national policies would
not be applicable: external trade regulations (tariffs and commercial defence), state control and
the monetary and exchange rate policy of the ECB. If the states would conduct parallel policies
in these fields, the Common Market and currency would be doomed to fall apart. Consequently,
the states have maintained their own national security processes in all policy fields where national
policies do not directly threaten to make the Common Market and the EMU dysfunctional.
The third column indicates if the policies are utilised to counteract threats to the referent ob-
jects described in the first column. The defence against external commercial threats is of special
interest, because this is where the deviations are found. The first four policies (1, 2a, 2b and 3)
constitute what one might call the EC's international competition policies. The main difference
to the internal competition policy is that the external one is conducted within the institutional-
ised framework of the WTO. Consequently, the EC security process is embedded in another one
at an even higher level. This is why these EC policies cannot be utilised as power politics in the
fashion suggested by geo-economics. European technical standards are not utilised to protect
domestic production against external commercial threats. If one wishes, these can be regarded as
security policies in an insurance or health context, but hardly in an economic one, that puts the
stability and performance of the economic system in the centre of the analysis. With the excep-
tion of export subsidies, which are decreasingly applied, European subsidies are not utilised to
protect or enhance the competitiveness of domestic products within or outside the EU. Apart
from those financed by the structural and cohesion funds, EC subsidies have not been intro-
duced to protect any of the secondary referent objects considered in this chapter. The subsidies
can certainly affect the secondary referent objects, but they should not be understood or ex-
plained as economic security instruments (exemptions as described). As for the Union's tariff
concessions and aid policy, they are only moderately utilised to defend universal values outside of
the EU area. With the exception of the two special arrangements (linked to labour rights and
sustainable management of tropical forests) incentive conditionality is not utilised at all. Punitive
conditionality, in contrast, is usually included in all tariff and aid agreements. However, just like
sanctions, they are applied in a very inconsistent way. Economic sanctions represent the only
                                                          
157 As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, this is so because the threat cannot always be identified, i.e. what it is that affects the secondary
referent object. Security policies are therefore often designed to counterbalance the identified effect instead of counteracting the threat directly.
This is additionally complicated by the fact that a policy that serves to protect one secondary referent object, may have negative influence and
threaten another secondary referent object.
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consensual security policy. But, since EC sanctions depend on a CFSP decision and usually are
applied in combination with other penalising measures, sanctions can be regarded as the point
where security processes of the economic and other contexts blend. The external economic EC
policies are led by the principle of an open market economy with free competition (with the
exemption of the agriculture and the textile sector). In the external dimension this is more or less
applied as a panacea and as a universal value of its own.
The Euro deserves special attention because it has both a practical and symbolic function as
referent object. As common currency, it combines the Euro-countries to a single economic area
in a more perceivable way than any other single feature of the EC. In addition, the price stability
is the only European referent object for which an objectified and therefore controllable goal has
been formulated. Reports on the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar and other currencies also give a
daily indication of the performance of the European economy. The Swedish and the British non-
membership in the third stage of the EMU are therefore particularly important from an ESDI
perspective.158 Although this may change once referendums have been held in the two countries,
the non-participation impedes significantly on the idea of a shared European economic system
and of an indivisible economic security.
The Community has definitely established a common economic system and it actively seeks to
protect its stability and performance from internal or external economic threats. All things con-
sidered, a mixture of an autonomous and semi-autonomous ESDI has been established in the
economic context.
                                                          
158 The Danish non-membership does not really curtail on the ESDI since Denmark participates in the EMR II.
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3.3 Criminal Context
Criminal threats and their relation to the SDI may require some clarification. This section be-
gins by specifying what criminal threats are, how they are linked to the collective identity and
how they affect a community's security.
Crime, law, identity and threat. Dictionaries define the term crime as an act "…punishable by
law, as being forbidden by statute or injurious to the public welfare,”1 or as an act "…committed
or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it and for which punishment is im-
posed upon conviction.”2 This does not mean that the violation of any law is a criminal act. The
legislation and the judicial system in the western world make a differentiation between criminal
and civil law. Criminal cases involve prosecution by the government of a person for an unaccept-
able act that the state has defined as punishable by law. Thus, the community defines all poten-
tial conduct that it regards as threatening in advance in the form of criminal law. Criminal law
defines the relation between the community (state) and the individual.3 Therefore, the state ini-
tiates the investigation and suit. Persons convicted of a crime may be incarcerated, fined, or both.
Civil law, on the other hand, regulates the relationships among the community's individuals
and/or legal persons. Civil cases are not concerned with behaviour that is unacceptable to the
community. Instead, individuals and organisations seek to resolve legal disputes among them-
selves. Here, the victim brings the suit. Real or legal persons found liable in a civil case may have
to give up property and/or pay money. But, they are not being punished by the state and thus
neither fined nor incarcerated. This is so, because civil cases are not concerned with the relation-
ship between the community (state) and the individual.4 Hence, the counterpart to crime is not
any law, but criminal law.
Criminal laws simultaneously reflect and influence the general norms and values of the society
and, thus, of the collective identity.5 At least they can be expected to do so in democracies.6 On
the one hand, criminal law reflects the identity, as it determines what behaviour the society re-
gards as intolerable. In democracies, criminal law does neither deviate too much from the moral
understanding and the norms of the people, nor can it allow for actions that people in general
regard as unmoral and unacceptable. In this sense, criminal law is derived from societal moral
and reflects the collective identity. On the other hand, criminal law influences the identity
through its rectifying function. Defining and fighting crime does not only serve to regulate inter-
societal relations, it also plays a vital role in the production and reproduction of uniformity, i.e.
of the society's setting of moral and norms and thus of the collective identity. Criminal law ob-
jectifies the moral and norms that are in effect in the society. In other words, criminal law pre-
scribes what norms and values are given general validity within the nation state, both in space
(throughout the state's territory) and in time (until they are changed). Therefore, criminal law
                                                          
1 The Oxford English Dictionary Online. Available at: http://dictionary.oed.com
2 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
3 Despite of this, measures have been taken, not at least at the level of the European Union, that foresee responsibility of legal persons for criminal
acts. See for example article 3 of the Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, (OJ
C 221, 19.07.1997); article 3 of Joint Action of 21 December 1998 on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in
the Member States of the European Union (98/773/JHA); and article 8 of the Framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by
criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the Euro (2000/383/JHA).
4 Legal Information Institute. http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/criminal.html
5 For a closer discussion on the relation between law and identity, see Burgess, Peter, 'Law and Cultural Identity', Arena working Paper, no. 14,
1997.
6 Not that democracy is a prerequisite for this, but, while the laws in all democratic systems can be expected to reflect and influence the collective
identity, the laws in undemocratic systems can only be expected to do so if the people regard the ruling elite and their governance as legitimate.
Since a democratically elected government's remaining at power depends on the people's approval, it cannot govern in its own or its clientele's
interest alone, but must comply to, or at least not deviate too much from, the interest of the governed people.
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offers a uniform, standardised setting of codified moral and norms that can be internalised.
Through its enforcement, criminal law maintains these norms and values, and the collective
identity. In this sense, the moral applied is derived from what the law prescribes.7 Hence, crimi-
nal law and its enforcement are not separated from, but rather a vital part of the (re)production
of the collective identity.
Crime and SDI. As criminal law defines what behaviour is unacceptable and intolerable, it also
delineates what behaviour is regarded as a threat to the community, its norms and its identity. A
violation of criminal law is always a threat, i.e. a criminal threat. When a crime is committed, it
does not only affect the victim directly (for instance a person who has been exposed to physical
violence, burglary etc.), but also the society/state. This is why the state, not the individual victim,
acts as aggrieved party and plaintive in criminal cases. From the perspective of the state, crime
can be regarded as a threat to three different referent objects:
First, the specific law broken is a referent object, and with it, the particular norms and values it
represents. Second, crime threatens the validity of the principle of rule of law. It is difficult to
say, when the principle of rule of law endangered. In principle, every crime challenges this prin-
ciple by disregarding the validity of a specific law. It would, however, be exaggerated to claim
that a single crime overthrows the rule of law altogether. Surely, the principle is suspended at the
specific point in time and space when the crime is committed. However, it can be restored and
defended through the prosecution and punishment of the criminal. Single offences do neither
threaten the collective identity as such, nor its production and reproduction. Rather than being
suspended by a single event, the principle of rule of law can be said to erode gradually. The rea-
son for this is that its validity and invalidity obviously varies in time and space. What can be said
with certainty is that the government's legislation will cease to represent a set of generally bind-
ing rules if the law is not defended continuously. As long as criminals have reason to fear justice,
and the apparatus of law enforcement has a deterrent effect on criminal activity, the rule of law is
effective (at least it has some effect). When justice gradually loses its deterrent function, it also
loses its ability to enforce compliance and uniformity. This does not only mean that crime is
merely prevented by the applied moral, but also that this moral threatens to decay since the soci-
ety has lost the means by which it can maintain the moral uniform, namely by standardised col-
lective coercion. On the way to this stage, the third referent object is affected, the government's
ability to govern. This can be clarified by arguing with organised crime, which is the most serious
form of crime seen from the society's perspective.
Organised crime continuously and systematically challenges the rectifying function of the legal
body more than any other form of crime. It also poses the major threat to the second and third
referent objects mentioned above, since it can offer and impose an own regulatory system that
competes with the one enacted by the state. When this happens, organised crime becomes a seri-
ous threat to the community as such and thereby to the collective identity. Organised crime tar-
gets the basis of the community as it prevents it from producing and implementing collectively
binding decisions on society's behalf. With its own rules concerning the use of physical violence,
corruption, intimidation and extortion, organised crime challenges the states supremacy and
                                                          
7 This can be clarified by an experience that everybody has made. We have all been in a situation, where we have replaced the informal moral and
personal responsibility by the moral codified in law. This is the case when we start to legitimise our actions with reference to legality instead of to
some kind of internalised societal moral. -'Since it is not illegal, it is OK to do this'.
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creates a system within or beside the state. Organised crime does not only neglect the law and
place outside of the legal framework, it also uses and demands the state's services when it serves
the organisation's interests, and can even achieve to manipulate and subordinate state activities to
its own demands and interests.
Hence, crime, and in particular organised crime, threatens the existing society as it challenges
the norms and values that constitute the democratic society's collective identity. By changing
how, by whom, and in who's interest effective rules are defined, crime threatens the process in
which the Community's collective identity is produced and reproduced, namely that part which
consists of the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws. In addition, crime changes the eco-
nomic life fundamentally. Using illegal means, crime abolishes the principle of the market and
changes the mechanisms for attaining ownership. It is likely to drive out legitimate enterprises
and deter investments. This will have negative effects on the productivity and result in a decrease
of tax yield, both of which make a macro economic management more difficult.8 Thus, at the
same time as crime threatens the contents of the collective identity (moral, norms, allocation
mechanisms etc.) it also undermines the foundation for the state's ability to enforce laws and
maintain the system. Dysfunctional law enforcement is likely to shatter the confidence in central
mechanisms of the state's system. With an undermined authority, the state as such and/or the
democratic system may lose legitimacy. This means that the state loses its ability to govern, and
with it the function as central rectifying institution and the role as security guarantor. This can
cause a collapse at the macro level that can make the life unbearable at the micro level.9 To-
gether, these mutually reinforcing developments can result in decay of the society and a
reformulation and reorganisation of the collective identity(ies) altogether.
Enforcing the rule of law and fighting crime, in particular organised crime, is therefore directly
linked to the defence and the maintenance of the existing society and thus of the collective iden-
tity. Crime, and especially organised crime, simultaneously threatens the legal, political and the
economic systems, and therefore the foundation of a societies' collective identity.
International cooperation. International cooperation in the fight against crime has become a
necessity as criminals move across borders and crime operates internationally. Since criminals can
travel between countries, states depend on the co-operation of other states in their struggle to
defend the rule of law. Criminals could use other countries as 'safe havens' if they would not
have to fear extradition or prosecution. Without a cross border judicial co-operation, and an
efficient apparatus for law enforcement on both sides of the border, criminal activity would be
made easier. This would certainly undermine the deterrent function of the law enforcement
agencies in the state where a crime is committed. In addition, the geographical area of criminal
activities does not follow country borders. Organised crime makes up a large proportion of the
transnationally operating crime, which makes the international cooperation necessary in the first
place. Organised crime has access to, and uses, the same facilities that enable legal businesses to
operate internationally. Criminal activities in one country may even be led and controlled from a
centre based in another country. To catch the leading figures and eliminate such criminal rings
states must co-operate. Purely national operations would only interrupt, not stop, criminal ac-
                                                          
8 Godson, Roy and Williams, Philip, 'Strengthening Cooperation Against Transnational Crime', Survival, vol. 40, no. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 66-
88, here p. 69.
9 See Ohlemacher 2002:68.
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tivities led from another country. Consequently, the decay of the legal system in one country is a
concern for the affected as well as for the surrounding states.10 Such a development can affect the
stability and security of an entire region, as crime can operate freely from that lawless area. Due
to transborder crime and its international repercussion the distinction between internal and ex-
ternal criminal threats is blurred.11 This is why states have addressed the issue of transnational
crime both on a bilateral level and various international forums (UN, Council of Europe, EU,
G8, and OECD). They have also created common institutions for the purpose of crime fighting
(e.g. Interpol and Europol).
However, states do not only support each other in the fight against crime. Sometimes, it is dif-
ficult to disentangle internationally organised crime and state activities. On the one hand, this
results from governmental involvement in organised crime. Some states support criminal organi-
sations and activities in other states.12 On the other hand, it results from the involvement of or-
ganised crime in governance. In crisis regions where the rule of law has collapsed, the armed de
facto authority often gets involved in criminal activities inside and outside the own territory. The
differentiation between military threats and criminal threats can also be rather indistinct.13 When
freedom fighters turn into organised criminals, military and criminal threats blend. Organised
crime also tends to be involved when states obtain weapons illegally. The proliferation of weap-
ons of mass-destruction is particularly serious in this context. On the one hand, the same ac-
tor/organisation can simultaneously pose military and criminal threats.14 On the other hand, the
same institutions, procedures and instruments are used to counter both threats. The military
apparatus, for instance, is operating in a policing mode in crisis areas, restoring order and some
times even targeting groups that can be described as criminal organisations. Finally, it can also be
difficult to separate internal criminal threats from external ones. That transnationally operating
crime makes this distinction impossible is one of the main reasons for the international co-
operation in combating crime.
SELECTING ORGANISATION
When searching for a European organisation that encompasses a security process aiming at
counteracting criminal threats the choice falls on the European Union, which has adopted the
goal to establish an area of freedom, security and justice to accompany the creation of the single
market.15 The Council of Europe Conventions are of greatest importance and will continue to
serve as 'mother conventions' for many EU agreements.16 Nevertheless, the centre of gravity and
the dynamics of the international fight against crime are located to the Union and its so-called
"co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs” (JHA). The creation of the Common
Market and the abolition of internal borders have increased the opportunities for both legal and
                                                          
10 Godson and Williams 1998: 67.
11 Alain, Marc, 'Transnational Police Cooperation in Europe and in North America: Revisiting the Traditional Border Between internal and
External Security Matters, or How Policing in Being Globalized', European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 9/2,
2001, pp. 113-129, here p. 117.
12 History is also full of examples where states operated within the territory of another state, without considering the effective laws of that coun-
try. This is a natural part of the task of national intelligence services. It is quite obvious that the activity of spying often is connected to illegal
activities. But states can also support more aggressive activities. The linkage between the Hizbullah and Iran, or the Lockerbie attack and Libya,
may serve as examples.
13 Peter Andreas and Richard Price describe this indistinctiveness by stating that the differentiation between military and criminal threats is
gradually being reshaped. See Andreas, Peter and Price, Richard 2001, 'From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American
National Security State', in International Studies Review, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pp.31-52.
14 Economic threats are not entered as an additional form of threat here. As pointed out above, criminal and military activities can affect and
threaten the economy. The economic dimension can therefore be said to be included within the two.
15 article 61 ECT. Preamble and article 2 TEU.
16 Schomburg, Wolfgang, 'Are we on the Road to a European Law enforcement Area? International Cooperation in Criminal Matters. What
Place for Justice?', in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol 8/1, 2000, pp, 51-60, here p. 54.
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illegal cross-border activities within the EU. Therefore, the integration process has been accom-
panied by compensatory measures including a more far-reaching co-operation in fighting crime
than in any other European organisation. The EU has not only incorporated conventions con-
cluded in the framework of other organisations. The member states have also surpassed this by
completing own agreements and by harmonising their criminal laws and procedural standards.
In addition, the EU is the only European organisation that has founded common institutions
that are active in the operational dimension of the fight against crime.
This chapter focuses on the co-operation between European governments and law enforcement
agencies in their attempt to fight crime within the EU and the Schengen area. From a European
perspective, this cooperation can be regarded as directed against internal threats. Concerning the
external threats it focuses on the efforts made to control the common external borders. Opera-
tions in crisis regions OOA conducted by European military or police units have already been
dealt with in the section of military threats and are therefore not treated again at this place.17
Illegal immigration forms a part of criminal threats, because it is directly linked to criminal law.18
Given the freedom of movement within the EU, illegal migration would best be classified as
external threats. Since the EU is the only European organisation that regulates migratory flows
by common law and the only one that has set itself the goal to conducts a common asylum and
immigration policy, the choice to focus on the EU is self-evident in this area.
3.3.1 Category polity and politics – Organisation and Authority
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The aim of this section is to explore what kind of ESDI is reflected in the EU security proc-
esses in the criminal context, and to what extent it is reflected. This investigation must scrutinise
how criminal threats are defined at the European level, as well as how they are counteracted.
Just as at the national level, there are two ways of defining criminal threats at the European
level. First, there is a political dimension, in which what is to be regarded as a crime is formalised
and objectified in a legal definition. Second, there is a judicial dimension, concerned with the
interpretation, application and compliance of the defined rules. Here, decisions on how the
common definition of criminal law is to be interpreted are taken, as well as whether a particular
case can be defined as a crime. Within this political and judicial dimension the following main
aspects are of interest for the ESDI:
- At what level are crimes (criminal threats) or the legal immigration (non-migratory threats)
defined by laws?
                                                          
17 The main objective why armed military forces are used in a policing mode within crisis and conflict management operations is that they can
resist military, paramilitary or other armed aggressors. Thus, in first line they can be said to counteract threats from military formations using
military equipment. This is also the case if they are confronted with local criminal organisations.
18 See further in section 3.3.1.2 Regulating immigration on page 157.
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- What legislative instruments are used at the European level when deciding on common defi-
nitions of criminal threats and on collective countermeasures? How are these agreed upon?
- How is the compliance to the European rules controlled? What instance decides how defini-
tions of criminal law are to be interpreted within the European Union? What role does the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) have and what is its relation to national courts?
As for the operational dimension of criminal threats, EU initiatives to counteract crime are of
interest for the ESDI. European co-operation has been established in areas such as resources for
analysis (intelligence), databases, police co-operation and judicial co-operation. These initiatives
must be examined with regards to what areas they cover (and do not cover), how they function
and how they can be used.
As will be shown, migratory threats have some specific characteristics and differ from ordinary
criminal threats. Therefore, I have chosen to examine migratory threats separately from other
criminal threats in this section. This separation is also made within the EU, which treats the
migration policy in the first pillar and the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in
the third pillar. The first part of the survey is therefore concerned with what one might call 'or-
dinary' crime (3.3.1.1), and the second part with migratory threats (3.3.1.2).
3.3.1.1 Defining and Fighting Crime within the EU (internal threats)
A common definition of what constitutes a crime, i.e. what is to be fought, is the basis and a
prerequisite for all cooperation aiming at fighting crime. To this end, one must begin by an ac-
cord on how common definitions can be determined. The participants must agree on the proce-
dures of negotiations and the form in which the common definitions of crimes and criminal
threats shall be given. Once this has been done and common definitions have been found, the
law enforcement agencies can commence to discuss how to cooperate in practice and start fight-
ing crime together. This section seeks to reflect that chronological order.
 POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL DIMENSION: DEFINING CRIME AND CRIMINAL THREATS
What constitutes a crime and by what means it can be prosecuted is defined by law. Fighting
crime at the national level is therefore 'merely' confronted with the difficulty to detect criminal
activities, collect evidence as well as to arrest and convict criminals. When several states attempt
to join forces in the fight against crime, things become more complicated. First, they have to
have the same opinion about what constitutes a crime. States cannot start to combat crime to-
gether without a common understanding of what is to be fought, i.e. what behaviour is unac-
ceptable and criminal. This is defined by substantive (or material) criminal law. In order to make
full use of the cooperation, it may also be necessary to agree on procedures for fighting crime.
This is defined by so called procedural law. It may for instance matter how evidence is collected.
Depending on the legal system in which a trial is held, one country's courts may allow for certain
evidence, while others rejects it.19
Theoretically, there are two ways of achieving the required harmonisation of substantive
criminal law and procedural law. Either the different nation states co-operate and approximate
their laws on an intergovernmental basis, or they get together in a supranational organisation,
                                                          
19 See Tak, Peter, 'Bottlenecks in International Police and Judicial Cooperations in the EU', European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice, vol. 8/4, 2000, p. 343-360, here from p.348-353.
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which enacts common laws that define crimes and determine how they are to be prosecuted. In
practice the latter is not an option, since criminal law and criminal procedure have remained in
the nation-state's exclusive competency. No European country has transferred the sovereign right
to an international institution that would give it the competence to set supranational criminal
law. The supranational European Communities do not even have this competency.20 No collec-
tive definition of crime formulated in EU/EC legislation has the status of criminal law. Formally,
what constitutes a crime is, thus, defined at the national level alone. This does not prevent states
from interacting with each other and to harmonise their laws on an intergovernmental basis.
They may for instance draw up and sign international conventions that include common defini-
tions of certain crimes and address how they are to be fought. However, strictly speaking, 'Euro-
pean criminal law' does not exist as direct binding law. It is rather a generic term under which
the European criminal law developments that affect the national criminal law are gathered.21
Whatever common definitions of criminal law and procedural law the sovereign states agree
upon must therefore be converted into national criminal law. Initially the question of at what
level crimes are being defined by laws is therefore easy to answer. Only states have the authority
to enact valid criminal and procedural law.
DEFINING CRIMINAL THREATS IN THE THIRD PILLAR.
The national sovereignty in the sphere of criminal law is reflected in the structure of the EU.
With a few exceptions, which will be returned to later, the judicial and police cooperation in
criminal matters is located to the intergovernmental third pillar. Here the Council adopts all
collective definitions of crimes and criminal threats unanimously.22 In contrast to the second
pillar, the third pillar does not allow for a constructive abstention. Although this may obstruct
the decision-making in some cases, this rule can be advantageous in the long run. The mecha-
nism of constructive abstention can be practical when deciding on single ad hoc measures that
concern the relation to third parties. Applying it to regulate matters that concern the internal
European relations in a more or less permanent way, however, could be damaging. Sticking to
the rule of consensus hinders the legal fragmentation from being internalised into the EU legis-
lation. Including the constructive abstention could lessen the incentive to reach consensus, end
up in a European Union à la carte and result in more diversity rather than harmonisation. This
would complicate future cooperation.
Thus, all common definitions of crimes and criminal threats result from a consensual security
process.23
THE FIRST PILLAR – CRIMINAL LAW IN DISGUISE
At first sight, the separation between the first and the third pillars appears to be straightforward
and clean. But, before dismissing the first pillar as completely negligible for the definition of
                                                          
20 Ligeti, Katalin, 'European Criminal Law: Administrative and Criminal Sanctions as Means of Enforcing Community Law', Acta Juridica
Hungarica, vol 41, no. 3-4, 2000, pp 199-212, here p. 201.
21 Albrecht, Peter-Alexis and Braun, Stefan, 'Deficiencies in the Development of European Criminal law', European Law Journal, vol. 5, no. 3.
September 1999, pp. 293-310, here p. 297.
22 When the treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999, the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the
States of the Benelux economic union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their
common borders was incorporated into the European Union Framework under title IV of the ECT (Visas, asylum, immigration and other
policies related to free movement of persons) and title VI of the TEU (Provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) police
and judicial cooperation). At the same time, the Executive Committee created under the Schengen agreement was replaced by the Council. The
Council is therefore the only political decision-making body within the EU framework that deals with criminal matters.
23 The only exception from the rule of consensus is when the Council adopts measures implementing Decisions and Conventions. It does so with
qualified majority respectively a majority of two-thirds of votes. This does however not concern the definition of criminal threats.
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crimes and criminal threats, one should explore how its legal instruments affect the endorsement
of criminal law.
To begin with, one could expect the EC to have the ability to influence the national endorse-
ment of criminal law indirectly. According to chapter three of the Amsterdam treaty, the Coun-
cil can issue directives for the harmonisation of national legal provisions if this is necessary for
the establishment and correct functioning of the internal market. Some directives suggest that
criminal law can be a part of this market harmonisation process. The money laundering24 and
the insider dealing25 directives may serve as examples. Both directives indirectly called national
legislators to criminalise and penalise certain activities, defined by the Community, which were
infringing Community legislation.26 However, it seems quite clear that no legal binding obliga-
tion to enact any criminal legislation would arise from the directives for any member state.27 This
provision would otherwise give the Community the ability to extend its own competency be-
yond the field explicitly given to it in the Treaty of Amsterdam (or the Treaty of Nice).
Second, direct applicable EC regulations can themselves function like criminal law in the sense
that they have punitive affect. The EC can apply sanctions against actors that infringe or misuse
the provisions laid down in some of its regulations. Such regulations are widely used to protect
the EU budget from misuses, especially in matters concerning EU subsidies or grants. Within the
agriculture policy, for instance, unjustified use of subsidies and grant payments are not only
neutralised through restitution, but also penalised through surcharges, reduction of payment
claims and withdrawal of benefits to the disadvantage of the person who unjustly received a sub-
sidy.28 Competition29 and the protection of the European Communities financial interests30 are
other examples of areas where penalties are imposed based on direct applicable EC regulations. It
must however be underlined that these regulations and the imposed punishments are not classi-
fied as criminal law and criminal sanctions. Officially, the penalties are presented as administra-
tive penalties or fines.31 This technical differentiation can be made since they are not imposed by
the judiciary or limited to natural persons, nor do they include the option of imprisonment.
Nevertheless, administrative penalties are assimilated to and are bound to the same safeguards as
criminal law. They are bound to the general principle of equity, proportionality and to the prin-
ciples of 'ne bis in idem' and 'nulla poena sine lega'.32 Moreover, the regulations and their en-
forcement are directed against activities that are covered by criminal law in the member states.
                                                          
24 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. (OJ L
166, 28.06.1991, p. 77 – 83.). Amended by Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001. (OJ L
344, 28.12.2001).
25 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing. OJ L 334, 18.11.1989, p. 30 –32.
26 The directives do not make any explicit reference to an obligation of the member states for enacting penal provisions, although reference is
made explicitly to such measures. Nevertheless, in the German version of the attachment to the directive on money laundering, the representa-
tives of the Governments of the member states obliged themselves ('verpflichten sich') to enact the necessary criminal legislation. Other examples
of EC legislation that suggest a criminalization of certain activities are: Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering (see article 2). Amended by Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 4 December 2001; Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons
(see article 16); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods. According to article 9 "Each
Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of the provisions of this Regulation. The penalties shall be sufficient to
promote compliance with those provisions”; Council Directive 92/109/EEC of 14 December 1992 on the manufacture and the placing on the
market of certain substances used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (see article 8); More recent examples
are: The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law.
Commission proposal COM (2001) 139 final (see article 3 and 4); The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the criminal-law protection of the Community's financial interests. Commission proposal COM (2001) 272 final.
27 Albrecht 1999: 302; Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., 'The Development towards Harmonization within Criminal Law in the European Union – A Citi-
zen's Perspective', European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 9/4, 2001, pp 239–263, here p. 248.
28 As for the CAP, this practice is justified with article 34 (2) ECT. See Albrecht 1999: 300.
29 Based on article 83 (2a) ECT.
30 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests. OJ
L 312, 23.12.1995. This regulation is based on article 308 ECT.
31 C.f. article 1 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995. The ECJ has also presented them in this way. C.f.
Kaiafa-Gbandi 2001:245.
32 The former describes the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence. Although this principle
appears clear, it may be difficult to define what is understood by 'idem' -'the same facts' or 'the same case'. The latter states that no punishment
can be imposed unless a criminal law has made provision for it in advance.
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The purpose and effect of the supranational law enforcement and the administrative fines are
therefore directly directed against what can be labelled criminal activities and they form part of
the fight against crime. Most interesting is that the EC has developed an own system of admin-
istrative penalties and law enforcement to protect its own interests. In a way, this is a crime
fighting apparatus in disguise. The EC does no longer rely on the member states judiciary to
enforce its own legislation and to protect its interests against criminal activities. I will return to
this supranational law enforcement below when examining the operational dimension.
Finally, community law sets certain limits to what the member states can define as a criminal
threat and a crime.33 Community legislation encroaches on national criminal law. The ECJ can
neutralise domestic criminal law provisions and declare them inapplicable if they contradict
Community law, e.g. the four freedoms.34 It must however be underlined, that this is not the
same as a common definition of criminal threats. In this sense, the EC legislation does not pre-
scribe the definition of any criminal law. It merely exempts certain activities from criminalisation
and determines what may not be defined as a criminal threat.
JUDICIAL DIMENSION: INTERPRETATION AND CONTROL OF COMPLIANCE
An examination of how the judicial interpretation of single cases is organised and how the
compliance to the collective European definitions is controlled completes the survey of common
European definitions of crimes and criminal threats.
The jurisdiction in single criminal matters is reserved exclusively to national courts. Thus,
whether or not the evidence presented in a case is enough to lead to a conviction and a punish-
ment lies in the full competency of national courts.35
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Figure 3.3- 1.  ECJ jurisdiction in 'ordinary' criminal and
administrative matters
As for the first pillar, parties penalised by administrative fines following EC legislation can ap-
peal to the ECJ. The ECJ has also been assigned the responsibility to decide on the interpreta-
tion of binding decisions taken under Title VI EUT (Provisions on police and judicial coopera-
                                                          
33 This has been shown in the ECJ Case C-203/80 Casati (Guerrino), (Criminal Proceedings Against) [1981] ECR 2595, [1982] 1 CMLR 365,
2618.
34 Katalin Ligeti 2000: 200.
35 The two exceptions from this rule, the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia can be
excluded from this study. This is not because the jurisdiction of these UN courts is limited to what is labelled as the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The main reason is that none of them represents or forms part of what might be seen as a
judicial system with a European scope. The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted on 17 July 1998 at the United
Nations Conference in Rome and entered into force on 1 July 2002. The Court's jurisdiction is limited to states that become a Party to the
Statute and only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute. The ICC has jurisdiction with respect to crimes of
genocide, against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression (The Statute of the International Criminal Court article 5-8). The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council resolution 827. This resolution was passed on 25 May
1993. The Tribunal is unique in the sense that it has not been conferred its powers by the concerned state (neither by Yugoslavia or its successor
states) but by the Security Council. This means that the International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. Since the Security
Council adopted the statute, it defined both the criminal law and the courts jurisdiction. Hence, there is such a thing as international criminal
law. However, this will never apply to the permanent members of the Security Council against their will. The ICTY has the power to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violating the laws or customs of
war, committing genocide and crimes against the civilian population.
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tion in criminal matters – Pillar 3) and on the compliance of national legislation.36 The jurisdic-
tion of the ECJ varies depending on what legally binding instrument has been applied.
Title VI of the EU Treaty foresees three different ones: framework decisions, decisions and
conventions.37 Framework decisions function as the directives of the first pillar. They are applied
for the purpose of approximation of national laws and regulations, and are binding to the mem-
ber states as to the result to be achieved, while leaving the member states' authorities the choice
of form and method. Consequently, they do not entail direct effect. Decisions can be adopted
for any purpose in the policy field of the third pillar, except for those concerned with the ap-
proximation of the laws and regulations of the member states. Decisions are binding but explic-
itly do not entail direct effect. The Council adopts both Framework decisions and Decisions
unanimously. In contrast, the Council cannot adopt Conventions. It can only unanimously
adopt the text of a Convention that it recommends to the member states for adoption in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional requirements.
The Court has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between member states regarding the inter-
pretation or application of the measures adopted and on any dispute between member states and
the Commission about the interpretation or application of conventions established under the
third pillar.38 Thus, the Commission can only take a case regarding the interpretation of con-
ventions to the ECJ. It has not legal means to dispute a member state's lacking compliance to a
framework decision or decision. Only member states can take each other to the ECJ for this rea-
son, and only if the dispute cannot be settled in the Council within six months. Since member
states do not tend to accuse each other in front of the ECJ, this legal instrument is hardly ever
applied. Furthermore, the ECJ reviews the legality of framework decisions or decisions brought
before it by member states or the Commission. The ECJ can also annul these provisions.39 Fi-
nally, the ECJ can give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework deci-
sions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established under title VI EUT, and on
the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them. However, this only applies
to those member states that have made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.40
Until present, all member states but Denmark, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom made
such declarations.41
OPERATIONAL DIMENSION: COUNTERACTING CRIME
The fight against and the prosecution of cross-border crimes is the major challenge of the third
pillar. The main problem seems to be that the European criminal law enforcement area is still
too fragmented. Together the 15 member states have more than 120 police forces, dozens of
separate legal jurisdictions, and a multitude of different judicial and policing traditions.42 Cross-
border crime is still counteracted by national police and judicial authorities that are empowered
to act on their own territory only.43 Clearly, this complicates the fight against crime. The neces-
sity to make the mosaic of criminal-law systems more efficient and less complex is obvious.
                                                          
36 Article 35 TEU.
37 Article 34 TEU. In the version of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Council could adopt joint positions, joint action and draw up conventions.
38 Article 35(7) TEU.
39 Article 35(6) TEU.
40 Article 35(1 and 2) TEU.
41 Information concerning the state of the declarations concerning acceptance has been published in OJ C 120, 01.05.1999, p. 24.
42 See Hall, Ben and Bhatt, Ashish, Policing Europe, EU justice and home affairs cooperation, London 1999, p. 28.
43 Exceptions to this are cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits regulated in bilateral agreements based on article 40 and article 41 of the
Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.
(Schengen Convention) (OJ L 239, 22.09.2000, p. 19-62).
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A basic difficulty consists of determining under what country's jurisdiction a case falls. Per
definition, cross-border crime stretches over several states. Thus, conflicting claims of jurisdiction
or a conflicting disclaimer of jurisdiction can occur between the concerned states. However, this
seems to be a minor problem. The major obstacle hindering an efficient management of
"Europe's single market in crime”44 is that responsible national authorities depend on legal assis-
tance from other states. The information and evidence that can lead to a conviction is to be
found and must be collected in different states. Thus, an efficient prosecution requires a well-
organised co-ordination of, and co-operation between, national investigations. Given that every
member state has its own particular laws and institutional system for law enforcement it is not
surprising that this involves both legal and considerable practical difficulties.
Figure 3.3- 2.  Vertical and horizontal assistance
There are two basic strategies to make the European fight against crime more efficient. The
member states can either build a system of vertical judicial assistance and police cooperation or
seek ways to improve the horizontal co-ordination. Both of them can include the creation of
European bodies. In the case of vertical assistance, certain authority is transferred from the na-
tional agencies to the European one (autonomous), or the European body is given competencies
that are complementary to those of national authorities (semi-autonomous). In the case of the
horizontal co-ordination, in contrast, the responsibility to fight crime fully remains at the na-
tional level. Here the aim of European initiatives is to improve the effectiveness and co-operation
of the competent national authorities. If any collective bodies are set up, they merely render
services to the national authorities, without having any own authority to influence the fight
against crime
VERTICAL ASSISTANCE AND SUPRANATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT- FIRST PILLAR
The strategy of vertical assistance is much more ambitious from an ESDI perspective. Here the
responsibility for the coordination of national investigations and operations is lifted up to the
European level and given to a European institution. The advantage of this system is that the
different national agencies only have to deal with one central point of contact in all cross-border
crime cases of a certain type. Instead of contacting and cooperating with a multitude of foreign
agencies with different procedural rules, each state only has to define its relation to the European
agency. This allows national agencies to focus on the contents of the information they submit
instead of finding out which specific foreign agency X is responsible in country Y and what spe-
cial procedural rules Z must be respected when dealing with them. By giving a European agency
the responsibility and authority to lead the investigation and prosecution of cross-border crime,
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the information flow could be simplified and thus accelerated. A central agency would also do
away with the problem of competing, partial or non-existent investigations and proceedings
within the Union.45 In addition, a central European agency could gain an overall picture of
cross-border crime, have a better chance to detect linkages between different criminal activities
and be well suited to lead the fight against organised crime.
However, for two main reasons the system of vertical assistance is difficult to establish. The
first problem concerns the need for a common substantial criminal law. It is only feasible for a
central European agency to take action against activities that are deemed as criminal in all mem-
ber states. As shown above, such harmonisation can be difficult to establish and will forcefully be
restricted to a limited field of criminal activities. The second difficulty concerns the relationship
between European and national agencies. This is not primarily about the formalities of how na-
tional authorities shall submit information to the European agency, but rather the communica-
tion in the reverse direction. Member states have to determine the European agency's authority,
i.e. its ability to instruct and lead investigations and/or its ability to conduct its own investiga-
tions on their territory. It is difficult to see a European agency emerge, that has the competency
to order and lead investigations and operations in the member states, be it with European offi-
cers or by ordering the local authorities. These two reasons set clear limits to the 'federalisation'
of investigations, prosecution and law enforcement. It is not surprising, that the only two exam-
ples that fall within the category of vertical assistance are to be found within the first pillar and
are restricted to the protection of a referent object that can easily be identified as a European one
- the Union's financial interests. Since this area primarily is of a European and not of national
concern, it has also been easier for the member states to agree on the substantial law for its pro-
tection.
As with other laws, the compliance with EC legislation is controlled, and violations counter-
acted with punitive sanctions. The EC has built up own institutions to control that its rules are
obeyed and to penalise those who break them. The Commission's function in the competition
policy has already been addressed. The Court of Auditors is another well-known body involved
in the control of compliance of the rules. However, it merely examines whether all revenue has
been received and all expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner and whether the fi-
nancial management has been sound.46 It reports irregularities to European Parliament and the
Council, and notifies the institutions concerned about its findings.47 The Court of Auditors is
not responsible for conducting further investigations of irregular acts likely to lead to adminis-
trative, penal or criminal proceedings. This task has been confided to the European Anti-fraud
Office (OLAF), which is the first example to be examined. It goes beyond the concept of vertical
assistance, representing a form of supranational law enforcement, but is formally excluded from
criminal proceedings and may only conduct administrative investigations. The second example
that will be scrutinised has been discussed for some time, but without being put into action, the
European public prosecutor.
                                                          
45 Additional Commission contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms of 29 September 2000, The criminal
protection of the Community's financial interests: a European Prosecutor, COM (2000) 608. Printed in Annex 1 to the Green Paper on crimi-
nal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715 final, p. 77-
86, here p. 78.
46 Article 248(2) ECT.
47 According to article 248 (1 and 4) ECT, all these reports are to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
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Europen Anti-fraud Office. OLAF is the investigation unit of the Community, exercising the
powers of investigation conferred on the Commission by the Community rules, regulations and
agreements.48. The administrative investigations conducted by the office aim at revealing illegal
activity affecting the financial interests of the European Communities. This basically covers any
infringement of a provision of Community law that has or would have the effect of prejudicing
the general budget of the Community or budgets managed by it.49 In other words, it includes
any fraud against the Community budget. With a budget of nearly   40 million50 and a foreseen
staff of 300,51 OLAF conducts internal investigations within the Communities' own institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies, as well as external investigations in the form of on-the-spot inspec-
tions and checks of economic operators52 in the member states and in some third countries.53 In
all member states, OLAF inspectors carry out on-the-spot checks of economic operators under
the same conditions as national administrative inspectors and in compliance with national legis-
lation. If the national authorities so whish, the inspections are carried out jointly. Nevertheless, it
is remarkable that OLAF has operative competencies throughout the entire Community area and
in some cases even beyond it.
This does not in any way free the member states from their responsibility to conduct investi-
gations, prosecute and counteract criminal activities directed against the EC. According to article
280 ECT "Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial
interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests”.
Since all crimes fall under the jurisdiction of at least one of the member states, there is always a
responsible national agency. However, the efforts undertaken by the member states are not re-
garded as sufficient to protect the financial interests of the Community. Therefore, the member
states share the responsibility for the investigation with the Commission (through OLAF). For
this purpose, member states are obliged to communicate to the Commission all cases of irregu-
larity which exceed   4 000 (  10 000 for own resources).54 National judicial authorities also
communicate the outcome of criminal proceedings to OLAF for the purposes of recovery of EC
funds. In return, OLAF provides the concerned national authorities with documents and infor-
mation likely to be useful in national criminal proceedings.55
In each particular case, OLAF draws up a report specifying the facts established, the financial
loss, if any, and the findings of the investigation, including recommendations on the action.56
On the basis of these reports, the Commission decides on administrative penal sanctions.57 Nev-
ertheless, all formal criminal proceedings that may result from such an investigation fall within
                                                          
48 article 1 (1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investiga-
tions conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
49 Compare article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communi-
ties financial interests.
50 General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2002, Section III: Commission, Annex III: European Anti-fraud Office, OJ L 29,
31.01.2002, p. 553.
51 Report of the European Anti Fraud Office, Activity report for the period 1 June 2000 - 31 May 2001. p. 33.
52 Economic operators are such natural or legal persons and other entities on which national law confers legal capacity who have committed the
irregularity and to those who are under a duty to take responsibility for the irregularity or to ensure that it is not committed. Article 7 of Council
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests.
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted
by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), article 3 and 4. Checks in third countries are conducted in accordance with the cooperation agree-
ments in force.
54 Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities finan-
cial interests. OJ L 312, 23.12.1995.
55 To estimate the efficiency of a law enforcement agency is always difficult, as the number of unreported cases and 'successful' fraud never could
be seized. For data concerning the activities (number of cases and amount) of OLAF, see Report from the Commission, Protection of the finan-
cial interests of the Communities and fight against fraud – Annual report 2001- COM (2002) 348 final/2.
56 Council Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted
by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), article 9.
57 The Commission has suggested the extension of the administrative penalties to the most sensitive sectors in order to avoid the development of
irregular actions and strengthen compliance with Community legal provisions. Thereby adding to the administrative control provisions a system
of administrative penalties. This should be done in accordance with the framework established by Council Regulation No 2988/95, and follow
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the competency of national authorities. Thus, the supranational law enforcement is restricted to
investigations of fraud against the Community budget and to the determination of administra-
tive penalties.
A European Public Prosecutor. The idea of an international prosecutor is neither fantastic nor
revolutionary. Such an institution is already applied at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribu-
nals in The Hague and Arusha and foreseen for the International Criminal Court based on the
Rome Statue. When considering the jurisdiction of these courts and the authority of interna-
tional prosecutors, it becomes clear that their creation is less about transferring judicial responsi-
bilities from the national to the international level, and much more a matter of creating a judici-
ary for a lawless space. In practice, EU states will most likely only have to defend themselves at
very rare occasions in international courts of this sort.
The issue of a European prosecutor is far more sensitive for the member states. The idea of a
European Public Prosecutor began to take concrete form under the label Corpus Juris in the mid
1990s.58 The function of the European Prosecutor would be to coordinate and direct the investi-
gation of offences against the financial interests of the Communities. As a self-contained organ
within the EC, the European Public Prosecutor would also overtake the prosecution of these
criminal offences. A European public prosecutor would therefore take over responsibilities cur-
rently assigned to and conducted by national prosecutors. Thus, it is not a question of establish-
ing a common code of criminal procedure, but of a uniform European system of criminal prose-
cution. In contrast to OLAF, a European prosecutor would not complement but rather relieve
the member states judiciary from certain responsibilities. In addition, the European prosecutor
would be involved in formal criminal procedures, and not only in 'administrative' ones. In this
sense, the European prosecutor can be seen as the judicial follow-up to the administrative inves-
tigations of OLAF.
However, the involvement in criminal procedures is explicitly prohibited by article 280 (4) of
the EC treaty. Therefore the Commission proposed necessary alterations to the European Coun-
cil of Nice.59 The Council, however, was not ready to take this step and rejected the proposal.
This does not mean that the idea has been abandoned. By releasing a Green Paper on the estab-
lishment of a European Prosecutor in 200160 the Commission demonstrated that it still considers
the office as feasible and necessary. Thus, it is too early to dismiss the idea all together. From an
ESDI perspective, the European Prosecutor is interesting, as it represents the first step in the
institutionalisation of the operational dimension at the European level in formal criminal mat-
ters. As such, it would represent a milestone in the development of the ESDI in the criminal
context.
                                                                                                                                                       
the model of the existing system for the common agricultural policy. Communication from the Commission - Protection of the Communities'
financial interests - The fight against fraud - For an overall strategic approach. COM/2000/358 final. p. 9.
58 On the initiative of the European Commission, a group of eight academic lawyers under the direction of Mireille Delmas-Marty produced the
research report Corpus Juris, introducing penal provisions for the purpose of the financial interests of the European Union, Paris 1997.
59 The Commission proposed the introduction of an article 208a. Additional Commission contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference on
institutional reforms of 29 September 2000, The criminal protection of the Community's financial interests: a European Prosecutor, COM
(2000) 608. Printed in Annex 1 to the Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment
of a European Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715 final, p. 77-86, here p. 84-86.
60 Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM
(2001) 715 final.
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HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION AND CENTRAL ASSISTANCE – THIRD PILLAR.
As a rule, surveillance and enforcement of penal law is a domestic issue. Even when the actus
reus is predefined by Community law, the procedural law (regulating how police operations are
conducted) and the definition of sanctions lies in the competence of the 15 member states.61
Therefore, most European efforts that seek to strengthen the operational dimension follow the
strategy of horizontal co-ordination. They do not attempt to lift the operational responsibility to
a European level. The aim is to simplify, facilitate, enhance and ameliorate the co-operation be-
tween national authorities.
To improve the horizontal co-ordination the Union agreed on establishing a network of con-
tacts with the help of Liaison Magistrates and by establishing the European Judicial Network
(EJN). The setting up of Joint Investigation Teams has also been facilitated. These initiatives
cannot do away with the difficulties involved in the horizontal assistance, nor do they lift any
parts of the security process up to a European level. They merely seek ways to facilitate the con-
tact amongst the different judiciary systems. In an attempt to exhaust the advantages of central
agencies, without depriving the nation states from the full and sole responsibility for fighting
crime, member states have also agreed on two initiatives that could be labelled 'hybrids'. De jure
they follow the logic of the horizontal co-ordination, although the arrangements also provide for
lifting parts of the security process up to the European level. The two initiatives are Eurojust and
Europol. The Schengen Information System (SIS), finally, is a network containing uniform data
on specific 'wanted' persons and property. In contrast to the initiatives mentioned above, it in-
terlinks national authorities of the participating states directly. All police stations and consular
agents have direct access to the network.
Liaison officers. In 1996 the Council agreed on a framework for the exchange of liaison mag-
istrates with the aim to increase the speed and effectiveness of judicial co-operation, to promote
the pooling of information of the member states' legal and judicial system and to facilitate better
mutual understanding thereof.62 The actual exchange of liaison magistrates or officers takes place
among the member states that so wish and on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements.
Thus, the joint action merely picked up a praxis that already existed. Therefore, the value added
by the initiative only consists of the promotion of the exchange of liaison magistrates.63 It is the
task of the liaison officer to establish direct links with the competent departments and judicial
authorities in the host nation. As an expert on his own country's judicial system, the magistrate
provides the host nation's agencies with information concerning whom to contact in his own
country and on procedural formalities that must be respected in order to receive assistance from
them. This information can be given on a general basis or on request in a specific case. Following
this concept, countries seek to increase the transparency by spreading knowledge of their own
system through representatives stationed in other states. In some cases, the liaison officer can also
function as a channel of information, but the contact is usually established directly between the
                                                          
61 Katalin Ligeti 2000:211.
62 96/277/JHA: Joint Action of 22 April 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning a
framework for the exchange of liaison magistrates to improve judicial cooperation between the Member States of the European Union. OJ L 105,
27.04.1996 p.1 – 2.
63 The only novelty was that member states have to provide the Council each year with information on the respective liaison officer network.
Article 3 of 96/602/JHA: Joint Action of 14 October 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union
providing for a common framework for the initiatives of the Member States concerning liaison officers. OJ L 268 19.10.1996 p.2-4.
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competent authorities. In this sense, a liaison officer fulfils the role of a 'qualified directory', an-
swering whom to contact and how to approach them.
European Judicial Network. The establishment of the EJN serves the same purpose, namely to
provide the necessary legal and practical information to enable judicial authorities to prepare an
effective request for judicial cooperation or to improve judicial cooperation in general.64 How-
ever, the EJN is differently structured. Here all member states are held to establish one or more
contact points in their own country.65 These contact points are interconnected with an own tele-
communication network with a central data bank, which is located within and administrated by
the General Secretariat of the Council. The national contact points are responsible to submit the
required information66 to the central data bank and to check that the information it contains is
accurate. To obtain the required information, national authorities can either get in touch with a
contact point in their own country or one in the country with which they want to cooperate.
The contact point can also informally expedite requests for assistance in criminal prosecutions or
investigations (so called international judicial orders or 'letters rogatory'). Once national
authorities have obtained the necessary information and help from the contact point, the com-
munication concerning the actual judicial co-operation takes place directly between the compe-
tent authorities and outside of the EJN. The function of the EJN and its national contact points
can thus be described as a network of qualified central 'switchboards'. Following this concept,
countries seek to increase the transparency by letting a national point of contact provide infor-
mation on their system.
Joint Investigation Teams. The Council Framework Decision on joint investigation teams rep-
resents one of the latest European JHA initiatives.67 Just like the rules for the exchange of liaison
magistrates, this initiative does not add a new instrument to the European law enforcement co-
operation, nor does it lift any part of the security process up to a European level. The Framework
Decision merely highlights the possibility to set up joint teams for a specific purpose during a
limited period.68 The only novelty this initiative contains is that representatives from EU bodies
can be included in such bi- or multilateral teams, in particular persons from Europol and
OLAF.69 Nevertheless, it also contains one provision that makes the practical co-operation
somewhat simpler and smoother. National officers who have been seconded to a Joint Investiga-
tion Team shall be able to request (not order) their own national authorities to perform acts that
are deemed necessary by the team. Thus, instead of letting the country where the team is oper-
ating start the lengthy process of making formal request for assistance to other countries, a team
member can do so in his national function. This does not change that the composition and ac-
tivities of a joint team are based on a mutual agreement among the competent authorities of two
or several member states. Joint Teams cannot be set up by (or amongst) any European body(ies).
                                                          
64 Article 4(2) of Joint action 98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998, adopted by the Council, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network. OJ L 191, 07.07.1998 p.4-7.
65 Article 2 (2) of Joint action 98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998, adopted by the Council, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network. OJ L 191, 07.07.1998 p.4-7.
66 According to article 8 of 98/428/JHA the information available within the EJN consists of: "1) full details of the contact points in each mem-
ber state with, where necessary, an explanation of their responsibilities at national level; 2) a simplified list of the judicial authorities and a direc-
tory of the local authorities in each member state; 3) concise legal and practical information concerning the judicial and procedural systems in the
15 member states; 4) the texts of the relevant legal instruments and, for conventions currently in force, the texts of declarations and reservations.”
67 2002/465/JHA, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams.
The same text is contained in article 13 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, which was established by a Council Act of 29 May 2000. See OJ C 197, 12.07.2000.
68 Article 1(1) 2002/465/JHA.
69 According to point (9) of the introduction and article 1(12) of 2002/465/JHA.
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A joint investigation team shall carry out its activities in accordance with the law of the member
state in which it operates and be led by a representative of a competent authority from that
member state. Each participating member state shall decide on what authority it confers to the
foreign team members while operating on its own territory. Thus, the whole co-operation is set
up and conducted directly between the competent authorities and outside of the EU framework.
Eurojust - the first 'hybrid'. With the establishment of Eurojust in The Hague (alongside with
Europol) parts of the security process have been lifted up to the European level. In contrast to
the systems described above, this arrangement does not only aim at helping national authorities
to come in contact with their relevant counterparts and to observe the right procedures when
doing so, nor does it merely consist of a legal framework facilitating the co-operation among the
authorities of the member states. With Eurojust a body was founded that can initiate coopera-
tion and actively assists national authorities in their efforts to coordinate their investigations and
prosecutions.70 Eurojust can also invite and recommend competent authorities to take actions in
one member state to stop criminal activities carried out by criminal organisations directed against
another member state.71
Eurojust is composed of one seconded prosecutor, judge or police officer of equivalent com-
petence from each member state.72 As such, Eurojust has neither operational powers nor the
right to issue orders to national prosecuting authorities. But, it can ask the competent national
authorities to undertake actions, e.g. to launch an investigation or prosecution, to coordinate
their activities and to set up joint investigation teams.73 Moreover, all national members of Eu-
rojust are double hatted and can also act in their national function.74 Thus, those member states
who decide to give their representatives the power to initiate investigations in their national
function, de facto allow the actual operational orders to be drawn up and coordinated within the
Eurojust structure.75 At the time of writing, Denmark was the only country that had clarified the
competencies of its national member of Eurojust. It did however not grant its member this com-
petency.76 Moreover, if a particular case so requires, the concerned national members can ask
their State to set up a joint investigation team and suggest that the Eurojust member from the
member state in which the team operates shall be appointed as team leader.77 In this sense, Eu-
rojust can be described as a round table of national magistrates that can discuss concrete cases,
exchange information, co-operate directly on a bi- or multilateral level and co-ordinate investi-
gations. As a central unit, Eurojust provides a permanent framework within which the co-
ordination of investigations can be launched. At best, linkages between different cases can be
established and the necessity to bring various investigations together revealed. In addition, Eu-
rojust shall assist co-operating national authorities on their request and offer them logistical sup-
port. Such support may include translation, interpretation and the organisation of coordination
                                                          
70 Moreover, while the EJN mainly aims at facilitating bilateral relations, Eurojust can deal with transnational matters concerning several Mem-
bers. See the document presented by the Belgian delegation on this issue (Council document n° 11209/00 EUROJUST 11).
71 According to the Swedish Member to Eurojust, Björn Blomqvist, Eurojust has already initiated such investigations.
72 Article 2(1) of 2002/187/JHA: Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious
crime. OJ L 63, 06.03.2002 p.1-13. According to article 2(2) Each national member may be assisted by one or several persons.
73 Article 6(a) and 7(a) 2002/187/JHA.
74 Each member state defines the nature and extent of the judicial powers it grants its national member. Article 9(3) 2002/187/JHA.
75 For an argument concerning the competencies of the national members of Eurojust, see Council of the European Union document 9404/02,
Bringing Member States' national law into conformity with the Decision setting up Eurojust – Discussion paper.
76 According to Council of the European Union document 8740/02, Denmark's national member of Eurojust, the national member will not be
competent to investigate and bring proceedings in criminal cases in Denmark, nor will he have competence as a judicial authority.
77 Communication from the Commission on the Establishment of Eurojust. COM(2000) 746 final. p. 6.
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meetings. From a national point of view, this is an elegant solution, because it makes use of the
advantages of having a common central body without transferring any formal powers to it.
In order to fulfil this function and to enable it to assist the competent authorities of the mem-
ber states, Eurojust has its own provisions concerning access to information. National members
shall have access to the "…information contained in the national criminal records or in any other
register of his member state in the same way as stipulated by his national law in the case of a
prosecutor, judge or police officer of equivalent competence”.78 Moreover, they shall be empow-
ered to exchange this information necessary without prior authorisation, among themselves or
with their member state's competent authorities.79 Consequently, Eurojust is the only point
where national criminal records of all member states come together. In this sense Eurojust can
both be regarded as a focal point and as a bridge. Although Eurojust as such only may exchange
information with the consent of the member state that submitted it,80 there are no restrictions
concerning what parts of the information accessible to a national member may be submitted to
his colleagues within Eurojust, and thus, what information they transmit to their respective na-
tional authorities.
Eurojust also has its own network structure and is fully integrated in the EJN. In fact, the se-
cretariat of EJN forms part of the Eurojust secretariat.81 Apart from these contacts, all communi-
cation between Eurojust and the member states is channelled through the national member. In
their own country, a national member may either exchange information directly with the com-
petent authorities,82 or via so called national correspondents who simultaneously may be ap-
pointed as contact point of the EJN.83 Although the national authorities may address the na-
tional members directly, questions are usually sent via the national correspondents or the na-
tional EJN contact points. This is done in order to avoid duplication of work and to prevent that
Eurojust is overloaded with tasks for which the other units have been established. Eurojust is also
responsible to maintain close cooperation with Europol and OLAF. It is worth noting, that
OLAF explicitly is denied access to any information from Eurojust as such, and that the assis-
tance is directed in one way only, from OLAF to Eurojust.84 Through this arrangement, member
states underlined the formal exclusion of OLAF from criminal matters, thereby calming fears
concerning the expansion of OLAF's competencies. Finally, as a legal body, Eurojust may also
conclude cooperation agreements with third states (provided that these are approved by the
Council). These agreements may in particular concern provisions for the secondment of liaison
magistrates or officers from third countries to Eurojust.85
Thus, with Eurojust the member states do not simply seek to enhance the transparency, but to
increase the efficiency of the actual co-ordination of investigations. Eurojust represents a forum
in which the contents of investigations are discussed, and where further co-operation is evalu-
ated, initiated and supported.
The European Police Office. Europol was created to fill a functional gap that is not fully cov-
ered by any national authority. Although its objective, namely to improve the effectiveness and
                                                          
78 Article 9(4) 2002/187/JHA.
79 Article 13(2) 2002/187/JHA.
80 Article 27(2) 2002/187/JHA.
81 Article 26(2) 2002/187/JHA.
82 Article 9(5) and 13(1) 2002/187/JHA.
83 Article 12(1 and 2) 2002/187/JHA.
84 OLAF may merely obtain information from the national members of Eurojust in their national capacity. Article 26 (3 and 4) 2002/187/JHA.
85 Article 27(3) 2002/187/JHA.
153
cooperation of the competent authorities in the member states, clearly falls within the category of
horizontal co-operation, Europol is more than a 'switchboard' or a mediator between competent
national authorities.86 Europol produces its own added value to the fight against crime. Initially
it was set up as a 'clearing house' for the exchange of information between member states and
given the task to collate and analyse information and intelligence on organised crime. It is the
task of producing its own analysis that makes Europol more than an intelligence broker. By
compiling and analysing the information from several states, Europol can detect patterns, make
linkages between different criminal activities and draw conclusions that can be decisive in the
fight against crime. The output from Europol can be said to represent more than the sum of the
input. In this sense, Europol plays its own role in the fight against crime. But, although its or-
ganisation, tasks and mandate have been extended continuously over time, this role remains
strictly limited.87
Europol has no power to command national authorities, no exclusive competency to fight any
crimes and therefore neither the authority nor the facilities to plan or undertake police opera-
tions. It is thus far from being anything like a European FBI. In contrast to Eurojust, the staffs of
Europol are not double hated, but directly engaged and dismissed by the Director of Europol.88
As a consequence, Europol officials cannot compensate for Europol's lacking authority by acting
in their national function. Europol is thus not a 'hybrid' in the same sense as Eurojust. Never-
theless, by creating Europol, member states have decided to lift certain parts of the security proc-
ess up to a European level.
In its 1997 Action plan to combat organised crime, the European Council announced that Eu-
ropol should be given 'operative powers', i.e. the ability to work directly together with national
authorities.89 This idea was entered into the Amsterdam Treaty that includes provisions with a
view to extend Europol's competency. According to article 30(2) of the TEU, Europol shall be
able to:
- initiate investigations by asking (not instructing) the competent authorities of the mem-
ber states to conduct and coordinate their investigations in specific cases,
- develop specific expertise which may be put at the disposal of member states to assist
them in investigating cases of organised crime, and
- participate in operational actions of joint teams in a support capacity.
This might sound impressive, but Europol has not been given any authority what so ever. No
responsibilities have been transferred from the national level to Europol. National authorities are
still fully responsible for the fight against crime. In practice it merely means that Europol will
have more ways to communicate its findings. In other words, the range of services it can offer
member states is widened.
Europol remains an intelligence unit without any competency for planning or leading opera-
tions. The recent extension of its mandate, to include forgery of money and other means of
payment, does not change this.90 Furthermore, as Europol lacks formal powers its ability to fulfil
                                                          
86 Article 2(1) of the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office
(Europol Convention), OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 2 – 32.
87 In 2002 it had a budget of   51,66 million and an own staff of 198 plus 44 liaison officers. In 2003 the staff will grow to a number of 350
including liaison officers and security personal.
88 Article 30 (2) Europol Convention.
89 Article 8 (10) of the Action plan to combat organized crime, adopted by the Council on 28 April 1997. OJ C 251, 15.08.1997, p. 1 – 16.
90 The general competence of Europol covers the same types of crimes that Eurojust can be involved in ( article 1(1) 2002/187/JHA.). These
cover computer crime, fraud and corruption and any criminal offences affecting the European Communities' financial interests, the laundering of
the proceeds of crime, environmental crime, as well as the participation in a criminal organisation Where an organised criminal structure is
involved and two or more member states are affected, Europol may also support law enforcement activity against: terrorism, drug trafficking,
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its central task, i.e. of handling and analysing information, is also restricted. In contrast to Eu-
rojust, no Europol official has direct access to national criminal records or other national regis-
ters. Of course Europol is free to accept or request information from other EU and international
bodies, international organisations, third states and the member states. But, it cannot order any
unit to provide it with information, not even the European Union's own bodies.91 It is thus fully
dependent on the cooperation of the member states to fulfil its tasks. In addition, Europol does
not 'own' the information it has obtained. It can utilise the data provided by member states to
perform its own tasks, but it cannot dispose freely of this information. It cannot use it in ex-
change for other information nor can it forward it according to its own liking. Information ob-
tained from one member state may only be communicated to third parties with the consent of
that member state. Other member states may only utilise that information to prevent and com-
bat crimes falling within the competence of Europol. Moreover, all contacts between Europol
and the competent national authorities are channelled through a central national unit set up in
each member state.92 Thus, with the exception of Europol officials participating in joint investi-
gation teams, Europol has little direct contact with other police forces.
In a way, this 'isolation' from national information and operative authorities reflects Europol's
position. It performs its tasks detached from the national security processes. The important fac-
tor from an ESDI perspective is that Europol's competency is very limited and that the basis for
its performance, the communication with national authorities, is restricted to small points of
contact or 'windows'. Informal contacts and the fact that Eurojust may assist Europol, in par-
ticular by giving feedback on Europol analyses,93 may to some extent compensate for this. But,
with the current provisions, only a very limited part of the security process can take place within
Europol, and thus be lifted up to the European level. In fact, the work of Europol does not even
have to be made a part of the actual security process at all. It is still up to the competent national
authorities to decide on whether or not it will follow Europol's advice and make use of the assis-
tance it offers. In the end, Europol represents but an optional bonus, of which the member states
can avail themselves at free will.94
Schengen Information System (SIS). When national authorities search for certain persons or
goods, it can be difficult to know in which country they are located, and thus, which country
they should ask for assistance. The abolishment of internal borders has made this even harder.
To some extent, the SIS does away with this problem. The SIS is a network that interlinks na-
tional authorities of participating states directly. It contains more than 10 million items of data
on persons and property.95 This data relates to persons wanted for arrest for extradition (Schen-
gen Convention Article 95); aliens who are reported for the purpose of being refused entry (Arti-
cle 96); persons who have disappeared or who need to be placed provisionally in a place of safety
                                                                                                                                                       
trafficking in radioactive and nuclear substances, immigration networks, trafficking in human beings including child pornography, vehicle
trafficking as well as forgery of money and other means of payment (See article 2 of the Europol Convention and the annex referred to in the
same article). In contrast to Europol, Eurojust may also engage in any offences other than these on the request of a member state ( article 1(2)
2002/187/JHA).
91 Although article 10(3) of the Europol Convention states that national units shall communicate to Europol all information which it may require
for the performance of its tasks, this is subject to the reservations made in article 4(5). Accordingly member states can refrain from submitting the
requested information if they consider that this would harm essential national security interests, jeopardize the success of a current investigation
or the safety of individuals or involve information pertaining to organizations or specific intelligence activities in the field of State security. In
other words, it is up to each state to decide what they submit.
92 Article 4 (2) Europol Convention.
93 Article 7(f) 2002/187/JHA.
94 For more information about and a discussion on the tasks and role of Europol see Kneelangen, Wilhelm Das Politikfeld Innere Sicherheit im
Integrationsprozeß, Die Entstehung einer europäischen Politik der inneren Sicherheit., Opladen 2001.
95 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Development of the Schengen Information System II,
COM(2001) 720 final, p. 6.
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in the interests of their own protection or in order to prevent threats (Article 97); witnesses and
persons accused or convicted of offences (Article 98); persons and vehicles for the purpose of
discreet surveillance or specific checks (Article 99); and objects sought for the purposes of seizure
or of evidence in criminal proceedings (Article 100).
In difference to the initiatives described above the primary purpose of the SIS is neither to fa-
cilitate contact among the responsible national authorities nor to co-ordinate their investigations.
It is rather a tool that allows the authorities of one state to obtain alerts regarding persons or
property sought by the own or by another state. The system enables the users to run immediate
checks and to ascertain if certain persons or goods are wanted or if a person should be refused
entry into the Schengen area. In this sense the SIS can be described as a European 'wanted' list, a
report system or a search instrument consulted by police, border police, customs and authorities
responsible for delivering visas and residence permits.96 The system is completely decentralised
without any central agency. All police stations and consular agents have direct access to the net-
work and can enter alerts into it in accordance with their national laws. Consequently, each re-
sponsible national authority can act directly on the basis of the uniform data contained in the
SIS.97
The SIS currently used became operational in 1995. It was designed to include only eighteen
states98 and is now technically outdated. To allow for the forthcoming enlargement a SIS II is to
be developed by 2006.99 Discussions are now under way concerning both the technical develop-
ment and the extension of the system with a view to make better use of its potential. Judging
from the discussions at the time of writing, it seems likely that national authorities will be given
the option to feed the system with more information, e.g. with new identification material such
as photographs and fingerprints (deepening contents).100 Moreover, new categories of entries will
most likely be introduced (widening the contents).101 Furthermore, the applicability of the sys-
tem will be improved, amongst other things by enabling searches on the basis of incomplete
information (e.g. with only parts of a chassis number). In addition, the question has been raised
to introduce new databases within the SIS II. Suggestions include a terrorist data base, one for
violent trouble-makers (hooligans), another detailing all visas issued (and refused) and one cov-
ering persons precluded from leaving the Schengen area (including suspects, prisoners on condi-
tional release and children at risk from abduction).102 Since the attack on the World Trade Cen-
tre the option to make full use of the potential of the SIS by transforming it from a mere record
of alerts to an investigation tool has become more attractive. This is not a completely new devel-
opment. The system already contains data relating to persons and vehicles for the purpose of
discreet surveillance or specific checks. These items are not meant to result in direct police inter-
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96 Article 101 of the Schengen Convention.
97 In the event of a hit (i.e. when a person/object is found) further information can be exchanged on a bilateral level through the network between
the national SIRENE (Supplementary Information REquests at the National Entry) offices. In contrast to the SIS, the SIRENE network does not
consist of a common database, and therefore, does not simultaneously provide all member states with uniform information. It is a system of
central national contact points through which the agencies of the member states can exchange information that is related directly to the entries in
the SIS, as well as other material in accordance with the respective national law. In this sense it merely simplifies the praxis of bi- and multilateral
exchange of information, without lifting any parts of the security process to a European level.
98 The fifteen member states, Iceland and Norway and one in reserve. COM(2001) 720 final p. 3.
99 COM(2001) 720 final p. 3.
100 According to article 1(1) of the Initiative of the Kingdom of Spain with a view to adopting the Council Decision 2002/.../JHA concerning the
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen information system, in particular in the fight against terrorism, the items included with
respect of alerts under article 95 of the Schengen Convention shall be extended with the type of offence(s) and in cases of alerts under article 95
and 99 with information on whether the person concerned absconded from a place of detention. See OJ C 160, 04/07/2002 p. 7.
101 As for objects sought for seizure or of evidence property entries may be allowed for registered ships and aircraft, as well as for credit documents.
In the area of discreet surveillance and of specific checks, the categories ships, aircraft and containers may also be added to the current entries on
persons and vehicles. Article 1(4) respectively 1(2) of the Initiative of the Kingdom of Spain with a view to adopting the Council Decision
2002/.../JHA concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen information system, in particular in the fight against terror-
ism, OJ C 160, 04/07/2002 p. 7.
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vention, but rather in reports aimed at supporting ongoing investigations and surveillance. The
move towards investigative support is reflected in the current proposals that aim at giving further
institutions, such as Europol and Eurojust access to the SIS.103 The tendency is thus clear. The
tool providing uniform information is being extended in order to expand the options to cooper-
ate and thereby to increase the efficiency of both controls and of investigations.
From an ESDI perspective the SIS is interesting for two reasons. First, and most important,
the simplicity of the system and the uniform information it contains allows all European police
and customs agencies to help each other fast and smoothly in the fight against crime. The SIS
enables national agencies to engage directly in the enforcement of the laws of other member
states and thus, in their security process and in the production of their security. In this sense the
SIS clearly and directly erases boundaries between the different member states' efforts to coun-
teract criminal activities.
Second, the SIS constitutes an essential tool allowing the application of uniform standards
during controls at the Schengen area's external borders. For this sake, the member states can
report illegal immigrants, persons wanted for extradition or persons whom they have classified as
a threat to public order and national security via the SIS. In this sense the SIS forms an elemen-
tary part in the creation of a common area of freedom, security and justice. This is also one of
the reasons why it was created in the first place.
However, the importance of the SIS as such must not be exaggerated. Surely, it is an important
tool that can enable the authorities in all member states to consider and act upon the same alerts.
But, the SIS has serious limitations and does not automatically generate a merger of the national
security processes in the operational dimension. The first prerequisite for such a merger is that
the SIS covers the crime concerned. But, even then, an entry into the system does not necessarily
results in an intervention by one of the European law enforcement agencies. The second neces-
sity is that a sought person or item is caught in a control and checked against the SIS. (It is up to
each country to regulate under what conditions and to what extent the responsible national
authorities must consult the SIS). Furthermore, the regulations establishing the SIS do not them-
selves oblige any national authorities to intervene and act in a specific way upon a matching en-
try. As such the SIS merely enables national agencies to act upon such a hit, without receiving
any further formal request or concluding co-operation agreements with the country that entered
the item. But the regulations concerning the establishment of the system do not compel them to
do so. Such obligations result from other agreements. The member states have for instance de-
cided to respect each other's security concerns to the effect that they mutually recognise national
decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals,104 as well as on the refusal to grant persons
entry.105 Here, the SIS is merely used as a tool to support the implementation of such arrange-
ments.
                                                                                                                                                       
102 SIS II takes ominous shape, Statewatch, 2002-04-04.
103 Article 1(6) of the Initiative of the Kingdom of Spain with a view to adopting the Council Decision 2002/.../JHA concerning the introduction
of some new functions for the Schengen information system, in particular in the fight against terrorism, OJ C 160, 04/07/2002 p. 7.
104 Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals, OJ L 149,
02.06.2001, p. 34 – 36.
105 Schengen Agreement, Convention from the 19 June 1990 applying the Schengen agreement of 14 June 1985, article 5 (1d) and 5(2).
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3.3.1.2 Regulating immigration (external threats)
The threat posed by certain migration and the linkage it has to crime and the collective iden-
tity is easiest explained by asking the question why free movement of persons has been restricted
in the first place? Free migration can be seen as a threat to four basic referent objects.106
The first is the government's ability to enforce national laws, i.e. to fight 'ordinary' crimes (of-
ten labelled internal security). As mentioned earlier, a state can normally only enforce its laws
and fight crime on its own territory.107 Without border controls criminals could escape prosecu-
tion simply by crossing borders. The second referent object used in the context of migration is
the cultural homogeneity. The third and fourth referent objects are both of economic character,
and regard foreigners as rivals to national citizens. The national welfare system constitutes the
third referent object. Granting all foreigners, including those who have not contributed to the
system, unlimited access to a country's social assistance and welfare provisions would certainly
undermine the welfare state. The fourth referent object is the employment of the own labour
force that is needed to finance the state and its welfare system. A complete opening of the labour
market to foreign competitors may drive out the national labour force and turn employed con-
tributors to the welfare system into unemployed beneficiaries. Current arrangements would be
threatened if foreign labour underbid the national one in terms of wages and other agreements.
It is feared that this would erode the social standards and the welfare system.
The security process launched to deal with these migratory threats differs from other security
processes in the sense that it is inverted. It begins by regarding all immigration as a threat to one
or several of the referent objects mentioned above. To start with, all immigration is therefore
illegal.108 Despite of this, some immigration may be acceptable or even desirable. The reception
of refugees in need of protection is one example. The immigration of skilled labour force is an-
other. Given the demographic development in Europe, immigration may even be regarded as a
necessity. According to a UN report, the number of immigrants would have to double in order
to maintain the present size of the EU labour force, and quadrupled to keep the relation between
retirees and workers constant. By the year 2050 only 2 active workers would finance one retiree
unless the immigration increased (compared to 4.3 workers today).109
From a security perspective, there are two ways of looking at the accepted immigration. One
could say that the legalisation is a process in which certain immigration is 'desecuritised' alto-
gether, and no longer handled as a threat. But, one could also say that those immigrants who
have entered legally may still pose a threat to cultural homogeneity, the welfare system and/or
the labour market, and that this migratory threat has to be managed in one way or another. This
is dealt with through a mix of domestic exclusion and integration. I prefer this idea of a security
process in two steps, because it does not only ask who is let in, but also under what conditions
those who have been granted access may stay. Thus, the security process does not only consist of
defining the migratory threat, but rather of determining what immigrants do not pose a threat
                                                          
106 For a good overview of the different arguments see: Huysmans, Jef, 'The European Union and the Securitization of migration', Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. 38, no. 5, December 2000, pp. 751-777.
107 If a state conducts a law enforcement operation outside the own territory without the explicit approval of the state in which the operation takes
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and under what condition. The accepted immigration is therefore legally defined in two ways
(political dimension).
First, there is an external control, defining who is allowed to enter the territory, i.e. determin-
ing the criteria a person must fulfil to be granted entry (e.g. refugees or economic immigrants).
The external control consists of the set of rules and procedures under which entry into the
country is granted to a non-citizen. It can be pictured as the legal and procedural 'filter' through
which a person has to pass in order to be allowed in to the country. Following the establishment
of an area of freedom, security and justice, special rules have been adopted for the migration
within the EU. These include specific provisions for EU –citizens, as well as for so called secon-
dary movements of non-EU citizens within the Union.
Second, the domestic control consists of the procedures and rules applied to manage the mi-
gratory threat posed by the legal immigrants once they are inside the country. It includes rules
regulating under which conditions the immigrant may stay on the territory and when he has to
leave. Third country nationals who reside in a country for a long time are usually granted exten-
sive participatory and welfare rights in order to promote their assimilation and to prevent cul-
tural separation and conflicts. In some cases, they are even offered full citizenship. The measures
aiming at making immigrants less alien can be interpreted as attempts to dissolve the threat.
Other foreigners, who are not expected or allowed to stay for a long period, are normally ex-
cluded from participatory rights and do not benefit from welfare provisions on the same condi-
tions as nationals. This can be seen as a way to control and hold the perceived threat in check.
Illegal immigrants pose a somewhat different threat than legal immigrants. By entering and
staying illegally in a state, they are committing a crime and pose a criminal threat. Since they
move outside of the legal framework, they cannot take up a legal (self)employment and will
commit further crimes when taking up any economic activity, even if the activity as such is not
criminal, such as household work. In addition, they pose a different migratory threat once they
are inside a country. Illegal immigrants cannot participate and integrate in social life in the same
way as legal immigrants (not even as legal short term residents who are partially excluded from
social life by law) and will remain more alien than these.
When considering countermeasures against the illegal immigration (operational dimension),
one must differentiate between the enforcement of the law at the borders that prevent illegal
entries and the controls conducted within the countries to track down illegal residents. It should
be noted that most illegal immigrants enter the Union legally, but choose to 'overstay' when
their visa runs out.110 Internal controls are therefore an important part of the defence against
migratory threats. Controls at the borders, on the other hand, are crucial because they have a
preventive effect. Counteracting the illegal entries is also important because it is linked to organ-
ised crime. In most cases, those who bypass the external control and enter illegally are smuggled
into the Union by organised criminal networks.111 Fighting cross-border trafficking is, thus, a
part of the fight against organised crime.
Concerning polity and politics the following aspects are of interest when investigating the
ESDI concerned with migratory threats:112
                                                          
110 'The European Union and immigration, Huddled masses, please stay away', The Economist, 2002-06-15, p. 39.
111 COM (2001) 672 final, p. 5.
112 The EU and its member states also seek to reduce the driving factors in the migrants' countries of origin that cause them to leave their homes
in the first place. This prevention of migration is done with a combination of the policies that have already been discussed in the two previous
sections on military and economic threats, and will therefore not be further explored here. Supportive measures, such as those directed against
xenophobia and racism will not be regarded in this study either. I do not consider such measures to be defensive measures aimed at counteracting
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- The political and judicial dimension, defining under what conditions what migration is not a
threat. This includes the rules and procedures for the external and domestic control as well as
for their interpretation by courts (compliance). From an ESDI perspective, it is interesting to
see to what extent the process in which the standards for the external and the domestic con-
trol are defined takes place at the European level.
- The operational dimension, concerned with how the illegal migration is prevented at and
within the external borders of the European Union.113 Just as in the military context, this will
reveal to what extent the security process is completed at the European level.
- Burden sharing regarding the stopping of illegal immigration at the borders. In addition,
tides of refugees can pose a serious burden. If the community adopts common rules for the
reception of refugees, it codifies the common European value of granting protection to those
in need. Assuming that this norm is a part of the values that constitute the European identity,
the member states would express the ESDI by managing the refugee question in a common
process and as a common challenge. Thus, an ESDI would suggest that the Union 'defends'
the common European value collectively and meets the burden involved when receiving hu-
manitarian immigrants collectively.
POLITICAL DIMENSION – LEGALISING NON-THREATENING MIGRATION
The figure below displays what areas the effective and proposed EC legislation covers in the
field of asylum and immigration policy. The EC competency may look impressive at first sight.
But, when scrutinising the process of legalising specific forms of migration, it is not only impor-
tant to determine whether decisions are taken at the European level. Since decisions are often
required at both the European and the national levels, one must also clarify what kind of deci-
sions are taken at what level, or better, to what extent the decisions taken at the European level
actually restricts the national room for manoeuvre.
As the figure below shows, EU citizens, economic immigrants, long-term refugees and persons
enjoying temporary protection are subject to different rules concerning their entry (external
control), their freedom of movement within the EU (secondary migration) and their welfare
conditions and participatory rights while residing in the EU (domestic control). To outline the
actual scope of the European security process, the regulations and standards applied will be ex-
amined for each category of immigrants.
                                                                                                                                                       
migratory threats posed to society by the legally residing foreigners. In first line, they belong to the category of measures aiming at making the
stay of those foreigners already accepted as agreeable as possible for all parties and at ensuring the rights of the foreigners while they reside in the
host nation.
113 The EU and its member states also seek to reduce the driving factors in the migrants' countries of origin that cause them to leave their homes
in the first place. This prevention of migration is done with a combination of the policies that have already been discussed in the two previous
sections on military and economic threats, and will therefore not be further explored here. Supportive measures, such as those directed against
xenophobia and racism will not be regarded in this study either. I do not consider such measures to be defensive measures aimed at counteracting
migratory threats posed to society by the legally residing foreigners. In first line, they belong to the category of measures aiming at making the
stay of those foreigners already accepted as agreeable as possible for all parties and at ensuring the rights of the foreigners while they reside in the
host nation.
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Figure 3.3- 3.  Proposed (grey boxes) and effective (3-D boxes)
European legislation on migration
DESECURITIZING MIGRATION OF EU CITIZENS
In terms of migratory threats, the establishment of the single market must be considered as an
extraordinary step.114 The progressive codification and implementation of the single market was
at first concerned with the abolition of restrictions (or filters) that had applied for EC citizens'
immigration within the Community.115 Since then, the external control regulating the entry into
the EC only applies for non-EC country nationals. The right of EC citizens to move freely
within the Community is an essential of the European integration process. Therefore, it has been
laid down in the EC Treaty and thereby gained the highest possible legal status at the European
level (box 1 in the figure above). Later the free movement was followed up with provisions con-
cerning the domestic control, i.e. welfare and participatory rights of EC citizens while residing in
another EU country.
Concerning participatory rights, member states can only define a few differences between their
own and other EU citizens (box 2). Restrictions are limited to decisions on the eligibility and the
right to vote in regional and national elections116 as well as to regulations concerning the access
to certain offices. The offices from which a foreign EU citizen can be denied access and thus be
discriminated with reference to his nationality are strictly limited. These are basically restricted to
                                                          
114 Article 18 ECT.
115 Freedom of movement of workers is based on Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. Between 1973 and 1975 these provisions were ex-
tended to cover self-employed persons. See Council Directive 73/148/EEC. Originally the right of resettlement was related to economic activity
(article 39 to 49 in the original EC Treaty), but it has been extended to include students (Directive 93/96/EEC), pensioners (Directive
90/365/EEC) and economically inactive ((Directive 90/364/EEC).
116 Member states have agreed on giving any EU citizens the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections and to the European
Parliament under the same conditions as nationals of that State. Article 19 ECT. Where the proportion of citizens of the Union of voting age
who reside in it but are not nationals of it exceeds 20 % of the total number of citizens of the Union residing there who are of voting age, that
member state may be eligible for a derogation from the rule for municipal. See: Council Directive 94/80/EC. OJ L 368, 31.12.1994, p. 38 – 47.
At present such a derogation is granted to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
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some official political functions, such as members of parliament and government, and to the
employment within the military and some other national security services.117
As for welfare rights, EU citizens are entitled to all social security benefits under the same con-
ditions as the nationals of the country in which they are ensured, just like all other working non-
nationals and their family members (box 3).118 This provision does not only protect non-
nationals from exploitation, but also the national working force from being undercut by foreign-
ers that do not compete on the same conditions. Those economically active are insured in the
country in which they carry out their occupation. In order to prevent non-working EU citizens
from welfare 'shopping', students, pensioners and the economically inactive may only resettle
under the condition that they do not burden the social security or assistance scheme of the host
member state. Therefore, non-working EU citizens remain insured in their country of origin or
where they have been economically active (box 4).119
Since the external control of EC citizens is abolished altogether between member states, and
since their options of applying domestic control is severely limited, one could say that the migra-
tion of EU citizens within the Union is not regarded and treated as a threat by any national or
European authority. Since EU citizens have the right to move to, or reside and work in another
EU state without examinations or special permits, the EU citizens' migration within the Union is
no longer a security issue. This has resulted from a process at the European level. If one assumes
that legalisation of certain immigration defines what is regarded as a migratory threat and what is
not, then the migration of EU citizens within the Union has been desecuritized once and for all
with the decision to introduce free movement of persons.
LEGALISING IMMIGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
The immigration of third country nationals, in contrast, has by no means been desecuritized
and legalised altogether. By doing away with the inner European border controls, EU countries
opened a 'back door' for migration.120 The result is an uncontrolled migration within the Union.
The idea of free movement of persons has therefore always been accompanied with the idea of
compensatory measures in the form of common regulations concerning third country nationals'
primary immigration into and their secondary immigration within the EC. In addition, member
states co-operate in fighting illegal immigration. Nevertheless, it took until 26 March 1995,
when the Schengen Convention came into operation, before such common European rules were
first put into action. With the Treaty of Amsterdam the Schengen acquis was then incorporated
into the EU framework and subsequently split up between the first and third pillars to match the
appropriate parts of the treaty.121 Within the first pillar a new Title IV "Visas, asylum, immigra-
tion and other policies related to the free movement of persons” was introduced. While the ex-
                                                          
117 According to article 39(4) EC, the principle of free movement of workers shall not apply to "employment in the public service”. According to
article 45(1) EC, the provisions on the right of establishment shall not apply to "activities which in a Member State are connected, even occasion-
ally, with the exercise of official authority”. "Both terms have been the subject of case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
which, in essence, restricted the possibility of using that derogation to those activities which involve the exercise of public authority and responsi-
bility for safeguarding the general interests of the state or other public bodies.” COM (2001) 386 p.18
118 Employed workers, self-employed workers and students are guaranteed the same treatment in the field of social security as nationals of the host
member state by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and No 574/72. C.f. ScadPlus, Free Movement of workers, Introduction. Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus.
119 Guild 2001:67. See also the documents referred to in footnote 115.
120 Article 62 (1) ECT.
121 Roughly speaking, the parts of the Schengen acquis relating to the crossing of external borders by persons was incorporated into Title IV ECT,
and provisions on compensatory measures into Title VI TEU.
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ternal and domestic control regarding EU citizens is codified throughout the EC Treaty,122 Title
IV is specifically devoted to third country nationals.
At first glance, the communitarisation of the asylum and immigration policy seems to imply
that the process of defining migratory threats, i.e. of defining under what conditions what immi-
grating third country nationals do not pose a threat, was lifted up to the European level and into
the first pillar of the EC.123 According to article 62 and 63 of the EC treaty, the Council shall
define what standards and procedures member states shall apply concerning the entry of third
country nationals (i.e. the criteria a person must fulfil to be allowed entry, as well as provisions
for how this shall be controlled), as well as what minimum standards shall apply for their recep-
tion and residence in an member state (i.e. welfare and participatory rights). This means that the
Council has the competency to determine the standards and procedures for both the external and
the domestic control, as shown in the figure above.
However, as with most policy areas under the first pillar, the EC has not been given the exclu-
sive legislative competency in matters falling under Title IV of the EC Treaty.124 As always, all
national legislation must comply with the standards defined by the EC. But, the external and
domestic control also cover and affect a large number of policies that are still under full national
authority. The member states are, for instance, fully responsible for the internal security, for the
welfare (social security) system and for some participatory rights of third country citizens (i.e.
regional and national elections).
This division of competencies has influenced the decision-making procedure of the Council.
The Amsterdam treaty foresees a transitional period of five years (until 31 May 2004) during
which the Council takes all decisions covered by Title VI unanimously.125 After the period of five
years, the Council shall act by qualified majority in accordance with article 251 ECT. However,
this change will not take place automatically. It requires a unanimous Council decision.126 Until
the Council has taken this decision, the Commission will share its right to submit proposals with
the member states. Consequently, the regulations concerned with the external and domestic
control of third country nationals will result from a consensual European security process. As will
be shown, the EU legislation merely defines boundaries that national provisions may not surpass.
In this sense, it expresses the common denominator the member states can agree upon.
Concerning the external control, reference is usually made to international conventions that
the states have already signed. In the field of domestic control, the EC usually uses a language
that leaves large room for interpretation to the executive national authority. Soft words like 'nec-
essary' or 'sufficient' are used to describe the standards that shall apply. Alternatively, they refer
to the equality of treatment with nationals. This means that the national differences are accepted,
but not a discriminating treatment. Surely, this is the only result that can be expected from a
decision-making process building on unanimity. The fact that the common asylum and immi-
                                                          
122 See in particular Titel III ECT for the desecuritization of EU citizens' migration. The immigration of third country national family members
of Community nationals are also covered under this title. See article 10 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1612/68.
123 The call of the Tampere European Council for a common EU asylum and migration policy seems to support this assumption. See Tampere
European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 15/16.10.1999, article 10.
124 In some few areas, the exclusive legislative competency has been lifted up from the national to the European level. The definition duties and
regulations concerning the European System of Central Banks may serve as examples.
125 There are two exceptions to this rule with regards to visas for intended stays of no more than three months. Since the entry into force of the
Amsterdam Treaty the Council decides by qualified majority on the list of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, and on rules concerning a uniform format for visas.
Article 67 (3) ECT.
126 Article 67(2) ECT. When the Council takes this decision, it is also held to decide on provisions relating to the powers of the Court of Justice.
According to statement signed by the heads of state and government in Nice, the shift to qualified majority voting will take place automatically
on 1 May 2004 for measures setting out the conditions under for free circulation of third country nationals legally resident on EC territory
(article 62 (3) ECT) and for measures concerning illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents (article 63
(3b) ECT).
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gration policy also may affect policy fields that lie outside of EC competencies is another factor
that sets limits the way in which proposed and adopted common standards and procedures can
be formulated. EC legislation cannot interfere and prescribe standards that contradict national
interests in policy fields that lie under national competency.
The division between national and European responsibilities also affects the jurisdiction of the
ECJ.127 Normally, all national courts can request the ECJ for a preliminary ruling concerning EC
legislation. This makes up the bulk of cases ruled by the ECJ. But, according to article 68 (1) EC
Treaty, cases falling under Title IV can only come before the ECJ for such a ruling if the highest
national court "considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judge-
ment”. This departure from article 234 of the EC Treaty will most likely relive a great workload
from the ECJ. However, it will also reduce the ECJ's possibility to clarify and consolidate the
acquis of Title IV and, thus, ensure the uniform application of Community law. Consequently,
the national and European judiciary are not interlocked in the same way as it is in other fields
covered by EC legislation. The national judiciary competency has clearly been favoured in this
area, since the national judiciary system must be exhausted, before the highest national courts
might request the ECJ.128 Thereby, lower national courts are uncoupled from the ECJ. Conse-
quently, the ECJ will most likely not be requested to make the same kind and number of rulings.
Admittedly, for the first time in the EC Treaty, the Commission, the Council and the member
states have been given the power to request a ruling on a question of interpretation without a
specific case. It would however be false to interpret this as an attempt to extend the authority of
the ECJ. There is a more practical explanation. A ruling given by the ECJ does not apply to
judgements of national courts or tribunals that have become effective.129 A person who has been
expelled or rejected asylum, and who has lost his case before a national court, is not granted the
right to re-enter, even if the ECJ prescribes another interpretation of the legalisation on which
the national courts judgement was based. It seems more plausible that abstract cases are allowed
for and applied because they make the exemption from the normal European legal practice,
which grants retroactive benefit, easier.130 Without a real plaintiff, there is no person who could
demand rectification directly. Moreover, the member states have obtained a saving clause. Article
64 ECT states that Title IV shall not affect the member states' exercise of their responsibilities
concerning the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.131
The assessment of the legalisation of immigration from third states could be stopped here and
classified as a consensual security process. But, since the treaty foresees a change of the decision-
making procedures and the right of initiatives, it seems wise to examine the current development
within Title IV further, in order to determine to what kind of security process it is developing.
                                                          
127 For an excellent overview see: Guild, Elspeth and Peers, Steve, 'Defence or Defiance? The Court of Justice's Jurisdiction over Immigration and
Asylum', in Guild and Harlow 2001:267-289.
128 Apart from relieving the ECJ from being deluged by references, Joseph Weiler has also suggested to another motive for this restriction. The
member states may have the belief that higher courts are more sensitive to the concerns of the interior and justice ministries and less likely to
make radical references. Lower courts may be thought to be more tempted to do so, because this is a way for them to "…engage with the highest
jurisdiction in the Community and, even more remarkably, to gain the power of judicial review over the executive and legislative branches even
in those jurisdictions where such judicial power was weak or non-existent. Has not power been the most intoxicating potion in human affairs?”.
Weiler, Joseph, The constitution of Europe. 'Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?' and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge
1999, p. 188-218, here p. 193.
129 Article 68 (3) ECT.
130 See Monar, Jörg, 'Ein Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts', in Jopp, Maurer and Schmuck 1998:127-155, here p. 146.
131 As for the re-imposition of controls of persons at the internal borders for security reasons, article 68 (2) even rules out the ECJ jurisdiction.
Although this grants the member states considerable rights in the case of emergency, they do not have a 'carte blanche'. Member states cannot
undertake any measures disregarding the EC aquis, simply by referring to their internal security. For instance, if such actions would affect trade
provisions, the case could be taken up in any EC state's courts or directly by the ECJ, which in their ruling would have to consider the propor-
tionateness of the measures implemented by the state. This is clearly a very delicate matter, and it is not perfectly clear how the ECJ would deal
with such a challenge, or how the member states would handle an ECJ ruling. Nevertheless, one must not forget that all member states have their
own judiciary system that restrain the political freedom of movement, and that a government's protective actions would most likely be scrutinized
in a national court that would have to rule on the commensurability of the measures.
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To make a well-founded prediction on how the legalisation of immigration is likely to be con-
ducted in the future, it is advisable to scrutinise the current acquis of the Title IV and the legal
proposals made within this framework. The EC makes a clear distinction between the legalisa-
tion of wanted and welcomed economic immigration (non-threatening and gratifying) and the
one accepted for humanitarian reasons (non-threatening but straining).
'Economic' immigration. Legalising 'economic' immigration is not a controversial issue among
the member states. The selection of economic immigrants is made according to a simple cost-
benefit analysis. At present, each member state decides how many and what kind of 'economic'
immigrants it needs, whom it allows entry and grants working and/or residence permits, as well
as under what conditions these are withdrawn and the immigrants have to leave the country (box
5 in the figure above).132 A distinction is made between seasonal workers and long-term resi-
dents. Since the former only stay for a short time without settling down, they do not pose a
veritable migratory threat and will not be regarded further in this study.133
Nevertheless, the Commission has made some proposals concerning the harmonisation of the
external control. These proposals do not aim at relieving the nation states from their compe-
tency. Even in the future, member states shall be responsible for the selection of economic mi-
grants and for deciding on how many of them are needed to meet national requirements.134 The
proposals do not even modify the conditions by which third country nationals should be admit-
ted into a member state.135 They are mainly concerned with simplifying and harmonising the
procedures and with introducing common definitions. This is necessary to allow for the formu-
lation of common rules concerning the domestic control of the third country nationals who re-
side within the EU.
The rules for secondary movements within the Union through the 'back door' are of particular
interest. At present, the Schengen acquis grants all third-country nationals holding a residence
permit the right to move for up to three months in the member states where the Schengen acquis
applies.136 This includes both economic immigrants and long-term refugees (box 6). However,
third-country nationals holding a residence permit do not have an automatic right of residence
in another member state. If they want to stay for longer than three months, they have to apply
for a permit from that member state, just like any third-country national residing outside of the
EU. 137
                                                          
132 An exception is made for third country nationals who work for a Community company, at least as regards service provisions. To clarify this
right the Commission has proposed a Directive on the posting of workers who are third-country nationals for the provision of cross-border
services (COM (1999) 3 and the amended version COM (2000) 271)
For an overview of the EU countries different policies, see the study carried out on behalf of the European Commission (Directorate General for
Justice and Home Affairs) by Barzilay, Robin, Groenendijk, Kees and Guild, Elspeth, The Legal Status of Third Country Nationals who are
Long-Term Residents in a Member State of the European Union, Nijmegan 2000.
133 It can even be disputed whether they represent a concurrence to the national labour, or if they must be regarded as irreplaceable and vital
contributors on which the national production depends.
134 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on an open method of coordination for the Community
immigration policy. COM (2001) 387. Headline 3.2. Admission of economic migrants.
135 The Commission's 'Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of
paid employment and self-employed economic activities, (COM (2001) 386 final 11.07.01) merely suggests the self-evident, namely that the
admission of third-country nationals to employed activities and self-employed economic activities should be subject to an "economic needs test”
and a "beneficial effects test. Third-country nationals should be admitted to self-employed economic activities if a test demonstrates an added
value for employment or the economic development of the host member state. For admitting third-country nationals to activities as an employed
person the logic varies slightly from the national one. The proposal suggests that the test should demonstrate that a post cannot be filled from
within the domestic EU labour market, and not just from the nation state's domestic labour market. It is understandable that an EC initiative
uses this formulation. But, in practice this difference is not likely to have more than marginal effect.
136 This solves many practical problems for third state nationals in connection with both of professional and private activity. Long-term residents
can undertake short-term trips within the EU without becoming illegal immigrants during temporary stays in another member state.
137 Following article 63 (4) the Commission has proposed a Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents. Amongst other things, it proposes that a long-term resident must "have possession of adequate resources available to avoid becoming a
burden on the second Member State during the period of residence and sickness insurance covering all risks in the second Member State” in
order to exercise the right of residence in the territory of member states other than the one which granted him the status. Whether or not he
fulfils all the criteria necessary is checked by the second member state, following an application that the long-term resident submits to that
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As for the domestic control, the EC legislation prescribes the non-discrimination principle in
the field of welfare provisions for the economic immigrants and their family members (box 3). In
contrast, member states still regulate the participatory rights. It is however likely that they are
generous towards the wanted economic long-term immigrants, such as qualified labour or self-
employed persons, in order to attract and integrate them. (I will return to box 7 further below.)
All in all, the legal economic migration is fully controlled by the member states and all propos-
als indicate that it will remain so. The explanation for the upholding of the member states' com-
petency concerning both long-term and temporary economic migration (i.e. seasonal workers) is
simple. A state will only allow someone into the country, if it expects this to be advantageous.
Due to the varying situations in the different states the question of what economic immigration
is needed and appropriate is best answered at the national level. Therefore, neither the member
states, nor the Commission have articulated any desire to replace this national competency with a
European one. Member states will continue to make their admission or non-admission depend-
ent of the applicant's personal qualifications and the current national needs. Hence it is a process
completely related to the national factors and steered by the NSDI, since it is not conducted
with consideration of any European referent objects.
Humanitarian driven immigration. The logic of the humanitarian driven immigration differs
from the one applied on economic migrants.138 It causes a clear tension between the notion of
having an obligation to host and help those in need of protection and the migratory threat re-
sulting from the reception of these people.
The admission of humanitarian driven immigration is not based on a calculation of economic
gain, but on values such as brotherliness, sympathy and the duty to act in solidarity. The duty to
offer protection to those in need can be regarded as a shared European value. All European States
have approved of the obligation to receive and harbour those in need of protection and have
codified this shared norm. The Geneva Convention of 1951 on the status of Refugees and the
1967 protocol are maybe the most prominent examples of such codifications. This common
value has also been expressed in various EU documents.139 Consequently, the common asylum
and refugee policy can be interpreted as a way to defend this common European value, and the
protection of refugees seen as a way to defend that part of the collective European Identity.
Nevertheless, asylum seekers, refugees and displaced persons are merely tolerated. The receiv-
ing nations obviously do not expect humanitarian driven immigration to be beneficial, and do
not promote or encourage this sort of immigration. If states would regard the entry as advanta-
geous, refugees and persons enjoying subsidiary forms of protection could have entered as eco-
nomic immigrants in the first place. Initially, they represent a financial and integrative burden.
Their entry may be seen as a threat to all referent objects that were mentioned on page 157. De-
                                                                                                                                                       
member state's competent authorities no later than three months after entering its territory (see COM (2001) 127 final, article 16 and 17). Given
the financial condition, it is not quite obvious, how this procedure differs from the economic immigration to the first EU country.
138 Theoretically EU citizens could apply for asylum in another member state. Nevertheless, I chose to treat the application for protections exclu-
sively as an issue involving non-EU citizens. With the establishment of the free movement, there is practically no reason for an EU citizen to seek
asylum in another member state. This becomes all the less probable as all member states can be regarded as safe countries. Belgium is the only
country having declared that it will carry out an individual examination of any asylum request made by a national of another member state. See:
Declaration No 56 annexed to the final act of Amsterdam by Belgium on the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European
Union.
139 Article 63 (1) ECT, Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 15/16.10.1999, article 13; Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
European Union, article 18 and 19(2); 96/196/JHA: Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of the term 'refugee' in article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July
1951 relating to the status of refugees. The Commission has even suggested that the rights and entitlements enjoyed by refugees within the
meaning of the Geneva Convention should be transposed into Community law. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament Towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum
(COM/2000/755 final), p. 12.
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nying protection would certainly solve the perceived migratory security threat, but also conflict
with fundamental values of the very community that is to be protected by such exclusion. This
would pose a new, although different, threat to the collective identity. Consequently, the society
will seek ways to balance these two threats by weighing the obligation to receive refugees against
the burden and migratory threat they pose. Finding equilibrium is not always simple. In times of
growing humanitarian driven immigration authorities are likely to counterbalance the growing
migratory threat by tightening the external or the domestic control.
The question is to what extent member states' possibilities to tighten or loosen the external and
the domestic control (national reaction to migratory threats) is restricted by European regula-
tions (defending the European value). Are external and the domestic control steered by standards
defined at the European level?
- Is the external control harmonised in such a way that an applicant has to pass through a
standardised European 'filter', i.e. must fulfil certain conditions that are verified in spe-
cific standardised procedures?
- Is the domestic control constrained by European minimum standards guaranteeing the
refugees specific rights?
External control of humanitarian driven immigration. Article 63 of the EC Treaty displays
high ambitions regarding the harmonisation of the external control in matters of asylum, refu-
gees and displaced persons. It sets out the objective to adopt "minimum standards with respect
to the qualifications of nationals of third nations as refugees”, "minimum standards on proce-
dures in member states for granting or withdrawing refugee status”, and "minimum standards for
giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their
country of origin and for persons who otherwise need international protection”.140 The Tampere
European Council reinforced this as it agreed to work towards establishing a Common European
Asylum System.141 In terms of external control the Council decided that this system should in-
clude the "approximation of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee status” and
"common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure”. Furthermore, it should be "com-
pleted with measures on subsidiary forms of protection offering an appropriate status to any
person in need of such protection”.142 In other words, the Common European Asylum System
aims at reducing disparities between member state's legislation and practice, and thereby to har-
monise the protection regimes, i.e. 'filters', applied for external control. By doing so, member
states would clearly define their common value, namely to whom and under what conditions
they have an obligation to offer protection. To this end the Commission has presented three
proposals to the Council. Two of which are concerned with long-term refugees, and a third one
that deals with the granting of temporary protection.
The first defines minimum standards for the qualification for protection (box 8).143 The Pro-
posal uses the definition of who is a refugee, as contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention.144
Drawing on the practise of the member states, it also adds subsidiary protection schemes com-
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141 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 15/16.10.1999, article 13.
142 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 15/16.10.1999, article 14.
143 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third
country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection, COM (2001) 510 final
144 Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. This definition has also been used within the Union at other occasions.
See for instance the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union and the Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the
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plementary to the protection regime enshrined in the Geneva Convention. But, "[r]ather then
creating new ratione personae protection obligations incumbent on Member States, the Proposal
is clarifying and codifying existing international and Community obligations and practice”.145
The second proposal is concerned with minimum standards on procedures in member states
for granting or withdrawing refugee status (box 8).146 It seeks to assure fair and efficient proce-
dures throughout the Union by dealing with procedural guarantees for asylum applicants and
defining minimum requirements regarding the decision making process. Most interesting from a
security perspective, is that the proposal determines when a country can dismiss an application as
inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, i.e. when the obligation to receive an applicant is not
effective and an applicant only poses a migratory threat. Most interestingly among the various
rules is the definition of safe third countries and safe country of origin.147 Although the proposal
contains a list of common principles, according to which countries are to be designated as safe
countries, no common European list of safe countries is to be drawn up. The member states are
merely held to exchange their national views on the designation of safe countries and to notify
the Commission of their national lists of safe countries.148 Accordingly, the standards to which a
person shall be granted the status as a refugee are being codified at the European level, while the
actual assessment is conducted by the nation states. This is not just a question of letting the
member states carry European regulations into effect. As the national lists of safe countries ex-
emplifies, different national interpretations, evaluations and assessments are expressively ac-
cepted.
The third proposal (the only one of the three that had been adapted at the time of writing) is
concerned with minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass in-
flux of displaced persons (box 9).149 According to article 5(1) of the directive "[t]he existence of
mass influx of displaced persons shall be determined by a Council Decision adopted by a quali-
fied majority on a proposal of the Commission”. This means that the Council takes a general
decision on giving temporary protection to a specific group of persons. Consequently, all mem-
ber states have to offer these persons protection, (even those that voted against the decision).150
The Council also decides on the time when the temporary protection comes to an end. The ex-
ternal control and the process of defining of who shall be granted protection has thus been lifted
from the national to the European level in the case of the largest migratory challenge, a mass
influx of displaced persons.
Secondary migration of humanitarian driven immigrants. Concerning the freedom of move-
ment, long term refugees and asylum applicants will have to stay in the country where they
                                                                                                                                                       
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of the term 'refugee' in article 1 of the
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees (96/196/JHA). OJ L 63, 13.03.1996, p. 2 – 7.
145 COM (2001)510 final, p.6.
146 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting or withdrawing refugee status, COM (2001) 578 final.
147 Other reasons to dismiss an application are amongst other things if another member state is responsible for examining the application, another
country (third state) is considered as a first country of asylum for the applicant, the application is fraudulent with respect to the applicants iden-
tity or nationality, he  cannot provide sufficiently convincing information to determine his identity or nationality, the he does not explain his
application by raising issues that justify international protection on the basis of the Geneva Convention or article 3 of the 1950 European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. COM (2000) 578 final p. 6.
148 COM (2000) 578 final p. 6.
149 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences
thereof.
150 The directive also defines under what circumstances member states may exclude a person from temporary protection (article 28). Although
these rules are expressed in very general terms (all relate to crime or to the security of the host member state), the states are not given a carte
blanche that allows them to reject all refuges concerned. The state has to make an individual case against each person that it wishes to exclude
from temporary protection and present evidence that supports the rejection on the grounds defined by the directive. No state will be able to do so
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lodged their application while it is examined. Once granted a residence permit, they will be free
to move within the Schengen area for up to three months (box 6). Persons enjoying temporary
protection do not have the right to enter another member state's territory without that country's
authorisation.
As derogation from these rules, secondary migration shall be allowed for family reunifica-
tion.151 For people benefiting from temporary protection in the event of a mass influx, this right
has been laid down in law (box 10).152 For long-term refugees rules have not yet been adopted,
although the Commission has submitted several proposals (box 11).153
Domestic control of humanitarian driven immigrants. Just as in the case of external control,
the domestic control must balance certain basic values concerning how the 'guests' must be
treated against the perceived migratory threat they pose. Integration, assimilation and naturalisa-
tion of aliens into the national community seems to be particularly recommendable way of
dealing with immigration of third country nationals that are most likely to remain permanently
in the country, or at least for a very long time. At the European level, member states have agreed
on applying different standards for different groups of third country nationals. A differentiation
is made between those given temporary protection, and those with a long-term residents status.
The member states obligations towards persons enjoying temporary protection have been laid
down in the Council Directive that deals with mass influx of displaced persons, which was men-
tioned above.154 Concerning the participatory rights (box 12), the directive states that member
states shall 'authorise' the persons enjoying temporary protection to engage in employed and self-
employed activities, educational opportunities for adults, vocational training and practical work-
place experience while benefiting of the temporary protection.155 However, the directive does not
clarify how fast after arrival the authorisation shall be given, or if the authorisation is linked to an
obligation to provide the opportunity to participate in these activities. The Directive only pre-
scribes the equal treatment with nationals of the host nation in one case, the access to the educa-
tion system for persons under the age of 18 years. Of course this non-discrimination principle
also comes into effect with regards to welfare provisions if persons benefiting from temporary
protection take on work in the host nation (box 3). The directive also defines the member states'
responsibilities concerning welfare conditions for those who remain without occupation (box
13). But, it uses the terms 'suitable' and 'necessary' to describe the standards for accommodation,
social welfare and medical care.156 This does not affect the national competency in any way. Just
as before, member states will provide what they consider to be suitable and necessary.
The Commission has also made some proposals addressing the welfare benefits and the par-
ticipatory rights of long-term residents. In its proposal for a Council Directive laying down
minimum standards on the reception of applicants for asylum in member states,157 the Commis-
sion once again suggests that minor children shall have access to the education system under the
same conditions as nationals (box 7).158 Furthermore, member states shall not forbid applicants
                                                                                                                                                       
since the evidence must stand firm in a court. According to article 29, each person who has been excluded from the benefit of temporary protec-
tion shall be entitled to mount a legal challenge in the member state concerned.
151 Decision No 1/2000 of 31 October 2000 of the Committee set up by article 18 of the Dublin Convention concerning the transfer of respon-
sibility for family members in accordance with article 3(4) and article 9 of that Convention, OJ L 281, 07.11.2000, p.1.
152 Council Directive 2001/55/EC, article 15.
153 COM (1999) 638 final; COM (2000) 624 final and COM (2002) 225 final.
154 Council Directive 2001/55/EC.
155 Article 12, Council Directive 2001/55/ EC.
156 Article 13, Council Directive 2001/55/ EC.
157 COM (2001) 181.
158 Article 12, COM (2001) 181.
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to the labour market and vocational training for more than six months after their application.159
The issue of self-employment, however, is not addressed. As for welfare conditions the proposal
does not restrict the member states' competency in any way for refugees that have not yet taken
up any occupation (box 14). Accordingly, member states shall ensure a standard of living "ade-
quate for the health and well being of applicants”.160 Furthermore, the applicants shall be en-
sured a "sufficient” amount of allowances and vouchers to avoid them "falling into poverty”.161
Applicants shall also have access to primary and emergency health and psychological care.162
Thus, exactly as the directive concerning those enjoying temporary protection, this communica-
tion only contains general standards and leaves the estimation of the refugee's actual needs to the
national authorities.
Harmonising domestic control - common status for all long-term residents. In another pro-
posal concerning the status of third-Country nationals who are long-term residents,163 the
Commission goes much further. The aim is to grant all long-term residents the same status, irre-
spectively if they immigrated for economic or humanitarian reasons, and grant them the rights
and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. A member state shall grant this European
long-term resident status to third-country nationals who have resided legally and continuously in
its territory for five years. When this is obtained, long-term residents shall enjoy equal treatment
with other nationals as regards welfare conditions (box 14).164 Concerning participatory rights
(box 7), they shall enjoy equal treatment as regards access to employment and self-employed
activity (provided such activities do not entail even occasional involvement in the exercise of
public authority), education and vocational training (including study grants), freedom of asso-
ciation and affiliation and membership of an organisation representing workers or employers.165
As for the free movement, the same rules as those mentioned above concerning economic immi-
grants shall apply (box 6). Finally, the proposal also suggests that a long-term resident only shall
be expelled where his personal conduct constitutes a threat to public order or domestic security.
This means that the person must have committed or be expected to commit serious crimes. Con-
sequently, member states could not make the stay of a long-term resident dependent of the do-
mestic situation or of the development in third country nationals' country of origin (box 8).
Although the introduction of a common permanent residence status formally limits the member
states' ability to decide freely on who is to stay in their territory, one must note, that they already
practice a restrictive expulsion policy for long-term residents.
OPERATIONAL DIMENSION: COUNTERACTING ILLEGAL MIGRATION
The operational dimension is concerned with how illegal migration is counteracted. As men-
tioned above, there are two basic categories of illicit immigration. There are those who enter
illegally by bypassing the border controls or by using false documents. Then there are those who
enter legally, but become illegal immigrants by 'overstaying' when their visas terminate.166 Un-
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160 Article 15, COM (2001) 181.
161 Article 17, COM (2001) 181.
162 Article 20 and 21, COM (2001) 181.
163 COM (2001) 127 final.
164 Amongst other things as regards: social protection, including social security and health-care, social assistance, social and tax benefits, as well as
the access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services made available to the public, including housing. Article 12 COM (2001)
127 final.
165 Article 12, COM (2001) 127 final.
166 In contrast to the Commission I do not regard people that reside legally, but who violate the residence regulations, as illegal immigrants but as
legal immigrants that commit a crime. C.f. COM (2001) 672 final, p. 7.
170
derstandably, there are no reliable figures on the proportions between the two categories. But, it
seems clear that they are both significant.167 Therefore, the active suppression of the phenome-
non requires strict checks and surveillance at the Union's external borders to prevent illegal en-
tries, as well as stringent controls within the territory of member states to detect and fight illegal
residing.
It is striking that the vast majority of European proposals and measures aiming at improving
the control of migration are related to the control at the external borders. The internal control of
immigrants that reside illegally within the Union has hardly been addressed at all,168 nor have
any measures been suggested or standards proposed for how illegal secondary movements should
be stopped.169 On the one hand, this imbalance between external and internal control can be
explained by the fact that one weak point in the external border affects the migratory threat to-
wards all member states. To ensure that the common frontier does not become pervious at any
point, the member states must define and submit to common control standards. This is a chal-
lenge that becomes all the more sensitive when the enlargement process is added to the equation.
The new members must perform checks and surveillance at the new common external borders as
efficiently as any current member does. Otherwise the enlargement will be associated with, and
result in, an increasing migratory threat. Since the whole idea of an area of freedom, security and
justice depends on a reliable and efficient border control, it is not surprising that the old and the
new members are focusing on this area at present. On the other hand, illegal residence is a crime
committed on a member state's territory. As with all enforcement of criminal law, the responsi-
bility to counteract the crime lies in the exclusive authority of that member state. Illegal resi-
dence is no exception in this sense. National authorities conduct internal controls on their own
in accordance with their specific national provisions in order to enforce the national law. If
needed, national law enforcement authorities can cooperate within the framework of the Euro-
pean police and judicial co-operation described above. However, it should be noted that fight
against illegal residence as such is not a priority at the European level but largely left to each na-
tional authority. This can be explained by the simple fact that the illegal residents primarily pose
a threat to the state in which they reside, and that there is little the member states can do to help
each other in these cases. States are most likely unaware of the illegal secondary movements that
take place from their territory. If however the illegal residence is linked to other forms of cross
border crimes, then the machinery of the European police and judicial co-operation may get
started.
Although the checks and surveillance of the external borders lie within the full national
authority, member states cooperate closely in this field.170 At present, each member state is free
to entrust checks and surveillance at external borders to the authorities of its choice, according to
its own national structures. Until present there is no such thing as a European police or customs
unit with the task to control and repress illicit immigration at the frontiers. So far, the coopera-
tion between member states and the Commission has therefore focused on two other areas. First,
they have sought to harmonise the standards and procedures that apply for counteracting illegal
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border crossing, in order to avoid 'weak points' along the external border. This includes measures
such as the definition of common rules on visas for intended stays of no more than three
months,171 the exchange of liaison officers,172 the harmonisation of penalties so that would-be
criminals have no reason to consider illegal entries to be relatively safer in one of the EC states,173
and laying down common uniform principles for checks and surveillance at the external bor-
ders.174 Second, they aim at enhancing the efficiency of external border controls. This includes
measures aimed at avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts, such as the adoption of criteria
and mechanisms for determining what country is responsible for considering an application for
asylum.175 The thought is that an asylum seeker shall only be able to launch his application in
one member state. To ensure this, a database called EURODAC has been established for the
comparison of fingerprints of asylum seekers.176 The foreseen European Visa Identification Sys-
tem is another database, envisaged to detect false travel documents and to help identifying per-
sons without travel documents.177 Furthermore, some centres for information exchange and dis-
cussions, such as the CIREFI178 and the CIREA,179 have been founded.
Clearly, these initiatives follow the strategy of horizontal co-ordination. None of them suggests
an operational task sharing among members and no operational responsibility is transferred to
the European level. Neither are there any European capabilities that can perform checks and
surveillance at the borders or within the area of free movement, nor are there any units that can
co-ordinate and lead operations or that produce common situation and risk analysis concerning
illegal border-crossings or 'overstays'. The measures above merely facilitate and support the op-
erations of national authorities based on national assessments.
However, there are proposals that go in the direction of vertical assistance. At present, the
Commission is considering the creation of a European Migration Observatory, which could
"monitor and carry out comparative analysis of asylum and legal and illegal migratory flows”.180
This would not necessarily change the way migratory threats are defined, i.e. what migration is
legalised, but it may have an impact on the European policy against illegal immigration. If the
Observatory would develop into a European migratory intelligence centre that assesses and maps
out trends of migratory flows, it might influence the implementation of preventive measures in
countries of origin, and outline how illegal immigration should be fought, i.e. where what kind
of efforts should be concentrated. However, this idea has hardly even reached the blueprint stage
and it would take many years to develop it into a European assessment centre with operational
influence.
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The Commission's proposal to establish a European Corps of Border Guards (ECBG) goes far
beyond this.181 Between the lines two interrelated motives behind the proposal can be identified:
a burden-sharing argument and worries about how an efficient external control can be assured,
especially after the enlargement. As the Union's frontier moves towards the East, a large propor-
tion of border control tasks move with it. Consequently, the richer 'inner' states are relieved
from some obligations which will be performed by the poorer frontier states. The Commission
proposes a financial burden-sharing mechanism that makes use of the existing national financing
together with Union budgetary support.182 Thereby, all countries benefiting of the control per-
formed at the Union's frontiers would contribute to the production of this public good. In addi-
tion, the common financing could ensure that checks and surveillance at the Union's external
borders are not dependent of each executing nation state's financial situation. Currently the rela-
tive number of border guards, their education and training, as well as the quality and quantity of
their equipment vary among the states. Common financing would promote uniform control
standards along the Union's entire external border.
In its proposal, the Commission outlines a development that in many ways reminds of and
surpasses the discussions in the second pillar on the ESDP. The Commission recommends that
the ECBG shall support national services, initially by exercising surveillance functions and sub-
sequently by handling checks at border crossing points. To lead the corps, an External Borders
Practitioners Common Unit (EBPCU) is to be created, consisting of representatives from the
member states' services ensuring controls at the external borders. This unit would not only de-
velop to a permanent headquarters staff charged with the operational command of the ECBG
and the management of its personal and equipment, but also be confided with duties concerning
the national services involved in checks and surveillance at external borders. To ensure that
common standards apply along the Union's external borders, the communication suggests that
the EBPCU should: have the power to exercise inspections of all services involved, in order to
verify the proper implementation of the common rules for the crossing of external borders; de-
velop a common basis for training of border guards, and eventually set up a European guards
college; lead the development of a system for common intelligence and information exchange
between the authorities concerned with checks and surveillance at external borders;183  and
monitor the development of risks with a view to draw conclusions for the deployment of person-
nel and equipment at external borders. The proposal also addresses capability issues. The Com-
mission underlines the need of interoperability between the mobile equipment of the Nation
States and suggests a common procurement on behalf of the ECBG, a common policy on fixed
infrastructures and common measures concerning the development of new technologies. Al-
though the Commission does not address the scope of the capability management, it seems to lay
much more emphasis on the central procurement and R&D, than has been done in the military
sphere.
The proposal is very ambitious as it suggests that the European Union and the member states
should share the operational responsibility at the European borders. It does however not clarify
the relationship between the European and national authorities, especially under ongoing opera-
                                                          
181 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Towards integrated management of external borders of
the Member States of the European Union, COM (2002) 233 final.
182 COM (2002) 233 final, p. 19.
183 The Commission calls this a 'permanent process of data and information exchange and processing' labelled PROSECUR ( 'PROcedure of
SECURity').
173
tions. Although this question is central for an ESDI argument, it is quite understandable that the
Commission has avoided the issue. It is most likely that the whole idea will be given much more
thought and time before anything of the kind can be implemented. The proposal of an EBPCU
and an ECBG clearly surpasses the framework covered by Title IV of the EC Treaty and con-
cerns the most delicate issue of exercising the sovereign right of law enforcement. Clearly the
staff of the ECBG must be given the necessary powers, irrespectively of their nationality and
place of deployment, in order to perform the tasks suggested by the Commission. All in all, the
proposal could be seen as the first step towards transferring the responsibility for border controls
to the European level. But, as the European integration process has shown many times, articu-
lating an idea is not the same thing as realising it. This is all the more true when it concerns
transferring authority from the national to the European level.
BURDEN SHARING
As indicated above, burden sharing can be regarded as question of efficiency and/or as a matter
of solidarity. Institutionalised burden sharing arrangements only make sense in two cases. Either
they contribute to the defence of a shared common value, i.e. if the referent object used is a
common European one. Or they are necessary to counteract the threat that the migration poses
to national referent objects. The EC treaty addresses the burden sharing issue in a rather attenu-
ate way, as it speaks of "promoting a balance of effort between member states in receiving and
bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons”.184 This formulation does
neither suggest a European funding of all the activities related to visa, asylum and immigration
policies, nor does it imply a mechanism for a fair and even distribution of costs and refugees
among the member states. It does however allow for some form of redistribution to ease the bur-
den of those who carry the largest load.
Although burden sharing has been on the Council's agenda at several times since the beginning
of the 1990s,185 member states could not agree on a concrete measure until the year 2000. The
European Refugee Fund (ERF) was established as a first means of financial burden sharing.186
Though its budget is still limited to the rather modest sum of   216 million,187 which does not
even correspond to the beginnings of the member states' expenses, it represents a first step. How-
ever, almost the full amount of the funds is distributed to the member states according to a fixed
key.188 Following a unanimous decision by the Council, the funds may also be used to finance
emergency measures in case of mass influx of refugees. In this case, the allocation of the ERF is
adapted to a situation assessment and can be interpreted as an attempt to defend the shared value
expressed in the obligation to receive refugees in need. Nevertheless, the unwillingness to insti-
tute a European burden sharing mechanism in the sphere of migratory threats still prevails. The
current system and the lacking solidarity among the states can be explained by different national
identities, i.e. with the use of national referent objects rather than European ones. Here a differ-
entiation must be made between the repression of illegal immigrants at the borders, the internal
control and the reception of persons in need of protection.
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As the Commissions proposal for a European Corps of Border Guards shows, a European
funding and an even cost sharing as well as a European implementation is feasible for the control
of illegal border crossing. There is a practical and a principal reason for this. It is practically pos-
sible because these tasks and costs can be identified and isolated from others fairly easily. It is
principally reasonable, because the control at the external European borders is producing a pub-
lic good for member states. Illegal immigrants will pass the border at its weakest point irrespec-
tively of their intended country of destination. Since it is relatively easy to move within the Un-
ion, the way in will not necessarily be chosen with respect to the final goal. Thus, the control
along the entire external border affects the migratory threat posed to every member state, i.e. its
national referent objects.
Concerning the internal control of illegal residents, member states are less willing to share the
burden. This could be explained by the simple fact that it is more difficult to separate this task
from others performed by national security agencies (e.g. fighting organised crime) and to isolate
the costs. However, the reluctance to share these expenses can also be explained in other ways.
An illegal immigrant in Portugal does not pose a perceivable threat to any Finnish referent ob-
ject, so why should Finland contribute to the costs in Portugal and vice versa? One can spin this
thread further when looking at the reception of refugees in need of protection.
As shown above, member states have agreed on and codified common values that can be used
as a referent object (in particular in the case of mass influx). This may also explain why the re-
ception is the only part of the asylum and immigration policy that contains an element of com-
mon funding at present. However, the ERF is purely of financial nature and still very limited
both in size and scope. There is no mechanism that can regulate the even distribution of refugees
and asylum seekers among member states.189 Even in the case of a mass influx the Council
merely discusses each member states capacity to receive refugees. If the number of refugees ex-
ceeds the reception capacity indicated by the member states, the Council shall ”examine the
situation and take appropriate action, including recommending additional support for member
states affected".190 This does not mean more than that the representatives of the member states
will try to find a common solution in the Council. Although member states assert the general
obligation to receive those in need, they have not been able to agree on a mechanism for allocat-
ing the refugees that arrive in the Union fairly among the member states and thus to spread the
migratory threat that these refugees might pose evenly. Theoretically, this means that one coun-
try could have to host all refugees in a case collectively defined as a mass-influx. A system that
equalises the burden among the member states would require a whole new way of thinking about
the refugee question.
One difficulty that complicates such a development is that the perceived migratory threat var-
ies among the member states and that the perceived burden cannot simply be expressed in finan-
cial costs or volume of refugees. This makes a definition of what is a fair distribution problem-
atic. The volume of refugees that a country can receive and the expenses it can carry without
risking that the situation transforms into an unmanageable and intolerable migratory threat is
not a fixed quantity. Cultural and historical bonds with the refugees can greatly influence a
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state's receptivity. The tolerance is likely to vary among the EU states for different groups of
refugees, as they threaten the national referent objects to different degrees.191 This suggests that
migratory threats are thought of and perceived with reference to the national rather than to a
European identity.
3.3.2 Category policy - Program
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That the European co-operation in the criminal context largely is driven by the aim of coun-
teracting crime is obvious. It is also clear that all member states regard crime as a threat. I have
already addressed what referent objects crime and migration may threaten. All countries utilise
the same principle referent objects such as the rule of law, the government's ability to govern,
cultural homogeneity and the maintenance of the welfare system (see p. 136 and 157). In addi-
tion to these, each criminal law also seeks to prohibit a specific action and to protect a specific
referent object. These can be expressed in the form of general norms and principles such as the
rejection of violence or the protection of ownership rights, which are generally accepted in all
European states. But, the legal texts contain a much more detailed description of when the legis-
lator considers that a violation has taken place, how the perpetuation of evidence may take place,
and what consequences this may have for the criminal. These differences in the 'detail' compli-
cate the European cooperation. This section does therefore not begin with a survey of what refer-
ent objects are used at the European level. Instead, it starts by exploring what common defini-
tions on criminal threats the European states have agreed upon.
- According to what principles are the criminal legislation and the definition of criminal
threats harmonised among the EU states (mutual recognition or common definitions)?
- What definitions of criminal threats have been achieved at the European level?
Thereafter the driving force behind the cooperation against crime will be scrutinised. Why
it has developed within the EU and not some other framework will also be discussed:
- Why is crime and crime fighting on the European Union's agenda?
Finally, the specific political difficulties involved in international co-operation in criminal
matters are examined. Here, Ireland's, Great Britain's, and Denmark's reasons for opting out
of some of the JHA co-operation will be analysed.
- Does non-membership comply with the idea of an ESDI?
                                                          
191 Nevertheless, in the case of mass influx, the reception tolerance may be influenced by the amount of refugees that other EU states receive. In
this case states are likely to be concerned with not receiving more than their 'fair' share.
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3.3.2.1 Common European definitions on crime.
Common definitions of crime and regulations concerning the fight against crime are adopted
within the first and the third pillar. Since the European laws on migration adopted under title IV
of the ECT have already been thoroughly displayed in the previous section, these will not be
addressed here. Apart from them, the first pillar only contains criminal law in disguise. EC legis-
lation cannot oblige member states to enact criminal law. As long as the Community is not given
the 'competence of competence', and as long as the Treaty is not changed, formally the EC will
not have the authority to endorse its own criminal law nor to oblige the member states to enact
criminal legislation. Thus, the definition of criminal threats and the endorsement of criminal
laws are still conducted by the nation-states. This can either result from purely national security
processes using and defining specific national referent objects and criminal threats, or from a
consensual European security process in the third pillar using and defining European referent
objects and common criminal threats. The substantial and procedural law resulting from this
collective process and the methods used to determine collective definitions stand in the centre of
this section.
COMMON DEFINITIONS OR MUTUAL RECOGNITION?
Within the third pillar, member states try to approximate the substantive criminal law and
procedural law in two ways. On the one hand, they seek to align the substantive criminal law by
adopting common definitions on the constituent elements of criminal acts. On the other hand,
they concentrate on enhancing the compatibility of national provisions. Instead of rectifying
national laws, this method builds on the formula of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and
requests, as well as on searching ways to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction between the member
states.192 Accordingly, national authorities are held to recognise and enforce judgements, as well
as to acknowledge and to comply with requests from the authorities of other member states, as
long as these fulfil certain specified formal requirements. From an ESDI perspective, these two
methods appear to pole apart, as they are based on differently structured security processes.
Common definitions. By agreeing on common definitions of crimes and criminal threats,
common standards and values are objectified. By determining these, member states delineate
common European referent objects and formalise their uniformity. In this sense, the common
consensual security process results in the formation of an ESDI and the European Identity. In
many cases the cost for this will be the duplication of the process already held at the national
level and the adaptation of national legislation to the agreed European provisions. To allow an
efficient application, these common definitions of substantial criminal law must be accompanied
by common definitions of procedural law.
Until present, the Council has adopted common definitions for two categories of crime and
criminal threats. The first might be labelled as the most serious and highly immoral crimes.
Here, general values are used as referent objects. This category includes activities related to the
participation in a criminal organisation, terrorism, racism and xenophobia, drug trafficking,
human trafficking and sexual exploitation of children.193 Current proposals also address serious
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making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union; Council Framework Decision
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environmental crime and cyber crime.194 The second category is not directly concerned with
defending certain moral values. Instead it targets economic crimes directly related to the financial
interests of the European Communities and the functioning of the Common Market such as
corruption, fraud and counterfeiting.195 The referent objects used here are thus of a more 'tech-
nical' and functional nature. (I will return to the use of different referent objects further below.)
In both categories, the approximation of criminal laws always begins with a common defini-
tion of the constituent elements of the threats/criminal acts that are to be punishable in each
member state. For the production of security, these common definitions are important, because
they include provisions to ensure that member states can apply other legal instruments that have
already been adopted on judicial cooperation, e.g. concerning extradition or confiscation of in-
strumentalities and the proceeds from crime. Since these instruments build on the principle of
mutual recognition, member states have found a way to evade the adoption of common proce-
dural law even when agreeing on common definitions of substantial criminal law.
Mutual recognition. Mutual recognition merely states that national authorities shall acknowl-
edge the outcome of the security processes held in another member state. The decisive difference
from an ESDI perspective (at least in theory) is that the method of mutual recognition does not
entail common definitions of what constitutes a crime and criminal threat. It does not include
the definition of sameness. Therefore the referent objects used when defining a crime are only
national ones. They do not consist of, nor are they made European ones.
This is not to say, that the method of mutual recognition cannot be advantageous if the goal is
to fight crime. By adopting the principle of mutual recognition, member states can avoid diffi-
cult and extensive negotiations on common definitions and evade the issue of standardising their
different national judicial systems. The latter would be extremely time consuming and, at least in
the short term, limit the co-operation to a smaller field than desired. With the concept of mutual
recognition vast areas of criminal law are covered at once, at the same time as the harmonisation
of procedural law can be bypassed. From a law enforcement perspective the largest advantages are
speed and simplicity.
Traditional judicial co-operation in criminal matters is based on a request-principle that allows
the requested state to refuse to recognise and execute the decision taken by the requesting states
judicial bodies, if there is no dual criminality.196 In other words, a state will not comply with a
request if the offender is charged for an action that is not regarded as a crime in the requested
                                                                                                                                                       
of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA); 96/443/JHA: Joint Action of 15 July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia; Proposal for a Council framework decision
on combating racism and xenophobia, COM(2001) 664 final; Joint Action 96/750/JHA adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of
the Treaty on European Union concerning the approximation of the laws and practices of the Member States of the European Union to combat
drug addiction and to prevent and combat illegal drug trafficking; Council Resolution 97/C 10/02 of 20 December 1996 on sentencing for
serious drug-trafficking; Proposal for a Framework Council Decision laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal
acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, COM(2001)259 final; Joint Action 97/154/JHA of 24 February 1997 adopted by the
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning action to combat trafficking in human beings and sexual
exploitation of children; Proposal for a Council framework decision on combating trafficking in human beings, COM(2000)854.
194 Initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark with a view to adopting a Council framework Decision on combating serious environmental crime.
Proposal from Denmark CNS2000/801; 1999/364/JHA, Common position of 27 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of article 34 of
the Treaty on European Union, on negotiations relating to the Draft Convention on Cyber Crime held in the Council of Europe.
195 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of
the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union. (OJ C 195, 25.06.1997); Protocol to the Convention har-
monization of sanctions for corruption offences. (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996); Joint Action 98/742/JHA of 22 December 1998 adopted by the
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on corruption in the private sector; Initiative of the Federal Republic of
Germany with a view to the adoption of a Council Framework Decision on criminal law protection against fraudulent or other unfair anti-
competitive conduct in relation to the award of public contracts in the Common Market. CNS/2000/812; Commission Communication dated
21 May 1997 to the Council and the European Parliament on the Union policy against corruption. COM(97) 192, 21.05.1997; 2001/413/JHA
Council framework decision of 28 May 2001 on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment. (OJ L 149, 02.06.2001);
Council Resolution of 28 May 1999 on increasing protection by penal sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of
the euro. (OJ C 171, 18.06.1999); 2000/383/JHA Framework Decision of On 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by penal sanctions against
counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro. (OJ L 140, 14.06.2000); Council Framework Decision amending Framework
Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the intro-
duction of the euro. (OJ L 329, 14.12.2001).
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state. The dual criminality clause basically amounts to the same thing as a common definition of
the crime and the criminal threat. The difference is, that it is not defined in advance, but must
be tested case by case. Each request must be tried in order to assure that the requirement of dual
criminality is fulfilled. Consequently, an extensive validation (exequatur) procedure is launched
each time. With the introduction of an automatic mutual recognition that renounces the princi-
ple of dual criminality, this comprehensive procedure is reduced to a minimum and concentrates
on the validation regarding the formal correctness (comprehensibility) and the authenticity of
the request. This allows the European fight against crime to start in all fields in which the princi-
ple of mutual recognition applies without delay. In this sense, the mutual recognition can be
regarded as a 'kick start' solution. The formula allows member states to conclude the political
dimension in one stroke and to enter the operational dimension directly. This efficiency argu-
ment is one explanation for why the Tampere European Council decided that the principle of
mutual recognition should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and
criminal matters within the Union.197 Spinning on this thread, it can be argued that the produc-
tion of (national) security (the fight against crime) is given priority to the formalisation of the
European identity and the ESDI.
However, the introduction of the mutual recognition can also be difficult, in particular in
some sensitive areas (e.g. abortion, euthanasia, press and soft drugs offences). It is hard to picture
the British authorities refraining from the dual criminality principle and that British police en-
force a ruling of an Irish court in an abortion suit. Recognition of a decision also functions in the
inverse direction, as it implies the use of the 'ne bis in idem' principle.198 In this sense, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that a court of one member state would accept the acquittal or a very low sen-
tence ruled by another country's court in which the concerned action is not punitive or only
regarded as a minor offence. Countries can only acknowledge the principle of mutual recogni-
tion if they are convinced that they share the same basic values. The differences between their
judicial systems must therefore be of a technical rather than a fundamental nature. Without the
notions of equivalence and trust one state could not recognise another's decisions.199 It could be
argued that the principle of mutual recognition is only applied when a notion of sameness is
assumed to exist and the European uniformity and identity is taken as a fact, although it is not
spelled out and formalised. Moreover, the application of the principle of mutual recognition
does not exclude the formulation of common definitions at a latter point.
In practice the question whether the use of the principle of mutual recognition reflects the in-
ability to agree on common definitions of criminal threats, or if it rather mirrors the notion of
common values and definitions, becomes superfluous in the case of the EU. A glance at the
practical interpretation and use of the principle of mutual recognition displays that it is not easily
established. Whereas the 'ne bis in idem' principle is given general validity by article 54-58 of the
Convention applying the Schengen Agreement,200 member states seem to find it much more
difficult to skip the dual criminality clause. As pointed out by the Commission, "[o]ne way to
overcome this difficulty might be to exclude from the scope of mutual recognition, some behav-
                                                                                                                                                       
196 See for example article 5(b) of the 1991 Brussels Convention between the EC Member States on the enforcement of foreign criminal sen-
tences, and article 4(1) of the 1970 Council of Europe Convention on the international validity of criminal judgments (ETS 70).
197 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusion, 15/16.10.1999, article 33 and 36.
198 See footnote 32 on page 142.
199 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal mat-
ters. COM(2000) 495 final.
200 Other instruments merely use the principle in the sense that it can be used by a requested state to refuse to comply with a request.
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iours, which are criminalised in certain member states, but not in others”.201 This approach
would allow the principle of mutual recognition to be given general validity, with a few ex-
empted cases. However, the member states have opted for the opposite approach and apply the
principle of mutual recognition as a means to speed up and simplify the judicial co-operation in
a limited amount of precisely listed and defined cases. The specification of the issues for which
the principle of mutual recognition applies, can be regarded as a substitute for the common defi-
nition of what constitutes a crime and a criminal threat, although it is a bit less detailed. Either
the context, within which the member states agree to refrain from the use of the dual criminality
principle, is very limited and clearly outlined,202 or what appears as a general and broad provision
turns out to consist of a list of specifications.
The European arrest warrant is a good example for the latter. The Council adopted a general
specification of the cases when a member state may issue a European arrest warrant that gives rise
to surrender without verification of the dual criminality.203 But, instead of defining certain ex-
ceptions from this rule, the Council presents a long list of offences for which the provision ap-
plies.204 This procedure therefore rather resembles a common definition of criminal threats and a
common moral basis. The member states have clearly listed the offences for which the standards
of the different nations' legislation are regarded as being compatible, i.e. where they have found a
uniform moral ground. Apart from basic offences such as murder, grievous bodily injury and
kidnapping, the list largely reflects the crimes for which common definitions have already been
adopted (see the list below).
The Convention relating to Extradition between the member states of the European Union205
reveals yet another way to make the application of the principle of mutual recognition dependent
of the dual criminality clause. According to article 2, extradition shall be granted in respect of
offences that are punishable in the issuing member state by a custodial sentence or a detention
order for a maximum period of at least 12 months. However, the same article states that the
offence also must be punishable under the law of the requested member state by deprivation of
liberty or a detention order for a maximum period of at least six months. This means that the
full automatic recognition is not granted.
Since neither the applicable legislation, nor the pending initiatives foresee the use of the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition as a generally applicable rule, but only in clearly limited areas in
which the member states expect their legislation to be compatible, the use of the principle is
based on the same logic as common definitions. The difference is merely that the common defi-
nitions are spelled out in more detail.
Thus, although member states basically decide on how crimes are to be punished, they have
found different ways to agree on common definitions of material criminal threats at the same
time, as they have managed to keep common definitions of procedural law, and thus the har-
                                                          
201 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal mat-
ters, COM(2000) 495 final, p. 11.
202 See for instance the Initiative by the Governments of the French Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Kingdom of Belgium for the
adoption by the Council of a Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing assets or evidence (CNS/201/803).
Article 6 confines the grounds for non-execution to formal deficit regarding the request.
203 The offence must be punishable in the issuing member state by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least
three years. 2002/584/JHA Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between
Member States, article 2 (2).
204 2002/584/JHA Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member
States, article 2 (2).
205 Council Act of 27 September 1996, adopted on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, drawing up the Convention relat-
ing to Extradition between the Member States of the European Union. (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996).
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monisation of the different national judicial systems, to a minimum.206 On the one hand, the
principle of mutual recognition, which makes the adoption of common procedural law superflu-
ous, has been applied restrictively for a number of criminal threats that they have specified to-
gether. On the other hand, common definitions for criminal threats have been complemented
with provisions that allow the use of instruments that are based on the principle of mutual rec-
ognition. Thereby, a common definition procedural law is no longer needed.
EUROPEAN DEFINITIONS OF CRIMINAL THREATS.
It is laborious to compile and present a complete list of the criminal threats that have been de-
fined within the EU. The list presented below displays the offences that give rise to surrender
pursuant a European arrest warrant.207 It is the single most comprehensive compilation of of-
fences that the Council has drawn up and it largely covers all areas for which some sort of com-
mon European definitions of criminal threats have been defined. The offences for which an ex-
plicit common definition has been determined are marked with a star (*).
ß participation in a criminal organisation,*
ß terrorism,*
ß trafficking in human beings,
ß sexual exploitation of children and child
pornography,*
ß illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances,*
ß illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions
and explosives,
• corruption,*
• fraud, including that affecting the
financial interests of the European
Communities within the meaning of the
Convention of 26 July 1995 on the
protection of the European Communi-
ties' financial interests,*
• laundering of the proceeds of crime,*
ß counterfeiting currency, including of the
euro,*
ß computer-related crime,
ß environmental crime, including illicit
trafficking in endangered animal species
and in endangered plant species and
varieties,*
ß facilitation of unauthorised entry and
residence,
ß murder, grievous bodily injury,
ß illicit trade in human organs and tissue,
ß kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-
taking,
ß racism and xenophobia,*
ß organised or armed robbery,
ß illicit trafficking in cultural goods, in-
cluding antiques and works of art,*
ß swindling,
ß racketeering and extortion,
ß counterfeiting and piracy of products,
ß forgery of administrative documents
and trafficking therein,
ß forgery of means of payment,
ß illicit trafficking in hormonal substances
and other growth promoters,
ß illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioac-
tive materials,
ß trafficking in stolen vehicles,
ß rape,
ß arson,
ß crimes within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court,
ß unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships,
ß sabotage.
It is worth noting that the bulk of common definitions of crimes and criminal threats, concern
areas to which organised crime can be linked directly (drugs, human trafficking, fraud, money
laundering, corruption etc.).
3.3.2.2 Why are criminal and migratory threats on the European agenda?
International co-operation among justice, police, customs and border guard authorities is by
no means a new occurrence. The EU is neither the first nor the only forum for such co-
operation, but certainly the most far-reaching and dynamic one. One must therefore ask two
questions. First, why do states in general cooperate in defining and combating crime (including
illegal immigration)? Second, why has the EU developed a particular dynamic? There is a risk of
stating the obvious when answering these questions, but it is necessary in order to complete the
survey.
In general, countries want to cooperate to fight crimes and illegal border crossings more effi-
ciently. As for 'ordinary' crime, the exchange of information allows national investigators to find
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out if they are actually dealing with internationally operating crime and criminals. If this is the
case, further cooperation is advisable. This will allow different national agencies to get a full
picture of the activities of internationally operating criminals and their organisations. At best,
efforts can be concentrated on the centre of the organisation in order to break it up all together.
But, even if this is not fully achieved, joint efforts can be a prerequisite for a successful prosecu-
tion. It may for instance be necessary to collect evidence in different countries. A more basic
situation occurs when a criminal flees the country, must be caught elsewhere and then extradited.
This is where the cooperation among the authorities that monitor borders comes into play. Just
like the fight against almost all internationally operating crime and criminals, an efficient control
of borders requires joint efforts. At least joint efforts make it much easier to produce security. It
is therefore not surprising that there are legion examples of cooperation agreements concluded
between countries on a bilateral, regional (within the Council of Europe) or global (within In-
terpol or the United Nations) level.
Two basic reasons necessitate an even closer cooperation within the EU. The first is the intro-
duction of the free movement of goods, persons and capital. The cooperation within the EU is
especially dynamic because the conditions for international crime and migration are particularly
favourable within the Union. The more the frontiers open, the more they open to criminals and
criminal activities the larger is the need for a criminal prosecution that stretches across borders. A
complete abolition of internal border controls, as applied within the Schengen-area, potentiates
this need as well as the one for a common migration policy. Since illegal secondary movements
within the Union are not controlled, member states must agree upon what third country nation-
als shall admitted into the Union, under what conditions and by whom decisions in the individ-
ual case shall be taken. The second reason is the development of the EC to an institution with
own financial interests that need to be protected. As demonstrated, the EU has been equipped
with some own instruments for 'self-defence'. In addition, the Union's financial interests are also
protected by criminal law that is enacted and enforced at the national level. The member states
also attempt to harmonise the concerned national criminal laws in order to assure that the finan-
cial interests are equally defended throughout the Union.
Accordingly, there are several explanations for the JHA cooperation in the third and first pillar.
Crime (including illegal immigration) is on the European agenda because it constitutes a com-
monly perceived security threat. The main purpose of the cooperation is thus to enhance the
efficiency of the fight against crime within the Union and the Schengen area. Moreover, the
cooperation can be regarded as the sum of compensatory measures, introduced to reconcile the
integration in other areas. Unless international crime and illegal immigration are efficiently
counteracted, the entire integration process may be jeopardised. It is doubtful whether European
citizens will be ready to pay for the 'four freedoms' with a considerable increase in criminal and
migratory threats. Fighting crime and illegal immigration efficiently is thus also a way to protect
the integration process. In addition to this functional 'spill-over', some EU countries also regard
the deepened cooperation in the sphere of JHA as a proper part of the integration process. The
will to cooperate is thus also motivated by a general strive to further and cement the integration
and to make the Union feasible to the people.208 This motive is also valid for the introduction of
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freedom of movement and for the abolition of internal border checks, which necessitate the in-
tensified cooperation in the first place.209
3.3.2.3 Do national policies comply with the idea of an ESDI?
Differentiated integration is also characterising for the JHA cooperation. In this sphere, the
EU comprises two forms of asymmetric membership that partly overlap. The first concerns the
Schengen agreement signed by all EU members but the UK and Ireland, as well as by the non-
EU members Iceland and Norway. The second concerns Title IV of the EC treaty in which
neither the UK, nor Ireland or Denmark participate fully.
Schengen participation. On 19 December 1996, all members of the Nordic Passport Union
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland) signed the Schengen Convention and ac-
cepted the full Schengen acquis. The three EU members obtained full membership, whilst Nor-
way and Iceland were given an associated status. This solution did not only make it possible to
maintain the Nordic passport Union. From a Nordic perspective, at least to some extent, it can
also be interpreted as an extension of that Union since the Schengen agreement allows the free-
dom to travel throughout the rest of Europe. In addition, all countries obtained access to the
SIS. At present, negotiations have also started with Switzerland, foreseeing the same associate
status as Norway and Iceland. If successful, this would leave the UK and Ireland as the only tra-
ditional western European non-Schengen countries
Why do they choose to remain outside of Schengen? What is the threat/ referent object used in
this argument? Just like any chosen non-membership, British opposition to Schengen can be
seen as a part of a general Euro scepticism and a defence of the national sovereignty. This general
argument is probably valid to some extent, but there are also some more concrete reasons. The
British position can be clarified by two arguments, one referring to national security and the
other to civil liberty.
The security argument could be summarised with the slogan 'most value for money'. Passport
controls at the external borders are seen as a vital weapon in fighting crime, drug smuggling and
illegal immigration. The physical barrier that surrounds the country –the sea – is regarded to be
particularly efficient. In this way, the UK distinguishes itself from continental Europe. Abolish-
ing the external border checks would deprive the UK of what it considers an effective means of
control. Redirecting the resources currently used for EU internal border controls to perform
domestic checks would be less effective. It would not result in the same level of control and thus
of security. This argument is based on two assumptions. First, controlling the traffic of goods
and persons into the country is an efficient way to combat cross-border crime. Second, thanks to
its geographical location, the UK can control the cross border traffic. This implies that the
criminals that operate on the continent are stopped at the British borders. Maintaining border
checks is thus regarded as essential for the production of British security. Admittedly, this is also
a way of separating British from continental European security, but this is merely the result of
the specific geographical position, not of some political strategy. If combating cross-border crime
is interpreted as a way to defend shared European values and the EI, than one might even argue
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that the UK simply utilises its comparative advantage as an island when doing so. British border
controls stand in no contrast to the ESDI and may even be seen as a part of it. This security ar-
gument would also explains why the UK has opted in and participates at those parts of the SIS
that it considers essential in the combat against crime. However, this whole argument is not con-
vincing. It is doubtful that the British themselves fully believe in the assumptions on which it is
based. Not only are the majority of criminals involved in cross-border crime likely to pass the
borders legally or not at all. It is also questionable whether the UK really can control the most
serious illegal traffic.
The liberty argument provides a more credible explanation. If the UK joined Schengen and
replaced controls at the internal EU borders with domestic checks, it would have to impose con-
tinental European style registration laws and introduce the obligation to carry personal identifi-
cation papers. This would oppose to the specific British liberal model, raise all sorts of civil lib-
erty issues and evoke much opposition. If this is the real reason for why the UK has decided not
to sign the Schengen Convention, it has done so to defend a specific national referent object. In
this case, the British choice can only be explained with the NSDI. Not that the NSDI would
oppose to an ESDI, but the UK makes a clear separation between the own security and the one
of continental Europe. In this context the British NSDI remains clearly separated from the ESDI
since it does not take part in the European security process. British visa regulations, for instance,
are likely to differ from the ones that the Schengen members agree upon. From a security per-
spective, the British option for a tight border policy and relaxed controls within the country is
paradox. It is the lack of internal control, which makes the UK an attractive destination for peo-
ple seeking to live illegally in the West. Once entered (legal immigration), they can relatively
easily disappear and stay hidden.
The explanation for the Irish position is different. If it wants to maintain the Common Travel
Area with the UK, Ireland has no choice but to follow the British position.210 For Ireland, a one
sided membership in Schengen would de facto result in a closure of borders rather than an
opening, since the vast majority of Irish travels to EU destinations go to or via the UK.
The integration of the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union further
clarified national positions. Whilst those parts of the acquis dealing with police and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters were integrated into the third pillar, those parts dealing directly
with the abolition of checks on persons at the internal borders and with immigration policy were
placed under Title IV of the first pillar.
Third Pillar - Title VI TEU. The UK and Ireland have declared that they want to participate
fully in the intergovernmental police and judicial cooperation within the third pillar.211 Hence all
EU members take part in all proposals and initiatives pursuant Title VI TEU. There are only a
few exceptions to this. The UK and Ireland both maintain their border checks and therefore do
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not need to allow for hot pursuit across the border.212 In contrast to the UK, Ireland does not
even authorise foreign officers to continue their surveillance on Irish territory.213 This may be
explained by the reluctance to allow British officers to operate in Ireland. Furthermore, the two
countries do not participate in those parts of the Schengen cooperation in the third pillar that
affect personal identification and registration laws,214 nor in those parts of the SIS related to im-
migration aspects.215
First Pillar - Title IV ECT. Nevertheless, the UK, Ireland and Denmark participate on a case-
by-case basis in the cooperation concerning visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related
to free movement of persons pursuant Title IV of the first pillar. As a Schengen signatory, Den-
mark has a somewhat smaller room for manoeuvre than the other two. Denmark was against the
communitarisation of the Schengen acquis. With the exception of the common visa policy, that
requires continuous adaptation,216 it has opted out of any decisions taken under Title IV of the
ECT.217 Although bound to the acquis that was adopted before the 1 May 1999 when the treaty
of Amsterdam entered into force, Denmark can choose whether or not to adopt and apply any
new decisions.218
The UK participates in most of the few provisions adopted under title IV that are not related
to visa regulations, whilst Denmark has chosen to remain outside. Ireland takes a position in
between the two.219 It is tempting to explain the Danish non-participation with the general re-
jection of majority voting in the field of JHA. This position is well in line with the results from
the so-called Edinburgh agreements.220 One of the opt-outs restricted Denmark to intergovern-
mental cooperation in the field of JHA. Following this argument, the reason for why Denmark
maintains its position could be that lifting any of the Danish opt out clauses, including the full
participation under title IV ECT, would require another referendum. However, this does not
explain why Denmark does not choose to opt in and participate in some of the provisions. This
can only be explained by the contents of the past initiatives and proposals, or by a principle re-
luctance against that these decisions are taken at the European level. The latter seems most plau-
sible. It matches the outspoken opposition against the transfer of title IV policies into the supra-
national first pillar. As shown earlier, it has its counterpart in the Danish rejection of the ESDP,
which is also based on a principle rather than on the contents of the decisions taken. Thus, this
Danish stance is based on Euro-scepticism and on the protection of the national identity.
Compliance with ESDI. Since all member states participate fully in the intergovernmental
third pillar, the consensual ESDI dealing with internal European criminal threats comprises all
EU members. The voluntary non-membership only affects the ESDI dealing with the external
European dimension, i.e. migratory threats.
                                                          
212 Article 41 Schengen Convention.
213 Article 40 Schengen Convention
214 I.e. article 45 of the Schengen Convention prescribing the producing a valid identity document when registering in a hotel, and provisions
regarding firearms and ammunition, article 77-91 of the Schengen Convention.
215 Both countries explicitly opt out from all provisions relating to article 96 of the Schengen Convention. Article 1 (a)(ii) 2000/365/EC and
article 1 (a)(ii) 2002/192/EC.
216 To be exact, only in article 62 (2) (b) (i) and (iii) ECT. See article 4 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark (annexed to the Treaty on
European Union).
217 Article 1 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark (annexed to the Treaty on European Union).
218 Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark (annexed to the Treaty on European Union).
219 The following examples clarify the positions: Council Regulation 2725/2000/EC (EORDAC): Denmark no; Council Regulation
407/2002/EC (Eurodac): Denmark no; Council Decision 2000/596/EC (European Refugee Fund): Denmark no; Council Directive
2001/40/EC (Mutual recognition expulsion of third country nationals): Denmark and Ireland no; Council Directive 2001/51/EC (Carrier
Sanctions Directive): Denmark and Ireland no; Council Directive 2001/55/EC (temporary protection in the event of a mass influx ): Denmark
and Ireland no.
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The British (and Irish) choice to remain outside of the Title IV cooperation can clearly be in-
terpreted as a separation between British and continental European security. However, one may
also interpret this as the only way for the UK to guarantee that its National security concerns can
prevail over the ESDI. In other words, from its current position, the UK has assured that it only
takes part in a European Security process on a consensual basis. It can and does opt-in when EC
initiatives match the national security interests. The UK does cooperate with other EU-states on
migratory threats; it participates in the definition of common standards (e.g. obligations to re-
ceive those in need for protection) and defends these within the EU framework. However, it can
refrain from all suggested norms, regulations or countermeasures that oppose parts of its national
identity (e.g. registration laws). Thus, even when majority voting is introduced under Title IV in
the future and the ESDI is given an autonomous character, the UK will not participate in an
ESDI that may contradict its NSDI.
The Danish position is more difficult to understand. Denmark seems to attach more impor-
tance to where a decision is taken, than to its contents. Although it is a bit early to say, it seems
like Denmark completely opposes to a further development of an ESDI within the EU in the
area covered by title IV. It is not only against the forming of an autonomous or semi-
autonomous ESDI. So far its consistent non-participation in decisions taken under title IV also
displays reluctance against a deepened consensual ESDI. Denmark does not only refuse to
deepen the European cooperation dealing with migratory threats it also declines to formulate
common standards in this area and to defend them collectively.
3.3.3 Current state of the ESDI in the criminal context
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WHAT KIND OF SECURITY PROCESS?
The European security process in the criminal context differs from the ones previously ana-
lysed. To clarify the differences between the criminal, military and economic context, one can
divide the security process into a legislative, an executive and a judiciary part. The terminology
utilised in the previous chapter on the economic context is thus extended (see for instance figure
3.2.1). I have chosen to wait with the introduction of this partition until the criminal context,
because it is not until here that the security process stretches across the three powers and involves
their separate functions (from the definition of a threat to the implementation of countermea-
sures).
The legislative part consists of two sections. The first largely corresponds to the political di-
mension and consists of the legislation that determines the competencies of different bodies and
                                                                                                                                                       
220 Adopted by the Edinburgh European Council on 12 December 1992.
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their decision-making procedures (e.g. national constitutions and European treaties). The other
can be described as 'security' legislation'. It is concerned with enacting substantial and procedural
law, or, as in the third pillar, with agreeing on common definitions of these. It can be argued
that the legislative part has little to do with a security process. In the criminal context it is not
concerned with the definition of concrete threats, but rather with defining common standards
and thus uniformity. This is valid at the national as well as at the European level. At both levels
agreements are reached upon what conduct is regarded as unacceptable and what behaviour con-
stitutes a crime, would it occur. The legislative part of the security process does not assess
whether parties in a concrete situation commit crimes and pose a threat. However, this argument
is not fully valid. The enactment of criminal law does belong to the security process, because it
defines anticipated threats. It does not only determine detected misconduct as a criminal threat,
but all anticipated misconduct. In this sense, criminal threats are the only threats in this study
that are (pre)defined in a fixed objectified form. This objectification is a prerequisite for the va-
lidity of the principle of rule of law. In contrast to the military and economic context, the pre-
definition of crimes constitutes the basis upon which the executive and legislative parts of the
security process build. The executive part covers the operational dimension and is concerned
with determining and counteracting concrete threats. The judiciary part, finally, controls the
compliance of enacted laws with valid legislation as well as the legality of countermeasures. It
determines if a crime has been committed in concrete cases, and decides on punishments and
executes sentence.221
In the criminal context the security process stretches across the legislative, executive and judici-
ary parts because it does not end with countermeasures against threats. Criminal threats are not
only stopped or prevented. The persons held responsible are also punished.222 The act of com-
mitting a crime has a prosecution as consequences even after the crime has been committed and
the threat directly posed has ceased. The reason for this is that the rule of law and the govern-
ment's ability to govern is used as a referent object and not only the actual norm that the crimi-
nal violates or the individual victim's safety. The prosecution and punishment of criminals form
part of countermeasures, because this deters and prevents other violations of the law to occur
where law enforcement agencies are not present and can stop crimes from being committed. This
is also why the separation between the three parts of the security process is much clearer in the
criminal than in other contexts. In the military and economic contexts, threats can be defined
and counteracted as they occur. In the economic context, for instance, the Council (or the Euro-
pean Council) does not only agree on the distribution of competencies and the creation of new
institutions. It also counteracts many economic threats by taking legally binding decision in con-
crete cases. The latter is not possible in the criminal context. The principle of the rule of law
prescribes that crimes must be defined in the form of general rules. Criminal law that only ap-
plies to isolated cases is compatible with arbitrary rule and despotic systems, but not with EU or
any of its member states. Thus, countermeasures cannot be launched against an unwanted occur-
rence based on a decision that is legally binding for that concrete case only. Both the substantial
criminal law and the procedural law are therefore predetermined in the form of general rules.
                                                          
221 Although the sentence is not executed by courts, but by penal institutions, I have ascribed this function to the judiciary for the sake of sim-
plicity. This does not change outcome of the analysis.
222 Even if the sentence often includes therapeutic treatment, resocialisation programs and the like, I simply the argument by speaking of punish-
ments only.
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Of course, the judiciary also needs to be engaged in a different way in the criminal context. In
the military and economic context, the judiciary is merely concerned with controlling the
authorities. It is responsible for the interpretation of security legislation (disputes and prelimi-
nary rulings) and determines if concrete countermeasures and new legal provisions are compati-
ble with effective law (annulment).223 In the criminal context, it also determines if a crime has
been committed and sentences criminals to punishments. Even if all punishments are not based
on a court decision, all punishments and the application of all countermeasures can be tried in
court. The parties targeted by countermeasures in the military and economic context do not have
this option.224
Therefore, the legislative and the judiciary parts of the security process play a much more dis-
tinct and prominent role in the criminal context than is the case in the military and economic
contexts. In the two latter, the executive and legislative are both directly engaged in counteract-
ing concrete threats, and the judiciary is normally not engaged in the security process at all.
The special feature of the security process at the European level in the criminal context is that
it is almost exclusively located to the legislative part of the security process. Rather than deter-
mining when a concrete threat occurs or ends, the member states are primarily concerned with
defining what kinds of events constitute threats. Thus, with a few exceptions, the executive and
judiciary parts of the security process remain at the national level. The principle differences be-
tween the three contexts are displayed in the somewhat simplified figure below.
The shaded fields mark the actual security processes at the European level. The security proc-
esses concerning migration and the financial interests of the EC represent special cases and are
displayed separately. As they are conducted within the first pillar, they do not match the descrip-
tion of the security process in the third pillar as presented in the figure.
One explanation for why the European security process in the criminal context and in the spe-
cial case of migration is concentrated to legislative part is that the cooperation in criminal ques-
tions is rather new. Given that the executive and judiciary build upon the legislative part, it is
only logical that the European cooperation begins with the legislative definition of crimes, re-
spectively of permissible migration.
The way in which the whole cooperation is structured and conducted is nevertheless remark-
able. The communality trumpeted in the criminal context suggests an organisational communal-
ity and an ESDI, which as yet does not exist.225 An ESDI requires a security process at the Euro-
pean level, which means that the EU has to be involved in the production of security. Moreover,
parts of the collective identity must be utilised as referent objects. The question is to what extent
this is the case.
                                                          
223 Within the first and third pillar, the judiciary is also concerned with the disputes on the interpretation between member states as well as of the
compliance of national legislation with EU or EC security legislation (e.g. framework decisions and directives).
224 Competition cases are the only exception, since victims of administrative penalties may have their case tried by the ECJ.
225 Pronk, Maarten and Schalken, Tom, 'On joint Investigation Teams, Europol and Supervision of their Joint Actions', European Journal of
Crime, Criminal law and Criminal Justice, vol. 10/1, 2002, pp. 70-82, here p. 70.
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Figure 3.3- 4.  Structure of European Security processes
Protecting the Communities' financial interests. Here it seems quite clear that one can speak of
a complete and autonomous European security process, although strictly speaking, it does not
belong to the criminal context. EC legislation regulates the correct use of the EC budget. The
threat consists of any irregularities that infringe on these provisions and the EC budget consti-
tutes the common referent object. The whole process including the legislative, executive and
judiciary is conducted at the European level. Even if OLAF can obtain support from national
authorities in the executive part of the security process (apart from criminal acts) the 'case' is
fully handled by the European body. Classifying the ESDI as autonomous in this context is
therefore easy.
Third Pillar. The common definitions in the legislative part of the security process can be in-
terpreted as a formally agreed uniformity that constitutes a part of the European identity. By
agreeing on common definitions on what constitutes a crime member states outline the shared
(Assistance from Europol, Eurojust and SIS))
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uniform moral standards that could be used as common referent object in a security process.
This can be seen as a step in the development of an EI and an ESDI. But, since there is no such
thing as a direct binding European criminal law, the common definitions are converted into
slightly different national criminal law. Each country also has its own procedural law that regu-
lates the activities of the authorities in the executive phase. Two identical acts will therefore be
treated differently in two different countries. How and what evidence against the suspect is col-
lected may differ. Since the 'third power' is still assigned to national level, the suspect will be
judged against two different criminal laws, by courts belonging to different judicial systems and
probably to different sentences. The uniformity is nevertheless somewhat restored by the fact
that most EU countries have accepted preliminary rulings by the ECJ on the interpretation of
the European definition of crime. Thus, the common European definitions could be used as a
referent object when security is produced. In contrast, it is difficult to argue for an ESDI that
utilises the rule of law as a referent object. Since European criminal law does not exist, the pro-
duction of security can only be concerned with protecting and enforcing the national rule of law
(rule of national law).
The involvement of the European Union in the production of security is very limited. In con-
trast to the military and economic contexts, the 'security legislation' does not automatically im-
ply that security is produced, because the actual threat has not been identified when the general
rules are formulated. The production of security is therefore located to the executive and judici-
ary parts. These lie fully in the national competency. This is why common definitions of proce-
dural law have been avoided at the European level. The entire cooperation of the third pillar,
including the common definition of crimes, is geared towards supporting the horizontal assis-
tance. This does not generate a security process at the European level in concrete cases. EU bod-
ies such as Europol and Eurojust merely support national authorities in their work. They do not
lift the security process up to a European level. Neither does the SIS, although it can be seen as a
step towards a merger of the national security processes. This is not to be confused with a Euro-
pean security process, as the referent object used here are still national ones. What is European, is
the tool tool is used to integrate the national security processes, and the fact that national agen-
cies engage directly in the enforcement of the laws of other member states and in the production
of their security.
Thus, the European identity is elaborated within the third pillar, but lacking a European secu-
rity process, one can hardly speak of an ESDI.
Migration. The member states of the EU must be given credit for desecuritzing the migration
of EU citizens within the Union. Arguing with common standards, one could say that the mem-
ber states have formalised a part of the European Identity by doing so. Today, the EU internal
migration of EU citizens is no longer a security issue, and can therefore be excluded from an
ESDI context. What remains is the regulation of migrants from third countries and the fight
against illegal immigration. The latter represents the external dimension of criminal threats.
From an ESDI perspective, the question of what referent object the European migration policy
utilises is interesting. When investigating the three parts of the security process, two things be-
come quite clear. The first is that migration is not primarily treated as a threat at the European
level. The security process is rather concerned with defining the obligation to receive those in
need of protection. This common value of allowing for humanitarian driven immigration is
190
codified in EC legislation. Thus, either this common value as such, or the safety of each individ-
ual applicant is used as a referent object. In contrast, the migratory threats involved in the legal
and illegal immigration (cultural heterogeneity and economic burden) remain national concerns.
A glance at the legislative confirms this. As shown, all proposed and effective EC legislation
concerned with the legal entry, i.e. the 'filter', is formulated in the form of minimum standards
that allow for more generous national provisions vis-à-vis immigrants. EC legislation has by no
means changed the standards already applied by the member states when assessing whether or
not a third country national shall be allowed entry. The minimum standards defined by the EC
do not surpass or change the obligations already prescribed by the Geneva Convention on Refu-
gees, the European Convention on Human Rights and the anti-torture convention. The EU has
only (repeatedly) defined the minimum size of the 'door' into the Union (comparable to sub-
stantive law) and how applications for humanitarian immigration shall be examined (comparable
to procedural law). The actual size of the national 'doors' will therefore vary. A State will obvi-
ously make the decision on a more favourable stance towards asylum applicants, refugees and
economic immigrants dependent of the own national situation and values, and thus of the na-
tional perception of migratory threats.
Since the EC does not set any limits to the member state's generosity in respect to third coun-
try nationals, it is still up to each member state to define what it will continue to regard as a
threat. Apart from the humanitarian driven immigration each country decides what immigration
shall be allowed and desecuritized. This is also the reason why the EC does not need to define
more than minimum standards in the sphere of secondary migration. Third country nationals
with a permanent residence permit in one member state are not automatically granted the right
to resettle freely within the Union. They may only do so with the approval of the new host na-
tion. With the exception of family reunifications, the new host nation treats applications from
third country nationals as a case of economic migration and will make its decision dependent on
its national needs alone. Thus, even if it is 'easier' to obtain a permit in one member state, immi-
grants cannot make this detour to reach their country of preference. There is no 'back door' for
legal immigration. Consequently, the creation of the area of free movement has not created a
direct need for common European standards and procedures ('filter') for granting permanent
resident permits. As long as the secondary migration is subject to a national assessment, the EC
can continue with its current policy and content itself with defining minimum standards to as-
sure that those in need are offered protection.226 Nation States are then let to decide on any ad-
ditional immigration into their territory.
As for the illegal immigration, the Union has merely defined common standards for how the
control shall take place at the points for external border crossings. This is the only EC legislation
that relates to migratory threats. However, what is controlled, i.e. who shall be granted and who
shall be refused entry is still defined by the member states.
The EC does not address the migratory threats in its regulations of the domestic control either.
Two different sets of referent objects are applied here. EC legislation protects the rights of third
country nationals by defining minimum standards concerning the participatory rights and wel-
fare provisions that restrict the member states' freedom of action. However, so far the legislation
refrains from protecting the most vulnerable, the refugees who do not work and therefore cannot
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support themselves. The proposed and adopted common European legislation does not prescribe
any required minimum standards that would limit the member states' freedom of action in terms
of welfare provisions.227 Third state nationals' engagement in professional activities, in contrast,
is much clearer regulated. This allows the conclusion that the European legislation in the field of
domestic control is not primarily concerned with protecting the well being of third country na-
tionals, but rather with protecting equal treatment of all participants in the market system. No
EU resident shall have to or be able to compete under different conditions. The referent object
has therefore nothing to do with migratory threats, little with humanitarian values and much
with economic referent objects.
The internal control of illegal immigrants finally, lies totally in the member states own com-
petency.
In the executive part of the security process, the EC plays a very limited role. It does neither
handle applications for the legal entry nor does it dispose of any law-enforcement agencies with
any operative authority to intervene, control and counteract illegal immigration. The responsible
national authorities, also make entries into the SIS that aim at refusing certain persons entry into
the Schengen area on criminal grounds.228 The only exception in the executive part is when the
Council decides on mass influx of displaced persons with qualified majority.229 This is the only
example where the assessment and decision in an actual migratory case is taken at the European
level. It is also the only one where a decision is taken for a group of people based on a mass-
assessment. Lacking a structure for individual assessments, the EC can only take these mass-
decisions.
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Figure 3.3- 5.  EC Legislation on migration
From an ESDI perspective, the decision of granting mass-protection is certainly significant, as
it represents an autonomous security process. However, it must be underlined that the decision is
not taken in a security process dealing with migratory threats. The referent object that is used
and defended at the European level consists of the common value. Migratory threats in the form
of cultural heterogeneity and economic burden do not occur until after the EC has decided on
                                                                                                                                                       
226 It should however be noted, that this is quite unfair towards asylum applicants. While some member states are more, and some are less gener-
ous when granting protection, a refugee can no longer decide freely upon were to lodge his application.
227 One reason for this may be that this group poses the largest financial burden on member states.
228 The SIS serves objectives that fall within the scope of Title VI of the EU-Treaty as well as some that fall under Title IV of the EC Treaty, here
I refer to article 96 of the Schengen Convention, which allows for the storage of data relating to aliens who are reported for the purpose of being
refused entry in the SIS.
229 Article 5, Council Directive 2001/55/EC
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granting temporary protection to a group of people. Since no European burden sharing mecha-
nism has been institutionalised,230 member states have to carry the burden alone and deal with
the migratory threats posed by immigrants. Hence, the EC has disentangled the obligation to
receive refugees from the burden and migratory threat they pose. While the security process that
uses the obligation to offer protection to those in need as a referent object has been lifted to the
European level, threats posed by legal and illegal migration are still only dealt with in national
security process.
The legislative part of the security process, finally, lies almost fully in the responsibility of the
national judiciary. Even if the ECJ gives a ruling on the interpretation of the EC legislation that
regulate migration, it shall not apply to judgements of courts or tribunals of the member states
which have become res judicata. The European judiciary therefore never does have direct effect
on a concrete case. Thus, the European security process in the migratory context is not con-
cerned with fighting crime but with defending the common value expressed in the obligation to
offer protection to those in need, as well as fair competition in the Common Market. Migratory
threats are defined and counteracted in national security processes (or better what migration does
not pose a threat). The security processes dealing with these threats are therefore national ones.
With the exception of the Communities' financial interests, crime and migration are thus not
thought of and handled as European, but as national threats.
                                                          
230 The ERF does not fulfil this function.
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4 Dynamic development of the ESDI
The previous investigation determined the current state of the ESDI in the military, economic
and criminal context. It demonstrated that the ESDI is differently pronounced in different con-
texts. There are variations as to what referent objects are used and how the security processes are
organised and how security is produced. The previous chapter answered the question to what
extent or rather what kind of ESDI exists in the different contexts. By taking what one might call
a candid shot of the ESDI's current state,1 it has shown that security is thought of, perceived and
produced more as a European security in some settings, while less so or not at all in others. The
candid shot outlined in the previous chapter can be applied for such research that utilises models
in which the ESDI can be treated as fixed, i.e. in models that analyse a limited period of time in
which the ESDI is not likely to undergo significant changes. Such 'static' models assume that
current events are interpreted with reference to a given SDI, and that any response will be based
on that interpretation (see the figure below). Here, the ESDI is primarily seen as the security
dimension of a collective identity, and not as a process shaping that identity. Countermeasures
will be launched to ward off identified threats and to preserve the status quo. For these models,
the candid shot of the ESDI clarifies to what extent and in which settings security is currently
thought of, perceived and produced as a European security.
Figure 4-1 Static ESDI
However, as the study has shown, the ESDI is the product of several interdependent variables.
Attempts to explained and elucidated the development of the ESDI and of the mechanisms that
steer its transformation would therefore have to be built on equivalent explicatory models, if they
were to do justice to the object of analysis. Such 'dynamic' models would only contain depend-
ent variables.
I'm not disqualifying 'static' models that work with some dependent and some independent
variables, e.g. that operate with a static ESDI. But, one has to be aware of their limited scope. By
declaring one or several variables to be independent, 'static' models forcefully display a linear
causal chain of reaction. This can be very useful. In economic studies, for instance, such an ap-
proach is well established. However, emphasising one particular variable and displaying what
happens in a thought model ceteris paribus, is not the same thing as explaining the dynamics of
the market (or identity in the case of the ESDI). This only demonstrates a one-way move, while
neglecting all other movements that may amplify, counteract or redirect the motion examined in
the model. One must be aware of the validity of 'static' models that assume dependent variables
                                                          
1 That the chapter occasionally touched upon the historical development of the security processes in the different contexts does not change the
static nature of the analysis
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to be independent. They can merely be used to stress and display certain variables and mecha-
nisms that are involved in different processes, be it the market, the European integration process
or the formation of the ESDI. As in all science, their validity can be measured against the past
development of the process. However, such a trial merely states whether or not the influence of
the examined variable can be used to explain the development. Strictly speaking, an explanation
cannot even be proved to be right. One may merely substantiate and strengthen an argument.
Such a test can never confirm whether the considered variable is more important than those that
are excluded. Since all models exclude some variables they cannot give any guidance in deter-
mining what variable is dominant. An approach that explains the European security polity, poli-
tics and policies as a response of an existing invariable common European Identity may be just as
valid as one that regards them as a result brought about by external changes and challenges to the
nation states. Clearly different approaches of identity and integration theories will offer varying
explanations for the development of the ESDI, depending on what variables they stress.
My ambition is not to remedy this flaw. Constructing a model that could explain the dynamics
of the ESDI in such a way, that it could be used to make valid predictions, lies way out of the
scope of a single thesis.2
This chapter addresses the dynamic development of the ESDI and therefore how the thinking
of security changes. An instability-of-the-object is introduced. The ESDI is not regarded as a
predetermined setting that withstands and opposes to all change. Investigating the formation of
the ESDI follows the constructivist understanding and thinking of security and international
relations. It assumes that actors on the international scene have transformable adaptive identities.
The way in which security and international relations are thought of can therefore change. The
epistemology and terminology of the static approach is unable to comprehend the dynamics of
intra-group identity formation because it assumes what is to be explained, the existence of the
collective identity.3
Of course, the process(es) in which collective (security) identities are formed is far too complex
to allow the development of a well-founded and indisputable scientific model that fully explains
the changes of the ESDI. Like other identities, the ESDI is not formed based on a linear chain of
causality, but rather in a process characterised by interactions. Whilst the principles displayed in
the figure above are not dismissed, further variables must be added if the dynamic change of
SDI's is to be included. Internal as well as environmental changes can induce new forms of
threats, of security, of referent objects and of SDIs. Countermeasures do not only preserve the
status quo. They also affect the environment and thereby future events and threats. In return,
these events may influence the identity itself and the way security is thought. Defensive actions
aiming at preserving one identity can cause unintended environmental changes that bring about
the modification of that same identity. The European integration process has shown that the
security processes are sometimes adapted to new situations and that this may influence the SDI.
In contrast to the static approach, this one allows for the possibility that a referent object is not
defined before a threat is identified. This may, for instance, be the case if a new type of threat
occurs. Therefore, identity does not always have a causal role for the behaviour. Sometimes be-
                                                          
2 The question is if it is possible at all. The larger the validity of the model, the more variables must be included. But even if the model duplicated
the entire reality (which is not only practically, but also logically impossible, since it would have to duplicate itself, and again once duplicated…),
it would only be a valid model, if all reactions can be explained with a causal chain reaction.
3 See Patricia Owens, Reflectivist and Constructivist IR Theory and the 199 Kosovo Crisis.
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haviour can be triggered by events that (re)define the identity and the way security is thought.
This does not mean that the continuity of the identity is lost. The actors on the international
arena will always judge a situation, drawing on their internalised setting, but these settings are
not fixed and can occasionally be redefined.
Figure 4-2 Dynamic ESDI
It would be presumptuous to believe that one could identify all events that influence the de-
velopment of a collective SDI, to determine how they affect it and how the Community's re-
sponse influences the chain of events. Fully revealing the mechanisms that steer the evolution of
a SDI is impossible. In contrast to the static utilisation of the ESDI outlined above, it is not pos-
sible to identify a dependent variable and a determinant when investigating the dynamics of the
ESDI.4 If this were not the case, it would be much easier to make predictions and to tell the fu-
ture. The fact that influential events never occur in isolation further complicates such endeavour.
The same input may be interpreted, understood and influence the identity in different ways,
depending on the wider context in which the event is embedded. Finally, it is difficult to deter-
mine how different members of a Community react on a specific external stimulus, since their
uniformity is relative rather than absolute. The range of influences on the collective identity and
the SDI is therefore too vast to be calculable.
Consequently, statements on the dynamics of a SDI can never claim to be complete and they
always contain a speculative element. This is why I have decided to discuss the dynamics of the
ESDI in a separate chapter. The candid shot of the ESDI taken in the previous chapter is largely
based on observations that describe the current state. An assessment of the ESDI's dynamics, in
contrast, must almost fully rely on interpretations of observations. What can be observed quite
easily is the state of the ESDI at time t1 and the new state at time t1+x. It is a totally different
venture to determine the exact causes for the change, i.e. what has brought the change about.
What I can and will do in this chapter is to highlight some aspects that in my opinion play a
decisive role for the development of the SDI in the different security contexts. This chapter seeks
explanations for why the ESDI has evolved the way it has in the different contexts. Why is secu-
rity thought of and produced in different manners in different settings? Based on this, it outlines
                                                          
4 In models utilising a static ESDI, the events are the determinant and the collectives reaction the dependent variable.
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how the ESDI is likely to develop in the future and identifies some indicators of major shifts in
the different contexts. These predictions cover a period of around ten to fifteen years.
CRIMINAL CONTEXT
The lack of common European referent objects in the criminal context is striking. So is the in-
completeness of the security process at the European level. The only exceptions are when the
European Communities' financial interests or the obligation to grant protection to those in need
are defended. In all other cases, internal and external threats are defined and counteracted in
national security processes and with reference to national referent objects. Crime challenges and
threatens the rule of national criminal law and the national government's ability to govern. The
same is also valid for illegal immigration. In addition, migration only poses an integrative and
economic burden on the host nation (not on the European Community) and is regarded as
something that primarily affects the national (not the European) cultural homogeneity.
The simplest explanation for why the security process in the criminal context has not been
lifted to the European level is that it is not necessary, nor would it increase the efficiency of the
fight against crime. At present, European institutions offer assistance, service and support to
national security processes and member states agree on common formulas to facilitate the coop-
eration among national authorities. These efforts can certainly be further developed, but there is
no need for a complete European security process. Member states do not strive for a European
FBI with operational responsibilities or a unified European judicial system.
One reason is that current arrangements serve and function well enough to enforce the general
validity of the principle of the rule of national law. As long as a national security process can
defend and protect the national referent objects, there is no functional necessity to install a
European security process. This would only become indispensable if the judicial system in one
state would erode and affect the ability of other member states to protect the rule of law within
their own territory. Such developments have already taken place in some lawless crisis areas,
where international forces have taken over responsibility for the fight against crime. The EU
states are however far from such an emergency.
The establishment of a complete European security process would also involve major practical
and principle hinders. The lingual and cultural European diversity would obviously pose severe
problems to any European investigator. Guaranteeing the democratic control of and giving a
European system legitimacy is another difficulty. Much more important, however, is that an
institution of European criminal law and the establishment of a European judicial system would
contradict the aim of the current national security processes. The main problem from a security
perspective is that the current security processes aim at protecting the national government's
ability to govern on behalf of the national legislator. The exclusive national right to enact crimi-
nal law is a central piece of that ability. Transferring this competency to the European level
would therefore not make the security process more efficient. On the contrary, it would seriously
infringe on the national referent object that is to be protected in the first place. It is not surpris-
ing that the governments and parliaments of member states oppose to such transfers of responsi-
bilities as long as they achieve to defend the rule of national criminal law. In addition, national
criminal law reflects the national identity. Following a transfer of the competency to enact
criminal law, national and European identities might find themselves in positions where they
conflict instead of complement and reinforce each other.
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As the current European cooperation aims at making the national security processes more effi-
cient, it serves to conserve the national security process rather than to prepare for the establish-
ment of a European security process. To fight crime efficiently national authorities must cooper-
ate. But, it is not necessary to transfer the security process to the European level in order to pre-
serve the rule of national law.
Nevertheless, functional incentives that suggest further integration can be identified in three
areas. The first concerns the economic interests of the European Communities and the idea of
the Corpus Juris. The creation of an own European judicial system in this area is feasible as long
as it does not concern criminal law and as long as the aim is limited to the protection of the
common European referent object. A European public prosecutor is likely to be introduced in
this area to complement OLAF. Within the next fifteen years, we may even get an own Euro-
pean court that rules in these matters. It is thus probable that the EU will arm itself with an
autonomous security process to defend the Communities ' financial interests.
The second area concerns the granting of temporary protection in the case of mass influx of
displaced persons. Since these decisions are taken at the European level with qualified majority, it
is likely that the burden-sharing mechanism will be further developed for such cases. The system
of financial compensations is likely to be increased and if necessary complemented with a ratio of
distribution of those in need of temporary protection. For other areas of legal immigration, how-
ever, the cooperation is not likely to surpass the current common definitions of minimum stan-
dards. Persons enjoying temporary protection do not confront the host nation with the same
integrative burden as long-term refugees. Nor do they pose the same migratory threat to national
referent objects since they will leave in a foreseeable future. This makes it easier for member
states to allocate the competency to decide on mass influx to the European level. It should also
be noted, that it is the only mass-assessment that is made in the context of migration, and there-
fore the only one that can be performed by the Council. As long as migration only poses threats
to national referent objects, it is difficult to see how and why the decision on who shall be al-
lowed to immigrate to a European country should be lifted to the European level. Both primary
migration into the Union and secondary migration within it will remain subject to a national
assessment performed by the anticipated new host nation.
The third and final area where functional incentives can be identified concerns the control at
external European borders. The illegal crossing of external border is a common concern of all
member states. By stopping illicit immigration border guards produce a public good. One mem-
ber state cannot compensate for the inefficiency of another member state's border control. While
member states will continue to determine what immigration shall be legal, the illegal immigra-
tion must be hindered with equal efficiency along the whole external border of the common area
of freedom, security and justice. Since internal border controls are abolished, the weakest spot
along the common external border determines the control over cross-border traffic to the entire
area. A member state could of course protect itself temporarily by reinstating inner-European
border controls. In the mid-term, an improved internal control could also be used. In the long-
term, however, equal standards must be applied along the Union's entire border if the area of
free movement is to be maintained. The creation of the proposed European Border Guard is
therefore not fictional. Initially it would probably be set up as a complement to national units. In
contrast to the police cooperation, the European Border Guards may also obtain operational
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responsibilities. It is nevertheless difficult to imagine that the responsibility for border security
will be transferred from the national to the European level altogether. Why should any member
state resign responsibilities, and accept that the fight against illegal crossings of the country's own
borders becomes dependent of the priorities set by a European Headquarter (with limited re-
sources), while it retains the responsibility for the internal security. The security process in the
sphere of external border controls has the potential to develop to a semi-autonomous one that is
co-ordinated with and compensates national efforts. But, there is no prospect of an autonomous
European security process within the next ten to fifteen years.
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
The remarkable thing about the European cooperation in the economic context is that it was
launched to counteract mutual military threats. Robert Schuman and his colleagues deserve
much credit. They did not only seek remedy for the insufficient national security processes at the
European level. In addition they sought and found a solution for military threats outside of the
military context. That they did so in a time when the traditional recipe of power balancing was
still implemented, i.e. in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, hon-
ours them even more. What makes the ECSC and its successors brilliant, is that they achieved to
dissolve the perception of military threats among the participants altogether. This was accom-
plished through the development of a European referent object - the common economic system
and its stability.
This does not mean that the entire development of the economic cooperation within the EC
has been driven and steered alone by the idea of overcoming internal military threats. As the
cooperation intensified and internal military threats vanished, economic events and interests
became increasingly important for the economic integration.
One thing that has not changed over the years, is the belief in market economy and free trade
as keys to prosperity, and as universal countermeasures against military and many other threats.
This trust in market economy and free trade characterises the Union's security processes in the
economic context. It determines what is regarded as a European economic threat, what responsi-
bilities the Union has, and how the Union produces security. Meantime the functioning, subsis-
tence and stability of the Common Market have gained the status of an ideal, and turned into
something that is best described as an end in itself. This ideal has become the primary European
referent object. Safeguarding the stability of the common European economic system is regarded
as the best way to dissolve internal military threats, attain prosperity and to delegate the respon-
sibility for supply to the market.
In relation to third countries, the Union's policies of course primarily seek to increase the
prosperity of the Community. Nevertheless, it also advocates free trade and market economy on
the international arena. Although the Union does not lose sight of its own advantage in relation
to third states, theses principles are regarded as main ingredients to solve both European and
other international security challenges. As the section on geo-economics revealed, the Union
seems to prefer economic co-operation to economic and military power projection. This clearly
influences how the EU has and will utilise its economic might on the international arena. Appar-
ently, economic co-operation is regarded as the more efficient way to protect the Union's eco-
nomic interests, as well as to export and promote common values. I cannot see any reason why
the principle of free trade and market economy would lose their central position in the European
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security process. The development outlined above is therefore not likely to change during the
next fifteen years.
Why are some European security processes in the economic context autonomous and others
semi-autonomous or consensual? While it has become an end in itself to protect and sustain the
common European economic system, transferring responsibilities to the European level has not.
Security processes that defend the Common Market from internal and external threats are or-
ganised according to a functional logic. Member states prefer to retain responsibilities for the
production of security as far as the existence of a common market allows.
Countermeasures do not only result in the protection of the referent object. They also influ-
ence their environment and are therefore directly or indirectly linked to other events and con-
texts. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to isolate security contexts from 'normal'
policies. Launching a European security process does not only imply that decisions on when and
what countermeasures shall or shall not to be implemented are taken at the European level. A
European security policy can also limit the member states' political room of manoeuvre within
the same or in other contexts. Autonomous European security processes potentiate this problem.
Here member states are at the 'mercy' of EU. They can neither compensate for European de-
faults or inadequacies, nor can they set own priorities when the protection of two referent objects
is incompatible.5 Where the Common Market allows, member states therefore always prefer
semi-autonomous to autonomous security processes. National and consensual security processes
are applied where the production of security (efficiency) and the stability of the system allow.
Concerning the future, I hardly see any qualitative change of the ESDI in the economic con-
text. I am not suggesting that the European economic integration process has reached its final
stage. The security processes will continue to develop, but none will shift from one class to an-
other, e.g. no semi-autonomous process will transform into an autonomous one.
There are only two functional incentives for instating autonomous European security proc-
esses. In both cases, a common, indivisible referent object is used and the economic security is
produced as a public goods. The first applies when security cannot be produced through semi-
autonomous security processes. The functioning of the Common Market, for instance, may re-
quire a single policy in some fields, e.g. a single customs or monetary policy.6 However, the areas
within the economic and monetary union to which this applies have already been defined.
Therefore, none is likely to be added as long as a 'fourth step' of the economic and monetary
union is not introduced. The second incentive applies when member states have to be disci-
plined. The Stability Pact and the Commission's role in competition matters are two examples
where member states have submitted to the control of an autonomous European security process.
I do not see any other areas within the economic context where member states cannot be suffi-
ciently disciplined by European legislation.7 I recognise the necessity of improvements, e.g. to
develop the Stability pact. But, since the European security processes in this setting already are
autonomous, this does not imply a qualitative change of the ESDI. Hence, I cannot think of any
                                                          
5 The disputed Philips Curve, for instance, suggests a trade-off between employment and inflation.
6 The Commission's role in competition matters concerning 'larger' cases is another example. A merger of companies, for instance, requires a
single and unambiguous decision. It cannot be allowed in some and rejected in other national security processes.
7 It should be noted that the Stability Pact does not have the status of European legislation, and that the foreseen decisions of the Council cannot
be tried in court.
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European security processes in the economic context that will have to be made autonomous in
the next fifteen years.
The same thing is basically valid for the semi-autonomous security processes. The volume and
scope of the current semi-autonomous processes may be extended, but I can only see one field
where an additional semi-autonomous process may develop. Even if the export of arms and dual
use goods rather belongs to the military context, I address it here. In the long run, European
regulations that can be complemented with more restrictive national ones may become necessary.
Common export regulations are indispensable for an efficient cooperation amongst the European
arms industry. In addition, it will avoid tensions and splits among member states. There are ex-
amples where some European member states have made profits by exporting weapons and/or
dual use goods to some regimes, and where all member states had to share the burden when that
country turned into a 'trouble maker'. Finally, it is an essential step towards a global, or at least
international, proliferation policy.
As for consensual security processes, economic sanctions is one of the few issues that require a
collective European decision to become efficient and represent more than a moral rejection of a
country's regime or policies. This does not hinder member states from trying to securitize other
issues within the economic context at the European level. In some cases, the European Union
may consensually decide on a common response to the challenges addressed. However, at present
I cannot identify any specific security policy within the economic context apart from economic
sanctions, that necessitates the establishment of a consensual European security process for effi-
ciency reasons within the next fifteen years.
To conclude one should underline that Union most likely will continue to rely on the market
to regulate the security of supply, and refrain from geo-economics. Thus, in the economic con-
text no remarkable change of the ESDI is to be expected.
MILITARY CONTEXT
Thanks to the development of the European Union and the Alliance, a state of a-security has
been established among the member states. Consequently, the military security context is only
concerned with external threats. Despite of all differences and tensions among the member states
within the two organisations, this is not likely to change.
There are many reasons why the European security process is only consensual in the military
context. Semi-autonomous and autonomous European security processes would require forces
that can operate autonomously and that stand under a European command. Such a development
is therefore unfeasible for the same reasons that prompt nation states to keep own forces and to
reject the idea of a veritable European army.
Throughout history, military forces were set up to enforce the interests of their erector. The
primary purpose of today's national military forces is still to deter aggressors and to defend the
national territory or interests. Military force is the strongest power instrument and therefore the
only means by which a state ultimately can defend its own sovereignty. No wonder that the own
military strength and formal military autonomy form part of several European states' self image.
Replacing national with European forces would strip the member states of this instrument and
oblige them to rely on a European security process to defend their sovereignty and interests. The
crucial reason why this will not happen is that member states may not be able to correct Euro-
pean deficiencies. When the European security process proves unable to defend a state's sover-
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eignty, that state may no longer exist as a state. A European army could for example have to sur-
render certain parts Europe in order to defend the entity. Even the thought of this is unaccept-
able for the people in most member states. It is not an option for the governments either, which
are responsible to the national electorate and have to guarantee for their country's security. In
many countries, it would therefore be difficult to justify a transfer of the military responsibility
to the European level.
Creating standing European military forces that complement the national armies is also diffi-
cult. The main hinder to such a development is not necessarily the theoretical possibility of hav-
ing European and one or several nation's forces on opposing sides in a conflict. It is rather a
question of economics. European taxpayers must finance European as well as national forces. It is
not likely that a European defence budget would be added on top of national ones. Why should
taxpayers or decision-makers be ready to spend additional sums on a European force, if they are
not prepared to augment current national defence budgets? A European army would have to be
set up at the expense of national forces. This would be unproblematic, as long as all member
states share the same interests and set the same priorities. However, they cannot assume that this
will be the case. The simple fact that the geographical scope of the member states' military secu-
rity policies varies refutes such presumptions. To this, one can add historical, cultural and other
variations that may result in differences. Countries like France, Great Britain and the USA prefer
to spend their money on national assets, because they want to be sure to have access to them
when needed. Who would reallocate financial means from national to European forces, if one
cannot be sure to utilise the European resources at will? Without participation of the big military
powers, there is of course no perspective to set up a semi-autonomous security process within the
EU or NATO.
The resistance against standing European police forces for OOA operations can be explained
with similar arguments. Apart from the economic reasons, one must also ask what responsibili-
ties those parts of the force would have that are not on an international mission. Recruiting po-
lice officers to such a force would not be possible without a rotation system. It would not be
acceptable to finance a European police force of which at least 3/4 would not be involved in law
enforcement. On the other hand, it would be difficult for the member states to accept a system
in which the European Union could draw on national police forces at will. Member states will
not give the EU the competency to dictate when and how many national police officers it needs
from which country. Not only is this incompatible with the current voluntary recruitment sys-
tem of national police officers for OOA missions. Most important is that each country will re-
serve the right to dispose of its national police force and to decide if national officers can be
spared for international missions.
NATO and the EU have merely built up and will maintain the collective assets that are neces-
sary for a consensual security process and for the co-ordination of multinational military (and
within the Union police) operations within the Euro-Atlantic area. There are of course incentives
to intensify cooperation in some areas. States may for instance choose to acquire specific capa-
bilities together with others, if they cannot afford to do so unilaterally. However, this will not
generate an autonomous or semi-autonomous European security process. In the military context,
NATO and/or EU members will therefore not abandon the current national line of thought for
a European one. Security will not be thought of as an indivisible European security.
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The two European consensual security processes are nevertheless in a transition phase that can
result in severe changes. Even if no qualitative change of the ESDI can be expected, I want to
address the current dynamic because it will influence the transatlantic relationship, the internal
development of the Union and the Alliance, as well as the relation between the two organisa-
tions. In other words, it may effect the definition of 'us' and 'them'.
Geographical fragmentation. The abolition of the commonly perceived military threat from
the Warsaw Pact has released some trends that can have unifying effects and others that may
unravel the ESDI. Until 1990, the military context was dominated by the East-West conflict.
The security interests of the European countries were therefore embedded in and subordinated
to the bipolar order. Consequently, all their military activities within or outside of the Euro-
Atlantic area were placed in the wider context of the block confrontation. At the time, NATO
was an organisation that prepared for collective military countermeasures in the geographical area
where the main theatre of war was expected in case of an open military conflict. The end of the
East-West conflict dissolved the unifying force that had brought Western European military
security policies in line worldwide. As a result, NATO's security process no longer matches the
security concerns of its member states. The overhanging Soviet threat does no longer synchronise
the member states' global security interests with the Alliance's security process. I am not sug-
gesting that all Allies used to agree with all fellow member states' security policies outside of the
Euro-Atlantic area before the 1990. Transatlantic differences have occurred from time to time.
Since the Second World War, the USA has had an ability to engage and utilise military force
around the globe that widely surpasses those of other allies. It is therefore not surprising that
Washington defined and defended security interests throughout the world in a different way
than European states. Arguing that the US to some extent did so on behalf of the entire West,
does not change the fact that the American security agenda always differed somewhat from the
one of other NATO members. These differences, or better the suspicion that Washington might
set different priorities than the continental European countries, already induced a closer French-
German cooperation in 1980's. The end of the cold war allowed these differences to take larger
proportions and opened for divergent security interests and threat perceptions. This did not only
start the development of what was to become the ESDP. All of a sudden, NATO was no longer
the organisation in which the member states manage all their external military security concern.
As the imperative of collective defence diminished, NATO has turned into an organisation that
only deals with certain security concerns, namely those within the Euro-Atlantic area. This geo-
graphical limitation is also valid for the ESDP. Thus, neither the ESDP nor the Alliance satisfies
the global security interests of some member states.
Today, member states seek to meet threats that occur within the Euro-Atlantic area in two
parallel European security processes, while they try to safeguard those security interests that lie
outside of the Euro-Atlantic area through the UN and/or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. This is
problematic for the ESDI, because differences concerning the production of security outside of
the organisations' scope can strain the relations among member states and influences the collec-
tive security process that deals with threats within the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition, the geo-
graphic division results in a situation where member states obviously do not primarily try to
produce security through the collective security process of the two organisations. This is only
done when threats occur within the Euro-Atlantic area. All member states carry the responsibility
for this.
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On the one hand, member states with regional security interests have not been prepared to give
the organisations a global military role, let alone to procure the necessary capabilities that would
allow the organisations to operate world wide. Thus, the two collective security processes only
partially meet the security needs of those member states that pursue a global military policy.
Therefore, these member states are obliged to acquire other capabilities than the fellow members
and to pursue their global security interests outside of the organisations' framework. Different
security interests and different capabilities result in different actions. This provokes different
reactions from the targeted parties that most likely will concentrate their countermeasures against
those countries that participate in the coalition of the willing against them. As a result, the threat
perception among member states will drift apart even more. This is how an unravelling dynamic
could gain speed.
On the other hand, those states with global interests have not always attempted to raise their
security concerns within the organisations, let alone to lift the security process to a European
level altogether. The 2003 Iraq war is a good example of this. Neither the USA nor any other
member state made attempts to launch and complete a security process in NATO.8 The USA
took the decision to act and invade Iraq unilaterally and sought support for the impending war
from other states on a bilateral level, while Germany declared that it would not be part of any
military operations what so ever against Iraq, not even with a UN mandate. Thus, both countries
entered the international arena with fixed positions, basically claiming that they would only be a
part of a collective international security process if the outcome corresponded to the predefined
national position. This approach hindered any attempts to start a security process within NATO.
Consequently, the thinking of security as something essentially national is preserved and even
strengthened. In other words, neither the Alliance nor the Union has achieved to harmonise their
members' thinking of security. Externalising these varieties from the two organisations will not
dissolve the differences, nor does it contribute to a rapprochement or to the development to-
wards a thinking of security in terms of a European security. For the evolution of the ESDI, it
would therefore be important to harmonise the scope of the two organisations with the one of
their member states. The Union's decision to send forces to Congo can be seen as a first move
towards counteracting such a development and widening its geographical scope in the military
context.9 However, while both organisations are likely to take position or comment military
conflicts world wide, none is likely to engage and launch military operations all around the globe
within the next 15 years.
Functional  unification. Even if the abolition of the East-West conflict did away with a unify-
ing threat, it also caused a shift within the organisations from Article 5 to crisis management
tasks that favours unification. The crisis on the Balkans has revealed severe deficits of the Euro-
pean security processes and prompted member states to search for collective solutions. Crisis
management in the Euro-Atlantic area can of course be regarded as 'Article 5 prevention'. How-
ever, the effect of crisis management operations on each member states' security is indirect and
impossible to assess. The prevention and management of crisis is therefore best described as a
public good. Unless a country perceives a direct threat, it will not be prepared to carry the whole
burden of crisis management and prevention efforts alone. A unilateral extensive engagement
                                                          
8 Since the USA were the driving force behind the invasion, launching a security process within the EU was not an option.
9 Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003 on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
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over a long time would overstretch a country's resources and hardly be justifiable vis-à-vis the
own electorate. Above all, it is impossible for a single member state to handle a crisis. This is not
simply a question of military insufficiency. The main reason is that one cannot solve a crisis with
military means alone. Crisis management operations never aim at helping one party to victory.
On the contrary, per definition they prevent such a development. Consequently the tensions and
the conflict as such will remain. A stabilisation of the resulting situation does therefore require
civilian efforts. In no other setting is the linkage between military, economic and criminal con-
texts as close and obvious as in the prevention and reconstruction phase. Single member states
cannot offer the necessary support, because the Union decides on some of the most important
issues in this context. Trade regulations is only one issue where member states cannot act unilat-
erally. Incentives for closer cooperation at the European level and in particular within the EU are
therefore obvious.
Maintained capability gap. The question of capabilities poses another challenge to the ESDI.
Paradoxically, one could interpret the transatlantic capability gap as an indicator for a strong
ESDI. The European countries may be seen as free riders that refrain from increasing their de-
fence budgets and to enlarge their military capabilities because they can rely on the USA to pull
the chestnuts out of the fire if necessary. There is something to this argument, but above all, the
capability gap seems to strain the transatlantic relations and the ESDI. It is quite clear, that the
decline of defence expenditure during the last decade largely was caused by a changing threat
perception. On the other hand, it is also obvious that a country's military capability influences
the scope of the national security agenda, what options for the production of security it may
consider, what importance it attaches to the military force as foreign policy instrument and what
efforts it is willing to undertakes to maintain its military capacity. Those who posses more mili-
tary power think differently of the use of military power. Most European countries do not only
think of security in a different way than the USA (and to some extent the UK and France).
European troops also have difficulties to operate together with technically more advanced Ameri-
can forces. For certain operations, Americans may therefore sometimes see European contribu-
tions as a burden rather than a support. If a coalition of the willing is set up, the American lead is
never questioned. Disagreements concerning the use of different national forces may therefore
arise. As the American technological advantage may be particularly suited for high intensity
tasks, while European forces at times are assigned to flanking measures with low medial profile.
Lasting European capability flaws will not only continue to cause distress in Washington,
where European declarations will lose credibility. It will also endanger the credibility of the two
organisations themselves, and in particular of the ESDP. Setting up common goals and not
achieving them is one thing. The EU, however, has not only adopted the Helsinki Headline
Goal, which sounds modest in numbers, and yet remains unattainable due to supplement "mili-
tarily self-sustaining",10 and made it public in order to avoid misunderstandings and uncertainty.
The Union has also given assurances that the goal can and will be achieved.11 This public strat-
egy certainly is hazardous. It is wise, if the aim is to increase the pressure on the responsible gov-
ernments. But, if the goal is not met, exactly that which initially was used as a lever to encourage
performance, will be exposed, namely the inability of the member states to co-ordinate their
                                                          
10 Which is not clearer then the contentious word autonomy which often
11 C.f. Defence Ministers from European Union Member States at the Capability Improvement Conference: Statement on improving European
Military Capabilities –European Capability Action Plan. Brussels 19.11.2001,article 2 and 4.
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efforts and to provide the necessary national resources to achieve a common objective. That the
capabilities of the member states and the headline Goal do not add up, will surely be a subject in
the public debate during years to come. The worst-case scenario would be that a large-scale
Headline Goal fitted conflict of high intensity occurred while the American resources were em-
ployed elsewhere in the world and NATO choose not to engage. In that case, EU members
would have to admit that they cannot deliver. This would damage the credibility of the EU as a
military authority and with it the CFSP. The military inferiority makes the Europeans depend-
ent of US resources if they want to conduct own operations. The problem is not that the Euro-
peans are unable to conduct own large-scale operations of high intensity. They already carry a
large share of the military crisis management burden, and their capabilities are not diminishing.
In addition, the defined force requirements are merely estimates. Since every crisis is different,
the listed forces might not match the actual needs anyhow. Turning the argument around, the
committed forces, in some categories exceeding the requirements, might be able to achieve far
more than expected. In any case it would be difficult to estimate which crisis requires 60 000
soldiers and which would require 65 000. Could the EU really remain inactive arguing that the
crisis requires 70 000 troops? Of course not. When it comes to the crunch, the defined force
goals of both organisations merely indicate estimated requirements and do not represent exact
figures. Nevertheless, as leading military power the USA sets the standards for what is required
for an operation and what the public expects from such operations. High-intensity zero-casualty-
operations can only be performed with American support. If the public does not adjust its ex-
pectations to the European capabilities the dependence on the USA will last.
Nevertheless, capability flaws that hamper the Europeans' ability to produce security and the
dependence on the USA are also incentives for further and intensified cooperation among Euro-
pean states. However, the affect of this development should not be overestimated. The transat-
lantic capability gap is not likely to be closed within the next fifteen years. On the contrary, it
will most likely grow. On the one hand, the defence expenditure gap is likely to remain. On the
other hand, the USA can spend its money more wisely and use its resources more efficiently be-
cause it only maintains a single national defence structure. The procurement volume is larger
than the European one and relevant decision-making procedures less complicated than any coor-
dinated European one. As long as the Europeans do not set up a single defence, they will never
be able to rationalise procurement and use of military assets to the same extent and as easily as
the USA can. Surely, the European arms-industry can expect further deregulation that will fa-
cilitate cooperation amongst the European manufacturers. A closer cooperation on the demand
side, i.e. the member states is also likely. The trend towards coordinated procurement and train-
ing will continue. But, the upholding of separate national forces always involves duplication of
assets. In addition, each state has a separate national procurement planning and decision making
processes that is dependent of and must be coordinated with other national policies and ex-
penses. The example of the German acquisition of the A400M has displayed these difficulties.
Veritable European assets will only be acquired if a) they are exclusively needed at the European
level, b) they are only needed for crisis management tasks, or c) when member states cannot af-
ford to procure them unilaterally or together with their closest partners.
Preserved separation. Finally, the separation of the two organisations' security processes ob-
structs further development of an ESDI in the military context. Overcoming the separation of
the two parallel security processes is a main challenge in the years to come, and a necessity to
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prevent a gap from opening across the Atlantic. A merger of the two processes would certainly
resolve that situation. However, the empirical study has already dismissed such a development. A
division of labour therefore appears as the only option. This approach will only work if the divi-
sion is given a form that does not result in a division of perception. A geographical partition of
responsibilities is therefore not suitable. A functional division where the EU would lead all civil-
ian, and the Alliance all military countermeasures, is not a realistic option either. Thus, a way
must be found where both organisations take on military tasks, where their security processes
become interlocked and where duplication becomes superfluous. The last point is central because
the duplication of NATO abilities within the Union allows the two security processes from de-
taching and remaining separate. To prevent this, the Alliance must give the Union guaranteed
access to NATO staffs, while the Union has to develop capabilities that add value to NATO's
military crisis management operations and a way to integrate all allied states into the Union's
crisis prevention and reconstruction policies. As for the latter, the Stability Pact for South East-
ern Europe is a step in the right direction and an example for how the security processes of EU
and NATO states can be coordinated and integrated. Concerning the added value, the Union
has the potential to develop an ability to coordinate civilian with military crisis management
instruments.12 In addition, the EU and its member states could focus on a 'constructive duplica-
tion', i.e. on the development of transport, communications and intelligence capabilities that are
scarce even in US forces.13 The big problem seems to be the involvement of non-members in the
Union's preventive policies, above all commercial and trade policies, and for the Alliance to
guarantee the Union access to NATO capabilities. Although efforts will be made to bring the
two organisations closer to each other, it is unlikely that any solution will be found to interlock
the two organisations' security processes in such a way that they will produce security together in
a coordinated manner. Thus, what the division boils done to, namely the transatlantic division,
will not be overcome. Consequently, two different ESDIs will continue to develop in two sepa-
rate organisations.
ESDI IN NATO OR EU?
I want to conclude this chapter by asking which organisation has the larger potential to de-
velop the ESDI further. Although it is difficult to give a straightforward answer, current trends
seem to favour the EU, even if the Union's potential should not be exaggerated.
To begin with, the Union's potential can be explained with the common economic policy.
Although the Union does not apply its commercial, trade and development policies in a 'stick
and carrot' manner, it appears reasonable that these policies influence the security production.
For instance, they form a crucial part of crisis prevention and reconstruction/stabilisation efforts.
The Union is responsible for commercial and trade policies vis-à-vis third states worldwide.
Thus, geographically EU policies also match the security interests of those members that have a
global scope. I am not saying that the Union always applies these measures as security policies.
But, if member states with global security interests want to complement their national military
efforts with economic policies, they will also turn to the EU. I am not suggesting that this will
boost the ESDI. The EU will have difficulties to sell its civil crisis prevention policies as successes
                                                          
12 C.f. Müller-Wille 2002.
13 C.f. Schake, Kori, 'Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU reliance on US military assets', in Centre for European Reform, Working Paper,
January 2002.
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stories. Their efficiency is much more difficult to assess and they are more arduous to propagan-
dise than military interventions. In addition, civilian instruments strive to include and support
local authorities and actors. It is therefore more difficult to ascribe the credits among those in-
volved. My point is that member states depend on the EU to implement commercial and trade
policies, in security as well as in other contexts.
The shift from Article 5 to crisis management tasks favours international cooperation in gen-
eral, and the cooperation within the EU in particular. Whilst NATO has adapted its military
apparatus to the new tasks, the EU has entered a new field by developing a military capability
and stands at the beginning of designing a structure in which civilian and military instruments
are to be orchestrated.
As for the capability gap, finally, it will most likely assure that NATO will remain the centre of
gravity for the coordination of European military forces. The Alliance will be able to keep its
position as the main military organisation thanks to the integrated military structure and the US
membership. The main dynamic, however, will be located to the Union. As described above, the
transatlantic capability gap has both dividing and unifying effects. While the dividing influence
threatens to increase the transatlantic differences, the unifying influence only affects the Europe-
ans who are driven to cooperate even closer.
Consequently, NATO will struggle to maintain the ESDI it has developed, while the ESDI
will continue to evolve further within the EU. This does not mean that the evolution of the
ESDI will rush ahead in the EU. All hinders and limits displayed above will remain in the three
security contexts. EU members will neither replace the national security processes with a Euro-
pean one to fight internal threats, nor will they do so to counteract external threats. The ESDI
will thus not replace the NSDIs. Security will not automatically be thought of as European secu-
rity either. Nevertheless, the ESDI will progress within the EU, while NATO will try to prevent
the erosion of the one it has established.   
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5 Conclusion
This conclusion addresses to what extent an ESDI presently exists in the EU and NATO, and
what its nature is. Some implications of the current state of the ESDI are also outlined. Of spe-
cific interest is in what areas, to what extent, and to what degree, security is conceived as a pan-
European security. How is European security conceived and produced?
The study in hand is subdivided into three main parts that reflect different concepts of security
– a military, an economic and criminal one. Moreover, internal threats are differentiated from
external ones in order to display differences in the definition, production and reproduction of
uniformity and identity. The figure below displays the arrangement of various security challenges
in the resulting six sub-fields.
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Figure 5-1. Six fields of security
European organisations and the member states define and respond to threats that occur in
these fields through differing national and European security processes. The occurrence of several
European security processes suggests that several European SDIs may exist.
The study displays that the scope and capabilities of the Union differ from the Alliance's. The
EU defines and counteracts threats in all three examined contexts, which the Alliance does not.
(box c-f). Additionally, the two organisations' range of action differs within the military context
in which both are active (box b).1 As a security producer, the EU utilises a broader range and
more clearly outlined referent objects, deals with a larger variety of threats, and counteracts them
with a wider array of instruments. When arguing in terms of referent objects, it becomes quite
clear that the Alliance is more heterogeneous than the Union. As the Union counteracts both
internal and external threats in the economic and criminal contexts, it determines sameness and
its own identity in a different way than the Alliance. The ESDI of NATO, which only deals with
external threats, is based on a collective definition of that which is different, i.e. the non-conform
and the 'other'. The EU, in contrast, not only defines uniformity by distancing itself from exter-
nal others, it also accommodates processes in which common internal rules and values are de-
fined, and in which uniformity is produced through internal rectifying moves.2 Consequently,
                                                          
1 See figure 3.1-4.
2 The presentation of general values that were used as referent objects during crisis management operations does not change this argument. While
both organisations oppose to and counteract violations of democracy, human rights, rule of law etc., the member states have not elaborated a
common interpretation of theses, nor advocated any specific model solutions that should be applied. They have agreed on the definition of
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the Union's ESDI extends far beyond that of NATO because it operates within a wider area and
its referent objects (the uniformity and identity) are more substantial.
Before addressing the limitations and difficulties of the Union's ESDI, I will further discuss
the military context (box b) within which both organisations are active and outline some simi-
larities, differences and implications of the ESDIs displayed.
MILITARY CONTEXT – NATO AND EU
With the exception of Greece and Turkey, military conflicts between NATO and/or EU
member states are not on the organisations' agenda. This does not mean that the two organisa-
tions do not have an internal dimension in the military context and that a-security among mem-
ber states could be taken for granted. Nevertheless, the ongoing cooperation within both organi-
sations has effected and maintains a situation in which mutual military threats are not an issue.
Speaking of an ESDI in the internal dimension of the military context would therefore not be
useful. Both organisations' production and reproduction of the ESDI in the military context is
thus fully based on external threats (box b). The ESDIs of NATO and the EU are best classified
as quasi-consensual ones. Consensual, due to the way in which threats and referent objects are
defined, and quasi, because none of them possesses the means to complete an autonomous secu-
rity process. One could therefore be tempted to describe the ESDI as the sum of the congruent
national security interests. However, this does not do full justice to the ESDI. To draw a com-
plete and clear picture of the current state of the ESDI in the Alliance and the Union, and how it
develops in the military context, one must make further specifications. To begin with, collective
defence is losing significance for the ESDI, while crisis management tasks become more impor-
tant. Furthermore, the ESDI is geographically limited to the Euro- Atlantic area. Finally, it
seems as if the ESDI can develop further within the EU than in NATO.
Article 5 and crisis management. From an ESDI perspective, crisis management operations are
particularly interesting because they result from European security processes in which threats and
countermeasures are defined collectively. It should be noted that no member state has launched
military crisis management operations within the Euro-Atlantic area outside of one of the two
organisations' framework or against the expressed opposition of another member. This is possible
because crises do not pose direct threats to any member states' territory, people or resources.
General European referent objects can therefore be applied and adhered to. Thus, within the
Euro-Atlantic area, member states do not simply utilise the two organisations as one option to
assert national security interests, but as the option to assert shared European security interests
consisting of congruent national values. Experience shows that all member states are committed
to the idea of dealing with crisis challenges collectively within that geographically limited area.
Thus, although most countries have an autonomous military apparatus, no member regards sin-
gle-handed national efforts within the Euro-Atlantic area as an option.3 In other words, the
NSDIs have been Europeanised, at least as far as crisis management within the organisations'
operational range is concerned. Here, differences between national and European security con-
ceptions are vanishing since general values are applied as referent objects. No member state
                                                                                                                                                       
violations, i.e. what behaviour is not conform, rather than on the contents of the values and what conduct is appropriate. Thus, even here mem-
ber states agree on what they oppose to, and if one so pleases, construct shared images of the 'other', the opponent, against whom they unit.
3 Operation Alba does not really contradict this, since the Italians tried to launch it within the organisations and finally conducted it with the
silent consent of all other member states.
210
would conduct a unilateral crisis management operation and produce security within the Euro-
Atlantic area without the consent of its fellow members.
To what extent such a 'Europeanisation' of NSDIs applies to collective defence is uncertain. As
argued in chapter 3.1, the significance of formal defence guarantees for the ESDI should not be
exaggerated. Although NATO is the only organisation that prepares for it, all European coun-
tries, including the non-allied, consider collective defence an option. One might suspect that
allies would be more likely to assist each other and act collectively in the case of a military attack
on one of them. However, the Alliance's collective territorial defence and the mutual loyalties
have never been set to a real test, nor has the role of the non-allied states been tried in such a
situation.4 During the cold war, (allied) member states probably saw national and European
security as two sides of the same coin. The collective defence against the Warsaw Pact seemed to
be the only realistic option. Not because no member state could have resisted an attack unilater-
ally (maybe those with nuclear weapons might have), but because a potential attack was expected
against the West as an entity and not against one state alone. Nevertheless, with few exceptions,
NATO and EU states have never relied on the support of allies to defend their specific national
referent objects. Almost all member states kept and keep a defence structure that allows for an
individual, nationally organised self-defence, because they are not sure that their national referent
objects match those of other member states at all times or in all situations.5 This is the first hin-
drance to the creation of a veritable European defence, a complete security process at the Euro-
pean level, and thus an autonomous ESDI in a military context. When the Warsaw Pact dis-
solved, the West also 'lost' the adversary that treated and threatened it as an entity. The unity
among Western states was thus no longer ascribed to them by an external other. The lack of a
perceived enemy has already hampered NATO's collective provisions against an external attack.6
Even if the Alliance's arrangements for collective defence are substantial and real, preparations
against a non-identified aggressor are not exactly the best ground on which to produce and re-
produce an ESDI in the long run. All of this together sets the significance of Article 5 commit-
ments for the ESDI in perspective. The shift in national and European security processes from
territorial defence to crisis management operations, which followed in the wake of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, has had the same affect.
Of course, the upgrading of crisis management tasks can be interpreted as a method to prevent
escalations that could affect the member states security directly. In this sense, crisis management
represents a collective defence against discernible indirect threats, and can be seen as a prelimi-
nary stage of collective defence. Article 5 commitments will not be disregarded (nor activated
and tested), but non-Article 5 efforts will most likely continue to become more significant as
long as no direct external military adversary and threat can be identified. Hence, the ESDI is
formed by NSDIs that are in the process of becoming more European. This is one side of the
ESDI within the military context.
Geographical limitations. It is quite clear that the EU's and NATO's collective consensual se-
curity processes do not represent an option outside of the two organisations' operational scope,
                                                          
4 The activation of Article 5 after September 11th does not really clarify whether or not security would be produced collectively if one member
state were attacked.
5 Not only can the referent objects as such vary, e.g. the territory. Referent objects shared by different member states may also be given different
priorities.
6 As argued in chapter 3.1, NATOs Defence Capability Initiative must be interpreted in this way.
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i.e. beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The diverging geographical range of member states' security
interests is directly linked to varying threat perceptions and self-images, i.e. what responsibilities
and roles different countries attribute to themselves. These divergences are a second hindrance to
a European security process replacing the national one in the military context, and have severe
implications for the development of an ESDI.
Member states with the capability of worldwide engagement (e.g. USA, UK and France) tend
to have security interests around the globe. These states neither wish to confine, their power
within a European organisation (above all the USA, with its clear capability of acting alone), nor
are they given the option to do so. In default of a European alternative, they have no choice but
to counteract perceived threats within the UN if possible, and unilaterally or within coalitions of
the willing if necessary. The logic of an indivisible collective European Security does, thus, not
apply outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. Here, security processes of the two European organisa-
tions merely result in political declarations. They are not engaged in the production of security in
the military context outside of their geographical range of action. Unfortunately, the UN does
not always suggest itself as an alternative. UN efforts cannot, or will not, always succeed in
making those who perceive a threat feel secure.7 Lacking European and global alternatives, indi-
vidual states have to fall back on a national concept and production of security. This influences
the ESDI in two ways.
First, the separate countries' various security policies provoke different reactions from those
affected by them. The terrorist attack on September 11th, for instance, was deliberately directed
against an American symbol and not against NATO, the EU or a Danish target. Due to their
different geographical scopes states subjectively perceive threats differently, at the same time as
threats objectively directed against them vary. This can develop an own dynamic. What defence
expenditure states consider necessary varies. This influences their military capabilities and en-
gagement around the world, the reactions they provoke, what resources are perceived to be re-
quired to produce security and so on. The growing gap between US and European defence
budgets is an obvious case of such divergence. The dispute on the war against Iraq in the begin-
ning of 2003 is another striking example of the extent to which the perceptions of threat can
diverge.
Second, this divergence is transferred to the European security processes that focus on security
issues within the Euro-Atlantic area. The repercussions of some member states' global security
engagements do not halt at the Euro-Atlantic area's border. External threats directed against a
member state will affect that state's production of security, as well as its defence preparations and
disposition of resources. This will not necessarily match the security interests of those member
states with strictly regional security interests. In addition, member states pursue their security
interests in- and outside of the Euro-Atlantic area within the same national security process. That
states sometimes have no choice than to act outside of a European framework reinforces the im-
age of their own independent role and responsibility as security producer. Since global threats
and countermeasures are defined in an autonomous national security process, security interests
outside of the Euro-Atlantic area are handled as national security interests and security thought
of as national security. The notion of security as a national concern may be transferred to the
European security processes as a counterpoise to the idea of a collective and indivisible European
212
security, and strain the ESDI. The relapse into a strictly national conception of security is thus a
continual feedback loop. Specific threats that are only directed, or at least are perceived to be
directed, against a single member state's core national referent objects, are likely to be a response
to that state's unilateral security policies. In such a case, other member states might not perceive
the same threats against their national referent objects, nor be prepared to counteract the threats
together with and in the manner that the affected state prefers. If the other member states have a
different view of the appropriateness of the affected state's unilateral security policy that pro-
voked the threat, they will most likely also disagree on what countermeasures are apposite and
efficient. Consequently, the affected member state will continue to act unilaterally, and so on
and on. The ESDI will not be sustainable unless the organisations, in which European security
process take place, are given a global scope and those states that have the capability to act unilat-
erally begin to co-ordinate their global policies with other member states. This is the other side
of the ESDI within the military context.
EU versus NATO. I have already addressed many of the obvious differences between NATO
and the EU in chapter 3.1, e.g. the military capability, Article 5 commitments, and the different
membership constellations. These need not be repeated at this place. What I would like to em-
phasise here is the Union's advantage over the Alliance in terms of the development of an ESDI.
I am not suggesting that the rift among NATO states, caused by diverging threat perceptions,
is a strictly transatlantic one or that this is a problem of the Alliance only. The separating move-
ment can also be found within the Union, as the security interests of the EU members have
varying geographical scope within the military context. Admittedly, the extent to which the USA
can and does engage around the world wildly surpasses the capacity of any other state. Never-
theless, the United Kingdom usually supports and often contributes to US-led operations.
France does so as well, although it tends to take its own stand more often than the United King-
dom. The detachment from the collective security and the recourse to a national concept of secu-
rity can therefore also be found within the Union.
However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the EU deals with internal threats and
produces uniformity in a different way than the Alliance. In addition, its member states pursue
common external policies in far more areas than the allies do through NATO. Given that some
of the Union's policies already have a global scope, e.g. trade policies, the EU is already a global
actor. The ability of EU members to act unilaterally vis-à-vis third states is therefore already re-
stricted. EU countries cannot act autonomously towards third parties in the same way as non-
EU-members, such as the USA, can. In addition, the CFSP offers a framework for common
global policies (with the exception of the ESDP), which the Alliance is still lacking. Thus, as the
Union is involved in far more security processes than NATO, the notion of the Union as a secu-
rity producer is more widely spread. Security is therefore conceived as a collective security in a
much wider range of security-processes and more often within the EU than within the Alliance.
Even concerning military operations, which is the only field where the Alliance still has an ad-
vantage over the Union, the EU is building institutions and is gaining access to NATO-
capabilities. Thus, the EU is catching up even here.
                                                                                                                                                       
7 This was recently demonstrated by the quarrel on the war against Iraq during the beginning of 2003. In this particular case, the USA declared
that it was prepared to act alone if necessary.
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THINKING SECURITY WITHIN THE EU
The first conclusion to be drawn is that an ESDI within the Union is still confronted with
some limitations and problems. It by no means flourishes to the extent that an ESDI is about to
replace the NSDIs of the member states. The study has demonstrated that the distribution of
responsibilities between the national and the Union levels are different depending on the con-
text. Some threats are defined and counteracted within a pan-European security process only,
other EU efforts complement or merely support national ones, while yet other threats are not
addressed at the European level at all. There are two primary issues concerning the relationship
between the NSDIs and an ESDI. First, what does this ESDI consist of and what areas does it
cover? Second, how is European uniformity and thus the ESDI produced and reproduced?
As for the first, manifold European security processes utilise, define and defend varying refer-
ent objects, and identify different threats in different contexts. The produced and reproduced
European uniformity and ESDI are therefore best pictured as a disjoint patchwork of similarities.
The referent object used in a European security process can vary. Sometimes, an EU institution
itself and/or its resources are utilised, in other cases it is the implementation of EU policies,
whilst in yet other security processes common general values are defined and defended. In con-
trast to the national uniformity, the European 'sameness' and the limits of the Union's responsi-
bilities are quite well defined. The ESDI is therefore of a technical, civic nature, and cannot be
described as a cultural identity. In difference to national identities, which are grown and con-
structed on an omnipresent cultural heritage, using symbolism and myths, the ESDI does not
offer a complete 'mosaic' image that can be internalised. Consequently, its scope is far more re-
stricted than that of NSDIs. The ESDI can therefore not develop detached from the NSDIs, let
alone display its own dynamic with the potential to replace the NSDIs altogether - at least not in
my lifetime.
As for the second issue, the European uniformity and the ESDI is produced and reproduced in
different ways in the varying security process that can be divided into three groups, autonomous,
consensual and semi-autonomous security processes. When investigating theses three groups, the
first central conclusion that can be drawn concerning the relationship between the ESDI and
NSDIs is the following. It would be wrong to believe that there is such a thing as 'true' European
interests and a 'veritable' European ratio, which can be set against and seen in opposition to na-
tional ones. The ESDI does therefore not oppose to or menace the NSDI of any member state.
Autonomous EU security processes do not have an equivalent at the national level that deals
with the same threats, referent objects and countermeasures, i.e. the same cases. Here, security is
thought of and produced as a European security. EU countermeasures can of course affect and
interfere with other national interests. But, since the security process has not been duplicated at
the national level the ESDI is not confronted with a parallel and opposing national one. Euro-
pean and national policies do not conflict because they operate in different spheres, utilising
different security conceptions, and varying referent objects and ideas concerning how security
should be produced. It is simply a matter of two completely separate and different security proc-
esses, in which different (even if at times incompatible) securities are produced. In other words,
there is no opposing national counterpart to the applied European rationality.
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In the case of consensual security processes, the European interests and rationality are formed
and constructed by the member states in consent. Consequently, the ESDI is produced by the
member states. Whatever shape the member states give the ESDI, that one constitutes the true
and only ESDI. In consensual security processes, security is therefore only conceived and pro-
duced as pan-European to the extent that the member states can reach consensus. The ESDI
does thus not conflict with the NSDI.
The Union's semi-autonomous security processes are the only ones where the national and the
European concepts of security and the rationality applied can conflict. Differences can thus occur
concerning referent objects used, the threats perceived and what countermeasures are regarded
apposite. Here the Commission prepares and presents the propositions that national representa-
tives can adopt or reject in the Council. The possible contents and function of the ESDI (poten-
tial referent objects and countermeasures against identified threats) are therefore elaborated at the
European level. Nevertheless, the member states still decide whether or not they will accept a
proposal. The ESDI will only take the shape suggested by the Commission with the consent of
many member states (depending on the decision-making procedure). For those countries that are
outvoted, the ESDI could conflict with the NSDI. However, the significance of these potential
conflicts is put into perspective when one considers which EU security processes are semi-
autonomous.
In the figure below, different European security processes are superimposed on the matrix pre-
sented at the beginning of this chapter. As the contextual division followed in this study was not
undertaken with reference to the different instruments applied to produce security, a little
tweaking was necessary to fit in the Union's three-pillar structure and the organisation of EU
security processes.8
It should be noted that autonomous European security processes have been instituted only
where the Common Market does not allow for another solution. The ESDI has only replaced the
NSDIs within the economic context where there is no alternative.9 With the exception of these,
all European security processes displayed in the figure above are duplicated at the national level.
Additional national security processes, apart from the European ones, exist in all five contextual
fields (box b-f).10 This is most evident in box e, in which the activities of OLAF represent the
only European security process. In default of a veritable European security process, cooperation
within the third pillar does not even result in a consensual ESDI.
                                                          
8 I refer to the summaries on the current state of the ESDI at the end of the empirical examination of each context (3.1.4, 3.2.4 and 3.3.3) for a
detailed overview, assessment and classification of the Union's different security processes.
9 The strictly limited security process that is run by OLAF is the only case that to some extent might be regarded as an exception from this rule.
10 The national defence structure would even allow a security process in box a, even if this is not an issue at present.
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Figure 5-2. Security processes in the six fields of security.
Claiming that we are entering a new "post-nation-state" or "supranational" security age would
therefore be just as incorrect as declaring that European security processes are nothing more than
a complement to the traditional national ones. The EU is not simply a vehicle for solving na-
tional security concerns, nor does the ESDI replace the NSDI. Member states construct the
ESDI together, and in those areas where they establish and develop the ESDI, the concept of
security as a pan-European security is transferred to their NSDIs, i.e. the notion that security
should be produced collectively through the EU in these fields.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the survey of EU security processes is that the Union
does not have a comprehensive approach to security. Despite its many instruments and its en-
gagement in five of the six contextual fields outlined above, the different security processes are
not interlocked. The ESDI therefore remains fragmented in a double sense. It does not have full
coverage, nor are the existing security processes coordinated.
Just as at the national level, the organisation of European security processes is determined by
the countermeasures and policies that are used, and not by the type of threat that is to be dealt
with. Different security processes are therefore synonymous with different security policies and
instruments, not necessarily with different events and threats. The Union's security processes do
not take a specific source of threat or a common referent object as an organising principle.
Rather, separate security processes are launched for each specific countermeasure/instrument.
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This structure of the security processes/policies does not necessarily impede on or make the pro-
duction of security inefficient, but it determines how security is understood. It has severe conse-
quences for the conception and production of security within the EU, i.e. how and what threats
are identified, and how they are counteracted.
In the Union's different security processes, the environment is interpreted with reference to the
respective security policies/instruments. The same event is thus construed differently in the vari-
ous security processes. Which properties of the environment are considered in the different secu-
rity processes (i.e. how the security context that is dealt with in each process is defined and sepa-
rated from the ongoing development), is not primarily steered by common values or threatened
referent objects. Rather, the respective instrument/policy is made the point of reference for the
interpretation of the security environment in each security process. The reality is thus dismantled
in such a way that each security process only selects and considers those aspects, and defines
those threats and referent objects, that stand in direct relation to and are relevant for the coun-
termeasures that it can apply.
This instrumental compartmentalisation of the security processes hinders a comprehensive ap-
proach to security. I am not saying that a contextual separation of security is permanent – espe-
cially not in the sense that I have utilised the term 'context' here. The separation into six fields
used in this study is far too coarse. Since security is defined and produced within each security
process with reference to the specific countermeasures available to it, the classification of internal
and external military, economic and criminal security would refer to the applicable instru-
ments/countermeasures. But, since there are many different economic and criminal instruments,
there is no such thing as a criminal or economic security. These are generic terms for several
separate security conceptions. I suggest that it is more appropriate to claim that the EU has many
different, separate and parallel approaches to security, even when various threats are directly con-
nected with each other and originate from the same source. The Union's 'three pillar'-structure
makes the development of a comprehensive approach to security even more difficult. Just like
nation states, the Union does not have a holistic but rather a multiple approach to security.
I do not imply that a comprehensive security concept, i.e. the direct interlocking of several se-
curity processes within or across the different pillars, would be indispensable or preferable in all
situations. It can be difficult to identify direct connections among some of the threats that are
counteracted by the Union's different security processes. For example, it could be difficult to
make a case for a comprehensive approach in which the competition policy and the obligation to
grant protection to those in need (migration policy) should be united in a single security process.
Sometimes, however, the connection is evident. It makes good sense to interlock those security
processes that deal with threats originating from the same source. Crisis management operations
may serve as an example. Admittedly, an exception has been made in this particular area, in that
military and police operations OOA can be coordinated within the second pillar, but this is an
exception. This is a sensible solution, since military and criminal threats tend to blend in crisis
areas. Once military forces are deployed to a crisis area, threats from military forces are often
replaced by violence from criminal organisations. However pragmatic and logical this coordina-
tion is, other relevant security processes, such as development and trade policies, are still run
separately.
It would not necessarily always be feasible nor a simple matter to interlock different security
processes and/or to take a specific identified source of threat or referent object as a starting point
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when organising security processes. However, I suggest that it is clear that the current fragmen-
tation of the European security processes do not allow for a sufficiently comprehensive approach
to security.
In short, the ESDI does not stand in opposition to the member states' NSDIs. Rather it com-
plements the dominating NSDIs. Although it is still fledgling, the ESDI is further developed and
has a larger perspective of thriving within the EU than in NATO. Still, security processes in
Europe, and thereby the ESDI, suffer from excessive compartmentalisation. This does not neces-
sarily result in inconsistent national and European security policies, but makes a targeted and
efficient production of security virtually impossible to formalise.
218
6 Annex
CFSP  AND     ESDP        INSTITUTIONS                       
1. Frames
units dealing with civil and/or open information.
units dealing with military intelligence
units dealing with both civil and military intelligence
2. Lines      The lines mark the flow of information
civil and/or open information.
military intelligence
both civil information and military intelligence
The European Council
The Commission The Council of the European Union
Secretary-General of the Council and
High Rep. for the CFSP
Joint Situation
Centre
Seconded nat.
analysts+PPU+
EUMS.Staff 12 The Military
Committee
(EUMC)
The Military Staff (EUMS)
Staff 140
CFSP/ESDP
Policy
Planning
and Early
Warning
Unit
Staff 21
Satellite
Centre
Staff 68
about half
processing
Council
General
Secre-
tariat
EUMS
INT
INTEL DIV
Staff 30
EUMC Chairman
channels pol-mil
guidance to the
OPCOM
Dissem-
ination
Institute
for Secu-
rity Stud-
ies
Staff 28,
9 Analysts
Political and Security Committee
(PSC)
National
Intelligence
Committee
of Con-
tributors
Decides
Permanent Representatives
Committee (Coreper)
Examines and
recommends EU
response options
EU CM-operation
Committee for
Civilian Aspects
of CM
219
N    ATIONAL     C             ONTRIBUTIONS TO   'E                                UROPEAN  ' C                  RISIS      M       ANAGEMENT     O                   PERATIONS UNTIL    2002.                           
NATO
ORG WEU
W
EUN
ATO B-H Alb. Kosovo Macedonia
St
ar
t
En
d
93
-
06
-1
8
96
-0
9-
24
94
- 0
7-
23
96
-1
0-
15
97
- 0
6-
24
01
-0
6
99
- 0
5-
10
01
-1
1
92
-0
7-
16
96
-1
0-
02
93
-0
4-
12
95
-1
2-
20
95
-1
2-
20
96
-1
2-
20
96
- 1
2-
20
-
99
-0
4-
10
99
-0
9-
01
99
- 0
3-
24
99
-0
6-
10
99
-0
6-
12
-
01
-0
8-
22
01
-0
9-
26
01
-0
9-
26
-
M
em
be
r-
sh
ip
1
O
P
D
an
ub
e 
O
p2
U
PF
M
 3
M
A
PE
(E
X
T
)4
W
EU
D
A
M
C
ro
at
ia
5
A
dr
ia
tic
 S
ea
6
D
en
y 
fli
gh
t
D
el
. F
or
ce
7
IF
O
R
8
SF
O
R
9
A
FO
R
10
A
lli
ed
 F
or
ce
11
K
FO
R
12
Es
se
nt
ia
l
H
ar
ve
st
13
A
m
be
r F
ox
14
CZ < < < < < <
(N) HU < < < < < <
PL < < < < <
CA < < < < < < < <
IS < <
N NO < < < < < < < < <
TR < < < < < < < < <
US < < < < < < <
N, E DK < < < < < < < <
BE < < < < < < < < < <
FR < < < < < < < < < < < <
DE < < < < < < < < < < < <
GB < < < < < < < < < < <
GR < < < < < < < <
N, E, W IT < < < < < < < < < < < <
LU < < < < < <
NL < < < < < < < < < < <
PT < < < < < < < < <
ES < < < < < < < < < < <
AT < < < < < < <
E IE < <
SE < < < < < <
FI < < < < < <
Participants 7 12 25 8 14 12 32 36 24 13 35 14
Max. Deployed 250 182 139 9 60000 32000 8080 50000 3500 1000
Type of Opera-
tion15 PE PB PB HUM PE PE PS PS HUM WAR PS PB PB
1 Only full membership. N= NATO; E = EU; W = WEU; (N)= Members since 1999.
2 Participants according to General Horst Holthoff (former Deputy Secretary General, WEU): The Role of WEU in the New European Security
Architecture. In: Joulwan, George A. and Weissinger-Baylon, Roger(editors): European Security: Beginning a New Century. XIIIth NATO
Workshop On Political-Military Decision Making Warsaw, Poland 19-23 June 1996. Available in the internet on URL:
http://www.csdr.org/96Book/Holthoff.htm
3 Unified Police Force of Mostar. Source: Assembly of WEU: Document 1609. WEU police forces – reply to the annual report of the Council.
Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur. 13 May 1998. p. 11. Available in the internet on URL:
http://int-serv.weu.int/assembly/WEU/newwebsite/docu/e-1609.html
4 Multinational Advisory Police Element. Apart from NATO and EU states, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia also
contributed with personnel. Source: http://www.weu.int/eng/mape/info.htm
5 Western European Union Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia. Apart from NATO and EU states Bulgaria also contributed with personnel.
Source http://www.weu.int/eng/info/weudam.htm
6 The maritime operations in the Adriatic Sea began in 1992 as two parallel WEU (Sharp Vigilance and Sharp fence) and NATO (Maritime
Monitor and Maritime Guard) operations. On 15 June 1993 the two where merged to the joint NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard under
NATO command. Source: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/FACTSHEETS/SharpGuardFactSheet.htm
7 Source: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/FACTSHEETS/DenyFlightFactSheet.htm http://www.afsouth.nato.int/FACTSHEETS/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm
8 Implementation Force. Apart from NATO and EU states, Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Estonia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Romania, Russia and Ukraine also contributed with personnel. Source http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/fs/multinat.html
9 Stabilisation Force. Apart from NATO and EU states, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Estonia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine have or still do contribute with personnel. Sources
http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm ; http://www.nato.int/sfor/nations/; http://www.nato.int/sfor/nations/pastnation.htm
10 Albania Force. Apart from NATO and EU states Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates also contributed with
personnel. Source:    http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/harbour/  
11 Source: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/detforce/Force.htm
12 Kosovo Force. Apart from NATO and EU states Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates have or still do contribute with personnel. Source:
http://kforonline.com/kfor/nations/default.htm
13 Source: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje/harvest.htm 14 http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje2/FOX.htm
15 Type of operation PE= Peace Enforcement, PB= Peace Building, HUM= Humanitarian Operation, PS = Peace Support, WAR = War. Defini-
tions following those used in the PfP Exercise Viking 1999. See http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/concpso.html
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EC  PROCEDURES IN SECURITY PROCESS USING COMMERCIAL COUNTERMEASURES  .                                                                                                                         
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1 According to the so-called 'Trade Barriers Regulation'. Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community
procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade
rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/traderegul/adgreg06a.htm    
2 According to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members
of the European Community. A consolidated provision is available at:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/pdf/1996/en_1996R0384_do_001.pdf  
3 According to Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members
of the European Community.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/policy/subsidy/adgreg04a.htm    
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1997/en_397R2026.html  
4 According to the so-called 'Safeguard Clauses/ Common Import and Export Regime - Emergency protection'. Council Regulation (EC) No
3285/94 of 22 December 1994 on the common rules for imports and repealing Regulation (EC) No 518/94. A consolidated provision is avail-
able at:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/pdf/1994/en_1994R3285_do_001.pdf  
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